In and Of an Urban Time:

(re)imagining the (im)possible limits of time, knowledge and the city

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MARCH 2015

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies

Abstract

In the broadest sense this work is concerned with processes of cultural construction in the contemporary city, and their connections to the framing, recording and concrete manifestation of society and its ills. Acknowledging the academy to be a productive site in this regard this thesis takes a somewhat meta-theoretical approach, engaging with dominant analyses of urban problems and the methodological approaches they entail. My specific focus is on understandings of time and modes of temporality – crucial factors in the organisation of urban society but which appear largely naturalised in both everyday life and the academy. Attempting to uncover some of the ways in which the socially constructed nature of time has become invisible in these contexts, my aim in this work is to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study. Beyond that, this work seeks to establish this case as an impetus for the examination of other absences in urban knowledge production, and a renewed urban imagination. To this end I have designed a methodological approach of autoethnographic rhizoanalysis. I have rhizomatically analysed the urban studies canon for the (non)presence of time and temporality within its dominant texts, practices, performances and methods; and I have performed everyday and experimental autoethnography, as I have continued to make sense of time and temporality as a member of both the contemporary culture that experiences time as naturalised, and the academic culture which seeks to construct knowledge of the city. Along the way this work has also engaged with the craft of academic work, as I have worked to uncover some of the everyday assumptions and practices which may serve to maintain and strengthen hegemonic ideas of the nature of time, temporality and truth. As a counter to the ways in which existing approaches may limit rather than expand urban imaginations I have made a hand-embroidered, patchwork quilt to accompany this written thesis. This object allows for an alternative way of experiencing and performing this work as it relates to processes of knowledge production and cultural construction, of and in the contemporary city.

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Acknowledgements

This work has been imagined and made possible at many extensions beyond myself. To Annette, Libby and Ben. Thank you for your guidance and support at all stages of this work. You have pushed me to follow my instincts and to realise this work in ways that I might not have dared without your encouragement. Thank you also to Mhairi, for your enthusiasm and belief in what I was doing.

There are many Others, within, outside and between the university and elsewhere, who have helped guide me and this project along. Be it through an active engagement with the work, or indeed, helping me find ways of distancing my thoughts when it got too much. They know who they are.

And finally, most of all, thank you to my family. Jason and Wren. Mum and Dad. Boo, Dandelion and Cora. It is because of all of you that this work is here. Within these pages, upon a quilt, and no longer just within my mind.

Author's declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at he University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature _____

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Preface

IN AND OF TIME

It is Friday the 1st of March, 2013. Today, as I leave my flat and walk to the train station on Albert Drive to get the 10:24$_{AM}$ to *Glasgow Central*, popping into my local shop to make change on the way, I am suddenly aware of two things. First, the sobering knowledge that I've only seven months of funding remaining is strongly countered by a giddy bemusement that I have not felt for a while: *I am getting there*. From this present moment I can almost touch the future and the prospect of life beyond a PhD. Second, much has changed since I first returned to the *University of Glasgow* as a postgraduate student in September, 2008.

Darnley Road, my regular thoroughfare for the past two and half years, is both indicative and illustrative of such shifts. To my right I see the now almost completed *Sing Sabha Glasgow Central Gurdwara*. This time last year I'd listen to the rhythmic pounding of construction machines preparing the ground, marking time as I sat at my desk. Back then there was no gold dome to reveal the intended evolution of the site, only a Glasgow City Council issued planning permit, fixed to a lamppost between the train station and the *Tramway Theatre*. A single sheet of A4 paper that spoke more of a need to materialise bureaucratic process in the concrete form of the city than the fact that this was to be the first purpose built Sikh temple in Scotland, some twenty-odd years in the planning. In contrast, Darnley Road as it appears on my left hasn't changed that much at all. The bus stop at the top of the street remains *not in use* and an unknown white powder continues to coat the pavement outside the electrical supplier, tracing the movements of visitors to and from its premises, and up the street. But whilst visually this side has remained stagnant I am reminded of other changes when I leave the shop, water in hand, change in purse, and approach the Italian restaurant at the corner of Melville Street. Two years ago *Roma Mia* was just somewhere I *kept meaning to try*. Now, it's a place where I've exchanged stories with

friends over meals, celebrated special occasions with family and learned that I share my surname with the owner's wife – connections which elicit a courteous nod between myself and the owner today, as is often the case. But my overriding sense of where Darnley Road and Melville Street meet returns me to last January, when police lined the surrounding streets throughout that month and national newspaper headlines shared and rotated the terms: racial, attack, alleged, youths, white, Asian, Muslim and Irish. It is these words and their connotations that remain etched in my mind, hinting, just as they did in print, at the politicking involved in telling the story of a man's murder, and telling it right.

As I turn right onto Albert Drive, nearing the station, my thoughts turn to changes to my inner realm, specifically as they relate to the trajectory of my research problem. I commenced this PhD already concerned with how processes of cultural construction in the contemporary city connected to the ordering of society and its ills, already armed with the foresight that *space* was the prevalent lens for engaging such concerns in the disciplinary traditions of urban studies. Gradually a more distinct focus developed: time was initially elevated as a culturally contingent feature worthy of attention; the extent to which time appeared as a largely naturalised *thing* in the contemporary city was subsequently revealed. But as I embarked to feel out the parameters for my positive engagement in such issues I instead found a cornucopia of gaps, cracks, aporias and Others, leaving in their eventual wake a three-tiered research problem that today I state as follows:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
   a. time is socially constructed, *and*
   b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

3. Knowledge of the urban is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

Just as on Darnley Road, the expansion of an initial focus on *the city* and *difference* to the development of the multifaceted problem above includes points that are marked on my material and mental landscape. On Tuesday the 12th of October, 2010, nine days prior to my first ever meeting with my PhD supervisors, the question *what about time?* became etched

in my thoughts as vivid as it was scrolled over and over again in my notebook entries that day. Just as memorable is the knot in my stomach as I nervously typed, deleted and typed again point three of the research problem above onto my powerpoint slides the night before my First Year Review presentation, simultaneously admitting for the first time the disciplinary and institutional dimensions of my problem, and my fear of speaking them aloud to my peers and betters. But while I remain cognisant of these moments the majority of shifts are more subtle, and I find it impossible to untangle the ways in which the ideas above have entered dialogue with each other, and the city underfoot, weaving together across the days, months and years to produce the research problem above. Nor can I expound in full the ways in which my research problem came to include as its concerns institutional and non-institutional dimensions of ethics; the promise of rhizomatic thinking for critical thought; and the craft of academic work. Or how it led me to explore non-standard methods and alternative mediums to convey this work, resulting in my making of a hand-embroidered, patchwork quilt as companion to this text. In many ways I am no more privy to the origin and order of these things than the passerby who perhaps sees and wonders why I nod to the Italian restauranteur.

As I reach *Pollokshields East Train Station* I am confronted by my journeys up and down the steps to the platform. Just like the development of my research problem some are clear or at least seem clear. Nonetheless, such clarities are forcibly overridden by my sense that any attempt at order would be both artificial and detract from their cumulative, non-linear nature. The city and my relations to it are remade anew with each encounter. And suddenly, keenly, I am aware of the extent to which time – a principal subject of my work and the necessary condition through which I experience and write my thesis – flanks me on all sides. The question of how to represent the development of difference, the city and time as a research focus *through* time has sat with me for a while now. No easy solution avails. To frame the work solely in the terms in which it was first conceived would be unable to capture the iterative driving force which revealed its multifaceted form above. Reporting on it as an end-point would be similarly ineffective, missing the nuanced ways in which my understanding of time has been inextricably bound with my experience of time across this project, and vice versa. Each and every has changed.

Departing the train at *Glasgow Central* – checking the time, checking myself for checking the time – I think back to my most recent supervision meeting only two days ago, where the

substantive item of discussion was my latest findings chapter. The meeting went well and my supervisors agreed that now was a good point to draw a line under work completed; to go back to the start and bring it all together. I've little doubt that it was this which precipitated the giddy bemusement I noted at the start of this Preface, if only then to channel such carefree thoughts of the future towards concern over how I reach it. As I mentally run through my monthly submissions I reflect again on all that has changed in the past four years to shape my understanding, my approach, my productions. But *going back to the start* I realise that I am no longer witness to the development of a problem but to the development of my imagination in relation to it. I remember that this is a thesis about time, the city and the people who live there; that my central concern was and remains the cultural norms which exclude and Other those whose use and experience of time fall out with normative city logics. I remember that my desire to capture the ways in which processes of urban cultural construction leant to the development of material and mental biases against those who don't *fit* with dominant modes, motivated an opening of my mind and a questioning of what those processes were. It was here that my immersion in such concerns revealed *culture* in a multitude of processes that weren't countable or knowable all at once, nor at all. As I delved deeper, leaving behind the certainty of what was known, I all too clearly saw myself, my colleagues and the work of urban studies as we researched, wrote and constructed the city through our work. I recognised the productive capacity of ideas to shape the reality of what is, and the potential role for imagination either to legitimate existing understandings or to expand horizons towards that which could not be thought. And it was this that precipitated a final shift to consider that time is not the only conceptual victim but that the ways in which knowledge is constructed within the academy can lead to a narrowing of imagination and of ideas. No longer could I be satisfied that the naturalisation of time in the city could be separated from the temporal modes of the academy, nor could I be assured that the tools on offer were suitably orientated to my concerns. I'd glimpsed the (im)possible, and those things seen, that which was imagined, could not be undone.

As I move beyond the limits of *Glasgow Central* I realise that it is not changes to the city nor the research problem which drove this thesis onwards, but changes that have occurred within my imagination. It is my imagination which has helped me make sense of the uncertain and unknown aspects of this work. It is my imagination that has positioned them not as gaps to be filled but omissions to be questioned. It is my imagination that now

recognises these as central and necessary to the progressing endeavour. My journey towards and across these shifts has not been linear nor fully knowable by any means. Every change is bound up with others; each is part of both larger and smaller transformations. But these are transformations which nonetheless provide partial coordinates from which to orientate myself, and which therefore hold a similar promise for the production of my work within this thesis.

* * *

Difference, the city and time have long served together as the primary connections, the anchors I've used to delve deeper and collect the other threads in this thesis. As I've delved, the certainty of even these primary connections have themselves been drawn in from the periphery. This has forced me to face tensions, exclusions and processes of Othering where it was difficult and uncomfortable to do so. But in the aftermath, I have been freed to imagine alternatives. I have written this thesis so as to reflect these processes and their productions, and the document you hold is accordingly structured to capture the development and transformation of my imagination in relation to three intersecting tiers: my research problem, my research approach, and my understanding of difference, the city and time. To give a brief overview of how this unfolds:

- **Chapters One, Two** and **Three** move between various bodies of literature on the city and time as I encountered them, presenting them not as reviews of existing knowledge but as constitutive elements of the journey through which my imagination of the problem developed.

- In **Chapters Four, Five** and **Six**, I discuss matters of a methodological nature. The narrative once again tracks alongside my imagination as I discuss the methodological concerns which have arisen as I've continually questioned the dimensions of my research problem. I detail here my methodological approaches of autoethnography and rhizoanalysis, and embed these within discussions of social justice, ontological politics and performance.

- Having reported on the productions of my method in **Chapters Seven, Eight** and **Nine, Chapter Ten** discusses the potential returns of that insight for this project. **Chapter Eleven** then draws conclusion to the concretisation of my journey in this thesis.

In addition, there are two points which pertain to the content and orientation of those discussions described above which are helpful to be aware of in advance of their reading:

- **Chapters Two** and **Three** look upon literature on time not for review but as a research resource in its own right. That is, they seek the literature not as support for but to *do* the work of the PhD. In addition to the extensive research activities of reading, synthesising and analysing this literature, these chapters draw on primary research generated through autoethnography, a method I've pursued since the first year of this work. There is a dedicated discussion of autoethnography in **Chapter Five**.

- The **quilt** mentioned is a separate but very much connected feature of this thesis. It is constructed from thirty-six squares of fabric, each one hand embroidered with a text excerpt from a non-academic source. Each is unique but all are linked across a myriad of registers. Both outputs – the thesis document and this alternative form – combine to reveal the incompleteness of the other and in doing so argue for the need to make visible that which cannot be said within existing parameters. There is a more detailed discussion of this in **Chapter Six**.

Across three tiers and in this way, that is how I've chosen to write *of* time *in* time. On the face of it, these particular transformations might simply appear as the conventional moments of narrative that guide the reader of any thesis, journeying from literature to method, and onto a discussion of *findings* original. However, within this thesis, within each of these transformations, there are many more shifts and their combined effect is one which serves to disrupt that presumed linearity of thesis-making. My hope, therefore, is that *this* presentation in *this* thesis enables me to capture difference, the city and time in ways that support the need to imagine the temporal possibilities of the city anew. Thus to speak of these connections, and in doing so establish many more, is all that remains.

I

LOOKING TO THE LITERATURE (LOOKING TO THE SELF)

Chapter One

DIFFERENCE, THE CITY AND TIME

What About Time?

It is a simple question that sits at the heart of this work: *what about time?* In this thesis it is aimed at the literature of urban studies, the inner workings of the contemporary academy, and directed towards everyday life in general. But as it first came to my mind in the Autumn of 2008, it was a more inward retort, prompted by an experience that was not directly mine. At that time I was a student, studying for a Masters in Public Policy, observing at home from the comfort of my sofa. It was Toby Ziegler who had a place at the table. Toby was the White House Communications Director and special advisor to the President of the United States of America – a fictional character in a television show about the daily grind of modern policy making and politics at America's highest office, *The West Wing*. In the episode Toby and his White House colleagues were hosting a summit to investigate the cost and availability of AIDS medication to African nations beset by the epidemic[1].

Via my television screen I'd been privy to many such occasions, with most following a similar trajectory. Proponents would outline a problem, make a case for action, perhaps offer a possible solution. Their respondents would then query such premises, or at very least temper their case and make a counter offer of *realistic* action. A tussle of words would ensue, playing out over one, two, maybe three scenes. Until eventually, hesitant nods would be issued from relevant authorities, each side marking their respective concessions; recording their partial wins nonetheless. Only that was rarely the end of it. As Toby Ziegler – more incisive and critical, more jaded and stubborn than the others – would invariably point to the flawed logic: why things wouldn't work, why deals couldn't be done. Hard silences would follow, along with the scratching of heads, the rubbing of temples, the

stretching of arms, and so on. Scenes would fade to black and other stories told. And while battles were at times revisited in later acts, equally often they were unconcluded, the spoils and scars unbeknownst to both characters and viewers alike.

I'd found that my nightly viewing of *The West Wing* provided an unexpected antidote to the abstractions of policy I was studying by day. In lectures I learned of a policy process that cycled from the definition of problems, to the setting of agendas, and onwards to the development, implementation and evaluation of policies. In class we discussed that any such cycle was linked to another, that of politics. We considered the challenges that may be encountered where a policy was actualised in the real world; heard testimonies from insiders to various policy fields who recounted their experiences, at times to very personal affect. But rehearsed dry in lecture theatres and tutorial rooms, it never came close to capturing the ever ongoing, playing-out of policy making in every direction and all at once. *The West Wing* was of course a fictional account, developed from a fixed geographical and historical context, and specifically tuned to the sensibilities of its prime-time American audience. Nonetheless, it pointed to things uncollected in abstract models, unsaid by those who had experienced life on both sides of the polity. The intractability of problems faced; the directing of evidence towards pre-conceived ends; abuses of power at every level; incalculable dimensions of bureaucracy. Each of these less than palatable aspects of policy making which often sat just out of sight were front and centre in *The West Wing*. It was, however, the more personal presentations which for me revealed something previously unseen and unimagined. Apathy, indifference and fatigue which followed optimistic and pessimistic characters alike; self-imposed gags and inter-personal policing methods which accompanied even the most *moral* of pretenders; self-destructive behaviours adopted to make bearable a life full of concessions. In these traits, and for the first time, I recognised policy making not just as an external struggle for resources, leverage and the privilege of a speaking position, but as an internal battle that established itself firmly in the everyday and in the individual.

Twenty-six episodes in to the seven-season series, and I was witnessing these personal presentations not just on screen but within my own mind. As I sat and watched, a growing orchestration of mitigations and excuses filled my head: *at least they tried*, *that could have been much worse*, *given the circumstances*, *their hands were tied*, etc. Yet in this episode, the one in which they turned to address the AIDS crisis in Africa, there was a more buoyant air of potential

to the proceedings. It was the third act of the episode, the fourth day of the summit, and they were still talking. Toby sat at the table alongside Josh Lyman, the White House Deputy Chief of Staff. President Nimbala of the fictional sub-saharan nation of Equatorial Kundu, the proponent, was present with only a translator by his side. Directly across sat Alan Damson, CEO of a pharmaceutical giant, and his entourage of aides and spokespeople. They, and representatives from a number of other drug companies, responded collectively to the gentleman from Africa.

Many issues surrounding the supply of AIDS medication to Nimbala's country had been brought into focus earlier in the episode. For example, Nimbala raised concern that it was far cheaper for Norway to purchase the drugs than African countries. Damson lamented that black market trade to Africa was in violation of patents held by the pharmaceutical companies. Toby pointed to the disincentives of action, forcing others to grudgingly concede that it was more profitable to treat a white man's erectile disfunction than it was to cure a black person of AIDS. And Josh, away from the activity of the meeting room, quietly cautioned the already self-righteous Toby to get "out of their face" given that "the pharmaceutical companies got half the House of Representatives elected". The breadth of issues was as vast as it was complex, but as each was heard and debated over the course of the episode the impression was that though they were compounded, they were not insurmountable. This sense that something might for once be achieved continued to build, right up until the following dialogue ensued:

> ALAN DAMSON: I think there's a more fundamental problem than marginal costs. We've been at this for four days and I still think we haven't talked about the fundamental misunderstanding in Africa over the basic facts of AIDS.
>
> TRANSLATOR [NIMBALA]: I don't think there's a misunderstanding.
>
> ALAN DAMSON: A week ago you people stood up and said that AIDS has only a casual relationship to HIV.
>
> TRANSLATOR [NIMBALA]: I'm not sure to whom you are referring when you say, 'you people', but it was President Mbeki of South Africa who said that, and not anyone in this room.
>
> SPOKESMAN 2: I think Mr. Damson has brought up a hard truth that should faced.
>
> JOSH: What's that?
>
> ALAN DAMSON: If tomorrow we made AIDS medication free to every patient in your country, as much as they needed for as long as they needed it, it would likely make very little difference in the spread of the epidemic.

JOSH: Why?

SPOKESMAN 2: Anti-HIV drugs are a triple cocktail. It's a complicated regimen that requires ten pills to be taken every day at precise times. Two protease inhibitors every eight hours, two combination RTI pills every twelve hours.

JOSH: What's the problem?

There is a silence. Toby sighs.

TOBY: They don't own wristwatches. They can't tell time.

Josh rubs his temples, looking tired. There is another silence.

For the rest of the episode I remained with the silence in that room – held back, shocked, dumbfounded. I'd grown to recognise, even expect the so-called barriers to policy: money, political will, (dis)incentives, existing legislation, discrimination, relationships, to name a few. Such things were tangible, contested and constructed, and were very much active and changeable sites of interpretation in that regard. But time – the self-evident backdrop of existence, the fundamental nature through which life is lived – how could this be blamed for the inability to act? *How could this be named as the excuse to deny longevity to those with no other recourse?*

I made half grasps to process both the sensibility of what I'd witnessed and my reactions to it but was only after the credits rolled and I moved from the relative comfort of my viewer's position, that Toby's comment returned to strike a blow of a more personal and telling nature: how could *I* not have anticipated this would be an issue? How could *I* have assumed a self-evident nature of time? I suddenly remembered the internal sites at which policy making took place and my initial reactions were now closely accompanied with alarm and ire towards my own complacency; concern over what it suggested of my potential complicity. Such thoughts lingered for some time, appending themselves to my questions, undermining that which I thought I knew, and all the while I thought to myself *what about time?* Until eventually, perhaps not knowing what to do with it, I must have put it away again.

* * *

Almost two years on and my one year of postgraduate study had turned to a prospective five. I'd completed my first Masters and was now nearing the end of a second, this time an

MRes in Public Policy, purposefully leading to a PhD in Urban Studies. From policy to the urban, my academic interests had undergone a similar shift. My attention was now focused on the ways in which cultural norms were produced in and through the very fabric of the city, and the means by which such norms could order difference and exclude those whose *ways of life* fell out with dominant urban logics. Policy remained a part of this, but its relevance was not contained in its reactive, problem-solving dimensions. Rather, it was its productive capacity for shaping the urban form and population to specific cultural ends through the *naming* of problems and the *framing* of viable solutions, that garnered my attention. There of course remained very real ills to be counted in the modern city. But I recognised these as no longer confined to the epidemic, catastrophic and apocalyptic scenarios which legitimated policy intervention. Instead, I was drawn to issues anchored in the everyday experiences of ordinary people as they made their ways and lived their lives in urban quarters. It was here that encounters between the city and difference were happening all the time, and where I found it most prudent to ask who the city worked for and who it worked against.

My finding of this focus was in no way immediate but emerged slowly as I grew more and more familiar with the field of urban studies. Via the fictional worlds of literature and film, my mind had been previously exposed to the dark and desperate faces of city living. From Victorian-era depictions of overcrowding, abject poverty, dispossession, and squalor found coursing through the works of Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo. To the terror of dystopian futures plagued by bureaucracy, class division, totalitarianism, censorship and genetic engineering – imagined in the novels of Yevgeny Zamyatin and Ray Bradbury; made manifest in the films of Fritz Lang and Terry Gilliam[2]. Questions regarding the forms and natures of urban ills were long etched in to my curiosity. As I embarked to engage with academic discussions I found the non-fictional accounts of urban studies to be borne of similar concerns. They included, but were in no way limited to, "catastrophic proportions" of inner-city poverty, welfare dependancy, teenage pregnancy and serious crimes in William Julius Wilson (1987: 3). The devolution of public life, repression of feelings and "resigned acquiescence" in Richard Sennett (1974: 3). The maintenance of injustice through "elitism, exclusion, prejudice, greed and despair" in Danny Dorling (2010). The displacement of "minorities, working people, the poor and homeless" in Neil Smith (1996: ii). And even those darkest faces of urban living which were perhaps more comfortably held in fiction, or at very least consigned to an earlier, less advanced stage of

city dwelling, were revealed a contemporary and growing concern in Mike Davis' text with the all revealing title: *Planet of Slums* (2006).

It was beyond its depiction of urban ills, however, that the academic literature had its most salient role to play. No doubt buoyed by the same sense which led the World Health Organisation to project seventy per cent of the world's population as city dwellers by the year 2050 (WHO, 2010), its description extended to explanation, its critique to prescription. This seeming inevitability of urban futures also secured a place for more positive associations to be found. Post-industrial shifts towards a knowledge-based economic order, the benefits of regeneration, the rise of the creative class and the creative city, and the value of urban clustering, for example, each drew a vast commentary across journal articles, dedicated monographs, conference streams and edited collections. But still, it was engagement with the *urban problem* that for me emerged as the most compelling avenue, and I found much to reflect on in the connections David Harvey drew between social justice and the geography of the city (1973); the correlation Georg Simmel imagined between city living and poor mental wellbeing (1903/1995); and the explanations Sharon Zukin gave as to how the post-industrial city, and its people, had been aggressively reshaped through processes of deindustrialisation, gentrification and immigration (1995).

With my familiarity of the urban literature growing I was starting to see my own city, Glasgow, in very different ways. I found myself with a new language to describe my experiences, different models to weight my observations against. Progressively, the city became not just somewhere I lived in or moved through, but a conceptual puzzle with boundless pieces and orientations. As I mulled these over in my mind, in person I was motivated to visit areas un-trapped in the webs of my daily, weekly and monthly routines. I drove by different streets, walked by different routes, and did so even when there was no ordained destination. As I slowly filled in the fragments of my urban reality with those that had previously been hidden to me I again found the urban literature crucial in helping me make sense and extend the meaning of what I'd witnessed. This experience of seeing different parts of the city whilst seeing the city differently, shaped my urban imagination in a couple of defining ways.

First, as I started to move more purposefully around the city I began to better appreciate the ways in which inequality was constituted. Previously I'd informed myself with headline

grabbing statistics designed to illustrate *the Glasgow effect* [3]: premature deaths were more than 30% higher in Glasgow than in the comparable cities of Liverpool and Manchester (Walsh, et al., 2010: 8); life expectancy was almost eleven years shorter for men living in the most deprived areas of the city compared to their less deprived counterparts (Audit Scotland, 2012: 2); 57% of children were living in poverty in the most deprived deciles compared to 6% in the least deprived (SIMD, 2009). It was, however, only when I left behind *my* city and ventured to encounter the Glasgow of Other realities, that I came to recognise the actualities of such polarised fates. A familiar walk from the leafy serenity of Pollokshields West into the hustle and bustle of Govanhill, for example, revealed difference across many registers. Between both points I found a sensory mix of sights, smells and sounds that did not so much confirm the truth of the quantitative descriptors, but rather reveal them a sanitised record of the stark inequalities faced by those living only two miles from Glasgow's much celebrated *Garden Suburb* (Pollokshields Heritage, 2012). However, this walk, and others like it, also revealed a quality of difference that couldn't rightly be categorised as negative: it was not simply deprivation that was brought to the fore, but *ways of life* and ways of being with Others that were quite unlike the urban logics which dominated.

Second, as my journeys through both the literature and the city intensified, so too did my appreciation of the nature of urban ills. The academic literature told at great lengths of the multi-faceted (Paddison, 2001), complicated (Harvey, 1973), complex (Healey, 2007), even *wicked* nature (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of the urban site and its problems. It was only as I read more and seen more, however, that I truly recognised the substance of such descriptions. I became increasingly aware of a profound intermingling between the likes of poverty, unemployment and depression; apathy, drug misuse and anxiety. In any given scenario, at any given time, any problem could be cast as antecedent to another. Job loss might engender poverty, but impoverished living could lead to insufficient employability skills. Alcohol dependancy might prompt a turn towards criminal methods of money making, whilst immersion in a life of crime might lead one to congregate in circles of drug misuse. No one thing would necessarily serve to disentangle a primary cause of the troubles nor a true concern from that which was effected by it. No problem was discrete. This intractability not only brought to life the complexity and fluidity of the urban sphere, but even more significantly, it hinted that the problems of the city and the ills of urban living were manifestations of much deeper things at play.

With my experience of the city continuing to build alongside my reading of the literature, the constitution of difference and the sense that there was something deeper at play where urban problems presented remained equally prominent to my concerns. Together, they drew my attention to sites at which difference was visible in everyday urban life and processes whereby it was mediated and ordered through it. Here I felt it might be possible to discern not simply the ills of city living, but places where norms of culture came face to face with alternative expressions, and where power, order and exclusion sat side by side. I had many questions to pose at such sites: *how does difference play out?*, I wondered. *How does it hold steady? Who benefits from the ordering of difference* and *who struggles?* As I worked to hone these questions and locate their possible targets I found precedent for such inquires within urban traditions, with *culture* marked a privileged concern in some of discipline's most foundational texts (Simmel, 1903/1995; Mumford, 1938; Wirth, 1938; and Benjamin, 1999). Quite in-keeping with the *cultural turn* which took the social sciences more generally from the 1950s onwards, the promise of culture as a means to understand the social was immediately discernible from the array of lenses urban studies made available to itself – whereby it could hold difference still for just long enough to see its effects. Social class remained a key dimension here, but the likes of race, gender, and sexuality were also cemented as important and legitimate registers in the seminal texts of Wilson (1978), Gillian Rose (1993) and David Bell and Gill Valentine (1995), amongst others. The notion of a culturally heterogenous urban sphere in which people benefited or suffered as a result of how their *ways of life* sat with the city's prevailing norms quite simply appeared to *go without saying* in urban studies.

It was, however, as I considered how to ask questions of difference more generally – questions which were not tied a single lens but which spoke across the already legitimate and those yet unspoken dimensions of difference – that I began to appreciate something even more relevant to my concerns; something even more telling of the character of urban scholarship. While the *cultural turn* might have fixed difference within the urban studies' epistemology it was the *spatial turn* which called to prominence the site via which difference was ordered and contained. Its catalyst placed by many in the work of French philosopher, Henri Lefebvre (Massey, 1992), the spatial turn of the 1990s saw both a reconceptualisation of space, and a reconceptualisation of urban questions. Objecting to its previously reified nature in urban theory, Lefebvre insisted that space was a product that was materially produced whilst simultaneously operating "on processes from which it cannot separate itself

because it is a product of them" (1991: 66). No longer was space presented as a vacant stage on which social life played out, it was active – constitutive of and constituted by the activity. Furthermore, noting that the processes of spatial production were based upon values which led to the social production of meaning, Lefebvre argued, in line with Antonio Gramsci's concept of *cultural hegemony*, that the production and codification of space was commanded by the dominant class as a tool to reproduce its dominance.

The *spatial turn* ensured that its disarmingly simple thesis – that urban space involved the production and reproduction of all aspects of urban life – would transform the way in which urban studies dealt with culture and society. It became theoretically commonplace to acknowledge that conceptualisations of space were not power-neutral, but generative of effects and inequities (Harvey, 1973, 1992; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996, 2010). And in terms of its empirical development, the discipline witnessed the further evolution of geographical frameworks for analysing trajectories, thresholds, spatial nodes, and other elements of space, both real and imagined (Vuolteenaho, et al., 2012). But by the time I'd encountered the urban studies literature, so seemingly complete was the *turn* that I admittedly failed to discern its spatialising tendencies in my earliest readings. Quickly, however, I came to appreciate both its reach and potential, and I found its effect on my own work to be similarly pronounced.

Continuing my journeys with a spatial gaze, I increasingly recognised the city not as planned but as produced and productive. The concrete forms of car parks and office blocks, wooden fences and video entry systems, merged with their users and non-users alike, marking out the sensibility of urban life. The public nature of *Queen's Park* lent itself to the mingling of difference and increased the probability of chance encounters. The tee-off times at *Cawder Golf Course* guaranteed its private members adequate distance from one another, whilst its dress rules ensured their visual homogeneity. The M8 motorway cut its path through Glasgow's city centre, elevating car users' easy access from the north to the south, downgrading pedestrians to alternative routes. And the shop lined, pedestrianised zones of Sauchiehall, Buchanan and Argyle Street turned shoppers' eyes away from the River Clyde and Glasgow's maritime history, towards a new economy of consumption. Density and distance, proximity and barriers, the fabric of the city enabled certain groupings to come together with ease whilst preventing other connections from forming. It allowed some behaviours to be praised, others to be sanctioned, a few to pass unseen, the

rest deemed problematic. Variable categories and degrees of difference were permitted at various sites, but always dealt with and always ordered. And across all of these facets the dominant productions of space embedded themselves in everyday life, reinforcing the norms to which their users were tested.

Within this hegemony I came to recognise Lefebvre's stance that urban space wasn't just the place where political struggles happened, rather, it was the seat of those struggles. Arguments over the location of airport runways, golf courses or off-shore wind farms, for example, were not simply *turf wars*. But with space the vehicle through which a culture developed, built and sustained itself, each was a "trial by space" (1991: 416); an attempt to promote certain usages into wider consciousness, and with them, the *ways of life* from which they were imagined. These *turf wars* were ontological battles over that which got counted as real and that which was to be dismissed as fanciful or illegitimate. As Lefebvre had it, "the production of space – has nothing incidental about it: it is a matter of life and death" (417). And for my own interests, I realised that no longer could I hold the ordering of difference and the ills of modern urban living "on the head of a pin, in a spaceless, geographically undifferentiated world" (Massey, 1984: 4). I had to pose them of the production of space itself.

* * *

In the earliest days of my PhD there was a point at which I thought back to my watching of episode twenty-six of *The West Wing*, and where the experience became caught-up with a meaning that had previously escaped me. I couldn't say with certainty the exact circumstances of clarification but I remember working from home, from a makeshift desk in my living room. I was making preparations for my first supervision meeting. It happened also to be the day that thirty-three Chilean miners were rescued from seven hundred meters below ground, following a mining accident that had left them trapped for sixty-nine days. I'd tuned into *BBC News* with breakfast that morning just as the eighth of *Los 33* was brought to the surface, and hadn't yet the will to turn it off again. So as I outlined a brief of how I planned to take my interests forward into a three year research project the conclusion to the miners' rescue played on in the background. My attention flitted between the two but that wasn't a problem – it was one of those days where the writing seemed to take care of itself.

Over my two years of studying the city I'd grown increasingly confident with how to pose questions of difference and order within the urban context. And with the theoretical precedents of urban studies very much in mind I proposed, in my first-ever paper for my supervisors, that to examine who the city works for and who it works against, I'd identify spaces of conflict and spaces of agreement. I'd observe how they were used and by whom, and study behaviours that were celebrated and those which appeared challenging. I would talk to people and with them design ways to track their movements. Then I'd make comparative maps of individual users across spaces in the city, and maps which compared multiple users in a single space. Taken together the findings would let me say something meaningful about the ways in which difference was ordered in and through the city, and maybe, just maybe, I'd be able to report on the connections between such processes and the ills of everyday city life. It was obvious and I was done.

Satisfied with my progress so far that morning I turned my attention to a pile of undergraduate policy essays sat patiently awaiting their grades, whilst news of the miners' rescue played on in the background. Thirteen men had now made it safely to the surface and the rescue capsule was descending to collect the next in line. The broadcaster rarely moved to tell of other news. Instead, pre-recorded segments connected to the headline story were rotated: vigils kept by family members, interviews with technical experts, overviews of Chile's mining industry, and so on. Most frequent of these, however, was a segment telling that it was against all odds that these thirty-three men were on the brink of their freedoms. It explained how *The San José Mine's* notoriously poor safety record and limited rescue resources both pointed to a single, inevitable truth: none were likely to have survived the initial collapse but if by any slim chance someone had, they would likely starve to death before they were ever located. And so, that seventeen days into the crisis the tip of a drill which had made one of just eight intended exploratory boreholes should carry a message from the miners back to the surface was, given the circumstances, nothing short of a miracle. An image of the miners' hand written note was shown at the climax of the segment, it read simply: *Estamos bien en el refugio, los 33 / We are well in the shelter, the 33.*

It was at some point around the rescue of the fifteenth miner that I turned off the television to attend fully to the essays. Despite the quiet I now found myself distracted. I moved my workspace to the kitchen table, made a cup of tea, but couldn't find focus. I stopped for lunch, then afterwards sat on the sofa with the essays on my lap, but my

attention seemed elsewhere. Looking to satisfy myself that I'd achieved something that day I turned to proof the research brief I'd written just a few hours prior. It was then I found cause for my distraction. The text was exactly as I'd recalled but no longer did I feel satisfaction, I felt unease. I felt concern that it should have been so easy; alarm that it should have appeared so obvious that difference, order and everyday life were tightly tuned to the spatial production of the city. And suddenly, there in my mind was Toby Ziegler and I recalled my dizzying frustrations from another time. I remembered the ways in which the obvious concealed much from sight and where the ascendancy of the self-evident had very real consequences for those who'd experienced it otherwise. Perhaps it would be the deaths of those whose suffering from AIDS was deemed inevitable due to the cultural assumptions and workings of Western medicine. Maybe it would have been the ultimate perishing of thirty-three Chilean miners if economic sense had prevailed and only two exploratory boreholes were drilled instead of eight. I moved from the sofa back to my makeshift desk, opened my notebook and started to write. And this time the question was entirely mine to pose: to urban studies, *what about time?*

Dimensions of a Research Problem

As I've presented it thus far, the question *what about time?* has had its significance in recording my alarm at the fixity of time within my own mind, and in my reaction to the ubiquity of the spatial turn in urban studies. Those early moments I've recounted, and many others like them, while largely rhetorical, have nonetheless had a formative effect on this work. It was these which first led me to pose some precursory questions of a time whose nature was not like the naturalised one I'd supposed. They encouraged me to turn to anthropological studies of the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), the Hopi (Whorf, 1956) and the Amondawa (Sinha et al., 2011), and through these I began to appreciate times of other cultures which manifested beyond confines of the clock. Furthermore, I began to imagine temporal differences *within* cultures that were quite incongruous with the linear and rational norms of time which seemed to dominate the contemporary urban experience. Single parents, religious minorities, the terminally ill, the unemployed, children, the working poor, those suffering with drug and alcohol addictions, rural and ethnic migrants – the list of those who might have known other temporalities was endless. My early experiences also led me to look more closely to the composition of the urban field. I noted in the previous section a sense that difference *went without saying* in urban studies. Indeed, it

was through this condition that issues of justice, power, rights, exclusion, and so on, seemed most articulate and meaningful. On closer inspection, however, this did not stand true for time. As a category of analysis, or a lens through which to view difference in the city, time appeared largely absent[4]. Its presence, instead, was constituted by a form that was naturalised, homogenous, fixed and, crucially, unproblematic. That difference *should* have appeared so prevalent pointed not only to the extent to which the field was conceived spatially, but suggested also that this proliferation of space was keenly joined by silence as far as time's heterogeneity was concerned. Finally, these early returns together served to reinforce the importance of paying attention to niggles and things which didn't *sit quite right*. I've continued to do this ever since, and have grown ever more mindful of where such things manifest, mentally and physically. This experience of seeing, being, and feeling my way within and beyond an academic field has had a very significant effect on my work, shaping not simply the methodological direction of this project, as I will show in Chapters Four, Five and Six, but my research practice more broadly.

It is beyond these more reflective gains, however, that the question *what about time?* has come to generate a more productive and substantive course for this work. Posed directly to the urban field it has served to unearth moments of time's naturalisation and absence, and has subsequently revealed the potential consequences wrought through such presentations. Sitting across many layers but with three interactive dimensions keenly discernible, those returns can be summarised as follows:

> When the question *what about time?* is posed to the urban field:
>
> ONE: The inability of urban studies to account for a multiple and complex range of realities which shape urban life is revealed;
>
> TWO: the capacity for urban studies to Other and marginalise those whose differences from the norm extend to a temporal register is highlighted; *and*
>
> THREE: the ability for urban studies to further engender a naturalised view of time within its academic practice, and extend this outward to everyday life, is brought into focus.

Together, these potential consequences have helped explicate the research problems with which this work has ultimately found itself involved. Looking to each of these in turn the remainder of this section moves to provide a more explicit defence of why the naturalisation of time within the urban field is of consequence, and moreover, why it marks

a significant concern where matters of difference, order and everyday urban life are concerned. This chapter concludes with an overview of how these consequences, together with my ongoing reflections on such matters, have served to develop a research agenda capable of engaging with such concerns.

With regards the sensibility of those consequences summarised above, it is vital to first recognise that when questions regarding the interactions of difference and the city are posed in a temporal way, the urban field itself starts to change. Surprisingly, returning to the foundational ideas which gave rise to urban studies' spatial development offers one way to appreciate the significance of this change. As outlined in the previous section the move to conceive of space not simply in terms of its geometry but in the practices and associated meanings which it contains is placed by many in the work of Henri Lefebvre. In *The Production of Space* (1991) – Lefebvre's most frequently cited text by far – he demonstrates and supports his claim by conceptualising space across three layers: *representations of space*, *spaces of representation* and *spatial practices*. It is through this triad that Lefebvre renders intelligible qualities of space that are both perceptible and imperceptible to the senses, and rescues it from its status as something absolute and beyond human experience. This space that Lefebvre frees from metaphysical absolutism bears a striking parallel to the qualities, or indeed absence of quality, the urban field currently bestows upon time. With his spatial apparatus also offering a means to problematise the seemingly unproblematic, I'd argue that Lefebvre's work has the conceptual faculty to similarly bring to the fore the temporal dimensions of difference, order and urban problems pertinent to urban inquiry[5].

To first look more closely, then, to the detail of Lefebvre's spatial triad. *Representations of space* are those spaces found in the professional practices of planners, architects, bureaucrats and technocrats. They are the blueprints, models, plans and designs that are conceived by those with the means to actualise them. With their reach and qualities far removed from the everyday routines of their users, these spaces are instinctively regarded as abstract. However, as they find manifest expression in the concrete forms they expound – be it "buildings, monuments, works of art" (1991: 33) – these *representations of space* are objectified in and through professional practice, along with the ideologies, power relations and knowledge schemes embedded in their representational form. These spaces, writes Lefebvre, "are tied to relations of production and to the 'order' those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, to 'frontal' relations" (33). In contrast, *spaces of*

representation are those spaces directly *lived in* and which comprise everyday experience. Users know these spaces through their idiosyncratic descriptors – from the widely recognised *Big Ben*, to the hyper-contextualised *wee red brick house next to Mary's*. Unlike *representations of space*, these spaces are more of feeling than thinking. They are elusive, changeable and as alive as those who give meaning to them. As Lefebvre explains, they "may be qualified in various ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic" (42). Finally, *spatial practices* give structure to both *spaces of representation* and *representations of space,* via the routes, networks, patterns and interactions that connect people to place, and reality with images. With the ordering of difference through everyday life at the fore his concerns, Lefebvre notes that such practices link strongly to how individuals perceive their world, and in particular its ordinariness. Arguing that they "propound and propose" (38) society's space, shaping each other whilst themselves being shaped by the process, he reveals their dialectical interaction with space as it is conceived and space as it is lived, pointing also to their mediative function in this regard. This is not to say that this mediation between *representations of space* and *spaces of representation* is fashioned in an equally unfolding manner. Indeed, Lefebvre stressed a universal capitulation to conceived space from that which is lived, enabling *representations of space* to impregnate and socialise individuals to such an extent that users willingly forego truths grounded in their *spaces of representation*. And where abstract space ultimately denies concrete qualitative space – where a consensus forms as to what space *is* – difference is also denied, lending itself to those for whom abstract space accords, causing great mental and material hardship for those it does not.

Looking again to Lefebvre's triad but this time replacing his spatial layers with temporal designations, helps build a picture of what a temporally aware urban field might look like. *Representations of time* would likely have in its domain clocks, calendars and diaries, those things which are not time but which nonetheless impress themselves to such an extent where they emerge synonymous with it. *Times of representation*, on the other hand, would be time as it is experienced internally and with Others who share similar modes. It might be watched pots that never boil, 'Friday feelings' or lives flashing instantaneously upon the news of incurable disease, but time would be infinitely changeable beyond these expressions, as fluid and dynamic as its users' experiences. *Temporal practices* would then refer to the everyday use of time *through* time as it is objectively represented. Examples might include public holidays and religious events; the practice of working five days followed by

two days of rest; the celebration of a new year on the first day of January. As with its spatial counterpart *temporal practices* would enact a mediative role here, perhaps in helping the seventh day of the week feel different from the fifth or in garnering a sense of guilt where a full-time employee embarks on leisure time at 2:30PM on a work day. And just as abstract space denied the existence of qualitative space, abstract time would similarly deny qualitative time, and with it the experiences and needs of those who knew and lived by different temporalities.

One only has to look at the work of Lefebvre and its paradigmatic march across the urban studies' landscape to glimpse the potential impact of its temporal analogue: theoretically, ontologically, empirically, epistemologically – no aspect of the existing field would be safeguarded from revision. Just as the *spatial turn* facilitated an ongoing investigation into the effects and inequities generated in and through spatial production, so might a temporal shift. Just as it saw to the development of new tools and technologies of research to help it *see* its subject better, inquiries into a contingent but dominant and power-imbued temporality might lead to new methods which isolate the temporal facets of urban living. It is not, however, changes to the urban field that are of greatest consequence here. Rather, it is the potential for different perspectives on urban life to emerge where such a change takes place that is most crucial to appreciate. Even from the rudimentary framework I've mapped onto Lefebvre's triad, temporal facets pertinent to urban living are discernible. Extending across the objects, experiences and practices of time that comprise everyday urban life, questions might consider how the objects of time shape the everyday experience of it. They might ask after those practices of urban life which seem untenable in the face of time's objective reality. And it is the potential returns from these inquiries which start to reveal the gravity of posing the question *what about time?* to the urban field, highlighting more fully the potential consequences wrought through time's silence:

> ONE: Where time is asked after, a much fuller range of difference is brought into focus. Where it lies silent and inquiries follow existing means, the temporal aspects of difference which aren't visible in space are missed. When this occurs, an entire realm of urban life is excluded from view, arguably leading to the production of knowledge and explanations of the city which fail to account for the multiple and complex range of realities which comprise contemporary urban existence.

Immediately the query comes: what can be done about this? *How can it be ensured that knowledge of the city isn't as partial in its reach?* These are necessary questions. But equally

important to note is that the consequences do not end with this first point. As outlined early in this chapter, the activities of urban studies don't rest with description and critical explanation, but extend to prescription and the imagining of routes beyond urban problems. That the theoretical substance of urban studies is not only produced by but is itself productive of the realities it describes, means that attention must extend far beyond its explanatory shortcomings to relate to the productions of its work beyond the academy. This fact brings into sharper focus the second consequence of time's naturalisation:

> TWO: Not only does a temporal mode of inquiry see different problems, it yields different solutions. Where temporal questions are not posed, answers are unlikely to return temporal findings. And where the utility of the predominantly spatial work of urban studies is examined in regard to the development of the contemporary urban environment – when it is used by policy makers, architects, academics, government ministers, planners, etc., to support and/or effect change in the city – only spatial problems are dealt with, and difference and order are met only in a spatial register. Not only does this do little to help surface the temporal heterogeneity of the city, the authority with which academic theory speaks means that in failing to do so, it in effect denies it. Therefore, by failing to direct the attention of urban actors to temporal heterogeneity and by implicitly obscuring such needs from view, the discipline itself has a role to play in marginalising and Othering those whose difference to the norm is expressed not just spatially but temporally.

To the most immediate inquiries outlined after point one, comes the even graver concern of point two: *how can urban inquiry avoid further marginalising and Othering those whose differences to the norm manifest not just spatially but temporally?* Where the productive capacity of the field as a whole is considered, however, I find that another line of inquiry emerges as much more pressing and requisite, namely: *what are the conditions and motivations by which the field has emerged so partial in the first place?* To elaborate further: why is it that questions of spatial justice are so readily posed, but not temporal justice? If space has been thoroughly deconstructed, why hasn't time? Is there something that secures the prominence of space and prevents the inclusion of temporal concerns? What factors might support the dominance of space's contingency alongside time's naturalisation? Such questions look not simply to the productions of urban studies beyond the field, but within the field itself.

To reflect briefly on such matters, I find these words of the geographer Doreen Massey provide a particularly relevant entry point. Discussing the work of Lefebvre, amongst others, she asserts that "'[s]pace' is very much on the agenda these days" (1992: 65)". This simple observation cracks open the possibility that it is something other than the absolute

primacy of space which underpins its dominance, and perhaps, also, that this *something* might answer for the silencing of temporal concerns. There is indeed an interesting politics surrounding the dominance of space within urban studies, perhaps none more so than the manner in which Lefebvre's ideas have come to occupy prime position within the field. The ascendancy of space as the framework in which to conceive of life in the city does not accord with Lefebvre's initial writings on the subject but in their later rediscovery. Published in French in the 1970s, Lefebvre's theories of space were not immediately resonant (Schmid, 2008: 27). Rather, it was David Harvey in *Social Justice in the City* (1973) who first brought to the fore the centrality of geography for understanding experience in the modern city (Butcher, 2011). Moreover, it was Harvey's subsequent reading of Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* (1991) and, along with likes of Fredric Jameson (1991), Mark Gottdiener (1993) and Edward Soja (1996), his crediting of him for having reinvented urbanism, which secured the eventual, albeit unsolicited appointment of Lefebvre to the field (Merrifield, 2006: xxxii; Aronowitz, 2007; Butcher, 2011). It should also be noted that time was far from homogenous in Lefebvre's wider body of work, a point perhaps most appreciable in his work *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life* (2004). Indeed, Lefebvre's temporal interests preceded his spatial analyses of the city, featuring prominently in his writing as early as the 1920s, and as Stuart Elden reveals in the introduction to his 2004 translation of *Rhythmanalysis*, a focus on time was central to Lefebvre's work:

> the writings on rhythmanalysis are [...] the attempt to get us both to think space and time *differently*. [...] [In *The Production of Space*] Lefebvre's analysis is both conceptual [...] and historical. The historical dimension is often neglected in contemporary appropriations of Lefebvre's work, which is seriously to misread him. [...] he was also involved in a lifelong struggle both within and without orthodox Marxism to pluralise its understanding of time and history
>
> Elden, 2004: ix

Nonetheless, when *The Production of Space* was finally delivered to the anglophone world in 1991 it cemented the conceptual and spatial tradition of Lefebvre's work for urban studies. And as Stefan Kipfer, et al. argue, along with the spatial arguments excavated by urban scholars in the texts of Michel Foucault (1967) and Walter Benjamin (2002), Lefebvre's work lent its considerable weight in securing a privileged slot for space in the analytical agendas of the day (2008).

It is within this same field that:

time

falls

silent.

This emphasis I make is not to suggest that the dominance of space secures the absence of time *de re*, nor am I arguing that space and time relate to each other in any straightforward or guaranteed causal way. Rather, it is to highlight that both are features of the same field, each shaped by the field's activity. And where the productions of spatial and temporal analyses also shape the field – along with the absence of such productions – through it they shape each other. Such considerations place attention on the inward productions of the field itself, and it is indeed *within* the field that the third and final consequence of the absence of a temporal problematic in urban studies can be most fully appreciated:

> THREE: In their ability to capture temporal aspects of urban difference, temporal analyses simultaneously reveal their existence and subsequently bring to the fore time's heterogeneity. Where spatial findings are overwhelmingly delivered, space extends its legitimacy. Where space extends its legitimacy and questions of time go increasingly unposed and unanswered, time is further naturalised within the urban literature and practices of urban research.

Focusing on the ability of an academic field to reproduce itself through its productions, the concern here isn't simply that the dominance of space is reified, but that with it, so too is the naturalisation of time. This shows that it is not simply the partiality of the field, revealed in the first point, nor its outward productions, highlighted in point two, that are marked issues as far as time's absence is concerned. Indeed, this final point reveals that any desire to attend to the shortcomings of urban studies' explanatory reach, and with it, the ill-effects of its productions, are potentially premature where the field itself is non-conducive to temporal accounts. As such, the question that emerges most urgently after this final point is *what can be done to introduce, secure and elevate the status of temporal accounts within a spatially dominated urban field?*

The concerns revealed throughout this section have each emerged more pressing than the last, but all are of necessary importance and no easy indication is offered as how best to proceed. It is at this point that it bears repeating that the potential consequences unearthed by posing the question *what about time?* to the urban field do not sit apart, nor do their productions. Where they interact, each upholds and strengthens another:

> Where time is naturalised in the academic literature, through the same mechanisms by which the work of urban studies is made concrete in the city time is further naturalised within everyday life. Where time is naturalised in everyday life it appears inevitable and unproblematic, and can become easily overlooked as a salient category in

> academic debates. Where it is repeatedly overlooked in urban studies accounts of contemporary urban issues are unable to capture the true complexity of urban life. Where accounts of urban life are partial and unable to capture the heterogeneity of time, the naturalisation of time becomes normative in the academic literature. And through this very same cycle, the naturalisation of time extends itself outward again, casting its logic upon everyday life.

The interactions supposed above do not elevate the individual urgency of any one consequence over another. Rather, they suggest that simultaneously and silently, a place has been secured for a normative and naturalised understanding of time both *external to* and *within* the urban field. And it is with regards the hegemony of time's naturalisation which sits across both these dimensions that I believe the question *what about time?* finds its most pregnant expression and important trajectory. It reveals that for any inquiry to effectively engage with the interplay of difference, the city and time, questions must be posed both external to and within the urban field, in conjunction.

Towards a Research Agenda

In a global age where difference has the potential to manifest more variously than ever before in urban settings, the processes through which difference is ordered are of great concern. In particular, questions looking to who participates in creating the conditions which come to govern the *ways of life* deemed proper in the city must be addressed, as must the mental and material impacts such standards have on those whose ways differ from the norm. Queries of this type are readily posed within the discipline of urban studies. Premised largely on a spatial understanding of the city, however, the theories and solutions attached to such inquiries have a similarly spatial yield and arguably obscure the extent to which time and temporality are significant elements in the formation, form and effects of culture. With traditional urban analyses thus unable to capture these temporal facets of urban life, it bears consideration that work which emerges from such accounts is partial in its reach. A pressing need therefore exists within the field of urban studies, and arguably in the broader academy, to move beyond an overwhelmingly spatial understanding of urban issues and to explore the processes of social and cultural construction via a temporal lens. Just as urgent is the need to demonstrate to those who seek utility from urban theory the importance of conceptualising urban issues from a temporal perspective. Therefore, the first problem with which this work seeks to engage is stated as follows:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
    a. time is socially constructed, *and*
    b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

The overwhelmingly spatial conditions of the urban field reveal many areas that would mark a significant contribution to knowledge in this regard. Beyond the explanatory shortcomings thus far described, pertinent areas might extend to and include, for example, the phenomenological experience of urban time; the impacts of temporal technology; the routes through which urban time is constructed; or the social consequences of particular temporalities[6]. However, as evidenced by the concerns raised in the previous section, the explanatory shortcomings of urban studies don't arise simply as gaps to filled. That temporal concerns have fallen from the agendas of urban inquiry is not solely an intellectual avenue marked as opportunity in the urban field. Indeed, given urban studies' well developed appreciation of diversity within the urban population, the conditions which have allowed such omissions to form in the first place are themselves questionable. Recognising this reveals that it is not enough to merely highlight the sites of time's construction, pressing though this certainly is, but that it is necessary to look to why such concerns have fallen from the urban agenda. Accordingly, the second problem with which this work engages is as follows:

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

As suggested by my light engagement with this problem in the previous section, the political nature of academic knowledge production is potentially consequential in such a case. This brief look also suggested that the temporal understandings of urban studies were as normative and naturalised as their prospective targets. As such, the third and final problem with which this work engages is as follows:

3. Knowledge of the urban is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

This third and final problem reveals that in addition to highlighting the temporal dimensions of urban problems and looking to why such concerns have fallen from the urban agenda, it is necessary to consider the ways in which time can be introduced as a

research topic in a field that is dominated by spatial research. As stressed at the end of the previous section, where matters of time sit at the intersection of everyday life and urban studies attention must be paid across both sites in conjunction.

Taking direction from the research problems described, the main contribution this work seeks to make is to help imagine a research environment in which questions of difference, the city and time can be suitably posed and engaged with. To that effect, the purpose of this research is:

- To expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study.

More specifically, this work aims to:

- bring to life time's social construction, and with it, to highlight sites of its normative function in the contemporary city;
- open up dialogue on the meaning of time and temporality in the city;
- consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions which have contributed to time's naturalisation;
- help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; *and*
- stress the need to consider contemporary urban problems from a temporal perspective.

Beyond the scope of this study, and in the longer term, this work aims to contribute to a temporal urban agenda that is as effective as it is buoyant. Perhaps the ultimate test of this will once again come back to the question with which this chapter opened. Only, rather than return a list of sites where time is absent and naturalised, when *what about time?* is posed to the urban field it shall overwhelmingly yield an emphatic content which attests to the significance of time for urban inquiry and its concerns.

notes

[1] The episode, entitled *In this White House*, is the fourth episode of the show's second season, originally airing in 2000.

[2] See Dickens (1859/1999); Hugo (1862/1982); Zamyatin (1924/2007); Bradbury (1953/2008); Metropolis (1927); Brazil (1985).

[3] *The Glasgow effect* is a widely used term, referring to unexplained poor health and low life expectancy of Glaswegians when compared to the rest of the UK and Europe (see Walsh, et al., 2010).

[4] To be very clear, I'm not arguing that time is altogether absent in urban studies. It has a central presence in a number of texts, including Kenneth Lynch's *What Time is this Place* (1972) and, crucially, in Lefebvre's *Rhythmanalysis (2004)*; not to mention its constitutive presence in the hybrid terms of *space/time* (Harvey, 1989), *time-geography* (Hägerstrand, 1970) and *timespace* (May and Thrift, 2001). What I am arguing, however, is that there is a naturalness presumed of time, in comparison to space which, after the *spatial turn*, is more readily recognised as produced and productive of social realities, and, therefore, an important means by which to conceptualise difference, social justice, culture, the Other, and so on.

[5] This is not to suggest that Lefebvre's work is the best or only way to examine the city temporally, only that it can be used to show what a temporally aware urban field might look for.

[6] See Appendix One for the results of the research mapping exercise which led to the identification of these areas.

Chapter Two

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME

Introduction

A BRIEF NOTE ON METHOD

It might seem a bit strange that I should preempt the literature chapters of this work with a discussion of research methods. It would perhaps be more expected that having outlined the problems with which the work is engaged in Chapter One, I would now proceed with a review that embeds them within the wider disciplinary literature; allowing me to unequivocally identify and name the gap this work intends to fill. Only then would my attention turn to my research, actioned largely through the presentation and defence of my chosen methodological approach. While this pattern of thesis writing in many ways epitomises both the conventional social science thesis and the pursuit of academic knowledge as it is classically imagined, my own PhD journey has revealed such notions at odds with the progression of this work. I have broader concerns which relate to this and which I will attend to in later chapters, but for now, there are two aspects of this tension which emerge most prominently at this point.

First, I am unable to embed this work into the urban studies' literature on time given that this thesis has as a primary concern the very absence of such work. Second, the absence of this literature does not simply represent a gap in existing knowledge that requires to be filled but just as pressing are those questions which consider why such a gap has emerged in the first place. As such, these next two chapters look upon the literature on time not for review but as a research resource in its own right, that is they seek the literature not as support for but to *do* the work of the PhD. In addition to the extensive research activities of reading, synthesis and analysis which make possible yet often go unmentioned in literature chapters, these next two chapters also draw on primary research generated through

autoethnography, a method which I've been pursuing since the first year of this work and which has been very much reflected in my writing style thus far. I therefore want to take a moment to remark briefly on this method.

The practice and potential of autoethnography is in no way commonly agreed upon by the academic community. It has been diversely defined, ranging from a cultural study of one's own people (Hayano, 1979; Anderson, 2006), to a method which allows researchers to understand themselves in deeper ways, in turn enhancing their understanding of other issues (Hemmingson, 2008). Sitting somewhere between these descriptions, my initial turn to autoethnography was prompted by my desire to get behind the dominant experiences and representations of time in everyday urban life. Having designed and conducted a three week experiment during which I aimed to eliminate my access to clocks in order to reflect on my experience of time without these conventional tools of time-keeping[7], I also began to realise the broader potential of this method more generally. My eventual practice of autoethnography in this work has allowed me not simply to isolate and examine those aspects of my own culture which I take for granted, but furthermore, in helping make them strange and unnatural, it has yielded a very powerful, transformative effect on both my perception of time and the city, and also on my position as an academic researcher more generally. As such, it has formed an ongoing method in both this work and my broader practice, unbounded by notions of research start and end dates or ideas of what might constitute the research field. Moreover, in addition to its ongoing practice I have also conducted two other stand-alone autoethnography *experiments*. I draw on all three of these experiments, described briefly below, in these next two chapters, and throughout the thesis.

EXPERIMENT ONE
EVERYDAY LIFE WITHOUT CLOCKS

This experiment explored the experience of everyday life without the use of conventional methods of time-reckoning. The aim was to examine how and to what extent the subjective and intersubjective experience of time remains sensible without access to clocks, and to consider what this in turn reveals about the materiality of time in the contemporary city.

EXPERIMENT TWO
SAME SPACE, DIFFERENT TIME

This experiment tried to capture some of the space/time connections of daily urban life over five weeks by staggering (by 90 minutes) a walk taken every Tuesday by the same route through the city, culminating with a stop in the Tramway café.

EXPERIMENT THREE
EXPERIENCES OF HOLIDAY TIME

> This experiment tried to capture and compare some of the different sensibilities experienced while on holiday and while at work. It looked to how the perception of time differed, and how this in turn shapes perception of time in the moment and going forward.

There is a much more in depth discussion of the method of autoethnography in Chapter Five of this work. For now, however, it should hopefully suffice to say that it, along with the non-urban literature on time, has held a generative function in the content produced across these next two chapters.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS TWO AND THREE

Time strikes a natural, almost inevitable figure in the contemporary city. It is carried with us daily: on our watches, diaries and mobile phones; within in our minds as we calculate, sort and organise our tasks for the day, weeks and months ahead. Rarely do we question its nature but instead work within a reality which assumes it as fact. Despite such appearances, time is not natural nor factual but has form in a rich tapestry of representations, feelings, experiences, conceptualisations and behaviours. That a sense of its naturalness should pervade the modern urban experience must therefore be recognised as a partial, exclusionary and normative view of time, as outlined by the first point of my research problem:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
    a. time is socially constructed, *and*
    b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

That such a problem seems largely absented from the urban literature makes this concern all the more urgent and pronounced. As such, the aim of the next two chapters is to develop this argument further. To achieve this, Chapter Two looks to the social construction of time, whilst Chapter Three looks to time's construction of the social. Taken together, they aim to show that time is socially constructed, and that such constructions are political in form, function and effect.

Given the relative absence of such concerns in the urban literature direction is instead taken from other fields, including sociology, philosophy and anthropology. It is, however,

worth pointing out two things. First, the absence of temporal concerns within urban studies is not unique to the discipline. And second, those temporal inquiries found within sociology, philosophy and anthropology do not exist fully ideal for this task. Indeed, even in those disciplines where time is appreciated as, or at very least recognised in some quarters as constructed, there remains long standing barriers to recognising the full extent to which it is culturally and socially variable, and hence politically significant. In sociology, such analyses have only emerged in the last thirty or so years, and reflecting on this Barbara Adam considers that time has been a long standing "missing problem" in all social disciplines:

> Much like people in their everyday lives, social scientists take time largely for granted. Time is such an obvious factor in social science that it is almost invisible. To 'see' it and to recognise it in not just its dominant but also its less visible forms has proved to be hard work.
>
> 1990: 3

Certainly, Adam's writing on the subject (1988; 1989; 1990; 1995), and her work to bring it more to the fore by establishing the journal *Time and Society* in 1992, have gone some way to making recognisable the considerable absence of social time studies prior. However she, and others (Bastian, 2014), continue to stress that considerable work remains in this area (2006). In philosophy too, despite time being a long standing topic of metaphysical debate those accounts on offer certainly have their shortcomings. While the discipline hosts a long and varied engagement with time's different natures and experiences, there are those who contend that its most pregnant expressions remain with Newtonian physics and Cartesian dualisms of thought (Bernet, 1982; Ingold, 1986; Adam, 1988; Macnaughten and Urry, 1998; Urry, 2000). Nonetheless, philosophy, and specifically metaphysics, has proved itself a key domain for those starting to inquire after time, even in those studies of a non-philosophical bent. Finally, while anthropology has in many ways been at the forefront of exposing different systems of time and temporality, its earlier writings are today criticised for masking an elevation of *our* time as *Time,* in and through the ways it has traditionally attended to the time of Others. Nonetheless, even taking into account these disciplinary limits, anthropology, along with sociology and philosophy, offers an emergent body of literature on time. And taken together, these literatures provide sufficient theoretical and empirical insight to begin engagement with a problem that in urban inquiry is notable only for its absence.

Having got such caveats out of the way I'll now describe the structure of these next two chapters, which together seek to delve more deeply into the significance and consequence of the first research problem of this work. Each chapter takes as its cue and target, parts (a) and (b) of research problem one respectively. This chapter begins its task by looking to the diversity and plurality of Other times in order to consider how *our* time might have been different. Arguing that this reflexivity allows us to recognise time as constructed, I mark out some of the early politics that link parts (a) and (b) of the research problem. Having exploded the view of a naturalised and factual time in principle, Chapter Two then looks to the dominant form of Western urban time, and concludes by looking in greater detail to the various sites of its construction.

Having thoroughly engaged with part (a) of the research problem in this chapter, the aim of Chapter Three thereafter is to consider part (b), and to examine time's construction of the social. I begin by looking toward the material consequences of time as they emerge in and through the Western urban context. From such concerns I then look to identify and describe in more specific detail time's functions which give rise to those areas of political concern outlined in Chapter Two, and to consider those groups and individuals who are most negatively affected by such mechanisms. The final part of Chapter Three looks to the challenge of posing such questions within urban studies – a site, I argue, that time is naturalised in and through – and I end with an overview of how this thesis proceeds in light of the insight generated through my engagement with point one of my research problem.

Towards an Intimate Politics of Time

PLACING OUR TIME WITHIN THE OTHER

The idea that time is a relevant dimension for urban inquiry marks a cornerstone of this thesis, nestled within which is another, more foundational belief: *time is not homogenous nor natural, but is itself constructed in and through social interaction*. When faced with the overriding sensibility of *representations of time*, to re-use the Lefebvreian terminology from Chapter One, such a position can be difficult to maintain. Indeed, at the start of this PhD, even though I was increasingly questioning the modes of time which I took for granted and challenging them with my own *times of representation*, I nonetheless found myself caught within the familiarity of what I *knew*. At moments such as these I found Henry Rutz's opening remarks

to *The Politics of Time* to be incredibly supportive. Writing that "[t]he key to a politics of time is the theorem that time is a social and cultural construct" (1992: 2), Rutz's claim not only allowed me to state that time was constructed with some confidence, but helped me believe it so. I found the same true of Emile Durkheim's turn from the absolute time of metaphysics towards time's cultural diversity in *The Elementary forms of Religious Life* (1912); Carol Greenhouse's appropriately central premise that "time is cultural" (1996: 1); and Barbara Adam's insistence "that a multitude of times coexist" (1995: 42). Their combined protest that time was many things beyond its seemingly natural appearance allowed me to position time as an object of urban power and to connect it, in principle, to the ills of inequality, deprivation and poverty, unevenly pervasive in the landscape of the contemporary city. And here, it was possible to arrive at a most general understanding of the political nature of time's construction, representation and use.

It was not, however, the theory contained in these sociological accounts, but my exposure to Other times within them, and within other texts, which I believe set in motion the more intimate trajectory of this work outlined at the end of Chapter One. Piece by piece, stitch by stitch, as I've read, reflected and wrote about time the resounding result has not been to my better understanding but rather time's continued diversification within my own mind. At points this has been overwhelmingly the case, and to this day I keenly share the sense of anthropologist Nancy D. Munn who likens the experience of reading about time to the reading of Jorge Luis Borge's *Book of Sand* in Borge's short story of the same name. "As one opens this book, pages keep growing from it – it has no beginning or end", writes Munn in her seminal essay, *The Cultural Anthropology of Time* (1992: 93). I've come to recognise, however, that Munn's choice of analogy captures much more than the overwhelming experience of time's infinite diversity, it reveals the continuously transformative effect of looking. And I have found this to be an all together more powerful effect than theory alone, no more so than in relation to those times of practice and of experience with which we are most connected in our daily lives. It has enabled me to shift from a position where I *believed* that time was constructed to one where I *perceive* it as such. This is a position I now consider necessary to this work given that my aim is not simply to look towards an idea that time is constructed, but rather, is to cast the time of urban life, the time that *I* experience, within this assessment. There are, of course, no easy shortcuts to this effect. Nonetheless, an appreciation can at least be drawn by presenting just some of the diversity which has coloured my journey thus far:

ONE: There are no units of time between the month and day and night. People indicate the occurrence of an event more than a day or two ago by reference to some other event which took place at the same time or by counting the number of intervening 'sleeps' or, less commonly, 'suns'. There are terms for to-day, to-morrow, yesterday, etc., but there is no precision about them.

TWO: Gets up late, hits the street in the late morning or early afternoon, and works his way to the set. This is a place for relaxed social activity. Hanging on the set with the boys is the major way of passing time and waiting until some necessary or desirable action occurs. [...] On the set yesterday merges into today, and tomorrow is an an emptiness to be filled in and through the pursuit of bread and excitement.

THREE: The constantly diminishing future creates a new emphasis on the here, the present, the now, and while the threat of no future hovers overhead like a storm cloud, the urgency of being also expands the potential of the moment.

FOUR: Time has stopped; there is no time. [...] The past and future have collapsed into the present and I can't tell them apart.

FIVE: Now again we wait, facing each other silently [...] We sit, the way Zen masters sit. There's no awkwardness in it, no frantic noddings of the head or reassuring smiles.

SIX: And eat and drink until the white thread becomes distinct to you from the black thread of the dawn. Then strictly observe the fast until nightfall.

SEVEN: I do not know the date of my brother's fall but I remember that it was autumn and the beginning of his first and my final year in primary school.

EIGHT: The meetings took hours. But they were supposed to go on forever. They created a different structure of relevance, a different universe, one in which time was set out of order.

NINE: My alarm goes off. I glance at my phone but its not time to get up. I've fifteen minutes yet. I may not sleep, but I'm winning all the same with the time I've made for myself.

TEN: Time is divided not into years, but into two seasons: the dry season *Kuaripe* ('in the sun') and the rainy season *Amana* ('rain'). [...] The passage of the seasons is marked by changes in the weather, and consequent changes in the landscape, and also by the rhythm of agricultural activities.

ELEVEN: As for time, female subjectivity seems to offer it a specific concept of measurement that essentially retains *repetition* and *eternity* out of the many modalities that appear throughout the history of civilisation. On the one hand, this measure preserves cycles, gestation, and the eternal return of biological rhythm which is similar to the rhythm of nature [...] On the other hand, it preserves a solid temporality that is faultless and impenetrable, one that has so little to do with linear time that the very term 'temporality' seems inappropriate.

TWELVE: a cacophony of feelings and sensations, a bit like being tossed inside a washing machine. [...] a sense that time is standing still, or that your world is spiralling out of control. [...] in a dream, where nothing feels real [...] thoughts are fragmented.

THIRTEEN: I know without looking that the room where the candles would be burning is having its last golden moment of the day, the sun having sunk low enough to gild the walls. The sun sets shortly thereafter and plunges the world inside my time zone into [...] a temporal no-man's-land. It's neither the end of the sixth day nor the beginning of the seventh.

FOURTEEN: A *taytu* (a species of yam) contains a certain degree of ripeness, bigness, roundedness, etc.; without one of these defining ingredients, it is something else, perhaps a *bwanawa* or a *yowana*. [...] Events and objects are self-contained in another respect; there is a series of beings, but no becoming. There is no temporal connection between objects. The *taytu* always remains itself; it does not become over ripe; over-ripeness is an ingredient of another, a different being.

FIFTEEN: [They] always carry the past with them [...] time is a tapestry incorporating the past, present and future. The past is ever present.

SIXTEEN: It seemed to me, first, like a kind of solvent which dissolved the future, our future, a little at a time. It was like a dark stain, a floating, inky transparency hovering over Wally's body, and its intention was to erase the time ahead of us, to make that time, each day, a little smaller.

SEVENTEEN: For her, time stands still, moments flow together, the past and future do not lie still behind and before her. In place of sequence, and linear relation, there is an overwhelming richness of sensation, which pulls her attention from the outer world. She is immersed in the immediacy of experience. Her body is no longer a neutral background for her consciousness.

EIGHTEEN: Time changes and it changes reality. The role of time in my life relates to my consciousness and emotional relationship to time as well as my concern about what I do with it, how I use it. [...] Today I live more in the present than ten years ago.

NINETEEN: There's also a kinetic and haptic difference here. No longer checking in with the clock, I no longer reach for my phone. But it's *more* than that. My shoulders no longer meet my ears. My brow is no longer creased. I finish breakfast and I *look* outside the window. Materially, this *feels* different.

TWENTY: Sunday mornings are the lowest part of the week, because with no demands on attention, they are unable to decide what to do. The rest of the week psychic energy is directed by external routines: work, shopping, favorite TV shows, and so on. But what is one to do Sunday morning after breakfast, after having browsed through the papers?

TWENTY-ONE: When the stop arrests the intellectualising tendencies of the mind, the concept of time is also affected [...] When time comes to a stop, one experiences not timelessness, but time unqualified by intellect. [...] A reversal of ordinary assumptions takes place. Events are linked by nonlinear relations rather than by succession. Time ceases to be past, present and future, and instead either moves or is frozen. Time becomes ample enough to allow an event to occur without crimping it. Time ceases to exist apart from what takes place; instead it becomes a quality specific to the event.

These twenty-one excerpts cast time in a myriad of guises, together revealing the heterogeneity of Others' times. But their commentary also extends far beyond the diversity of those times told to reach and include our own, regardless of the form the *our* may take. Some may resonate or pass as unremarkable, others might jar or baffle. Their effect will be entirely dependant on the reader. But that they should impress themselves at all, or indeed fail to impress, tells of an implicit statement of (y)our time contained within each[8]. When viewed collectively, the effect intensifies: each builds upon the others, marking out a diversity of time across both history and space, including (y)our time in the gaps between. The eventual result is a collage which speaks not only to time's diversity, but to everything (y)our time is, everything that it is not, and everything that it might have been. And here, where our own personal time is contained within the collage – as just another piece which speaks to time's diversity, contingency and construction – the idea that time is not homogenous nor natural is not only believed of *Other* time, it may begin to be perceived of our own practices and experiences.

In recognising that time, *our* time that we take for granted, really could have been other than it is, it becomes possible to imagine a politics concealed within dominant representations which colour not only Others' time but also our own. Indeed, it is this placing of our time within the Other which allows for a much more intimate and relevant politics of time to emerge. At this stage it is only the most basic of discussions that is possible. Nonetheless, it is one that can reveal the powerful and divisive politics that time enacts across three key dimensions: practices of time; the relationship between time and culture; and the production of temporal norms. I'd argue that these three areas alone reveal the significance of time for urban studies and establish the need for a purposeful temporal consciousness within urban theory and research. To look to the first of these dimensions. A number of those examples given – excerpts ONE, FOUR, SIX, SEVEN, NINE, TEN, THIRTEEN and SEVENTEEN – relate to or speak of one such practice of time, the act of *telling* it. Even as presented, these acts relate not to time's natural measure, but to the values which underpin it. Compare, for example, excerpts SIX and NINE. Excerpt SIX is quoted from the Quran and describes the comparative use of different coloured threads to meet the daily fasting conditions of Ramadan[9]. Excerpt NINE comes from one of my own autoethnographic writings, recorded in response to my usual practice of *waking-up* in the morning. In each excerpt the person doing the reckoning gauges, measures, or counts not simply what time it is, but in doing so enacts that which is of value to them. In excerpt SIX, it is not a mechanical time piece set to an abstract measure but a *thread clock* dependent on conditions of light and darkness which ensures that fasting satisfactorily meets a literal interpretation of the Quran. As far as my own activities go, an alarm clock set not to the hour I wish to rise but instead to the time I wish to first gain awareness of the time ensures that *getting out of bed* feels more of my own making. In bringing these more subjective moments of time reckoning to the fore the notion that there exists a solely natural measure which sits beneath our temporal practice is quickly dispelled, helping reveal that even the practice of *telling* time enacts and engages a politics of time in and of itself.

Time's politics, however, are not contained in practices of time alone. The second dimension is revealed when the values with which time is measured, gauged and counted are contextualised in relation to a wider conception of priority and worldview. Look to excerpt THIRTEEN, for example. It is not simply the practice of the Sabbath but the corresponding rabbinical view that it is necessary to attend temple in both space and time (Schulevitz, 2011: 3) that structures this "temporal no-mans land" as a definitive feature of

Jewish culture. Similarly, the event orientated times of excerpts ONE and TEN make clear the connections between time, nature and the land for the Nuer and the Amondawa, respectively. In the broader literature, the strength of these connections between a culture and its time are well documented. Indeed, Robert Levine advocates that much can be told of what matters to a culture by looking to their systems of time (2006). While in *The Silent Language*, Edward T. Hall, someone from whom Levine takes great inspiration, reveals the power with which time *speaks* when he writes: "time talks. It speaks more plainly than words. The message it conveys comes through loud and clear. [...] It can shout the truth where words lie" (Hall, 1973: 1). This strong connection between a culture and its systems of time suggests that time's politics are not distinct nor immune from the ideological movements which come to shape a culture's broader form, and that time is a key object of power in this regard. But perhaps most significantly, it reveals that the politics of time extend far beyond the construction of time as an isolated thing, towards the construction of a *way of life*.

Finally, the third, and most pertinent dimension comes to the fore where there is potential for those excerpts presented to occur simultaneous within a context in which one time is dominant: the modern city. In a global age where the mixing of culture and identity in and through urban environs is prolifically documented (see, for example, Sassen, 1991; Featherstone, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 1997; Brenner, 1999; Low, 2000; Back, 2007), time's diversity translates into a plurality of time. Each individual comes to face not only their subjective experiences of time which differ from dominant modes, but the temporal systems of Others. As Lewis Mumford's description of "the Englishman in France who thought that bread was the right name for *le pain*" makes clear, however, "each culture believes that every other kind of space and time is an approximation to or a perversion of the real space and time in which it lives" (1946: 18). In the modern city, such judgements are of course uneven in their reach. Just like the argument Lefebvre puts forth of a cultural hegemony that is enacted via space, the processes of time's production are based upon values which lead to the social production of meaning, the production and codification of which is commanded by dominant groups as a tool to reproduce their dominance. Therefore, recognising this plurality of time within a setting in which *one* time is dominant reveals that those who conform to the dominant time have the more prominent platform from to name Others' time as a "perversion". This necessitates that those first two political dimensions already considered – the everyday practices of time and

their connections to a *way of life* – must here contend with an extended politics. Where time is not merely lived in but is constructed in the living, time's value accords not simply with time itself, or the broader ideological context in which it operates. It has the capacity to extend outwards beyond its own from to order difference, and hence to affect time's users in exclusionary ways in much the same fashion as Rosalyn Diprose describes:

> Truth may be arbitrary, but it endures through the work of fabricating social life and preserving the individual within the cultural group that that individual inhabits. To say one sees otherwise than the majority is to disqualify oneself, or be excluded, from that way of life.
>
> 2002: 150

Such functions point to time's ability to exclude those *ways of life* which fall out with dominant urban logics. Perhaps more crucially, however, it reveals that it is not simply the construction of time in general terms, but the construction of a dominant and normative time that is of immediate consequence to the visibility of time's diversity and plurality, and the wellbeing of time's users in the contemporary city.

In order to develop this discussion further, and into more specific areas of concern, it is now necessary to have in mind the form of those representations dominant to the contemporary urban context, and the sites of their construction. This more intimate understanding will help make real the ways in which norms of time come face to face with alternative expressions, revealing the likely sites at which power, order and exclusion sit side by side. As such, this chapter will next look to those *representations of time* found in *modern* and *Western* modes. Widely discussed as reciprocally connected to the Western history of urban economic life, and the rise in urbanisation across its various stages (see Marx, 1857/1973 and 1867/1976; Simmel, 1903/1995; Mumford, 1934 and 1946; Thomson, 1967; Giddens, 1981; Thrift, 1981; and Glennie and Thrift, 2005), I consider that such broad categorisations of time remain consonant with the continual evolution of the modes dominant to the contemporary urban context. This chapter will then conclude by examining the construction, maintenance and reification of these dominant modes across a handful of different sites. The task of Chapter Three thereafter will be to consider the political and uneven exercise of such constructions, and to examine their reign over individuals and groups disadvantaged by dominant modes of urban time.

FINDING OUR TIME WITHIN THE OTHER

Catching a glimpse of that which is so embedded, natural and taken for granted is not an easy task. The tenor of the previous section – the idea that our time is contained within our descriptions of Other time – does, however, offer a possible way into such matters. Such is a notion that in many ways extends itself from the idea that learning of the Other brings with it a learning of the self. In making his dedication of *The Silent Language* "to my friends and colleagues in foreign cultures who taught me so much about my own culture" (1973: iv), the value of reflexivity was something clearly at the forefront of Hall's thoughts as he wrote of time and space. And within the more recent time studies of anthropology and sociology, a similarly reflexive position is increasingly attributable to the work of Johannes Fabian (1983) and Barbara Adam (1989; 1990; and 1995), amongst others (Ingold, 1986; and Greenhouse, 1996). For Fabian, such an approach is a necessary one. Arguing against uncritical constructions of the West as progressive and of Others as dwelling in earlier, less advanced times, he seeks to unravel anthropology's hidden agenda – what he recognises to be a *politics of time* aimed at creating a discourse of Otherness which justified colonial rule and the "domination and exploitation of one part of mankind by another" (1983: xi). Adam's motivation similarly stems from the seemingly unproblematic presentations of *us* and *them* in traditional ethnographies. She insists that an "explicitly reflexive approach to time is imperative" (1995: 31) in order that time studies might move beyond dichotic explanations which serve only to conceal the plurality of times which coexist in contemporary life.

While disciplinary critiques such as these are a common driver, the potential for reflexive practice to unpack those *representations of time* which quietly dominate the Western experience is also recognised. Asserting that "the backcloth upon which our descriptions are drawn remains unattended", Adam insists that "any analysis of 'other time' is a simultaneous commentary on 'our time'" (1995: 31). With reference to those studies which epitomise the traditional work of anthropology, she continues to set forth the logic of her position, arguing:

> The studies of Evans-Pritchard (1940/1969) Whorf (1956) and the conceptual models of Lévi-Strauss (1963/1972) provide excellent exemplars of classical analyses of 'other time'. It is, however, neither their respective analyses of the difference between 'our' and 'other time' nor, as I have already mentioned, the many critiques offered in response to

> these studies which are of interest here. Rather, it is the stereotypical backdrop of unquestioned 'Western time' against which the respective time perception of the 'traditional' cultures are delineated which needs to become the centre of our attention
>
> 1995: 32

In addition to Adam's focus on the "stereotypical backdrop" implicit in traditional constructions of Other time, I'd argue that this reflexive potential further extends beyond the accounts of appointed experts, to moments where we describe our own practices and experiences of time as *being* or *feeling* different from the norm; where we witness our *times of representation* in contrast, contradiction or even conflict with the seeming objectivity of *representations of time*. Both types of reflections share in common an implicit ordinariness and everydayness of time which is used to cast a strangeness on that which time is not. Both, therefore, offer a valuable insight into that which time *is*. This section takes its cue from such effects. Combining reflexive readings of those excepts already presented[10], along with sociological literature on time and my own autoethnographic findings, the aim is to bring to the fore some of those constructions characteristic of the dominant and normative times of urban life.

To begin this task, I want to first return to the excerpt from *The West Wing* discussed in Chapter One, and specifically to Toby's description of the problem. In exclaiming: "[t]hey don't own wristwatches. They can't tell time", Toby reveals little about time in Equatorial Kundu, but a great deal about his own conception. His articulation thrusts forth an assumption that the *telling* of time is inextricability tied to a time-piece: an abstract, objective marker severed from its user's subjective experience. While this analysis stems from a fictional account it nonetheless resonates with the non-fictional context of its origin. Looking again to those excerpts presented at the end of the previous section, similar evidence can be drawn from Evans-Pritchard's depiction of Nuer time as "oecological [ecological]" in excerpt ONE, and Sinha, et al.'s description of the Amondawa's reliance on agricultural and meteorological markers in excerpt TEN. Both tell of a different time. Their success in making *sensible* the difference of these times, however, relies on an ability to contrast them with something already understood. As such, "no units of time between the month and day and night" and "no precision" in excerpt ONE; and time that is "divided not into years" and governed instead by the natural "rhythm of agricultural activities" in

excerpt TEN, can be read, in contrast, as time that is measurable and precise, divisible and countable in single objective units, and above all else, abstracted from nature. In addition, that time which deviates from such measures should appear so dramatically altered – as suggested by the depiction of *protest time* in excerpt EIGHT which saw a "different structure of relevance, a different universe, one in which time was set out of order" – the extent to which time's more *natural* partner is the clock in this context is strongly indicated.

In the broader literature too, the use of an abstract and objective measurement through which time is *correctly* reckoned is found not only to be a definitive hallmark of Western time, but is further extended. Taking the short step from time that is associated with the clock to time that is synonymous with it, *clock time* emerges as all pervasive. While Adam sees it an important point to reiterate the plurality of times which exist beyond *clock time*, she nonetheless recognises a urgent need to impress "the central importance and hegemony of the abstract, decontextualised, neutral medium of *clock time*" (1995, 156). Eviatar Zerubavel agrees on its prominence, writing:

> It is thus the clock, whose introduction to the West cannot be separated from the evolution of the schedule there, that allows the particular notion of temporality which has becomes so characteristic of Western civilisation. It is *clock time* that is at the basis of the modern Western notion of duration and that allows the durational rigidity that is so typical of modern life.
>
> 1981: 61

Many who write on this subject similarly afford *clock time* a definitive rank (Nowotny, 1994; Greenhouse, 1996; Landes, 2000; Levin, 2006; and Birth, 2012), and reflecting on its prominence Young and Schuller muse "[w]e have become like Alice's White Rabbit, always aware not of what time is but of what time it is" (1988: 2). Such is a notion that Adam shares and extends even further, commenting that it is not simply the creation and use of *clock time* that marks a definitive aspect of Western society but that we "relate to that creation as *being* time and organise [our] social life around it" (1990: 120). Her emphasis suggests that *clock time* not only dominates the contemporary Western experience of time, but that it dominates the contemporary Western experience absolutely.

Within this context many of those features of the clock can accordingly be extended to the experience of *clock time* in and across daily life. Going so far as to describe the clock as a necromantic device – a tool in which "the dead thinks for the living" (2012: 35) – Kevin Birth provides a possible foundation for this. His description reveals the behavioural trajectory of *clock time's* invention and further echoes Young and Schuller's description of our passive engagement with time. Birth himself writes: "[c]locks are tools which tell us time, but that obscure the answer to the question of what time is" (2012: 37). Indeed, such acquiescence manifests in practices that themselves are comparable to the clock, whereby the referencing of an objective, quantitative and rational source makes *clock time* something that is practiced by measuring, checking, counting and dividing. For Zerubavel, the extent of this is underlined by the all encompassing need for temporal regularity, where it not only expected that time-pieces should keep precise and regular time, but that the same is desired of our activities which fill it (1981). I've reflected on many such moments myself throughout this PhD: of the need to schedule meetings in one or two hour slots; to meet on or at half past the hour; to maintain week days for work and weekends for rest; and to subtract from time available in order to work out how long something will take – practices very much indicative of a life that is supposed to run like *clockwork*.

Beyond these everyday practices, there are certain characteristics of the clock that take on a markedly different shape. While the objects which maintain *clock time* are represented in more cyclical terms – hands which continuously rotate from twelve to twelve; diaries which start in January only to return to it again in twelve months – it is a decisively more linear structure that characterises the modern Western notion (Zerubavel, 1981; Adam, 1990 and 1995; Nowotny, 1994; and Greenhouse, 1996). Helpful counterpoints to this can be seen in Ziauddin Sardar's description of Wahhabism in excerpt FIFTEEN and Dorothy D. Lee's description of the Trobriand Islanders in excerpt FOURTEEN. In contrast, the linearity dominant to Western time becomes all too obvious: the past is never present, nor does the past, present and future combine – each is contained and maintained in neat progression. Moreover, the temporal direction which runs from the past to the present, and onwards to the future, is inescapable, and to Adam's mind it is this linearity which further secures time's irreversibility and elevates the importance of history and succession (1995). And where this linearity is considered alongside those abstract, objective and quantitative aspects, a further dimension is revealed: the measuring of time by distance and its resulting spatialisation. As Roger Jones explains:

> When we speak, for example, of time intervals and durations or of time order and sequence, we have in mind an imaginary long straight axis of time with points on it locating events and distances along it measuring the elapsed time between events. The very words *interval*, *duration*, *sequence* evoke spatial images that help us to think about time and its measurement.
>
> 1983: 79, original emphasis

These presentations of *clock time* as fixed, measurable, linear and spatial combine to help render it as something that is finite and can be used up, as "something that passes or can be saved, sold or wasted" (Adam, 1995: 33). This has a considerable two-fold effect on those temporal modes which accompany *clock time's* dominance in Western life. First, and most notably, is time's commodification – something stressed most famously by Karl Marx in both *Grundrisse* (1857/1973) and *Capital* (1867/1976). Connecting this back to the dominance of *clock time*, Levine writes that "[w]hen the clock predominates, time becomes a valuable commodity. *Clock time* cultures take for granted the reality of time as fixed, linear, and measurable" (2006: 90). Indeed, for Marx it was precisely the decontextualised, abstract nature of time that facilitated its commodification, allowing the conversion of a variable quality into an invariable and abstract exchange value (1857/1973). Second, the foremost economic value that is constructed, maintained and reified within and through *clock time* is widely linked to an increasingly hurried pace of modern life (Adam, 1995; Levine, 2006; Burnett et al., 2007; and Birth, 2012). Considering this to be decisively urban phenomenon, Irving Hoch writes:

> As a city grows larger, the value of its inhabitants' time increases with the city's increasing wage rate and cost of living, so that economizing on time becomes more urgent, and life becomes more hurried and harried.
>
> 1976: 857

It is at this juncture where *clock time* is most readily recognised not simply of the clock but of the daily practices which accompany its use, that the first and second dimensions of time's politics considered in the previous section (pages 41–42) are most articulate and interrelated: our practices of *clock time* connect to and maintain the *ways of life* associated with them. Further, it is additionally possible to recognise the third dimension here. While I've retained the descriptor of *clock time* throughout this section it must be stated that *clock time* is known

here simply as time, and more significant than those individual hallmarks – be it time's fixity, objectiveness, abstract form, quantitative nature, measurability, divisibility, linearity, spatiality, economically assumed value, or, indeed, its hurried pace – is that each is considered natural in this context. This reinforces not only the dominance of these hallmarks but, viewed in relation to the first and second political dimensions noted above and in the previous section, begins to hint at their hegemony and normativity. In bringing such things to light there are a number of questions which now follow in terms of the relationship between these constructions and their politics, namely:

- What leads to and maintains the formation of this time?
- How does the time that dominates modern, Western life function to order, Other and exclude?
- What are the connections between processes of temporal ordering and the ills of everyday city life?

The second and third of these questions form the work of Chapter Three. The remainder of this chapter will now cast its attention upon question one, and those sites at which dominant modes of urban time are constructed, maintained and reified as natural.

Sites of Time's Construction

Having outlined the dominant features of Western time prevalent to the contemporary urban context, it is now possible to imagine and look to the sites of their construction. By this I refer both to those areas of social interaction that are shaped by time, and those areas which are themselves a constitutive force in time's resulting form. As will be seen throughout this section, and in Chapter Three, these two aspects are far from separate. To achieve this, I again take my cue from both the literature and my own autoethnographic findings, and look first across the broad categories of history, politics, and everyday life – sites that in many ways run parallel with Durkheim's description of time as a social institution with traditions, rules and practices which surround our use of it (1912). Working to find time in the name of diversity, Durkheim turned against classical discourses of metaphysical abstraction found in the works of Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, Henri Bergson and Francis Herbert Bradley (Sorokin and Merton, 1937). And while his analysis was limited to differences between cultures, Durkheim's writings nonetheless paved the way for sociology to cast its eye on temporal difference as it is more socially constituted

(Zerubavel, 1981; Adam, 1990; Nowotny, 1994; and Greenhouse, 1996). Though I take direction from Durkheim in this instance, however, I will end my discussions in this section by looking to those systems of thought which Durkheim positioned himself against: the construction of time in and through philosophy.

Unfortunately, there is not the scope in this work to be comprehensive about any one of these sites in great detail. Indeed, such a task would be futile even if one dimension had been identified as the sole focus of this thesis. Nonetheless, while my consideration of time's construction through history, politics, everyday life and philosophy is both necessarily brief and partial, this discussion remains highly beneficial to this work insofar as it manages to make manifest just some of the complex, intermingled and intimate ways in which time becomes the *time* which dominates the contemporary urban experience.

HISTORY

The time that so typifies the modern Western temporal experience is in fact not particularly *Western* at all but is derived from a great deal of other cultural and social influences that have combined over time. The literature tells of many origin points through which time's regulation by clocks, calendars and schedules has evolved, and through which ideas of time as fixed, objective, countable, and linear have become dominant and naturalised. Remarking on some of its more multi-cultural influences in *Objects of Time: How Things Shape Temporality*, Kevin Birth reveals that it was the Ancient Egyptians who first divided day and night into twelve hours each, resulting in the daily allocation of twenty-four hours with which we are accustomed; while it was the Babylonians whose notions of sixty minutes and sixty seconds have extended to shape our own systems of counting (2012). In both examples, Birth appears keen to draw attention not simply to the non-Western cultural influences on modern time, but to emphasise that there is nothing inherently rational or scientific, i.e. *Western* about Western time. For example, while many perhaps hold a loose idea that twenty-four units of sixty-minute hours accurately tracks the movement of the earth around the sun, Birth informs that these accord only with an average day, and that the earth's axis and rotation around the sun ensures that some *days* are longer than others. Not only, then, are those hallmarks derived of the collective effort of many cultures over a long period of time, but any notion that time is solely of Western invention or a product of the scientific revolution is quashed.

Further demonstrating that our rational, objective time is in fact borne of much wider motives is the decisive influence that Benedictine monasticism has had on temporal regularity, order and punctuality. This is marked as a highly important origin point throughout much of the literature, discussed at length in a great many sources from Mumford (1967) and Foucault (1977), to Zerubavel (1981) and Adam (1995). Of its influence, Zerubavel writes:

> It is in the medieval Benedictine monasteries that we find what most probably constituted the original model for all modern Western schedules. [...] Therefore, it is in the medieval Benedictine monasteries that we ought to look for the genesis and source of diffusion of the particular type of temporal regularity that is so characteristic of modern life, as well as of one of the most fundamental sociocultural institutions in the modern West.
>
> 32

The model to which Zerubavel refers is a strict and precise timetable of daily life used by Benedictine Monks, contained in *The Rule of Saint Benedict*, *The Horarium*. Translated as *The Hours*, this schedule governed the set times for annual, weekly and daily routines, including prayer, work, sleep and bathing. To this day it remains a key aspect of Monastic life in Western Christianity, however, today its more considerable influence is arguably beyond the church (Moore, 1963; Zerubavel, 1981). In line with this proposition Michael Young considers that the first metronomic social system of Europe is indebted to the Benedictine's schedule, resulting in a "concatenation of informal and formal agreements, founded on the increasing sophistication of measurements and securing, above all, the greater willingness of people to undergo entrainment of their time habits than entrainment of any others" (1988: 78). Nonetheless, just like the cultural influences which shaped the Egyptian and Babylonian models of time to which we now ascribe, there is nothing particularly objective about *The Horarium*. According to Adam the motivation for this model was to avoid "idleness", a desire made clear in Rule XLVIII which states that "[i]dleness is the enemy of every soul" (1995: 64).

These examples reveal just some of the influences and interests which have come to bear upon the form of modern Western time, and help show the ways in which time is made *through* time. The power of history to construct time, however, is not conveyed through

individual examples alone. Rather, it is the way in which modes become traditional that to my mind reveals the true power of this site. This is quite difficult to appreciate from the examples discussed alone. Though they speak of different cultures and movements, the systems they describe retain a familiarity. The power of history to shape time is, therefore, perhaps better demonstrated by something unfamiliar. One such example is the French Revolutionary Calendar, discussed by Zerubavel (1981). Created and implemented during the French Revolution, the French Revolutionary Calendar was used by the French government from late 1793 to 1805, and for 18 days by the Paris Commune in 1871. Though it retained adherence to a twelve month year, each month was instead divided into three ten-day weeks called *décades*; and each day into ten hours of 100 decimal minutes, which were themselves divided into 100 decimal seconds. At the heart of the design was an attempt to eradicate the religious and royalist overtones of the existing Gregorian calendar, and to continue France's march towards decimalisation. As Zerubavel comments:

> The French Republican calendrical reform is undoubtedly the most radial attempt in modern history to have challenged the calendrical system that prevails in the world today. It is hard to over emphasize the extent to which the reformers obliterated the existing units of time as well as the existing time-reckoning and dating frameworks, since almost none of the constituent of those was spared. The scope of the Republican calendrical reform was almost total, since its architects strived to bring about a total symbolic transformation of the existing calendrical system.
>
> 1981: 83

That it is not used, and that many will not even recognise the historical existence of the French Revolutionary Calendar, reveals much about the historical construction of time. This example illustrates that time is not just made through time, but that it is also unmade through it. In ways more apparent than those familiar examples previously offered, the French Revolutionary Calendar reminds that history sorts and orders both the objects of time's constructions and our constructions of time into those which are legitimate and illegitimate. Furthermore, given that the symbolism of the French Revolutionary calendar arguably accords much more strongly to the secular, rationalist and enlightened tendencies of the modern West, tells of history's significant power to act upon itself: at the point at which those legitimate modes become traditional it has the ability to erase from view their diverse histories which attest to more cultural influences, and to reinforce them as simply

natural. And ultimately, then, it seems that time is made through time only so far as it is re-made and stabilised through it.

POLITICS

To now turn to politics, and its roles in influencing the shape of time. A number of political theorists have gone so far as to afford governance a very direct function in this regard, suggesting that the rise of the modern state rests in part upon its ability to provide not just standardised systems of laws and rights, but also a standardised system of time (Gross, 1985). Indeed, in very explicit ways, states around the world have governed to construct time through politics and legislation, and interventions in Western countries can be recognised as analogous to the uniform shape of modern time. In the United Kingdom, the *Interpretation Act of 1978* ensured the proliferation of Greenwich mean time (GMT) as the proper measure in both practice and law, stating that "whenever an expression of time occurs in an Act, the time referred to shall (unless otherwise specifically stated) be held to be Greenwich mean time" (Section 9). Similar measures were introduced in Belgium (1946, 1947); the republic of Ireland (1971; 2005); and in Canada (1985) (Landes, 2000), to ensure that local time in these countries was defined with reference to GMT. In the United States, the *Standard Time Act of 1918* was the first standardisation of nation-wide time. Prior to this time had been a matter reserved for local level, with not just states but cities and towns often having different measures that were maintained only by reference to a central clock (Prerau, 2005). The *Uniform Time Act of 1966* then continued these efforts, promoting "the adoption and observance of uniform time within the standard time zones" (Sections 2 and 4), and sought to simplify the methods by which Daylight Savings Time (DST) should be measured. Such strides towards standardisation are reflected across much of the Western world today. Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) was formally adopted as the legal basis for the way in which the world regulates both clocks and time in 1963, and while the United Kingdom notably maintains its legal reference to GMT, both UTC and GMT are recognised as largely synonymous (Langley, 1999).

There are a great many more interventions through which states have acted to fix time for their citizens. But what is of significance is not simply their power to explicitly construct time in certain ways, but rather, their capacity to maintain and extend existing modes. To look to those examples already discussed, it was the United Kingdom's growth as a maritime nation that prompted a better coordination of time-keeping, and arguably its

eventual development of and adherence to GMT (Nelson, 2001). While in the United States, it is argued that the practical needs of communication and travel led to the first legislation of DST practices (Prerau, 2005). In analogous ways, the move to adopt as far as possible a world-wide standardised measure in UTC similarly has the modern drivers of global trade and markets as its motivation. As Helga Nowotny remarks:

> Today, the systems of time are chiefly fixed by the market and the state. The market fixes time via the work to be done and the exchange relations between time and money. The state imposes its system of time via the legal system and thus structures the lives of its citizens.
>
> 2005: 105

In this sense, then, GMT, DST, UTC, and many other systems not discussed, don't simply construct time as a primary step. Rather, they react to time as it is already conceived in order to refine its practice. And then in making it ubiquitous they further reinforce its dominance.

There are also many legislative acts and policy measures which though they don't seek to establish a state sanctioned practice of time, at their core lies normative temporal ideals nonetheless. As Munn notes:

> The importance of calendric and related time shifts connected with sociopolitical changes is more than political in the narrow pragmatic sense. It has to do with the construction of cultural governance through reaching into the body time of persons and coordinating it with values embedded in the "worldtime" of a wider constructed universe of power.
>
> 1992: 109

Some obvious examples of Munn's "cultural governance" in a UK context include the setting of an age of consent at sixteen; establishing the right to vote at eighteen; and, by 2020, working towards the same State Pension age for men and women. These measures, and many others, fix in the mind a factual and linear progression of time across life. Less explicit examples can also be found. The policy of minimum wage, for example, introduced by Tony Blair's New Labour government in 1999 to protect low paid workers,

simultaneously maintains the idea that labour's value is correctly measured by the hour. While the UK area based initiative *Sure Start* announced in 1998 to give all children "the best possible start in life" manages to uphold the right to an equal and fair childhood, and with it, the notion that the past, present and future are causally connected in a linear direction.

Beyond these direct efforts and active strategies, time is also shaped through the very practice of politics. Barack Obama's 2008 election campaign for the United States' presidency, for example, was fought and won on the platform of *Hope* – an instruction to look not to the past but towards the future. The campaign's success in this regard was not only in obtaining the presidency but in obtaining buy-in to a particular *way of seeing*, making prolific a particular way of orientating oneself in time. A second example, and one that is much more local and familiar to me, is the 2006 cultural strategy of Glasgow City Council. Common to many of the UK's large postindustrial cities, urban cultural policies such as this look not only towards potential gains for a city's economic and tourist industries but take a largely nostalgic view of urban heritage to engender an urgent sense for reclaiming the past. In doing this, they work to construct an archive of official memories that, in similar ways to Obama's notion of hope, attempts to achieve buy-in from citizens at the level of perception. Neither of these examples explicitly remark on a use of time or the *meaning* of time itself. But relying strongly on a linear conception of time which can be reconstructed through rhetoric and a captive audience, both work to establish proper ways for citizens to experience it. As such, in these examples, and those others considered, the site of politics works both explicitly and implicitly to construct, maintain and reify time, and it does so in ways amenable to time's already dominant constructions.

EVERYDAY LIFE

Everyday life is by far the most subtle, diverse and expansive point at which time could be said to be constitutive and constructed. It not only encompasses those traditions and rules, of history and politics already discussed, but includes many other dimensions which are indicative of time's dominant form and of considerable influence to its formation. In many ways, then, everyday life is not a single site but a connection point at which rules and traditions meet with cultural practice, language, means of communication, tools, aesthetic sensibilities, technology, institutions, artistic modes of expression, naming but a few, to colour the experience of daily life. There is not scope here to consider in any detailed way

such a broad cross section of areas. Nonetheless, it remains important to recognise the diversity of those everyday dimensions through which time is constructed. As such, this section looks to three areas of everyday routine and experience at which time's *ordinariness* is often assumed: tools and technologies; language; and institutional structures and ideals.

– *Tools and technologies of time*

It is somewhat suggested by the close affiliation of the clock to *clock time* that modes of everyday life are intimately connected to the tools and technologies which are used to maintain it. As already considered, clocks, calendars and schedules form the backbone of *clock time's* practice in the modern city to such an extent that Mumford concludes it to be "the clock, not the steam engine [that] is the key-machine of the modern industrial age" (1934: 14). Indeed, it is the exacting nature of these tools which allows for the measurement and allocation of minutes, hours and days, throughout the week, month and year. And for Zerubavel, it is this ability which maintains temporal regularity, and with it the four "fundamental" parameters of time's order: sequential structure (the order in which events take place); duration (how long events last); temporal location (where, with reference to the clock, they take place); and rate of recurrence (how often events occur) (1981: 1). The time produced, however, does not remain with the tools themselves, but extends to structure the way time is felt and conceptualised in the mind (Adam, 1995; Birth, 2012). As I've conducted autoethnography throughout this PhD, I have at various points considered what my own conception of *clock time* looks like. More often than not, when someone speaks the time aloud I see in my mind's-eye the simplified clock-face on which I learned to tell time: a red bezel with a white face and different coloured numerals, which are met by two black hands, each with an arrow pointed end. Similarly, my visualisation of the week retains its image in the standard issue homework diary of my secondary school. Each double page contained a week to a view. Monday through Wednesday split the left-hand page in three; and on the facing page, Thursday and Friday took the top two slots, with Saturday and Sunday made to share the bottom. To this day, both of these images retain their strong connection to what the time, and the time available, look like to me.

In today's city Zerubavel's hallmarks of temporal regularity are not maintained by clocks, calendars and schedules alone but are also embedded within more modern technologies, a good example of which is the smart phone. There are two things of particular resonance here. First, the smart phone has the unrivalled ability to combine in one object dimensions

of time keeping that were previously disparate. This is not only more convenient, but the added benefit of multi-channel communication is also appreciable. By text message, email, voice call, and even synced applications, schedules can be compared, and time can allocated evermore efficiently – quite in keeping with the dominant ideal of the fast-paced lifestyle. The second crucial aspect of the smart phone is the vast range of additional tools available within it. *Apps* range from diaries and to-do lists, to alarm clocks and shared scheduling systems, each with the capacity to further extend the dominant hallmarks of Western time. One such example is the McTime app (Brown, 2013). Created for McDonald's workers to allow them to check their own and their co-workers schedules direct from their iPhones, scheduling becomes an outsourced and unpaid aspect of already low paid work, in many ways epitomising the *time is money* mantra of large corporations. Moreover, it enables work-time to extend beyond the place of work with ease, allowing it also to structure an individual's experience of non-work time. What this maintains from the long established tools of clocks, calendars and schedules is the idea of time budgeting. It's high level precision, however, manages to extend this notion even further. In this app, and many others I've came across, time works only as a process of subtraction – something that is *worked back from* and divided up, rather than being allocated and built from the basis of need. This further refinement to the ideals of *clock time* strongly suggests that technology does not simply cater to time's demands, but that technological advancements strongly shape the form of time available.

Beyond the smart phone and its vast range of apps, similar refinements can also be seen within the ongoing development of the alarm clock. A number of recent models go beyond the traditional notion of an alarm that sounds at a user-determined time, to include functions which require active engagement from the user in order to silence the device. *Clocky*, for example, is designed for the "40% of people" who "abuse the snooze" – it "runs away and hides if you don't get out of bed" (Nanda Home, 2011). While the *Puzzle Alarm Clock* (also available in app form) forces a level of cognitive engagement in order to rouse the user out of bed. It can only be silenced after a puzzle is solved (Ranjan, 2012). Finally, the *Money Shredding Alarm Clock*, while still in prototype stage, is designed to literally shred paper currency after a period of time if the user has not woken-up sufficiently to silence it (Olson, 2013). Such machines might be readily dismissed as novelty items, and yet the message of the time carried forth through these mediums is clear: time is finite, and is first and foremost of economic value. Such is a sentiment that would no doubt ring true for

author Jonathan Crary, who in *24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep* concludes capitalism's all encompassing colonisation of the day (2013).

Finally, it is important to reiterate that the messages of these tools and technologies remain in no way tied to the objects which articulate them, but through our use of such objects, these messages becomes further embedded into everyday life. Just as the structure of my homework diary continues to prefigure the *look* of available time in my mind, Kevin Birth impresses that in modern life *clock time* is largely experienced without reference to any actual clocks (2012). As I've continued to examine my own temporality throughout this PhD this has certainly been true of my experience also. In my first autoethnography experiment, *Everyday Life Without Clocks*, I found that even when I removed all clocks from view *clock time* remained present to such an extent that I could continue to locate myself within the day[11]. This was delivered in two particular ways. First, I found that tools and technologies that weren't designed to tell time directly nonetheless remained governed by *clock time*, and as such communicated it through their order and structure. The programming of television broadcasts, for example, maintained both a daily and weekly temporal regularity. Morning television was of notably different content from post-watershed viewing, as was weekend scheduling to programming during the week. The timing and frequency with which emails were delivered to my personal and work inboxes were another powerful indicator. My work alerts largely sounded only between the hours of 9:00AM to 5:00PM, while my personal account received a large volume of promotional content before 10:00AM and again after 5:00PM. Second, during the experiment I came to recognise that my unconscious familiarity with the ways in my routine overlapped with Others' was another strong indicator of *clock time*. Though I was not consulting a clock directly, both memory and the use of clocks by Others that were proximate helped me keep time with the conventions to which I was practiced. The findings of this experiment not only helped reinforce Birth's claims, but they strongly suggested that the construction of *clock time* comes not only via its technologies, but that it is stabilised in many more subtle, embedded and pervasive ways.

– *The language of time's articulation*

One such subtle way through which *clock time* proliferates, and the second aspect of everyday life I want to consider, is the language common to its description and practice. Like the brief discussion of tools and technology above, I found the relevance of this aspect to be revealed not only through academic writing on the subject, but supported further

through my autoethnography findings. Indeed, it wasn't until I forced my perception towards a setting that wasn't completely dominated by the clock that I grew significantly aware of the extent to which the language of *clock time* was dominant in everyday life. Again in my first experiment, this manifested through the ways in which those around me reacted to time's quantitative indicators. Numbers on clocks were frequently bestowed a qualitative value depending on how much time was left in the day. *Only a hour left* might be good should one be looking forward to *home time*, bad if there was a deadline to meet. These qualitative assessments of quantitative time served not only to uphold the idea that time's reckoning was correctly conducted through a process of subtraction, but in doing so it reinforced the sense was time was finite.

This finiteness was also a feature of experiment two, *Same Space, Different Time*. Each of my walks culminated in a forty-five minute tea break at the café in the *Tramway Theatre*. The first Tuesday of my walk I arrived 9:25AM, five minutes before opening time. I was not the only one waiting. There were two individuals, wearing business dress, each there to meet the other. Inside, and in the short queue, the two talked about how it was good they had found a time to *fit-in* the morning's meeting, and as they discussed the *tightness* of the *programme* each cautioned the other over the *non-flexibility* of their interdependent *deadlines*. In contrast, during walks two, three and four, my arrival at the café coincided not with morning business dealings but with organised and informal meetings of mothers, fathers and their young children. Perhaps these might have been imagined to be less tied to such rationalised measures. From snippets overheard, however, two concerns were mentioned often: that their children were growing up too fast; and that there weren't enough hours in the day.

Each case briefly described is very much indicative of Adam's assessment of *clock time* as "a time that is running on and out" (1995: 56), a time that is fixed, finite, factual and linear. The extent to which this notion is embedded, however, is not only indicated by the conversational tone of the exchanges I've recounted, but it grows even more apparent where the temporal lexis dominant to the practice of time is considered. Time is enjoyed, made, found, sold, wasted, saved, allocated and budgeted. Many of these activities are contextualised by the ways in which time is not only divided, but further by the way it has its compartmentalisation maintained via the suffixes of home, work, holiday, leisure, free, public and private. Moreover, *good* and *bad* uses of time are further supplemented with the

additional descriptors of economy and efficiency, and are often assessed with reference to deadlines, endpoints and delivery dates, in the longer term, and in the shorter term, by appointment start and end times, work time and non-work time, and weeks and week-ends. The use of *this* language of time in everyday practice serves not only to reveal the fixed, measurable, linear and finite sense of time that dominates, but its profusion begins to reveal the way in which the commodification of time is deeply embedded within everyday life itself. And our almost complete turn to this language can perhaps be best appreciated when we recognise its place within protest also. Remarking upon conflicts between factory workers and their fight to reduce the twelve-hour day to an eventual eight-hour day, E. P. Thomson notes that workers still "accepted the categories of their employers and [fought] back with them" (1967: 86).

That this language of *clock time* is not only descriptive of time's form but extends its descriptive reach to shape our understanding, practice and also our critique of time, gives a sense that this language is not only indicative of time, but is constitutive of it. The consequence of this is not only the construction and maintenance of *clock time* through the profusion of *clock time's* language, however, but arguably more concerning it is the maintained absence in language of that which *clock time* is not. Indicating one such absence, and its connection with practice, Rebecca Solnit looks to *slowness* as a counterpoint to the hurried pace that is a feature of the modern context. Of *clock time's* language she writes:

> Lost in the list is the language to argue that we are not machines and our lives include all sorts of subtleties – epiphanies, alliances, associations, meanings, purposes, pleasures – that engineers cannot design, factories cannot build, computers cannot measure, and marketers will not sell. [...] Ultimately, I believe that slowness is an act of resistance, not because slowness is a good in itself but because of all that it makes room for, the things that don't get measured and can't be bought.
>
> 2007

Even for Solnit, the significance of this extends far beyond a comparison between a fast-paced lifestyle and slow one. Revealing the consequence *clock time's* language has upon the construction and practice of time more generally she urges that "[w]hat we cannot describe vanishes into the ether, and so what begins as a problem of language ends as one of the broadest tragedies of our lives" (2007). And in this sense, the very absence of an

alternative temporal language must itself be recognised as serving to reify the dominance of *clock time* and those *ways of life* with which it is associated.

– *Institutions of practice and institutionalised ideals: education and family life*

Finally, I want to end this section on everyday life by turning to the institutional structures and ideals which are not only driven by notions of *clock time* but which strengthen it further. The diverse institutions which surround the work and labour of modern life are perhaps most easily connected here, linking quite obviously to time's commodification in labour that is paid hourly, and surplus profits that can only be understood in terms of temporal units (Harvey, 1989). Indeed, Adam notes such a focus to be the most prolific of all scholarly contributions to the study of social time (1995). However, given the relative presence of such accounts within the wider literature, I instead want to look at two things which are not as widely connected to the dominant time of modern life, but which nonetheless can be seen to reinforce the ideals of *clock time* as well as reconstructing them further. The first of these is education, a key site at which *clock time* is learnt and at which its use is made normative. Second, I'll look towards the family and how the institutional norms which surround family life afford *clock time* a proper use not only in the short term but in a much longer sense also.

To attend first to education. For Adam, a key aim of Western education is the socialisation of children, and time has a fundamental role in this regard. Education, Adam argues, constitutes a "hidden curriculum" in which the "dominant temporal structures and norms of society are absorbed, maintained, re-created and changed in daily educational practice" (1995: 59). Perhaps the most telling example of this process is the way in which time is commonly taught. Reflecting on his first experience of time as it was joined to the life world of education, Levine writes:

> Like most young Americans, I was initially taught that time is simply measured by a clock—in seconds and minutes, hours and days, months and years.
>
> 2006: xi

Such experiences are common throughout much of the literature (Nowotny, 1994; Adam, 1995; Birth, 2012) and reveal two things. First, that a key role of temporal education is to teach children how to tell *clock time*. The manner in which this is achieved reaches far

beyond the classroom, towards play at home. Throughout this PhD I've made note of numerous items which at first glance pass as completely benign. *Play* things such as a foam clock face with moveable hands, designed to suction onto the side of a bath; a "first learning" soft toy clock, again with moveable hands; and a wooden play puzzle with swappable numbers; not to mention countless children's books on the subject of time, from Eric Carle's *Tell Time with the Very Busy Spider* (2006) to *The Clock Struck One: A Time-Telling Tale* by Trudy Harris (2009).

On closer inspection, however, such objects are far from benign, and fall fatefully in line with Roland Barthes' analysis of French toys in *Mythologies*. He writes:

> French toys *always mean something*, and this something is always entirely socialized, constituted by the myths or the techniques of modern adult life [...] The fact that French toys *literally* prefigure the world of adult functions obviously cannot but prepare the child to accept them all, by constituting for him, even before he can think about it, the alibi of a Nature which has at all times created soldiers, postmen and Vespas. Toys here reveal the list of all the things the adult does not find unusual.
>
> 1993: 57, original emphasis

By the same reckoning those clock-based toys and books described above – and indeed, playground games such as *What's the Time Mr Wolf* and children's television shows such as *Tickety Toc* (2012) – seek to socialise the child to a key idea dominant to modern life: how to *tell* the time. Moreover, working to fix this as "Nature" for the child, such artefacts don't simply get the child to accept *clock time*, but leads them from asking more exploratory questions over what else time might be, either in their's or in Others' experiences.

This "hidden curriculum", as Adam describes it, extends beyond the silencing of questions over time's heterogenous nature to impart many other dominant notions. A great deal of these take place within the institutional setting of the school itself. Of this environment Adam writes:

> Even the most cursory examination of the way education is organized in Western-style societies show that everything is timed. The activities and interactions of all its participants

> are orchestrated to a symphony of buzzers, bells, timetables, schedules and deadlines. These time markers bind pupils and staff into a common schedule within which their respective activities are structured, paced, timed, sequenced and prioritized. They separate and section one activity from another and secure conformity to a regular collective beat.
> 1995: 59

Thus it is in the experience of the school day itself that dominant notions of time, such as its measurability, divisibility and homogenous nature, are firmly established. Arguably much more influential than the content of their lessons, it is this embodied practice of moving through school which prepares pupils for life beyond childhood and their entry into work.

This has a further two-fold effect: the imparting of time's proper use and of proper order. The first of these is embedded in two ways, through the child's use of time and in their experience of reward or punishment aligned with either their *good* or *bad* use. To elaborate, where a child displays the proper use of time – i.e. in accordance with the "bells, buzzers, bells, timetable, schedules and deadlines" – there are often rewards that confirm its *goodness*. The giving of more time to the pupil via additional free-time, play-time or reading-time, for example, or the cumulative rewards of a good report card and end of year certificate. In contrast, incorrect uses of time – late to class or repeated absence, missed deadlines, talking during lessons, fighting during play-time – are met with punishments which corroborate the *bad* use. Even more obviously temporally aligned than the rewards, such measures include the taking away of a pupil's previously *spare* time through detention and extra homework. Measures such as these further embed the rules of *clock time* within the pupil's mind as ideals likely to carried into adulthood. Secondly, as Adam points out, it is not just the correct use of time that is taught in schools, but the correct order of it. The maths that a child learns in primary seven is different from that learnt in primary three; just as different texts will feature in early school English, to those that will appear in a higher level (1995). Of these "learning assumptions" Adam writes:

> They encompass implicit assumptions about a 'right age', a pre-existing 'appropriate base' upon which to build, and about 'proper sequencing'. They are premised on the supposition that that a child who has not learnt to add up cannot be expected to grasp multiplication, that there has to

> be a progression from the simple to the complex and from the concrete to the abstract.
> 1995: 68

Finally, it is important to note that the institutionalisation of time in and through education does not simply configure time in this environment alone but extends far beyond it to structure time as it is experienced in other aspects of everyday life. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the effects of the school experience accompany most into adulthood, and no doubt focus the temporal experience of the other institutions of work and life. But it is not just through memory and socialisation that school education holds sway over dominant experiences of time, education also enacts a more active and present role. Of particular note in this regard is holiday-time. The duration of school holidays strongly enters the adult experience of scheduling, forcing parents to *work around* a school's stipulated holidays. Even for those without children, the time of school holidays might be a more expensive time to travel, or indeed a busier time, and this may lead them to alter their holiday schedule accordingly. Furthermore, while in one sense the vast proportion of school holidays align with preconfigured times – Christmas and Easter, for example – the number of days allocated to these by the school calendar has a strong bearing on what is possible for these holidays, and therefore strongly shape the experience of those holidays elsewhere deemed important. As such, time is constructed through the institutions of education not just in socialising children to the fixed notion of time and the proper ways of its use, but also by reaching beyond the institution to shape time as it is more broadly experienced in the present setting of everyday life.

To turn now to the second topic, the family. As thus far shown, the dominance of *clock time*, and its firmly associated features, find a particular manifestation in terms of what it is to have a good use of time in the short term, and can be understood as normative in this sense. The normativity of *clock time* does not remain confined to the daily practices of schedules, timetables and diaries, however, but extends much further to strongly influence and be influenced by the shape of successful life patterns in the longer term. Writing about the use of time *across* life, Judith Jack Halberstam considers its dominant cultural form to be one that has longevity "as the most desirable future" (2005: 4). For Halberstam, the Western propensity towards long life at any cost very much finds its most natural expression in the times which characterise family life:

> Obviously, not all people who have children keep or even are able to keep reproductive time, but many and possibly most people believe that the scheduling of repro-time is natural and desirable. Family time refers to the normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing. This timetable is governed by an imagined set of children's needs, and it relates to beliefs about children's health and healthful environments for child rearing.
>
> 2005: 5

Within Halberstam's description there are a number of ideas which are critical to note. Deserving particular attention is the notion that longevity is best maintained through order, proper scheduling and, perhaps most importantly, through stability and reproduction. It is through the idea of stability in particular that *clock time* can begin to be connected to behaviours and modes that at first glance may have nothing to do with time at all.

Marriage, for example, might on the one hand be seen as a life choice, or elsewhere, as a culturally requisite expression of love. But where it is positioned linearly, at the start of family life, it enacts a temporal gesture which is about commitment, leading to stability, and onwards to longevity. What it is even more interesting here is that that longevity is not simply contained within the individual's life, but extends across generations. And here the importance of reproduction can be appreciated. One might live to be one hundred years, but that achievement would, under Halberstam's reading, be lessened should it not also secure that individual's onward presence in family memory, and perhaps more importantly, the attribution of "values, wealth, goods and morals [...] passed through family ties from one generation to the next" (2005: 5). In many ways, then, family life is the institutionalised practice of *clock time* in both the short and long term. The short term extends the education of *clock time* from the school to the home through the maintenance of proper routine. And in the longer term, the *clock time* notion of linearity guides its users toward the pursuit of longevity which is secured not just for the individual, but across generations who similarly adhere to the "values" and "morals" of *clock time's* proper usage.

There is thus much at play in the ideal of the family which is highly pertinent to the experience, representations and conceptions of time that dominate daily life, and extend across longer periods also. It is when this notion of family time is connected back up to the broader demands of the state, however, that its full institutional reach can be best

appreciated. Writing on the significance of reproduction in this regard, Sarah Franklin and Helena Ragoné consider it a "potent symbol of the future, as well as of tradition and continuity with the past [...] increasingly visible as one of the most contested sites of contemporary cultural change" (1998: 11). When recognised as a site of cultural construction it is revealed that it is not simply familial stability that connects to longevity and the family, but that national stability is of similar consequence. This is something clearly to the fore of Lauren Berlant's thoughts when she considers the maintenance of the "national future":

> Because the only thing the nation form is able to assure for itself is its past, its archive of official memory, it must develop in the present ways of establishing its dominion over the future. This is one reason reproductive heterosexuality and the family always present such sensitive political issues. Reproduction and generationality are the main vehicles by which the national future can be figured, made visible, and made personal to citizens otherwise oblivious to the claims of a history that does not seem to be about them individually.
> 1997: 56

It is in this much broader sense that the true power of the ideals of family life can be understood as a vital site of time's active construction. Not simply do those dominant notions of *clock time* shape the short and long term practices of life that are deemed *good* and *proper*, but moreover, such practices in turn shape a population of time's users with the propensity to transmit time's dominant practices through their familial generations, and outwards toward the nation state.

PHILOSOPHY

I want to end this section on the sites's of time's construction by finally turning to look at the construction of time in and through philosophical debate. Despite it being those accounts erected in the traditions of philosophical inquiry that Durkheim was in many ways arguing against (1912), to my mind philosophy remains a key site at which time is constructed and maintained. Queries regarding the nature of time have long provided a basis for temporal inquiry, even out with philosophy, and ruminations over time's metaphysics have certainly proved an entry point for the more social concerns of other disciplines. The geographer Doreen Massey, for example, raises her worry that social debates into both space and time rest upon many contrasting definitions, the parity of

which go unquestioned due to an assumption that everyone "already assumes we know what these terms mean" (1992: 66), and indeed, Massey is keen to urge clarification in this regard. While in *Time and Social Theory*, a text pivotal in arresting time its more pronounced position in sociological thought, Adam embarks upon a historical reading of the philosophy of time before embedding her discussions within more social matters (1990). And even in those accounts explicitly positioned against its traditions, metaphysics continues to exert a strong influence on their discursive framing, as tellingly demonstrated in Fabian's preface to *Time and the Other*:

> WHEN THEY APPROACH the problem of Time, certain philosophers feel the need to fortify themselves with a ritual incantation. They quote Augustine: "What is time? If no one asks me about it, I know; if I want to explain it to the one who asks, I don't know" (Confessions, book XI). In fact, I have just joined that chorus.
>
> 1983: ix, original emphasis

I too quoted Saint Augustine's incantation in my early drafts of these chapters. I found it all too easy to get trapped in the depths of Aristotle, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger and McTaggart. I engaged eagerly in their debates, over whether time was a place or a relation; whether it was a single dimension or the dimensions of past, present and future combined; whether it should be understood as a process, a uni-directional flow or an ever expanding web. At one stage, as I searched for direction out and beyond the metaphysics of time towards the times of everyday life, these concerns formed a single, stand-alone chapter in this thesis. I eventually found, however, that it wasn't the questions I posed of time's nature to these philosophical tomes that proved remarkable. Rather, it was the fact that I, just as many others before and since, turned so freely to this body of literature in the first instance that made its significance felt and indeed made it significant.

I've come to appreciate that the widespread attention garnered by philosophy's commentaries on temporal matters is not just indicative, but is productive of the discipline's ability to speak truth to time's nature in a way that other domains do not. Philosophy's insights on time are maintained as somewhat more essential than those which look more towards the cultural or the social, and indeed, philosophy's transcendent analyses similarly place their commentaries above those of culture and the social in everyday life. For Norbert

Elias, philosophy's privileged position in this regard sparks from a dominant assumption, carried forth from Descartes to Kant, that we are endowed with specific ways of connecting events and *time* is one of those ways. Elias writes:

> It was assumed [...] that the synthesis of events in the form of time-sequences patterned humankind's perception prior to any experience and was, therefore, neither dependent on any any knowledge available in society nor acquired through learning. The assumptions of such 'synthesis *a priori*' implied that humans possessed not only a *general* capacity for establishing connections, but also a compulsory capacity for making *specific* connections and for forming corresponding concepts such as 'time', 'space', 'substance', 'natural laws', 'mechanical causation' and others
>
> 1998: 39-40

Those "corresponding concepts" are of course the very subjects of metaphysics and of them Elias is quick to point to the extent to which they are "made to appear as *unlearned* and *unchanging*" by philosophy (1998: 40, my emphasis) – as things that are not contingent, but natural.

Beyond these concepts it is also prudent to remark on the discursive tenor of Western philosophical debate as it appears to the broader academy. When viewed from outside the discipline, the philosophical arena is arguably marked most notably for its complex, sometimes impenetrable discourse, and often self-referential styles of argument. As such, it is difficult for non-philosophers to engage meaningfully in critique where they do not *speak the language*. The same is of course varyingly true of any academic discipline which seeks not only to advance its knowledge, but to maintain the premises on which it is based. However, where philosophy constructs a time which many from out with the discipline also turn to as truth despite their inabilities to query why such things might not be the case, the potential for philosophy to speak factually of time beyond its disciplinary borders is all the more pronounced.

Despite the fact that philosophy has rendered time as both "unlearned and unchanging", philosophy does not, of course, speak factually nor unproblematically of time's truth, and one does not have to look too far to glimpse the constructed nature of philosophical debates and hence the construction of time contained therein. Key to this is looking to the

manner in which philosophical understandings have advanced over the years. Indeed, examining such progressions reveals that definitions of time have built upon one another to construct a maze of supposed truths, each of which conceals and is complicit in its own construction. For example, the most general question of *what is time?* is, via Aristotle's *Physics* (1984), reduced to *can time exist without change?* in the accounts of Gottfried Leibniz (1686/1992) and Isaac Newton (1687/1999) thereafter. Such a shift does not simply mark a re-framing of rhetoric, however, but strongly shapes the content of those temporal accounts offered. Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics*, for example, continues its Aristotelean patronage in offering a non-linear account of time which sees substances contain the totality of their past, present and future predicates at their very moment of inception:

> An individual substance includes once and for all everything that can ever happen to it and that, by considering this notion, one can see there everything that can truly be said of it.
>
> 1686/1992: 7

While similarly, it is this close affiliation of *time* and *change* which arguably led J.M.E. McTaggart to first establish the now widespread A-series and B-series descriptors of time as devices to argue for time's unreality[12] (1908). What is most notable about both of these non-intuitive accounts – Leibniz's claim that substances in time are frozen postures where the past has disappeared and the future is yet to come; McTaggart's conclusion that since his A-series and B-series are incompatible, "no reality is in time" (1908: 8) – is that each arises out of an unwillingness to reject the law of non-contradiction, for no other reason than because *it* is intuitive. From this alone, the simultaneously formidable and complicated role intuition plays in establishing philosophical thought emerges for the first time, and when considered for its function in each of these accounts it can be seen that truth is not truth at all but perhaps just another intuition within an all too steep and wobbly hierarchy of intuits. In such things it can therefore be appreciated that time in philosophy is far from "unlearned" or "unchanging" but must be located and understood within the broader cultural and social context in which it exists.

Recognising that social and cultural constructions sit beneath even those philosophical accounts of time, allows them then to be cast amongst the excerpts at the beginning of the chapter. Philosophy's contribution to this thesis, however, does not begin and end in helping

to further flesh-out time's diversity. Rather, I'd argue that it's true potential lies where its power not just to name, represent and specify a proper use of time, but to construct it at an ontological level, is recognised. Philosophy serves not only to inform but plays a pivotal role in both representing and producing those realities with which it affiliates, including within those non-philosophical disciplines which turn towards its counsel. In science, certainly, the productive capacity of philosophical ideas is immediately appreciable. For example, despite the fact that McTaggart's account has been discredited as inaccurate "his argument remains the *locus classicus* for scientific theories more generally" (Dyke, 2002: 137), and his descriptors of time – established to make sensible his argument – have been widely rolled-out beyond scientific disciplines. And although Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity is difficult to square with our more experientially informed understandings of time, it has nonetheless allowed physicists to mathematically model the conditions for the possibility of time-travel (Davies, 2002). These examples reveal that thoughts, theories and ontologies conceived on paper, have the capacity to take on very real and manifest forms as they weave their insight throughout both the philosophical and scientific communities of thought. Furthermore, buoyed by the more widely held Western belief that *science* represents the world truly and accurately, such functions do not remain confined to the work of science but arguably extend much further into other realms of life. Indeed, the literature recognises a very particular hangover from metaphysics in Western time. As Rudolf Bernet considers:

> The traditional philosophical understanding of time probably finds its most pregnant expression in classical physics, and especially in the Newtonian image of the world. [...] In consequence of scientific theory 'streaming into' the praxis of the life-world, this traditional concept of time from philosophy and physics has come also to determine the everyday.
>
> 1982: 91

Bernet is certainly not alone is his assessment. The Newtonian model is also more widely recognised at the heart of our experiences, intuitions, understandings and organisation of time by Marshall McLuhan (1964), Tim Ingold (1986), Adam (1998) and John Urry (2000). Each have developed their own accounts of the ways in which Newton's philosophy has moved far beyond its canon to impeach our experiences of everyday life. And evidenced via those immediately recognisable parallels between *clock time* and time as it is appears in

Newton's mechanics – which when freed from the erroneous beliefs of the human perceiver renders time an objective, neutral, rationalised, uniform, uni-directional, all-encompassing and strictly linear *thing* – the power of their arguments can be appreciated. Therefore, not only is philosophy another of Western time's influences, but in recognising the *truth* such philosophical accounts bestow on time's nature, the considerable reach of metaphysics to construct time at an ontological level is similarly appreciable.

The Social Construction of Time

My discussions throughout this past section have been in no way comprehensive, indeed, the maintenance and construction of time takes place at many sites unmentioned, but which are just as relevant. Music, art and etiquette, for example, each carry their own temporal adherences to *clock time*, and serve to strengthen and maintain this definitive marker, as do a much wider range of everyday life practices, too numerable to count. While both the literature and my autoethnographic findings offer some tentative connections into these and other areas not discussed, it is, however, worth remembering that the task of this last section was not borne from any futile desire to explicate the absolute process of time's construction. Rather, its aim has advanced directly from the first section of this chapter which argued that to grasp the politics of time in an intimate sense it wasn't enough to simply state that time was socially and culturally constructed, but that our own time must be recognised within the assessment. Building out from the second section which articulated those most *natural* markers of Western time, I'm confident that it's gone someway to achieving this. It has shown that the time which dominates the contemporary urban experience can be seen to be constructed in and through history, politics, everyday life and philosophical thought in the most personal of ways, and that its ongoing maintenance similarly takes place at those very sites. Furthermore, it has revealed two additional factors which are highly pertinent, but not yet discussed. First, the construction of time does not occur at these sites in isolation, but occurs between all of them simultaneously; and second, the maintained absence of that which time is not is just as form-giving to the time dominant within these sites.

To elaborate on this first point. While I have discussed them in isolation for the sake of thematic convenience, it must be stressed that history, politics, everyday life and philosophy exist in no way separate. Time is represented and constructed, in, through and across all of

these sites in conjunction. Taking also into account those sites not discussed, this of course leads not simply to one site but to a web of many intersecting ones. Illustrating one such connection between history, eduction and family life, for example, Adam writes:

> In Western societies we have imposed the monastic schedule on ourselves, our children and their educators. That is, we have adopted this reified, abstracted time and its rationalized control as an educational strategy.
>
> 1995: 65

And remarking on the connections between technology and language, McLuhan notes that "[i]t was not the clock, but literacy reinforced by the clock, that created abstract time and led men to eat, not when they were hungry, but when it was 'time to eat'" (1964: 173). Similar linkages can be forged between any and all of those sites I've discussed. The metaphysical realities bestowed upon time stream into our lifeworlds through the belief that time's reality is a linear one. Our common everyday practices of time which sit across untold layers mutate their own inescapable transformation from history to tradition. The tools and technologies which materially maintain *clock time* extend its potential into realms not yet necessarily conceivable. Our common temporal lexis both mimics and makes possible the articulation of time in politics and legislation. There is no neat order to such things. In every one of these connections, and in all others that are here unspoken, time is re-articulated and reinforced simultaneously and multi-directionally. And arguably, it is through such a tangled web that the norms of time that are contained in more isolated moments lend themselves to the hegemony of *clock time* more generally.

There is another crucial element to this, which is conveyed in the second point I've raised. The maintained absence of time which is *not* dominant is just as form giving as the time that we experience as natural. Throughout my discussion I've given a number of examples which attest precisely to this: the French Revolutionary Calendar, for instance, or the difficulty of making sensible in everyday language those experiences which might remark on a less objective, rational and mechanical view of time. Undoubtably there exist many more such moments beyond these, and though they are more difficult to unearth from the overwhelming presence of time's constructed reality, it must be recognised that this is in no way incidental but that their absence helps constitute and maintain the normative hegemony of that overwhelming reality.

From the discussions throughout this chapter the politics of time can now begin to be imagined in a more intimate sense. Quite in line with the short overview contained at the beginning of this chapter, time has been shown to be measured based on what is of value, and the measurement of time in that particular way serves to uphold that value. And certainly, this value does not accord with the plurality of time and its users, but with a select few for whom *this* time maintains their privileged social positions. But having looked at both those dominant practices of time and the sites at where they are contained, maintained and extended, it is not simply the theoretical relevance of these concerns for urban studies that can begin to be grasped; they can now be positioned as resonant amidst the more nuanced and everyday realities of urban life. Moreover, the intimacy of these discussions have begun to make tangible the connections between time, culture, the social and the individual, suggesting that time's effect extends far beyond its own form. The emergence of these insights means that it is now possible to embed such discussions of time within the urban agenda of this thesis, which seeks to understand the way in which difference is ordered in and through the city setting, and how it might connect to the manifestation and experience of urban ills. As such, looking to the functions, consequences and exclusions of this time will be the important and necessary task for Chapter Three hereafter.

notes

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[7] A write-up of *Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks* can be viewed in Appendix Two.

[8] I've purposefully omitted any reference to names, types, cultures etc. within these excerpts, the reason being to try and help maintain a focus not on the content but the affect of the excerpt. A characterisation of these times and their references are as follows: ONE: Nuer time (Evans-Pritchard,1940: 100); TWO: Corner time (Henry, 1965: 24); THREE: Queer time (Halberstam, 2005: 2); FOUR: Schizophrenic time (Melges, 1982: xix); FIVE: Balkan time (Hoffman, 1993: 78); SIX: description of a thread clock (Mishnah, 1933: Berakoth 1.2); SEVEN: Children's time (Adam, 1995: 21); EIGHT: Protest time (Variant, 2010); NINE: Time of the alarm clock (Autoethnographic reflection from Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks); TEN: Amondawa time (Sinha, et al. 2011: 15); ELEVEN: Women's time (Kristeva, 1981: 354-355); TWELVE: Time of bereavement (BPS, 2014); THIRTEEN: Sabbath time (Shulevitz, 2011: 3); FOURTEEN: Trobriand Islanders' time (Lee, 1950: 91); FIFTEEN: Wahhabi time (Sardar in Ezzell, 2006); SIXTEEN: Time of illness (Doty, 1997); SEVENTEEN: Time of birthing (Fox, 1989: 132); EIGHTEEN: Time changing throughout life (Adam, 1995: 97-98); NINETEEN: Holiday Time (Autoethnographic reflection from Experiment Three: Experiences of Holiday Time); TWENTY: Elderly time (Levine, 2006); *and* TWENTY ONE: Time unqualified by intellect (Appelbaum, 1995: 85).

[9] A more functional description of how this is practiced by some members of the Muslim faith in Britain today is offered by the BBC (2004): "To test if it is dark enough to break the fast, a white thread can be held next to a black thread outside. If you can tell the difference between the two, then fasting continues."

[10] To be clear, while I am appealing to those dichotic models which Adam finds problematic, and does so for very good reason, I am not looking to reinscribe a simplified, definitive, non-contradictory and non-problematic idea of Western time. Rather, I am looking towards some of those uncritical constructions of the 'we' implicit in the *Other* time.

[11] A full write-up of this is contained in Appendix Two.

[12] McTaggart's argument in brief: the A-series orders time by the non-relational terms of past, present and future. In this view events must be acknowledged as undergoing continual transformation insofar as they begin as part of the future before becoming present and then eventually fading into the past. For example, it only makes sense to talk of the 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo as events of the future. However, in 2020 they will be events of the present, and by 2021 they will remain forever past. The B-series, on the other hand, orders time events according to a series of temporal positions which are relational and irreflexive. A particular time event either comes before or comes after another time event and unlike the A-series the event retains its designation. For example, the 2020 Olympic Games will always come after the 2014 Scottish Referendum on Independence. The relationship between these two events does not alter, regardless of the amount of time that has passed. In arguing for *The Unreality of Time*, McTaggart demonstrates the individual failings of these descriptions of time. Attacking the A-series, he argues that describing an event as both past, present and future is contradictory, and therefore unacceptable. He goes on to consider that since the distinctions of the B-series are permanent, then this may be more adequate. However, he considers that this would be a mistake as in line with the relational view of time, and indeed the line of inquiry posed by Aristotle, McTaggart contends that time is concerned with change. And as it isn't possible to conceptualise change in time via the B-Series alone, the A-Series is necessary to constitute the reality of time. He therefore concludes that given that the distinctions of past, present and future are just as essential to the nature of time, and considering their impermanence, time is unreal.

Chapter Three

TIME'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL

The Material Consequences of Abstract Time

Even in the most general sense those times taken for granted, those times felt natural, have significant consequences for life as it is experienced in the contemporary city. The often told crises of modern life – rising stress and anxiety levels; increasingly problematic drug and alcohol usage; progressive dependancies on prescription medications; escalating tendencies for convenience products and disposable modes of living, for example – can in many ways be read as the inevitable manifestations of dealing only in a time that is relentlessly advancing and running out. Such connections, then, offer a window through which to glimpse the processes by which time not only shapes its own form but powerfully and materially shapes the mental and physical wellbeing of the broader population. One most obvious connection point is through the modern propensity for a hurried and harried pace of life, the prolonged inhabitation of which takes a considerable toll on time's users (Ulmer and Schwartzburd, 1996; Adam, 2005; Levine, 2006; Burnett et al., 2007; Birth, 2007). Larry Dossey, for instance, goes so far to identify the effects of such patterns as a "hurry sickness". Demonstrating his claim, he outlines how the notion that time is finite inevitably leads to a sense of urgency, which in turn connects to a vast range of biological ills wrought on those who submit to the fast-paced demands of urban life. Moreover, highlighting the mutually constitutive and hegemonic relationship between temporal modes and human wellbeing, he argues that such patterns further perpetuate the perception of time on which they are based:

> Having convinced ourselves through the aid of clocks, watches, beeps, ticks, and a myriad of other cultural props that linear time is escaping, we generate maladies in our bodies that assure us of the same thing – for the ensuing

> heart disease, ulcers, and high blood pressure reinforce the message of the clock: we are running down, eventually to be swept away in the linear current of the river of time. For us, our perceptions have become our reality.
>
> 1982: 50

In these afflictions alone it is immediately appreciable that time's reach is not confined to an abstract realm but that it powerfully shapes our material existence. And where a reliance on the clock not only fuels a sense of urgency within a person but forces them to overlook the realities of their own lived experience, these self-perpetuating, organic effects are far from contained in the individual.

For some theorists it is precisely this disconnection from alternative, non-clock based cycles which is at the root of some of the twentieth century's greatest man-made disasters. Kevin Birth, for example, connects early-morning decision making to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986; the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989; and the Union Carbide gas disaster at Bhopal, India in 1984 – arguing that morning is when we are furtherest removed from the sensibilities of *clock time's* logic (2007). There is also evidence to suggest that our submission to the apparent truth of the clock not only links to discrete disasters such as these but gives rise to a whole host of institutional arrangements which impose a mandatory *clock time* on individuals who are most in need of a time that better aligns with their distinct bodily cycles. In *Patterns of Time in Hospital Life*, Eviatar Zerubavel looks at such conflicts emergent within Western healthcare. One example he gives is of the mismatch between the timing of patients' meals and doctors' rounds. He comments that "patients often ate their breakfasts cold" due to lack of coordination in such cycles (1979: 36). While this may seem a somewhat anodyne example, viewed temporally it speaks to a most contradictory practice of healthcare: the abstract temporal structures adopted throughout Western healthcare are at odds with patients' needs and may lead to a longer period of convalescence. Moreover, such clashes are not simply inconvenient but can be extended to the gravest of outcomes. A recent study into UK death rates across the National Health Service (NHS) revealed that of over fourteen million patients admitted to hospital between 2009 and 2010, patients admitted during weekends were 27% more likely to die than those whose stay commenced during Monday to Thursday (Freemantle, et al. 2012). The researchers concluded the increase to be a direct result of reduced staffing levels of doctors, clinicians and support staff between a Friday afternoon and Monday morning,

consequences which are again indicative of *clock time's* effect on those who are most in need of alternative modes. Further supporting the analyses of Dossey and Birth, these conflicts witnessed in the hospital environment powerfully demonstrate the material consequences that reified temporal patterns wreak on everyday lives lived at odds with their logic.

These are the obvious impacts. The consequences, that having recognised time not as natural but as a construction far abstracted from the plurality of life's experiences, needs and urges, become easiest to connect. The most powerful aspect of these connections lies, however, not in explaining absolutely the impact of dominant time on urban citizens. But rather, it is their ability to reveal that constructions of time don't just maintain time's own form but that they also shape time's users. Indeed, such a point is most central for Barbara Adam, whose work to demonstrate time's relevance to matters of social science has in many ways revolved around a central premise that the "way time is conceptualised makes a difference [...] it affects [...] our daily lives" (Adam, 2006: 7). From this point alone time is immediately relevant to the ills of modern urban life insofar as it can be now placed as an active and critical force in shaping the material existence of those who dwell in the city, and hence the city itself.

Where such matters become wholly pertinent to this work, however, is where time's material reach occurs unevenly. As shown throughout Chapter Two, time is both constituted by and constitutive of the historical, political, social and metaphysical ontologies of everyday life, which are themselves unevenly and politically shaped. And so, where conceptions of time and their associated realities appear to pass as natural the potential for normative modes to emerge is just as likely within the processes of time's construction as in any other moments of cultural construction in the contemporary city. Indeed, just as Lefebvre argued of our understandings of space, our understandings of time are not power-neutral but are generative of effects and inequities, and have the capacity to unevenly shape time's users and the broader social order towards exclusive ends. It is within these conditions, where time's constitutive reach extends far beyond its own form to materially construct and order the social, that the pursuit of urban temporal analyses become not only relevant, but urgent. As such, the need now is to look beyond those material effects of abstract time in a general sense, and to examine those consequences which are uneven in their reach. This chapter will therefore proceed with this task by turning to address the second and third questions outlined earlier in Chapter Two:

- How does the time that dominates modern, Western life function to order, Other and exclude?
- What are the connections between processes of temporal ordering and the ills of everyday city life?

Time's Construction of the Social

Time is not merely lived in. Rather, it is constructed in the living whilst being very much constitutive of that life. Cultural values shape our practices, ideas, and experiences of time. These in turn give rise to specific ways of thinking, feeling, behaving and being, and extend forth to shape the materiality of life in the profoundest of ways. However, in a context where one conception of time dominates, time's material effects are uneven in their reach. Commanded by dominant groups as a tool to reproduce their dominance, the ruling time not only casts a formidable weight against the sensibility of time's plurality, in doing so it has the capacity to order time's users in exclusionary ways. In this sense, time is far from a benign cultural backdrop but works to unify, separate and to order people. In the modern urban context, where time's heterogeneity is arguably at its most heightened, there are two key mechanisms through which it can be recognised to function in this regard. First, and regardless of its character, the normative hegemony of dominant time works to elevate those individuals whose *ways of life* accord with it, and to maintain the productive absence of Others whose temporalities don't align closely enough with the dominant mode. Second, the abstract character of Western time actively denies the experiences, needs and even the existence of those who live by different temporalities. Through each of these mechanisms Western time not only works to order, Other and exclude alternative *ways of life*, but musters a profound and uneven effect on the material existence of those individuals with whom they are connected. Looking to each of these functions in turn this section will now engage with the ways in which time not only constructs the individual, but the social.

NORMATIVE HEGEMONY

To look more closely to the first of these mechanisms. Dominant time functions normatively through the very same processes it works to maintain and extend its dominance. It is helpful, then, to better understand the unbounded course of its hegemonic march across daily existence. While my point here is a more general one there are a number of characteristics of Western time which help provide an apposite illustration, perhaps none better than the infamous aphorism widely attributed to Benjamin Franklin:

time is money. Just as I argued the broader point at the end of Chapter Two, time's economic value is not simply contained within an economic setting but is maintained and strengthened across all other sites at which it is directly and indirectly connected. Via its historical ascension it has secured the tradition of time as something that is "saved, sold or wasted" (Adam, 1995: 33). Legislation both reacts to and maintains its specific character, ensuring only that time *as* money is allowed an unhindered transaction. It both fuels and moulds technology to continually advance its better measure. And it constitutes the very character of labour, education and family life as they are institutionally organised.

Moreover, at each of these sites the notion that *time is money* is strengthened to such a degree that time is not simply money, but money is also more time. Those who achieve a more favourable proportion of money to time, for example, are also afforded the means to expand their existing temporal arrangements. They can secure additional time through the purchase of labour for home maintenance and child care; access faster, more convenient services for travel, communication and the procurement of goods. And money also unveils the potential for a more temporally privileged social status, buying some individuals "a place in front" (Levine, 2006: 114). This not only means that they are able to "make their subordinates wait" whilst they themselves are "nearly immune from waiting" (Levine, 2006: 114) but as Zerubavel explains of senior academics, they may even be deemed to require more "lead time" in order that their attendance or participation can be secured (1981: 147). In addition to these features there are certain types of time – holiday and leisure time, for example – that are in many ways only made legitimate within a context of time laboured and paid. From Zerubavel's commentary below it becomes clear that money is not simply a prerequisite to accessing the full and most privileged range of modern experiences, but furthermore, that an individual's experience of time *as* money is what upholds their broader *right* to access such experiences in the first instance:

> Within the domain of work, the official recognition given to the 'privatization' of some parts of individuals' time – that is, to their right to periodically dissociate themselves from their role and be professionally inaccessible at times – is most evident from the institutionalization of 'paid time off' as one of the most common forms of employees' fringe benefits. Hence the introduction of paid nonwork time periods such as annual holidays, vacations, sick leaves, jury leaves, voting time, coffee and rest breaks, meal periods and wash-up time.
>
> 1981: 155

In each of these things – both time as money and money as more time – language plays a critical role. As discussed in Chapter Two, the idea that *time is money* is continually reproduced and strengthened through the very language that is made available for meaningful discourse. The sensibility of the idea, however, is upheld and reified via additional means also. First, it is embedded to such an extent that it proliferates even through negative engagement – that is, the idea that *time is money* is not disputed, but rather, the source of contention is over how much time equals how much money. That arguments should relate not to the idea but to the appropriate correlation between the two is illustrative of the deep extent to which time *as* money is accepted. Not only is this likely to be one of the reasons why an alternative critique rarely surfaces, it simultaneously maintains the myth of time's objective nature in this regard, reifying it even further. Second, within this example it can be appreciated that these discursive regimes effect more than just time, but shape the material extension of time's users. Constituting the most essential backdrop to everyday life, such tropes permeate all facets of existence to such an extent that one doesn't even need to say that *time is money* but only to exchange currency for services rendered, consult a watch when parked on a meter, or leave the work-place prompt at 6:00PM. And this, arguably, is the most powerful way in which the language of dominant time shapes time's users: it leads them not only towards the ideas of dominant time but to prolifically and productively enact those beliefs and values through the embodied practices associated with them.

While I've focused on one characteristic here – the idea that *time is money* – it is important to reiterate that my argument is not tied to this one example. Rather, this focus was intended only to be illustrative of my broader point: the hegemony of time is maintained and strengthened at countless points, and it is in these selfsame processes that its normativity is established. Indeed, in each of these moments discussed, where time is further strengthened so too are the hierarchies which support it, alongside the norms and value judgements of those most dominant. This combined hegemony finds an unmistakeable manifestation in the judgements conferred on those who meet the standards of time's good and proper usage. They might be praised as sensible, organised, forward-thinking, responsible or well-grounded, for example. But these normative judgements not only reinforce the positive character and social position of those who align with the dominant time, they carry weight for the time of Others too. And with the temporally construed assessments of those who are not like the norm thus established as objective facts – lazy,

undisciplined and reckless, living on the edge, throwing caution to the wind, for example – it can here be appreciated that dominant time not only acts upon its own users but works to order the temporality of Others too.

For Carol Greenhouse this very feature is "central to the business of time". "Every temporal form suspends or rearranges the temporality of the 'other' or others, this is what formal systems of time *are*", she surmises (1996: 85, original emphasis). Her emphasis suggests that such things are not simply a side-effect of time's dominance but are themselves constitutive of it. And indeed, denied the discursive, practical or attitudinal stage to argue for their recognition, let alone afforded the dedicated technological advancement or the test of history to emerge as present in their own terms, those times of contrast are simultaneously implicated in and resigned to the exact same processes through which the hegemony of dominant time is maintained and strengthened. Just as Edward Said argued of the mutually productive relationship between the orient and the orientalist: "we must not forget that the Orientalist's presence is enabled by the Orient's effective absence" (1978: 208). It is therefore across both these limits, of absence and presence, that the normative hegemony of dominant time acts to elevate those *ways of life* and values which accord with it, and to exclude all others until the point that they align closely enough with the dominant ways. And in this sense, the absence of those times which are dominantly defined as *not* time is similarly vital to the privileged position of the time that *is*, with both, together, resulting in a social order in which an individual's use of time relatively correlates to either a more or less, privileged or disadvantaged position.

THE ABSTRACT CHARACTER OF WESTERN TIME

To turn now to the second mechanism through which the seeming inevitability of Western time unevenly affects those whose temporal modes mark them as different to the norm, and extends to shape the broader social order. Throughout this work I've commented on the abstract character of Western time and shared the views of those who argue that it is the dominant reckoning of a *clock time* which leads us from asking after time's alternative natures. Be it the parallels Young and Schuller draw between Western society and Alice's White Rabbit (1988); Birth's argument that the clock is a *necromantic device* though which the "dead think for the living" (2012); or the pervasive notion that the teaching of *time* in Western education is complete when a student is able to accurately read a clock face (Adam, 1995). The elaboration of each of these accounts attests to the view that in its

abstraction from human experience *clock time* helps to establish the natural character of Western time. Not only does this secure the seemingness of time's inevitability but in such effects Western time simultaneously establishes a *correct* pattern for its reckoning. Imparting the sense that time is told with reference to an abstract time-piece, it has the capacity to order time's users by way of those who *know* time and those who do not, thus effectively excluding those who cannot tell *clock time*, and indeed those who tell time by different measures. Taking into account the thorough embedding of *clock time* across all facets of everyday life the exclusionary potential of this is far-ranging, similar to that which Marshall McLuhan expresses in relation to literacy and intelligence testing:

> If the criminal appears as a nonconformist who is unable to meet the demand of technology that we behave in uniform and continuous patterns, literate man is quite inclined to see others who cannot conform as somewhat pathetic. Especially the child, the cripple, the woman, and the colored person appear in a world of visual and typographic technology as victims of injustice. [...] It is in our I.Q. testing that we have produced the greatest flood of misbegotten standards. Unaware of our typographic cultural bias, our testers assume that uniform and continuous habits are a sign of intelligence, thus eliminating the ear man and the tactile man.
>
> 1964: 18

Indeed, later in the same text McLuhan moves to argue the eventual ordering capacity of such standards, and does so with specific reference to the clock when he quotes Leonard Doob's comment that "[t]he turban, the sword and nowadays the alarm clock are worn or carried to signify high rank" (1964: 162).

In addition to maintaining its method of time reckoning as natural the abstract character of Western time further orders its users and non-users alike by working to ensure that they adhere to its *proper* use. As Darier argues, the arrival of *clock time* and the consequent commodification of time has meant that ideas about its *sensible* use have themselves become hegemonic (1998). One of the ways it achieves this in an everyday sense is via the tools, language, philosophies, institutions and politics which simultaneously echo and make possible the ideals of temporal regularity. This defining feature of Western time again relies on its abstraction from human use, but functions in this instance through the more specific notion that times of the same duration are interchangeable. As Zerubavel comments:

> The abstract conception of time is also responsible for the fact that we so often treat time slots that are durationally equivalent to one another as if they were actually interchangeable. Consider, for example, our ability to 'move' a one-hour class or appointment from one day to another. Note also the quite common practice of switching shifts in organizations that operate around the clock. It certainly presupposes a notion that, if I do not work my eight hours today, I can still work 'them' on some other day, as if they were still the same eight hours. [...] The interchangeability of time periods is inherent to the quantitative view of time in the West and is quite antithetical to the traditional qualitative conception of temporality.
>
> 1981: 64

What Zerubavel highlights here is how entrenched the notion of commensurability (that which can be made homogenous and uniform) is to the order of Western time, and this has two key effects. First, in functioning by counting only that which is the same it actively and productively overlooks difference. Assuming that eight hours one day is identical to eight hours on another, time's more qualitative contexts, as well as those more human facets of *being* in time, are ignored. Not only does this work to homogenise expectations of what both time and the experience of it should be like, this abstract measure also functions to unevenly organise society. Those whose qualitative time aligns relatively closer to time's quantitative, abstract and commensurable reckoning – i.e. the time deemed *sensible* – are more likely able to conform to time's *proper* use. But where an individual's qualitative experience makes it difficult or even impossible to meet the standards of temporal regularity, their use is deemed inefficient. And moreover, with the very idea that temporal modes might vary from person to person completely overlooked, those who fall into the latter category have no recourse to appeal such judgements.

Second, commensurability not only works to construct *proper* uses of time, it also homogenises the identities of time's users *in* time. Patterns, schedules and rhythms of life, though they are uniquely ours, they are not lived alone. Illustrating this by way of the most essential of daily activities, Mumford comments:

> Breakfast, lunch, dinner, occur at regular hours and are of definitely limited duration: a million people perform these functions within a very narrow band of time, and only minor

> provisions are made for those who would have food outside this regular schedule.
> 1934: 269

It is not just in our eating habits, however, but across the day's routines that we intersect most frequently with those who are temporally similar – getting the 7:32AM train to work each weekday morning; meeting a friend for coffee at 10:30AM on a Tuesday; attending the Job Centre every Thursday at 3:20PM to *sign-on*; doing the weekly shop on a Sunday morning, and so on. Indeed, so seemingly familiar are such processes that it is chance encounters or random events which become noteworthy enough to speak of.

Certainly, as I moved through the city at different times in my second autoethnography experiment, *Same Space, Different Time*, I found myself feeling most *at home* in those times I was broadly familiar with. Between the *non-peak* hours of 9:30AM and 3:00PM, for example, I recognised the spaces through which I moved – they were busy but not packed; lively but not hectic. By sight, sound, smell and even touch, the world outside just *felt* right. Out with these times I saw differences that in various ways made me feel as though I did not belong – people snaking their way through pedestrians and vehicles, running for the train; red break-lights stacked-up along the main route to town and exhaust stench full in the air; smart clothes crumpled due to exceeded capacities on buses and trains. For me, the psychological relevance of this became most pronounced when I reflected on my *researcher* status in these contrasting times. When I felt at home I initially found it somewhat more difficult to don an autoethnographic gaze – it took me longer to learn how to speak about those things that *just were*, those times that I was *inside*. In contrast, where I felt myself removed, it initially felt not as though I was looking to my own culture but ethnographically towards other groups, as an *outsider* gazing in. I came to recognise that this insider/outsider dynamic was not just an echo of the social times through which I moved but was also productive of them, and I found Zerubavel's work to again be particularly illuminating in this regard. Noting the "powerful function of sociotemporal orders in solidifying in-group sentiments and fostering mechanical solidarity", his comments extend my point from the psychological experience of being in time towards time's broader role in organising social identities. He explains:

> A temporal order that is commonly shared by a social group and is unique to the extent that it distinguishes and separates group members from "outsiders" contributes to the

> establishment of intergroup boundaries and constitutes a powerful basis for mechanical solidarity within a group.
> 1981: 67

Certainly, that such regular and familiar arrangements should be so strongly tied to group formation is something that is effortlessly appreciable within a spatial analysis. Different countries, different geographies, give rise to what is readily recognised as different cultures, *ways of living* and ways of being with Others. The exact same is true of life as it is experienced in time. And so powerful is this temporal dynamic that much like the experience of someone who has never left their hometown or country, those who are regular in their temporal patterns arguably find that it is not only the normativity of time that is homogenised, but the normative identities of time's users.

In addition to working to homogenise the way in which life is lived and the identities of those who experience it in the day-to-day, commensurability also extends this powerful function across life as it is experienced in the longer term. Different milestones, whilst abstractly defined, often function as comparison points in this regard. *Good* age ranges, for example, are culturally and socially defined for leaving school, getting married, buying a first home, achieving career advancement, having children, buying a bigger house, retiring from work, and so on. These milestones not only function in isolation, however, but as Halberstam comments, "in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation" (2005: 4). Moreover, the normativity of such patterns must also be recognised, as this interview excerpt drawn from Adam's research alludes to:

> The decades seem important – like watersheds – important points in one's life where one is so aware in terms of what one would like to *be* and *be doing* and that in turn to the *social standards* and to *expectancy*.
> "Mary" in Adam, 1995: 3, Adam's emphasis

As such, where such milestones are reached out side of expected parameters – the retired, mature-student studying for his first undergraduate degree; the fourteen-year-old attending the hospital for her 36-week pre-natal check-up; or the divorcee in his late forties who has had to sell his family home and move back to his parents' house – or are not met at all,

broader differences which are elsewhere hidden become all the more visible and pronounced. Not only does this become obvious in relation to the shortcomings of public provisions established in line with an expected progression throughout life but such normative standards also cast a powerful inward effect. This is not to say that these differences cannot be conceptualised or experienced in positive and empowering ways. Equally likely to be present, however, is the psychological burden of being the Other, the outsider or indeed, the outcast, which when cast against a dominant discourse that "pathologize[s] modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity" (Halberstam, 2005: 5) is potentially as devastating and compelling as any material barrier.

Further to such structural and psychological pressures to maintain appearance with both our short and long term apposite social identities there is an additional feature of Western time's abstraction which makes the normativity of these parameters all the more pronounced: its uni-directional linearity. This again has two main functions. First, Ziauddin Sardar argues that time's linearity leads not only to idea that time flows in one direction but leads individuals to orientate their lives in similar ways by spreading the expectation that life becomes better as time passes (2004). If "you think of time as an arrow, of course you think of the future as progress, going in one direction", Sardar explains (in Ezzell, 2006: 75). As such, it is not only that it it is *good* to marry prior to having children or to move from a smaller home into a larger one, but via time's linear nature the order of these things is maintained as *correct*. Second, this linear progression also works to exclude those who may live by different logics by again hiding time's plurality. Sardar argues that the deeply embedded notion of the past flowing towards the present amounts to Western time's colonisation of the future (2004), and recognising a similar effect, Adam connects this to the rationalist tendencies which underpin the Western conception of time, writing:

> The future is considered as a realm to be conquered and colonized. It is considered to be a calculable realm of potential, a world amenable to prediction and control on the basis of past experiences.
>
> 1995: 169

The limitations and emergent consequences of such tendencies, however, become all too clear from Sardar's obvious but often overlooked conclusion that "different people may desire different futures" (in Ezzell, 2006: 75). Greenhouse similarly comments on how

Western time's linearity leads us to overlook this most basic fact. Writing of the "geometry" that "inserts official representations of time in the West into the cultural analysis of everyday life" she argues that the "orthodox canons of linear time [...] are by no means universal to people's views on the world" (1996: 86). In Sardar's, Adam's and Greenhouse's comments it can therefore be seen that normative uses of time are not only strengthened through Western time's ability to maintain the idea of time's arrow as fact, but resulting in the colonisation of the future, its capacity to ignore, downgrade or outright deny the legitimacy of those experiences which would contradict such notions is also revealed.

This brings me to a final point in this section. The deeply embedded notions of commensurability and linearity not only work to instruct time's users on the correct uses of time and the correct identities of time's users, they also work to rearrange the time of Others whose modes are at odds with norms outlined by Western time. Such a point is central to Fabian's work. He argues that "[t]ime [...] is a carrier of significance, a form through which we define the content of relations between the Self and the Other" (1983: ix). For Fabian, the relevance of this idea accords firmly with his own project, aimed at revealing the long-hidden politics of anthropology to place its subjects in an earlier, less advanced time. Such partisan agendas are familiar to Doreen Massey also, who in recognising the modernist propensity for *Grand Narratives* in certain quarters of the academy writes:

> Those who focus on the terrifying simultaneity of today would [...] presumably long for such 'ethnic identities' and 'fundamentalisms' to be (re)placed in the past so that one story of progression between differences, rather than an account of the production of a number of different differences at one moment in time, could be told.
> 1992: 83

I would argue that the political gains and intellectual conveniences cited in Fabian's and Massey's analyses are not only revealing of the temporal arrangements of the Self and Others *between* cultures but also *within*, and are a most central point to how time functions in contemporary urban life. As shown throughout this section, despite the plurality of time contained in the modern city we are afforded little access to recognise time's heterogeneity. Via the dominant reckoning of a time that leads us from asking after time's alternative natures; in actively and productively overlooking difference by counting only that which is

commensurable; through homogenising the identities of time's users *in* time; and by virtue of its colonisation of the future, those different, alternative, *Other* renderings of time are irrepressibly hidden by Western time's abstract character. As such, where moments of difference are encountered it is not simply that those who do not share the dominant time are judged as failing to meet the requirements of normative modes, quite often they are placed *behind*. And by positioning Others so that they join the *line* of Western time at some point in its past, both they and their temporalities are actively rearranged so as to exclude the legitimacy of that diversity, and hence those individuals, from the present.

THE TEMPORAL ORDERING OF DIFFERENCE

In Chapter One I expressed that a considerable motivation for this work was my concern with how difference was ordered through the contemporary city; how it appeared to hold steady, benefiting some whilst causing great struggle and hardship for Others whose *ways of life* were cast silently aside the city's norms. Having spent the last two chapters looking at time's dominant form in modern urban life; the places of its construction, maintenance and reification; the material consequences of modern time's hurried pace and abstract form; and the way time is not only produced by but is productive of the social, it is now possible to offer some new insight into such concerns. There is undoubtably a time that dominates modern urban life and the objects, ideals and norms of this dominant time merge with both users and non-users alike, marking out the sensibility of urban life at every site. As has been shown thus far, these standards attempt to impregnate and socialise individuals to such an extent that they appear willing to forego truths grounded in their *times of representation* due to an overriding consensus of what time *is*. And here, where the abstract nature of this dominant time ultimately denies concrete qualitative time, difference is also denied and dominant time orders urban individuals in an uneven manner. In this sense, time is not simply a medium through which such struggles happen but is itself a seat of those struggles. As a vehicle through which a culture builds and sustains itself – by attempting to promote certain usages into wider consciousness, and with them, the *ways of life* from which they were imagined – urban time is at every moment both witness to and active in an ontological battle over what gets counted as real and what is to be dismissed as fanciful or illegitimate. And just as Lefebvre made his own arguments in relation to the production of space it can now be stated that time too lends itself to the construction and maintenance of socially privileged identities, and to an underclass of those who either can't or won't conform. To re-appropriate his terrible insight in this regard, "the production of

[time] has nothing incidental about it: it is a matter of life and death" (1991: 417). As such, with time too now appreciable as one of the ways in which difference is ordered in and through the city, this chapter now turns to begin engagement with the third and final question raised in Chapter Two:

- What are the connections between processes of temporal ordering and the ills of everyday city life?

The Shadowlands of Time

This section marks only an initial and brief exploration of the question posed above. Indeed, in this one query alone there are incalculable dimensions to address. In order to engage some of the early, tentative groundwork that might be important for such enquiries, however, I find it helpful to return once more to the attempts of dominant time to establish not only its modes as normative but to ensure normative identities for its *proper* users. Despite its efforts to construct identities which complement and maintain its hegemonic rule it is important to remember that dominant time is not wholly successful in this regard. In line with Glennie and Thrift (2005), Darier cautions against imagining that *clock time* has "totally replaced and erased other concepts and experience of time" (1998: 195); whilst Birth reminds that though the overwhelming presence of *clock time* attempts to render invisible those times which it is not there are many experiences, beliefs, ideas and concepts of time which "despite their invisibility, [...] continue to be felt." (2007: 217). I'd argue, therefore, at moments where *clock time* is unable to contend with time in its more visceral forms – where *times of representations* are unable to match the realities and needs posed by our *representations of times* – there exists a heightened potential for conflict to manifest, and for the invisible to become visible through such clashes. And moreover, by looking to the identities present within such moments it arguably becomes possible to glimpse those for whom dominant time casts its most severe effects. It is upon this logic that this section therefore expands.

Two points at which such clashes are arguably at their most heightened, and where the invisible becomes possible to glance, is in time as it is experienced and time as it is conceptualised. For example, there are experiences of time that though voluntarily entered, nonetheless provide a powerful lens into the alternative. Looking again to the collage I used to illustrate time's plurality early in Chapter Two, the description of holiday-time in

excerpt NINETEEN, for example, points to physical changes I myself experienced as I let go of my habitual predilection for "checking in with the clock". And certainly, the broader experience I captured through my third autoethnography experiment, *Experiences of Holiday Time*, confirmed not only ways in which time was experienced differently during a period of disassociation from my normal routine, but perhaps more telling was the way in which that disassociation continued to intensify during my period of leave to the point that my return to work felt as though I was returning to the life of another. Similarly, the time of meditation and the time of protest in excerpts FIVE and EIGHT respectively, each reveal an alternative cadence to that commonly expected of *clock time*, resulting in productions which range from a distinct lack of "awkwardness" to a "different universe".

It is where alternative experiences of time aren't so readily entered, however, that it becomes possible to glimpse those sites at which time's dominant reach occurs unevenly. At the start of this chapter I considered the disjuncture between abstract time and other, more organic cycles of life. My intention was and is not to isolate this a primary cause of urban ills but this connection nonetheless reveals many ways in which time holds an uneven bias for those whose lives manifest in ways incalculable by *clock time*. For Adam, "body time" is one key facet of this, she notes:

> As living beings we are permeated by rhythmic cycles which range from the very fast chemical and neuronal oscillation, via the slower rhythms of heartbeat, respiration and circadian rhythms, to menstrual and reproductive cycles, and to the very long-range recurrences of seasonal and even climatical change. [...] Activity and rest alternations, cyclical exchanges and transformations, seasonal and diurnal sensitivity, all form the silent pulse of our being.
>
> 1995: 45

It is, however, where an experience forces such pulses to emerge from beyond their silence, where one is forcibly confronted with a "body time" that no longer accords with the sensibility posed by the clock, that the disjuncture is at its most revealing. Looking again to the collage on pages 38–40, the poet Mark Doty's reflection of his partner's battle with AIDS in excerpt SIXTEEN, for example, brings to life a radically altered sense of the future that emerges where illness occurs and mortality is forcibly faced. And to this same point many other experiences from the collage can be added, including bereavement (TWELVE),

birthing (SEVENTEEN), mental illness (FOUR) and old age (TWENTY). In each of these examples attention is forcibly shifted from time's commensurability back onto alternative, variable rhythms of life. And in opening a different window, the abject disjuncture between the rationalised time of social construct and those modes which present as necessary where the organicity of life insists that it is recognised, becomes unmistakeable.

While the transformation to time in those examples so far discussed originates in experience, it is clear that a conceptual change is swift to follow. Where time is conceptualised differently as a primary course, however, similar disjunctures are still discernible and also illuminating. For example, the conceptualisation of an ever present past in excerpt FIFTEEN gives some indication of not only why many activities common to modern Western life are strictly forbidden within Wahhabism, but moreover, why it therefore seeks to negate the very idea of evolution in human thought and morality. Excerpts ONE, THREE, SIX, TEN, THIRTEEN, and FOURTEEN further illustrate the way in which alternative conceptions connect to very different life practices both in the moment and going forward, including the lack of grammatical tense for the inhabitants of the Trobriand Island in excerpt FOURTEEN, and to the increased attentiveness that the Amondawa pay the land in excerpt TEN. And perhaps what is most crucial to recognise here is that alternative experiences of time not only shape alternative conceptions of time, but that alternative conceptions also dictate the experiences that are possible.

Across these moments where experiences and conceptions are felt to clash with the pressing insistence of time's objective reality, indeed *within* these moments, there is a presence of individuals and groups. In the broadest sense the identities of these individuals and groups are bound to particular diagnoses: those who cannot *tell* time or those who tell time differently; those who struggle to, or who choose not to maintain appearance with dominant temporal identities. By looking to the contradictions faced and the difficulties that emerge when these contradictions are forcibly dealt with, however, a more specific insight can be gained. Consider the following example which brings to the fore the experience of children:

> Imagine yourself as a child in a classroom with adults who speak your language but whose directions you are unable to interpret, even though you may wish to please them. When you get up to see the gerbils, you are told to sit down, finish

> your coloring and wait to see the gerbils during free time. When you sit down to color, your paper is taken away before you finish, because it's ten o'clock and time for juice. Before you finish juice, it's 'potty time'.
>
> Norton, 1990: 1

Similarly, Till Roenneberg draws attention to contradiction and difficulty that teenagers face where *their* time meets the *clock time* of the education system. Noting that they "can stay up easily until the early morning hours and possess an unchallenged ability to sleep through the day – almost the entire day" (2012: 100), his point is then made by his subsequent question: "what does that mean for all those young people who have to *perform* in school during the early hours of the day?" (2012: 105, my emphasis). Those suffering the effects of drug and alcohol addiction emerge as another grouping to which the dominance of *clock time* might act upon unevenly. It is not the clock but a cycle of drug seeking and drug use which arguably fuels the regularity with which such individuals experience time. And this conflict is heightened all the more when they are invited to rejoin the mains of society upon their sobriety. At such a point not only are they forced to reinterpret their bodily urges in line with the clock, but they must also continually work to cast aside the sensibility of the temporal cues with which they were so accustomed. Similarly, those in poverty emerge as a significant grouping for whom the everyday experience of time is in contrast to the quantity and length of activities deemed *manageable* within a standard *clock time* day. Dealing with the provision of services in the public sphere, the work of managing tight budgets, a greater reliance on modes of public transport, to name a few examples, mean that those who are facing economic hardship not only experience an economic freedom that is comparatively shrunk, but a shrinking availability to their time when the additional and labour intensive activities of queuing, waiting, budgeting, using public transport and shopping in multiple locations are taken into account – that is the *time* it takes to be poor.

The examples and commentaries I've provided throughout this section are brief. But nonetheless, they can be expanded to highlight a great many groups and individuals who may experience and conceptualise time in a different manner than normatively considered. They include, but are not limited to: the single parent, the religious minority, the terminally ill, the unemployed, the child, the working poor, the insomniac, the addict, the rural migrant, the ethnic migrant, the homeless, the extremist, the traveller, the mentally ill, the

physically ill, the land-worker, the woman, the teenager, the protestor and the carer. And across these categories, the potential difficulty and indeed inability for certain groups and individuals to commit to an existence established through normative conceptions of time can be brought to the fore. But while these different facets of identity provide some insight into those who might be unevenly and negatively affected by the time that dominates contemporary urban life – revealing one of the ways in which temporal ordering connects to the ills of everyday city life – I want to be very clear that I'm not arguing that the relationship between isolated facets of an individual's identity correlate to their marginalisation in any straightforward way. I certainly have no desire to suggest a simple typography of the temporally excluded and there are indeed a couple of points which reveal the shortsightedness of any such goal: the heterogeneity of individual time and the temporally constituted nature of identity.

To elaborate on the first of these points. The heterogeneity of time that I've been arguing for throughout this work does not simply relate to the existence of Others' time in addition to the norm, but must also be recognised within the individual. The individual experience of time throughout a single day certainly proves this to be the case, in the contrast appreciable between everyday events such as sleeping, eating lunch, day-dreaming and waiting for a bus in the rain. Moreover, such heterogeneous experiences of time are of course only magnified when appreciated across a life that is strewn with experiences that force an individual not only to *feel* but to enter into different, unknown, and unusual temporal patterns, any of which might demand its own behaviours, moral attitudes and senses and sensibilities which contradict the time that dominates. Many of the "body times" which Adam considers in her quote on page 90, for example, are most heightened within self-contained events such as illness, travel, pregnancy, child-birth, bereavement, and so on. And though their experience is carried forth into the future, as facets of identity they are often seen as temporary states that are entered into and then exited out of. As such, it neither seems appropriate in the short term nor the longer term to draw a simple correlation between time and identity. To look to the second point. In addition to the fluidity of the relationship between the individual and these facets, these facets themselves are in no way static nor discrete. Individuals who fall under just one of these broad categories of identity are unlikely to experience the same degree of mental and/or material hardship than those who straddle a number of them. For example, a six-year-old child's experience of a dominant time that does not quite match their own needs and experiences

might, depending on the child, prove challenging. Such difficulties, however, are unlikely to match the hardship experienced by a twenty-year-old who carries with her the childhood experience of being homed with a number of different foster families, has spent the last three years living between shelters and sleeping rough on the streets, and whose temporality is strongly dictated by a continual cycle of drug seeking and drug use. Just as time shapes identity in the moment it also acts upon it over time. It is therefore important to recognise that individuals are in no way fixed within these identities. And once again, this means that the relationship between temporality and identity cannot be read in any straightforward manner.

Nonetheless, whilst it is important to stress that the connections between time and identity are in no way easily deciphered, I want to end this section by stating unequivocally two interrelated points. First, there are those identities who dwell in time that is undervalued in the modern city. As Adam comments:

> Children and the elderly, the unemployed, carers the world over and subsistence farmers of the majority of the world inhabit the shadowlands of un- and under-valued time. Women dwell there in unequal numbers. Their time does not register on the radar of commodified time.
>
> 2006: 124

Second, for those identities who dwell in the "shadowlands" of time, the dominance and ordering capacity of *clock time* effects their further marginalisation and exclusion. Indeed, when it is appreciated that some identities cannot or choose not to function within the confines of dominant time, and that time itself functions to actively exclude certain identities, work can then begin into how the *problems* of urban life manifest temporally. And though such a point marks only the earliest of ventures into connections between processes of temporal ordering and the ills of everyday city life, across the vast range of ills considered throughout Chapter One the urgency with which time too must have its role(s) imagined should now at least be undeniable.

An Intimate Politics of Time: reflections for research

These last two chapters have focused on point one of my research problem:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
    a. time is socially constructed, *and*
    b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

My aim has been twofold in my address of this: to bring to life a sense that time is not natural but is in constructed in, through and across untold layers of social life; *and* to reveal that within such arrangements the reach of dominant time extends far beyond the maintenance and reification of its own form, to order its users and non-users in exclusionary ways. As I've made clear from the outset, however, this is not the exclusive focus of this thesis. And while further engagement with these issues might appear the most urgent and logical course, two different concerns inform the remainder of this work:

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

3. Knowledge of the urban is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

Shortly, Chapters Four, Five and Six will move to detail the method by which this work seeks to engage in the above. First, however, this chapter concludes by discussing the rationale for this more reflexive approach. In doing so it seeks to emphasise that points two and three above exist in no way separate from point one but stem from the very same discussions that have been advanced thus far.

Setting out my stall early in Chapter Two, I argued that an intimate politics of time was necessary in order to fully grasp the ways in which time was not only shaped by the few, but how it, though partial, had the capacity to extend forth and shape the temporal perceptions and material conditions of the many. To achieve this I took seriously the warnings of Adam, and others, who stressed the "[i]mportance of getting to know the unreflected backcloth of our 'own' time upon which 'other' times are constructed" (1995: 7). Autoethnography was crucial to the success of that approach. It allowed me to *see* that which I took for granted, leading me to embed my discussions within the literature *and* the everyday experiences of *my* time. This not only allowed me to contribute to theoretical discussions surrounding the hegemonic and normative functions of dominant time; it allowed me to glimpse urban realities where norms of time came to face alternative modes,

and to recognise some of the ways in which power, order and exclusion were formed within such encounters, continuing their interaction as they played-out over time.

There was, however, another layer revealed in that intimate approach: the proximity of such arrangements to the context from which this work has thus far been conceived and actioned, *the academy*. If I've managed to make anything wholly evident thus far it is that no facet of our being, nor the world in which we live, is isolated from time. Time acts, renders, makes possible and ascribes modalities across all aspects of our daily and long term existence, and the academy is not immune from the considerable reach and influence of the time that dominates contemporary urban life. It sits at, is influenced by, and influences the exact same sites at which *clock time's* dominance is maintained and strengthened. Therefore, in pursuing an intimate approach this work has brought not one but two concerns to light, and which sit together only in an uneasy fashion: the urgency of posing temporal questions, and the suitability of posing them from within the existing traditions of academic research.

Given the urgency for temporal urban research that has been established across the past two chapters it might be expected that empirical work should begin immediately. The traditions of academic research, however, reveal a number of reasons why such an approach would be foolhardy. First, the conception of time prevalent within the academy means that existing methods are unlikely to capture data suitable for this task. Second, the narrow-focus of existing methods coupled with the privileged academic voice, suggests that any such research may in fact serve to uphold the very structures in which this work is intending to critically engage. To look to the first of these issues. The *doing* of social science in many ways mirrors the dominant logic of *clock time*. Commenting on the analogous form of the two, Adam writes:

> Time theories reflect the social sciences' explicit concern with objectivity, rationality and the scientific study of Western, post-enlightenment society. [...] They represent a reality that can be taken apart and reassembled both physically and conceptually, a controllable reality that constitutes humans in the role of machine operator, even that of maker.
>
> 2006: 120-21

The mechanical rationality by which the traditional modes of social science inquire after its subjects suggests that a plurality of time is unlikely to be grasped. Indeed, studying time through methodological traditions which are so closely connected to the dominant logic of *clock time* suggests that they are also likely to be imbued with a homogenous view of time, and are therefore unlikely to capture the very essence of the concern which sits at the heart of this work: time's heterogeneity.

To look now to the second concern. It is not simply that such endeavours might overlook those times which are not dominant, but rather, in doing so they may further deny their legitimacy. Indeed, as Adam's comments suggest, social science does not simply mirror the dominant metaphor which sits at the heart of normative time, but fuels it further. As my discussion of philosophy in Chapter Two, pages 66–71 revealed, there is a strong connection between *clock time* and the dominant paradigms of science. And in today's academic environment where science is not confined to its own disciplines but makes intelligible and legitimate much of the work that takes place in the academy more broadly, this of course crosses into social science research also. As such, the social scientist's role helps configure for society its higher level assumptions of ontology. And in also prescribing for itself appropriate methods by which to engage within the realities is seeks, it tells the world not only its knowledge, but what knowledge is. That the basic categories and assumptions of social science should render many things about time invisible, then, is all the more concerning. Indeed, not all time is commensurable; not all time can be counted; not all *time is money*. But where research is unable to capture such realities of time, it is likely to reproduce and uphold the dominant conception through which its activities are conceived, whilst maintaining the absence of those very times which are characteristic of Others.

Where existing methods not only run the risk of overlooking the main categories of temporal research but have the potential to uphold and strengthen them further, how does one study time? *How can it be made multiple; how can its transformative power be captured; how can we be taken from of our natural attitudes?* For Adam the answer is simple:

> We have to let go of the illusion of an objectively observable reality uncontaminated by observation and unaffected by times, most specifically, the invisibles of pasts and future
>
> 1995: 73

Such adjustments not only change the face of individual methods but calls into question the corner stones of social science research: validity, generalisation, verifiability, truth, and so on. It also reveals that there is a need to ask questions of those ontologies counted as real and those implicitly consigned to an Othered fate. As such, it is with this in mind that this work continues to seek its subject, and in that spirit that the discussion of method in the next three chapters proceeds.

II

METHOD AND APPROACH

Chapter Four

OF THINGS CRACKED AND DULLY JARRING

Introduction

As I've written this thesis thus far I've frequently embedded my discussions within my own experiences, giving information as to those more personal origins of this work I find myself able to isolate. As I've done this, the following reflection from Michel Foucault has remained central in my mind, reminding me not only of the relevance but the importance of this approach to academic writing:

> Each time I have attempted to do theoretical work, it has been on the basis of elements from my experience – always in relation to processes that I saw taking place around me. It is in fact because I thought I recognized something cracked, dully jarring, or dysfunctioning in things I saw, in the institutions with which I dealt, in my relations with others, that I undertook a particular piece of work, several fragments of an autobiography.
>
> quoted in Rajchman, 1985: 35-36

The productive sparks generated via things *cracked* and *dully jarring*, and the biographical nature of their reckoning to which Foucault nods, resonate with the origins and approach of this work. My research problem, though I have often presented it formalised across three, neat tiers, certainly did not make itself known in such a way. It announced itself slowly, iteratively – emerging through personal moments which sat outside its direct content and were much more suddenly felt. As I turn now in these next three chapters to discuss and describe the methodological approach this work has adopted in order to *get at* the research problem identified, it must be said that the same is true of its development. While I am now able to discuss it in such a way that it may appear conceptually and theoretically

fitting, the truer face of its production was messy, disordered and complex; marked by long, confusing aporias and hiatuses of intellectual confidence. All too often it seems that these stories of a messier, inconsistent, uncomfortable and more personal tone are written out from those more traditional methodological commentaries, which instead opt to formally bridge a thesis' aims to its findings, extolling their own rational, objective and verifiable virtues as they go. In choosing to position himself at the core of his work, however, Foucault's reflections come in stark contrast to this more traditional presentation of research. And more significantly, in bringing to life his own work in this way his quote serves as a powerful reminder that the researcher in no way stands isolated from their subject. A simple point that nonetheless has the potential to significantly alter both the orientation and scope of the research endeavour, as I will aim to show across these next three chapters.

It is within the spirit of this much more reflexive approach that I now turn to discuss those things which sit internal and external to this work, informing the research agenda and the research approach that is possible. As made clear in the Preface, the positioning of these chapters is in no way indicative of the point at which the research and method of this work commenced. Nonetheless, now remains a suitable point at which to (a) consider, in more detail, those things which have impressed constraint upon the scope and organisation of this work; and (b) describe and defend how I've navigated such parameters in order to carry out my research within those frames considered. This chapter deals with part (a) of these discussions. It begins by looking once more to the origins of this work but this time considers the emergence of my three-tiered research problem as *cracks* emerging from a broader, and more personally motivated concern: social justice. This is followed by a statement of the aims of this work, formalised in relation to those factors discussed. After this I move to consider how those *cracks* discussed have similarly guided and constrained the approach of this research in ways that sit outside the specificities of this project. Having more fully articulated both the aims of this research and those factors which delineate its approach, Chapter Five then moves to discuss part (b). I start by looking at the methodological approach of this work in the broadest terms. I then look in detail to the development and practice of that methodology within those sites at which I direct my attention: the self and the urban studies canon. These discussions take into account the methods I adopted to gain insight, and how I worked to ensure that these methods were effectively employed. Chapter Six then draws a close to part (b) of this methodological

discussion. Arguing that the *performance* of this work is just as important as those answers I seek to find, this chapter presents the other research practices that have taken place as I've undertaken the project of this PhD research.

Cracks: development of a research problem

As stated throughout, this work proceeds from the following three-tiered research problem:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
   a. time is socially constructed, *and*
   b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

3. Knowledge of the urban is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

Arising from a particular context and my relations within it, and sitting across multiple and intersecting sites of experience, the encounters from which this work proceeds, however, were not borne as the formalised problem set out above. Rather, each point grew iteratively, as a series of *cracks* first made themselves known, and then undeniable. As the stories in this thesis have indicated thus far, my attention was initially grabbed when I began to see the hegemony, normativity, power and exclusion inherent in a time that had previously appeared uncomplicated, benign and, indeed, *natural* to me. The urgency of this concern, however, was subsequently tempered by my more startling realisation that a problematisation of such issues was largely absent within urban studies' dominant readings of the city. And finally, where I came not only to recognise but to sense that understandings of the urban were in no way isolated from the *time* dominant to the modern, urban experience, my attention shifted towards the ways in which the academy was itself constituted by and productive of those temporal tensions identified.

In Chapters Two and Three of this thesis I chose to isolate and engage within only the first of these points. And though that choice served my discussion well it must again be stated that these points exist in no way separate. The common skein which binds each of them

together and motivates their transformation is a concern with social justice. Indeed, it is through this thread that these *cracks* have found their way from the realm of personal experience to their constitutive place in the formal research agenda above. Therefore, before presenting the aims of this work as they relate to my research problem I want to take the opportunity to review my argument in such a way that makes prominent the significance of these points to broader, and more ethically charged issues of social justice.

THE TEMPORAL AND ONTOLOGICAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Though perhaps not immediately apparent from the way it is often, and seemingly unproblematically deployed throughout the social sciences, including those discussions of an urban bent, social justice is not a neutral term. For some urban theorists its sense cannot be divorced from matters of *spatial* justice. Such positions contend that full, un-restricted access to constructing, participating and being equal in society is derived from and reliant on the same concessions in space (see Soja, 2009; 2010 and Marcuse, 2009). For others, though the term is less conceptually restrictive, it nonetheless remains tied to spheres of justice, such as property, money, cultural and social capital, democratic participation, freedom of expression, for example. At each point it is invoked it already *means* something and the same is of course true of its presence within this thesis. I find that my understanding and use of the term in this work cannot be separated from prior connections I'd made between the ways in which cultural norms were produced in and through the very fabric of the city, and the manner in which such norms ordered difference and excluded those whose *ways of life* fell out with dominant urban logics. Indeed, it was here that I first noticed encounters between the city and difference, and made multi-layered linkages between such processes and the *ills* of modern, urban life. Nonetheless, as this work has progressed the term has undergone additional shaping and its thrust and significance herein is connected at two distinct but interrelated points: to the temporal and the ontological.

To look first to the temporal connection I make with social justice. In many ways this is very much implied in my identification and formalisation of the first *crack* of this work as a research *problem*. Pointing towards a normative, hegemonic process via which time is naturalised my very statement of point one suggests this to be a marked concern for those who use, experience or conceptualise time in ways that deviate from the normative – something I've attempted to evidence throughout Chapters Two and Three. To briefly re-

cap these discussions: though time's dominant appearance in the contemporary city renders it as largely natural, examples which evidence time's construction are readily gathered where we challenge the common sensibilities of our seemingly natural temporal modes. Of those so far discussed in this work, perhaps most obvious are the clocks, calendars and schedules which make sensible the ideal of temporal regularity. These objects simultaneously serve to normalise the experience of time whilst firmly linking it to ideas attesting to its proper use – the impoliteness of being late, for example, or the respect afforded to those who complete tasks in a timely manner. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Three, proper notions are also abundant in relation to time as it extends across a lifetime, such as those paradigmatic markers of birth, marriage, reproduction, retirement and death. Yet even these can be appreciated as constructed when alternative temporal logics are made visible. And where it is recognised that diversity is to be found in all quarters of the city it is no great leap to argue that those who take ease in social, economic and cultural modes which lie outside the norm may also perceive and experience time differently.

Ultimately, this suggests that the difficulty and perhaps inability for certain individuals or groups to commit to an existence established through normative conceptions of time must also be considered germane as far as matters of social justice are concerned. Following this realisation questions are immediate. Does a single parent who finds it necessary to work two jobs have the same ability to access and participate in *romantic* time? Is an individual who allocates a daily portion of time for religious prayer at a disadvantage to meet the full requirements of *culture proper*? Will an addict's recovery be thwarted when their access to re-enter the mains of society via the labour market is predicated on their ability to conform to *clock time*? And moreover, do the reduced capacities of these individuals to meet normative time's paradigmatic markers cast additional negative assertions on their societal reputation? Though such inquiries hardly begin to capture those questions which must be posed of time as it relates to social justice their acute sensibility nonetheless demonstrates that cultural modes which contrast with the normative expand beyond a different way of generating and experiencing space to also include different expressions of time.

Though it is admittedly less immediate, the connection this work makes between social justice and ontology is captured in the formalisation of points two and three. However, where the potential consequences of points one, two and three are examined not discretely but as they combine, it becomes possible to rescue points two and three from abstraction

and position their significance firmly alongside the nested concerns of the first. Indeed, it is this that reveals that those forgotten facets of social justice relate not simply to urban issues of a temporal nature but that it is just as important to pursue such struggles at an ontological level also. To demonstrate this claim I find it prudent to begin and end with policy – the site through which I entered my academic work on this topic – and to firstly state that formulations of urban policy do not rest confined to the medium of their articulation but shape the manifest form of the city and its citizens. The ideas which influence urban policy are multiple, borne amongst political aspirations, election manifestos, party allegiances, public pressures, local and national pride, the guise of necessity, and so on. But sitting somewhat out of view, constraining the form of the arena in which such claims are heard as legitimate, the theoretical imagining of the city is of great import. In writing urban policy, policy makers draw freely on understandings of how cities work; how they can be improved; how their problems can be minimised – answers which by and large transpire through the theoretical and empirical activities of the contemporary academy. Within such accounts, however, policy makers are inculcated not only what to measure, but how to measure it; not only what to think, but how to think it; not only what to see, but how to see it. Moreover, in acknowledging both desires for and claims to *evidence-based policy*, the knowledge output of the modern academy – which includes not simply the content of its accounts but the prevailing paradigms which underpin such understandings – is afforded a great power to extend its reach far beyond the seat of its productions and strongly influence the policy that comes to fruition. Indeed, its noted authority and *expertise* in this regard suggests that it has the capacity to shape everyday urban life in the profoundest of ways. This reveals that the academy is not simply a site from which social justice can be studied in a multitude of registers, but rather, that the academy itself must also be examined for how its explicit and implicit knowledge productions act upon the city.

It is here that it should become apparent that social justice is not simply a concern of the material and tangible – that which can be counted, held and conceptualised within prevailing understandings – but that it must be expanded to bring into view to the politics which surround the dominant methodological, epistemological and ontological conditions of academic thought. Indeed, I very much believe that social justice relates not simply to everyday experiences of life but to whose realities are recognised as *real* within it and whose are dismissed as fanciful or illegitimate. As argued above, the academy has a powerful role

to play in this regard, and no less so than as it concerns the temporal focus of this work. The complexity of the city necessitates that the theories which describe it are incontrovertibly incomplete. However, as *cracks* two and three suggest, an entire analytical category has fallen from the urban studies' agenda. Within this discipline time is rarely made available as contingent or constructed; its nature is instead fixed as natural and hence unproblematic. The academy's role can be further articulated here by recognising two key points. First, the absence of temporal analyses is arguably augmented by the widespread presence of spatial approaches to urban topics. As Judith Jack Halberstam argues, the commonly held assertion that space is the primary lens through which to view the city in effect serves to conceal a normative and naturalised view of time which has "become hegemonic in academic practices" (2005: 6). Second, as considered at the end of Chapter Three, there is evidence to suggest that the academy itself is imbued with a temporal logic which sits in accordance with the dominant temporal norms and that it in effect transmits, maintains and stabilises such norms through its activities. Therefore in each of these things there exists a very real danger that key temporal differences which expose the complexity of different cultural and social groups within the contemporary city become invisible, and as such are delegitimised.

As dominant imaginings of the city filter down to the policy level, temporal questions of social justice, like those posed on page 104, are routinely overlooked. It is, after all, a policy approach founded on a homogenous and naturalised view of time and temporality, and though it might be faced with realities which strongly contradict that position it has neither motivation nor capacity to *see* them and then suitably react. Moreover, in requiring individuals to conform to a *proper* use of time in order to make best use of public services, policy runs the risk of rendering those who don't conform, whether this is through choice or circumstance, as victims of further injustice. Where policy has a role in not simply reacting to but proactively shaping the material form of the city, such omissions are even further heightened. For example, conceiving of social exclusion as a spatial issue of neighbourhood deprivation might lead to the design of a policy response which fails to account for the temporal barriers which excluded groups and individuals may encounter. The long-term, qualitative legacy claims used to support the hosting of mega-sporting events might be unachievable where their temporal parity with short-term actions – predicated on the meeting of quantitative spatial and economic targets – has simply been assumed. Again, such scenarios mark only the start of engagement but in each of these

things discussed what can be seen is that temporal concerns of social justice stand in no way isolated from those ontological concerns discussed. And with policy, urban theory and the prevailing philosophical orientations of academic research all currently insufficient to meet the temporal lived realities of individuals as they are conceived in their plurality, ultimately it is suggested that regardless of whether such *cracks* emerge from the theoretical imagining of the city in writing or the practice of it through policy and research, questions of social justice must be posed simultaneously of the temporal, the ontological and all areas in between. Indeed, it is across all facets that time comes to colour the *ways of life* that are considered normal and proper in the city, and therefore across all facets that my concerns of temporal social justice must accordingly respond.

AIMS OF THIS WORK

Having explored the first point of the research problem in Chapters Two and Three of this work via the available literature on time and my own autoethnographic research, my primary engagement with this topic now moves to an institutional level, at the site of the academy. Specifically, my interest lies in how, where, and when has time become naturalised within urban theory and to consider how this links to the naturalisation of time in everyday life. Beyond this, the aim is to examine the impact of such thought as it manifests through the actuality of the city, and to develop an understanding of those conditions necessary to include a more temporally aware agenda within urban research. Framed via my three-tiered research problem, the main objective of this study is therefore:

- To expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study.

More specifically, this work aims to:

- bring to life time's social construction, and with it, to highlight sites of its normative function in the contemporary city;
- open up dialogue on the meaning of time and temporality in the city;
- consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions which have contributed to time's naturalisation;
- help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; *and*

- stress the need to consider contemporary urban problems from a temporal perspective.

In pursuing these aims, however, it is not just those things which stand internal to the project's content which lend themselves to its development. There exist many external factors which are similarly motivated by my understanding of social justice and these too have served to guide and constrain the shape of my approach in quite signifiant ways. Therefore, before moving to describe and defend the approach designed in order to meet these aims in Chapter Five, I first want to offer some discussion of those factors which sit outside the specificities of this project but which nonetheless have a notable bearing on what is possible in this work.

Cracks: development of a research approach

Recognising the ever-present self in the motivation and development of research work – as Foucault does in his quotation which opened this chapter and as I have tried to show throughout this thesis thus far – also supports a need to delineate those things which frame research but which are not necessarily explicit within the formalisation of its problem(s). Apposite here is once again my concern with social justice. This has had a bearing not simply on the *problem* with which this work engages but it has strongly informed the approach called forth to answer it. In this final section, I therefore want to look at those things which sit just out of view but which have nonetheless had a formative presence on the shape of my broader research practice and hence the research and presentation of this work.

Of particular relevance is the philosophical stance which underpins my view of academic research. Given that this work looks not only directly to issues of urban time and temporality but also turns to question the points of their absence within the urban field already indicates that it is not simply the concrete and tangible which garner my interest but perhaps more so, it is those conditions which give rise to what is seen and what gets counted as real which truly spark my curiosity. While this framing of the problem of social justice is in no way unique, it does again stand in contrast to the more traditional orientations from which academic work might commonly proceed in urban studies. I therefore consider it important to make explicit my orientation towards this work as it

relates to understandings of reality, knowledge, and the activities of academic research more generally.

My approach to research is rooted in the belief that reality is multiple, constructed through the interactions between individuals, institutions, ideas, objects and texts. I view society and culture as emergent ontological forms which exist in a constant state of flux, each continually constituted and reconstituted at the various interfaces through which actors and subjects connect with their wider environment. It therefore follows that the meanings attached to the world are not static nor universal, but are multiple, variable and constantly subject to modification and change. Perhaps most importantly, I hold these beliefs not simply in relation to the external world but of course consider myself within these same processes. The relationship between me and this work, for example, has evolved through an ever-ongoing, dialogic process during which I've actively constructed the reality in which I'm engaged whilst I myself have been shaped through each encounter. And in line with this it follows that the *method* of this work is not simply intent on capturing and revealing those realities but that it must also be conscious of the ways in which it performs and is productive of them. The question that inevitably follows – what then is the stead of knowledge as it relates to such processes?

Following the ontological position set out above it might perhaps seem reasonable that I should locate my epistemological grounding within an interpretative tradition. As outlined, I do consider the social realm to be inherently complex, unpredictable, contradictory, multiple, diffuse and messy, and believe that as individuals contemplate, interpret and act within their environments notions of cause and effect no longer hold sway. And with human action not governed by same laws constructed for our physical world understandings of the social realm cannot be conceptualised within such positivistic schemas. Responding as such the philosopher Peter Winch provides some scope for a richer, more nuanced examination of social life when noting that "our language and our social relations are just two different sides of the same coin. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters" (1958: 123). In forging a reciprocal relationship between language use and the resulting form of reality Winch's views could arguably be read as advocating the use of any number of interpretative social science methods, each one appropriate to the task of navigating this work's problems of the social realm via the

lens of language. But Winch also recognises that dominant techniques for understanding the social world also emerge from within culture. Indeed, he cautions that the very idea of social *science* is borne not from a desire to interpret the world accurately but a need to make results amenable to Western modes of understanding reality. And for me it is this position that speaks volumes for the philosophical positioning of this study (no doubt heightened by the foreboding *crack* which manifests most dramatically against the dominance of specific knowledge regimes and is formalised as point three of my research problem). Thus the cultural baggage that accompanies modes of knowledge production and acts of knowledge interpretation also, reveals that any claims made to the *reasonableness* of an interpretative epistemological tradition does in fact stand in conflict to the full force of my ontological position. Indeed, it is not just an external reality or my relations within it that are ontologically multiple and complex, but the epistemological, methodological and axiological must too be drawn into that assessment.

As I've reflected on this tension the work of long time collaborators Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), has provided me an alternative conceptualisation of epistemology in my work. Before this alternative can be fully grasped, however, it is necessary to appreciate how Deleuze and Guattari see the pursuit and production of knowledge in a Western, academic setting. Suggesting *arboreal thinking* as a metaphor for the traditional modes of inquiry buoyant in this context, they explain that knowledge is conceptualised as a tree from which the roots grow in one direction to provide a firm and deep anchor. Edward Said's now classic analysis on the emergence of Orientalism, for example, can in many ways be read as an account of the framework that evolves to facilitate such *arboreal* modes of thought. The Orient, Said argues, is a European invention, a discourse created from popular texts, travel narratives, scientific works, letters and diaries. However, through the work of recognisable and noted authorities – in this case named by Said as Silvestre de Sacy, Ernest Renan, and William Lane – such discourses eventually become canonised in academic works. Describing the apparatus which aids the elevation of this specific type of *Oriental* discourse, Said writes:

> What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was to place Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of Orientalism was a considerable feat. It made possible a

> scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of the Orientalist as a central authority *for* the Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent Orientalist work; it put into circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the Orient would henceforth be *spoken for*; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige.
>
> 1978: 122

Recognising also the eventual evolution and hold of this intellectual apparatus once established, Said points towards the future generations of scholars who seek to contribute their own knowledge to the Orient yet nonetheless refer back to the "inaugurators" in order to do so. Indeed, he notes that "even when new materials came his way the Orientalist judged them by borrowing from predecessors (as scholars often do) their perspectives, ideologies, and guiding theses" (1978: 177).

With knowledge constructed by building upon or over the work of authoritative accounts the activity of academic inquiry, viewed under Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of *arboreal* thinking, becomes a matter of locating the correct theory and exploring it in depth, ultimately to the exclusion and silencing of other perspectives. With the right theory purportedly leading to the *truth* – a singular and verifiable explanation that emerges through the correct application of a research method – writing becomes the process of re-writing rather than the creation of new discourses or the reporting of difference grasped from observation and reflection. Deleuze and Guattari argue that with this approach conditioning a researcher to seek a primary cause, a *root*, a canonical explanation that is fixed within a particular discipline, academic monism inevitably follows. As alternative they offer the metaphor of the rhizome as a model for academic inquiry. In biological terms the word *rhizome* is given to resilient plant roots which generate new growth in directions that are both unpredictable and unexpected. Unlike rooted tree-structures rhizomes are non-hierarchical and have no beginning or end-points. They are always in-between; connective structures that allow for propagation in all directions in response to immanent relationships with other elements of their environment such as soil, water, sunlight, temperature, grazing animals and insects, etc. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that knowledge should be

conceptualised in a similar fashion, as a living entity that materialises in multiple and surprising incarnations.

That the *cracks* from which this research proceeds includes the marginalisation of time under an increasingly dominant, spatial understanding of urban issues, in many ways renders the offerings of Said, and Deleuze and Guattari somewhat prophetic. Indeed, the *cracks* from which points two and three of my research problem emerge can be read as exemplars of the way in which *arboreal* thinking has led to a disciplinary approach that is unable to conceptualise reality beyond its own terms, resulting in its own single-vision. Similarly, the alternative metaphor of the rhizome is also resonant to the interdisciplinary approach I've adopted in this study thus far. My turning to the literatures of sociology, anthropology and philosophy in Chapters Two and Three for their content on time was initially dictated by the manifest absence of such material within urban studies. As my understanding developed, however, it also became an active attempt to breech the artificial barriers which are constructed within and beyond the academy; to peer beyond the authority of the urban "inaugurators" so to speak. Across each of these things the rhizome therefore presents as a timely encounter for the methodological framing of this work. These points, however, should not be taken to suggest that its resonance automatically assures it an unproblematic position. Knowledge as conceptualised under Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of the rhizome is of course very different than the term *knowledge* which fuels the workings of the contemporary academy, and when this work is located once more within the prevailing paradigm of social *science*, Winch's cautions must again be heeded.

Keen to maintain a position for this work as a piece of social science research therefore brings me to a penultimate point in this chapter, revealed as I now briefly introduce how such orientations lend themselves both to what this research is trying to capture, and also what it is reasonably able to show. Standing in particular tension to what might be expected of each of these is a long standing hallmark of quality in academic research: validity. As it is traditionally conceived validity describes the degree to which inferences drawn from data are correct and therefore representative of the truth (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Though the legacy of this term stems from a more positivistic tradition of scientific research the trope remains a cornerstone of post-positivist, qualitative work today, to the extent that it leads James Scheurich to question what it is "about validity that exceeds its paradigmatic

birthplace? What compels the epistemological travellers of the post positivistic diaspora not to 'leave home without it?" (1997: 81). Indeed, even though it is often re-articulated in qualitative work through a language of trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, plausibility (Saukko, 2003), it retains its look towards the idea of a transcendent truth. As John Creswell and Dana Miller define it, validity in qualitative inquiry is "how accurately the account represents participants' reality of the social phenomena and is credible to them [...] [and] refers not to the data but to the inferences drawn from them" (2000: 125-125).

As they sit in relation to this research such inheritances are of course extremely problematic, not least from a standpoint of ontological social justice. Where a belief in coexisting, multiple, conflicting, messy, and fluid realities is taken seriously the mere suggestion of a singular, transcendent, verifiable truth is in stark divergence to that philosophical position. At best it is nonsensical. More realistically, however, it calls into question the integrity of an approach that would claim an alternative ontological and epistemological orientation yet continue to hark back to such unbefitting notions of academic *quality* and *value*. It is therefore a principled departure I take from such traditions but one that nonetheless demands that the scope and meaning of this work are altered in quite significant ways, not least in terms of how such things stand in relation to the *contribution to knowledge* I seek to make via this thesis. My discussion of what this altered approach *looks* like – how I've navigated the methodological considerations outlined in this chapter – will be the substance of Chapter Five which follows. For now, however, I want to flag up one final point. Though their ideas may seem at odds with the traditional pursuit of social science Deleuze and Guattari are far from advocating a dissolution of Western thought. Notably, within their argument there is no ontological dualism between rhizomes and the arboreal. On the contrary, they remind that where new ways of thinking are found these should be juxtaposed beside the old, that we are to "connect the roots or trees back up with the rhizome" (1987: 14). Indeed, they argue that it is through such comparative acts that it becomes possible to discover the breaches, disruptions and inconsistencies – the *cracks* – which are themselves generative of new questions being asked of our theories, methods and realities. And in this sense at least, there emerges a glimmer for how this work might not simply pursue an alternative process and production of knowledge but how it may do so in a way that continues its important dialogue with both urban studies and the traditions of social science research.

Chapter Five

PLAYING WITH REALITY

Introduction

BROAD APPROACH

Having detailed those things which inform the methodological approach possible for and pertinent to this work in Chapter Four, this chapter now moves to describe and discuss the methodology I've designed to engage my research problem. The approach I employ is fundamentally designed **to expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study**; and in doing so, to also meet this work's more specific aims in:

- bringing to life time's social construction, and with it, highlighting sites of its normative function in the contemporary city;
- opening up dialogue on the meaning of time and temporality in the city;
- considering the academic, social, cultural and political conditions which have contributed to time's naturalisation;
- helping to imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; *and*
- stressing the need to consider contemporary urban problems from a temporal perspective.

In addition, as I've designed the methodological approach of this work I have not only taken into account those things explicit within its problem and aims, but just as central have been those things external to, yet nonetheless formative in their content. To summarise the key points from Chapter Four which have had a significant bearing on the orientation and manifestation of this project:

- I view reality as multiple, non-static, diffuse and continually changing, and I include myself, epistemic positions, methodological paradigms and axiological frameworks, within that ontological view

- This work aims to move away from the production of hierarchical knowledge epitomised by more traditional approaches to social science research. I instead employ Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor of the rhizome as I seek to craft an alternative knowledge and understanding, of urban problems and urban studies.

- Concerns of social justice are what motivate my academic work, and are what drive this research. These do not simply align with matters of a tangible nature, however, but relate to the ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies made available for the production of research within the academy, and, in this case, within the discipline of urban studies.

- I recognise that this work must therefore itself be viewed as a performance of social justice, and my production of it must therefore include the crafting and manifestation of an altered remit for each of these philosophical orientations.

- Taking these points into account this work must navigate a tricky tension in not only ensuring that its *contribution* can be recognised within social science, but that it remains true to its philosophical orientations.

Shortly, I will move to discuss the development and practice of the methodological approach I've designed to respond to my research problem and aims, within the terms just outlined. First, however, I want to consider the positioning of my approach in a much broader sense. At its heart the adoption of a rhizomatic outlook involves engaging with alternative ways of producing knowledge. Unlike *arboreal* thinking which seeks a primary cause *rhizomatic* thinking stresses the need to bring to the fore that which is multiple. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari this is not simply desirable, but is necessary. Neglecting multiplicity, they argue, merely lends itself to replication of known answers to social phenomena, what they refer to as "overcoding" (1987: 8). And crucially for them the pursuit of knowledge should never be about reducing "the unconscious or to interpret it or to make it signify according to a tree model. The issue is to produce the unconscious, and with it new statements, different desires" (18). Responding as such rhizomatic thinking constantly reassesses itself. It steers itself away from the singular and canonical, from binary logics and linear thought, and instead moves continuously towards the rhizome and the multiple.

"To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it", insist Deleuze and Guattari (22). And though it was never issued as travel guide to the methodologically adventurous, the ideas central to their philosophy, as set out in *A Thousand*

Plateaus, do offer some insight into what might constitute an appropriate research design conceived under a rhizomatic epistemology and multiple ontology. Indeed, across a variety of social science disciplines their metaphor of the rhizome has been adopted, adapted and applied within fields diverse as education (Alvermann, 2000; St. Pierre, 2004; Gough, 2007; Honan, 2007, Masny and Waterhouse, 2011, and Masny, 2013), migration (Bottomley, 1998), urban planning (Hillier, 2008) and media studies (Carpentier, 2008). What the practices of these researchers appear to share is a conscious move away from simplicity, linear thought and the canonisation of an unquestionable, universal truth, towards an engagement in complexity, interconnectedness and the production of the multiple. Within such approaches there are two equally important things at play: the *process* of rhizomatic thinking and its *productions*.

In looking to the second of these first, in pursuing a *rhizoanalytic* approach rhizomatic research is aimed at bringing to the fore alternative and heterogeneous accounts of social phenomena. For Deleuze and Guattari a large part of this production functions at a conceptual level. It is, about revealing the "nonthought within thought" (St. Pierre, 2004: 284). As Todd May explains, however, such an appeal is not confined to the abstract but is "built upon the not-so-controversial idea that how we conceive the world is relevant to how we live in it" (2005: 295). May goes on to argue that it necessarily follows that "we ought to conceive understandings that at least permit and perhaps encourage better – and alternative – ways of living in the world we conceive' (2005: 295). This more tangible production is thus not severed from its conceptual counterpart, but indeed, it is the very engagement with alternative ways of thinking and the production of alternative thoughts that reveal a potential for making more advantageous relations in the world. Rhizomatic research is therefore not intent on producing *truth*[13] but quite in contrast, it aims to produce that which is silent, absent and lost within and through academia's more traditional and transcendental aims and productions.

The necessity of such productions across both a conceptual and tangible register similarly informs the general process required to produce them. A principle point of Deleuze and Guattari's use of the rhizome metaphor is that:

> Any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be [...] A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections

> between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, social sciences, and social struggles
>
> 1987: 7

The challenge for a rhizomatic methodology is therefore to facilitate the *seeing* of such linkages. As Eileen Honan understands it the task is for researchers to find new, creative and experimental ways of conducting academic inquiry, and amounts, in her case, to a textual exercise aimed at producing connections that shift attention away from the construction of inner meanings and particular readings "towards a new careful attendance to the multiplicity of linkages that can be mapped between any text and other texts, other readings, other assemblages of meaning" (2004: 296). Of course, just as crucial within this is the avoidance of falling back into more traditional ways of seeing: "never send down the roots, or plant them, however difficult it may be to avoid reverting to old procedures", warn Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 23). Instead, they instruct their reader to:

> Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant. Don't sow, grow offshoots! Don't be one or multiple be multiplicities! Run lines, never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when standing still!
>
> 24

In this sense, what is ultimately required is not simply a creative or experimental approach that offers the potential for seeing new linkages, but rather one that is able to see such linkages ceaselessly and continuously, in new incarnations and in multiple ways.

As it relates to this work it is no doubt clear by now that the process and production of a rhizomatic knowledge will not allow me to *prove* my thesis within the traditions of validity. It will not lead me to towards a truth that is transcendent, something original to represent, despite how well I design my methodology or how accurately I apply my methods. This means that I cannot speak of the *contribution to knowledge* this work makes in the same way that more traditional, qualitative works would. Nor can I assume that its quality will automatically be judged in line with alternative conventions I've followed. So to be clear, this work is not aimed at unearthing *truth*. Rather, its focus is firmly maintained on bringing to life the multiple realities in which it finds itself. Its attempt is to create a way of seeing the world that disturbs the realities and verities which impress their undeniability upon us.

Certainly, as I've pieced together alternative and multiple accounts of time thus far I have been transformed in each encounter, as has my *reading* of the next account. And I would argue that it has been the *affect* of uncovering diversity and the diversity uncovered that has made urban time undeniably plural, not my statement of time's heterogeneity as fact. The remainder of this thesis, then, is aimed at capturing and presenting that affective, transformative process – both for me and those in varying degrees of proximity to this work – as it sits across my research problem and as it has unfolded through the research process itself.

Questions will of course linger for how such work might be judged. And perhaps the point that must first be noted in this regard is that these questions don't simply have consequence for this work but are also part of a much larger discussion of the politics of validity, quality and rigour in the wider academy. Indeed, such academic badges of excellence are far from neutral and they too require reassessment where notions of social justice are taken seriously. As John Law notes, "[t]he guarantees, the gold standards, proposed for and by methods, will no longer suffice [...] we need to discover ways of making methods without accompanying imperialisms" (2005: 15). This is something I'll return to in Chapter Ten of this thesis. For now, however, though general, the ideas outlined in this introduction are nonetheless helpful in thinking through how the rhizome might sit lend itself to method, maintaining a *contribution* to social science in the process.

To elaborate: the pursuit of *rhizomatic* knowledge albeit appears a less ordered and messier practice. Still, it demands a coherence and consistency as the research unfolds, from identifying a problem, to designing the research, to establishing criteria for quality, to the rhetoric it employs in writing-up. The *quality* of such research might therefore be assessed by examining the extent to which it plays within the *rules of its game* even when those *rules* are cast aside, quite deliberately, in order to pursue anew the multiple. In addition, where its attempt is to move toward a place where research is not judged in relation to *truth* as an external notion but rather is assessed according to its affective powers, what really counts is its capacity to craft new realities. In this regard what is crucial is the extent to which it allows us to think the previously impossible; brings to light new relationships and alternative ways of seeing; unsettles existing regimes; and carves out new territories for those absences which cannot be freed. And the ultimate assessment of this, then, is not judged against *truth*, but against the development and practice of a methodological

approach that is capable of taking things apart and putting them back together in different ways – an approach that allows for experimentation and creation, for crafting and play.

Sites of Research

The self and the urban studies canon are the sites at which this study takes place. It was within these contexts that my research problem slowly emerged, and accordingly, it is here that I've sought to uncouple the sensibility of those realities and verities which impressed themselves upon me and put them back together again in alternate ways. It is important to note that in this work I do not consider these sites discrete from one another. But as I discuss them throughout this chapter I am first going to look at them and their associated methods individually, before I discuss how my methodology eventually evolved to view both sites in combination. The reason for this is two-fold. First, although they are inherently intertwined I wasn't always conscious of this fact. I therefore feel that isolated discussions have the added benefit of illustrating the development of my approach as I experienced it. Second, arriving at my eventual methodology was a messy, complex and confusing experience – a point I raised in the previous chapter and which I will again pick up on again at various points in this chapter. Given my hope that this thesis might also make a methodological contribution I consider it important to capture the development of a methodology contrary to those traditions which record the method of social research, even of a qualitative nature, as a much more calm, collected and sanitised affair. As such, the this section looks first to *The Self*, then to *The Urban Studies Canon*, before I conclude this chapter by looking at the method of *Autoethnographic Rhizoanalysis* which was designed to access these sites in combination.

THE SELF

From the very start, the self was an essential site of this study. It was inwards that I first turned as I grappled to formalise point one of my research problem below:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
    a. time is socially constructed, *and*
    b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

And it was inwards that I continued to engage with it, asking in Chapters Two and Three:

- What leads to and maintains the formation of this time?
- How does the time that dominates modern, Western life function to order, Other and exclude?
- What are the connections between processes of temporal ordering and the ills of everyday city life?

As already indicated in the Preface to this work, and in Chapters Two and Three, the method that enabled me to engage with such questions via the self was autoethnography.

– *Autoethnography*

Often credited to the anthropologist David Hayano (Anderson, 2006), autoethnography is broadly considered an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and/or analyse the personal in order to reach the cultural. While processes of both autobiography and ethnography are central in its composition it moves beyond a mere combination of the two and proponents are quick to point to the ways in which the method differs. Contrasting it from autobiography Heewon Chang states that autoethnography transcends mere narration of self to engage in cultural analysis and interpretation (2008); while David Silverman distances autoethnography from more traditional ethnographic practices, noting its focus on the mundane and everyday rather than the unusual or exotic (2007). It was in this combined sense that I first recognised the potential of autoethnography as a means to get beneath the sensibility of a time that up until that point had appeared natural to me.

The scope of autoethnographic writing has, however, dramatically evolved over the past decade and its use in furthering cultural understanding is no longer presented as its sole function. Increasingly, it is recognised as a tool for researchers to understand themselves in deeper ways in turn enhancing their understanding of other issues, to such an extent that Michael Hemmingson stipulates "reflection and analysis of one's life [to be] a tenet of autoethnography" (2008: 16). There are today a range of autoethnographic styles which epitomise Hemmingson's claim, and while I don't want to get bogged down in mere description of these it is nonetheless important to appreciate the vastness of the field that has grown-up around autoethnography since Hayano's inaugural definition of it as the cultural study of one's own people (1979). Indeed, it is this that leads to a central debate over the practice of contemporary autoethnography, something which has helped frame my use of it in this work.

A discernible way contemporary autoethnographic approaches differ from one another is in the emphasis placed on a researcher's interaction with Others during the research process. Collaborative techniques such as interactive interviews (Adams, 2008) and co-constructed narratives (Ellis and Bochner, 2002), for example, focus on the interactively produced meanings which surface through the processes of research. Similar to these collaborative processes, community autoethnographies draw on the experiences of researchers in collaboration to illustrate how a community manifests particular social and cultural issues. Laura Ellingson and Patricia Sotirin argue that such autoethnographies are not only "community-building" practices in and of themselves, but bringing to light the ways particular phenomena manifest and intersect with everyday life these techniques also make "cultural and social intervention" possible (2010: 59). It is therefore unsurprising that autoethnography has also found form as an emancipatory tool within more traditional ethnographies of indigenous peoples. Recognising the role of the privileged researcher in maintaining the structures which underpin such relations, Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln argue that autoethnography can be used to disrupt the traditional power hierarchies of Western research, particularly with regards the researcher's right to study Others (2008). Within such emancipatory practices those who were once the objects of study – the colonised, economically subordinated or mentally ill, for example – instead work with researchers to construct their own stories via autoethnographic means.

In contrast to these interactive and collaborative approaches there are many techniques that have their focus on and within the self. For example, narrative autoethnographies are often presented in the form of stories that incorporate the researcher's experiences into the ethnographic descriptions and analysis of Others; whilst reflexive autoethnographies document the changes a researcher undergoes as a result of doing fieldwork. The stories generated in both these approaches exist on a non-linear continuum and encompass such events as starting research; the researcher's biography; the researcher studying their life alongside cultural members' lives; and autoethnographic memoirs (Ellis, 2009). Though not labeled as such, *confessional tales* in which an ethnographer's backstage research endeavours become the focus of investigation have of course been taking place for years (Van Maanen, 1988). The anthropologist Margaret Mead, for example, recognised the importance of her own personal reflections, observing that it was her individual consciousness and long acquaintance with her field of study that made it possible for her to perceive and record aspects of lived experience that none else could (1978).

Finally, at the other end of the collaborative spectrum is evocative autoethnography, stories about authors who view themselves as the phenomenon and write deeply personal narratives in response to the pertinent facets of their lives. These personal narratives propose to understand a self or some aspect of a life as it intersects with a cultural context, and invite readers to enter the author's reality in order to reflect on, understand and cope with their own lives (Ellis, 2004). Accounts of this type emerge most often in response to crisis and many proponents also recognise this approach as therapeutic, considering their work a story that had to be written in order for them to navigate the difficulties surrounding a particular issue or experience (Ronai, 1995).

– *The auto/ethno/graphic debate*

In 2006, a special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* presented a collection of articles, effectively illustrating that autoethnography could be analytical (Anderson, 2006), written in the style of a novel (Ellis, 2004), performative (Denzin, 2006) and many more things in between. Not only did this juxtapose the different approaches that were both possible and practiced, it led a leading proponent of the method to bring to the surface what had up until that point been somewhat of an unarticulated debate: "apples and oranges – are we dealing with two different things?" remarked Denzin in his contribution to the anthology (420). Indeed, while the diversity of approach I've just discussed is acknowledged in autoethnographic circles it does not necessarily exist easy between advocates of specific styles. In particular, two opposing branches of autoethnography have stabilised over the years in the form of analytic and evocative autoethnography, and not only do these advance the merits of their own approach, at the same time each is highly critical of the other.

On the surface their debate relates to whether autoethnography should be more about the *ethno* or more about the *auto*, a heated issue that prompts no shortage of pointed criticism on both sides, as the title of Hemmingson's 2008 article *Here Come the Navel Gazers* attests. Wolff-Michael Roth, for example, criticises accounts which are overly focused on the self, citing examples where authors associate their practice with autoethnography but say little about culture (2009). Robert L. Krizek also notes the centrality of the self in some contemporary autoethnographic forms and expresses his concern for such accounts to devolve into narcissism (2003). He goes on to suggest that autoethnography, no matter how personal, should always connect to some larger element of life. Leon Anderson (2006) and

Martin Tolich (2010) are similarly contemptuous of overly evocative forms not simply because they focus more on the self but because they are inherently subjective and are arguably motivated for "selfish" reasons (Anderson, 2006: 389). For more analytic proponents such tendencies demand a "rescuing" of the method (Atkinson, 2006: 400) – amounting to a return to realist, ethnographic roots, along with an assurance that the researcher is a "complete member in the social world under study" (Anderson, 2006: 379) and has made a stated commitment to the development of "theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena" (373).

Having reviewed a number of studies that fall under the broad categorisation of evocative autoethnography there are indeed a number of examples that I consider problematic in certain aspects. My concerns, however, do not relate to a narcissistic focus on the self but to a failure to account for how the self is inextricably constituted by and has consequence for proximate and future Others. Indeed, Sophie Tamas has written about how her autoethnography of spousal abuse initially failed to take into account how the material production of that story would affect the children she conceived and raised with that spouse (2011); while April Chatham-Carpenter has reflected on how the institutional compulsion she felt to publish her autoethnography on anorexia may have ultimately been to the detriment of her own reputation and future career in academia (2010). These accounts, and many like them, have helped bring about a vibrant debate as to what counts as ethical practice in autoethnography. It has led Carolyn Ellis, for example, to reflect on the extent to which "self-revelations always involve revelations about others" (2007: 25); and Tolich to caution that "there are no future skin grafts for autoethnographic PhDs" (2010: 1605). Interestingly, however, the same charges over inattention to Others can be levelled at the analytic approach. Their dismissal of evocative methods for being *too* focused on the self in many ways overshadows the extent to which matters of the self *can* and *do* speak meaningfully of Others and culture more broadly. Whilst their demands that a researcher be a member of the culture they wish to study completely overlooks how that *member's* position shifts as they adopt the role of researcher, instead assuming a somewhat homogenous, static and non-consequential identity over time.

That these shared and arguably more ethically concerning weaknesses are overlooked in analytic autoethnography's positioning of itself as the legitimate form suggests that its critique of evocative styles stems not from their inability to tap into broader, cultural

debates, but that it is perhaps cultivated by a much deeper divergence. Indeed, for Denzin, the truer face of the debate is not simply about whether the self or culture constitutes the proper object of study but that each practice is borne from fundamentally different beliefs about the nature and limits of social inquiry (2006). Certainly, though he doesn't frame it as such, Anderson's (2006) call for a return to the basics of realist ethnography which accompanies his overt focus on culture must also be seen as a desire to return to a specific methodological paradigm. And for Denzin, such a position has considerable potential to negate recent poststructural, anti-foundational arguments which have been pivotal in the rise of autoethnographic practice, arguably leading towards the (re)marginalisation of phenomenological methodologies (2006). In a similar vein, DeLysa Burnier considers that criticisms of evocative autoethnography do not act to support a practice that is better able to focus on interactions between culture and the self. Rather, she views such criticisms as an attempt to undermine the validity of work that is "overly emotional", amounting to a campaign intent on re-inscribing "a series of gendered dichotomies – heart/mind, emotional/rational, literary-poetic/analytical, personal/scholarly, descriptive/theoretical – within autoethnography" (2006: 416). Seen in this light the practice of autoethnography labeled as evocative occurs not simply by chance, narcissism or an abandonment of ethical practice, but is in itself an active performance of deep seated differences in a researcher's political and philosophical motivations. Something to which Denzin's characterisation of his own approach attests when he states: "[t]oday I want to write my way out of this history, and this is why I write my version of autoethnography" (2006: 426).

There are number of things I've taken from these debates as I've thought about where *my* version of autoethnography lies. It was not crisis nor a desire for therapy that motivated this work yet nonetheless my focus has converged largely on the self. Similarly, my aim to expose the peculiarity of time in everyday life, and my belief that in doing so I could manage to say something about culture more generally, were not dispelled by my conviction that *I* in no way constituted a fixed point but would necessarily change as a result of the research endeavour. The practice of my work, then, does not fall within the evocative camp, but I find that my political and philosophical orientations sit much better here. And though my vision perhaps appears more settled within the wider, cultural focus of the analytic tradition, I cannot agree with the position they erect against evocative autoethnography, nor their argument that culture is the only legitimate target of *proper* autoethnographic work. What these tensions suggest is that autoethnographic practices are

not necessarily tied to such neatly prescribed frames. And there is an additional danger to note here, namely, that this debate between the extremes of the method, over what constitutes the legitimate form, runs the risk of making invisible other approaches which are not as widely written about, including those which have unique and multi-faceted motivations for adopting the practices that they do. I therefore consider it not only necessary for this work but also in terms of how this work speaks to the broader practice of the method, to not simply pick a best fit but to be as explicit as possible about my motivations for, and my use of autoethnography in this study.

– *Autoethnography: motivation and practical approach*

Throughout this work I have positioned myself central to the content that is developed; across all facets I have aimed to unapologetically write myself in. But while my focus is channeled via and speaks to the self, this work is of course about things that exist beyond me and my use of autoethnography was primarily motivated by my desire to gain insight into problems that were elsewhere overlooked. Its promise as a tool to see beneath the mundane presentations of everyday life that are so often taken for granted presented me a means to pick apart and play with a time I previously could only describe as natural. But more than this, it allowed me to make this time strange, problematic and entirely political. Furthermore, having recognised that dominant understandings of time were themselves partly stabilised within more traditional methods, as an alternative way of *doing* research and representing Others I considered that the practice of autoethnography in itself served to challenge such canonical ways of working.

To this end I used autoethnography in three different ways. First, in order to develop the coherence and integrity of this project as a whole I employed a reflexive style. To achieve this I documented the ways in which I approached my topic, methods, analysis and even acts of reflection, and sought to think through some of the varying and at times contradictory reasons for why I might have arrived at these preferences. As I practiced autoethnography in this way I was keen not only to acknowledge the innumerable ways in which my personal experiences influenced the trajectory of my thesis but to remain conscious of those things that existed beyond my autonomy. Including, for example institutional requirements (such as progress reviews, dealings with the ethics committee and meetings with supervisors); resources (considered in terms of funding, access and technology); and the interface between myself and my proximate Others (including the

impact of my transformation throughout the PhD, and the way in which not only I but Others were inevitably shaped in the presence of a three year long study on time). In attempting to accommodate a fuller remit of these internal and external influences within my research rather than assume their easy fit, I aimed to reposition myself "as an object of inquiry who depicts a site of interest in terms of personal awareness and experience" (Crawford, 1996: 167). The activities which comprised this process were of course autobiographical in part. But in also striving to make visible for the reader the manner in which I was shaped by much broader factors as I came to *see* the social realities of my study, my hope is that the resulting commentary moves beyond the self to comment meaningfully on the joining of the self and culture as they constitute and are constituted through my research agenda.

Second, in order to chart the lineages of my own transformation, including, importantly, my changing perception of time throughout the course of the work, I employed a narrative approach to my autoethnographic writing. This allowed me to document the everyday experience of thinking, reading and writing about time alongside examples of Other time that I came across. The stories I generated of alternate temporalities also allowed me to take *my* time apart and reflect on what else it might have been. In doing this I was able to see the contingency of dominant time and with it develop narrative accounts of its grave consequence for those who lived at odds with its logic.

Finally, in order to pursue such ideas further and examine how I could play with conventions of time in everyday life, I adopted an experimental approach. This was not a technique I'd seen documented elsewhere in autoethnographic volumes. My practice of it was, however, similar to the narrative approach just described. Looking to the experience of temporality under certain, specified conditions, I conducted three autoethnography experiments through which I attempted to tap into a previously unreflected aspect of time and think through how it functioned to uphold its sensibility. In *Experiment One: Everyday Life without Clocks*, I explored the experience of living without the use of conventional methods of time-reckoning. The aim was to examine how and to what extent the subjective and intersubjective experience of time remained sensible without access to clocks. Moreover, I sought to consider what this in turn revealed about the materiality of time in the contemporary city. In *Experiment Two: Same Space, Different Time*, I tried to capture some of the space/time connections of daily urban life over five weeks by staggering, at 90 minute

intervals, a walk taken every Tuesday by the same route through the city which culminated with a 45 minute stop in the Tramway café. The aim was to get a sense of how space was different at different times of the day, and likewise how time was different in different spaces. Moreover, in this experiment I was keen to consider what effect this had on the urban individual who lived largely within a self-contained temporality. Finally, in *Experiment Three: Experiences of Holiday Time*, I attempted to capture and compare the sensibilities experienced while on holiday to those I encountered whilst at work. My aim was to look to how my perception of time differed, and how this in turn shaped my perception of time in that moment and going forward.

Across each of these practices I generated data similar to that produced through ethnographic methods. This included participant observations (of the self); field notes, personal notes and memos; sketches and maps; and a range of gathered and produced artefacts, including photographs and videos, emails and text messages, and newspaper and magazines cuttings. My techniques for capturing this data were varied and included writing, sketching and mapping, on post-it notes, scraps of found papers, paper notebooks, computer documents, and various smart phone and tablet applications; sending emails to myself; and making audio, video and photographic recordings. In addition to these techniques which were used *ad hoc* I also kept two formal research diaries. The first was a fortnightly journal in which I reflected on my research experience, progress and the data I'd collected over the proceeding weeks. This was kept for much of the duration of my PhD, from December, 2010 to October, 2013. The second was a notebook I wrote in for fifteen minutes each morning, immediately upon waking. These *stream of consciousness* writings were kept over an eight month period from September, 2011 to May, 2012, and served the purpose of helping less deliberate narratives come to the fore.

Unsurprisingly these activities were very fruitful, producing no shortage of data between them. It was in the collation and analysis of that data, however, that I encountered two areas of difficulty: how to deal with memory and the shaping effects of technology. With regards memory, my design for collation and analysis was initially aimed at addressing one of the most common criticisms levelled on autoethnography from both within and outside the field: an over reliance on personal memory leading to a selective interpretation of events (Chang, 2008). This has led Tessa Muncey to suggest that the use of snapshots and artefacts are important for the legitimation of autoethnography (2005); and Margot

Duncan to call for the use of "hard evidence" to support "soft impressions" (2004: 1). Feeling an initial pressure to attend to such concerns I made an effort to balance the writing of lengthier accounts (more reliant on memory) with shorter narrative, reflexive and analytic thoughts, and my fortnightly diaries were originally conceived in order to ease this task further by facilitating an early synthesis of my data closer to its generation. The more aware I became of my evolving practice of autoethnography and also my broader methodological approach, however, I came to appreciate how my early rationale for minimising memory sat awkward with each. Amanda Coffey, for example, argues that memories collected from within the field, and after exit, are a crucial part of autoethnography and that fieldwork and its resulting texts cannot be separated from the memories that shape them. Stressing that "[auto]ethnography *is* an act of memory" (1999, 127, my emphasis) her position suggests that any attempt to extract memory from autoethnography is not only impossible but may in fact be detrimental to the resulting analysis. In also recognising that those who argue against memory in autoethnography align themselves with realist and positivistic research paradigms, I began to recognise the goal of *factual* or "hard evidence" as ill-conceived. As such, my eventual approach was to balance longer and shorter accounts in order not give preference to either, but in the end I stopped short of drawing down my data prematurely or to a fixed point of evidence.

With regards technology, initially my design was motivated by a desire to make the vast data more manageable and easily ordered. My early solution was to tag the various data sources with the code "a/e" followed by "N" for narrative, "R" for reflexive and "E" for experimental (and, where relevant, a combination of these suffixes). Where the data was electronic I assigned this code in the file name. Where it was paper based I wrote the code in prominent position, followed by a sequentially ascribed number, i.e. "a/e R 148". I then photographed each item and saved a digital copy of the photograph, with the code also used for the file name. Unlike my approach to memory, as my rationale and understanding shifted so too did this strategy for maintaining order. What had prompted my turn to technology had been my initial experience with the data. Spread out on the floor in front of me, I struggled to see past the mess. I shifted pieces around like a jigsaw, trying to see the different and *best* groupings I could make. In the resulting, messy collage, however, I was presented not only with the content I'd actively recorded but the story of its record: different colours and sizes of post-it notes; dates and destinations on train tickets; napkins smeared with tomato soup from memorable lunches, and so on.

Quite quickly, however, I came to realise that my digital strategy to maintain the order of my data was actually reproducing it anew by shaping it in two significant and undesirable ways. First, it sanitised the data. Those more nuanced, evocative, olfactory, haptic, and, of course, rhizomatic stories of its reckoning that weren't recorded in my actual writing of each piece became lost from view, along with the connections they told between me, my research and time. Second, it ascribed a hierarchy to my data, and more concerning, that hierarchy was linear. No longer could I appreciate the diverse stories of my data and their infinite points of intersection, instead I had to sift through pre-defined menus which made it very difficult to appreciate connections beyond the groupings I'd priorly assigned. In the end I continued to mark each item with the letters 'a/e' but reverted to working with the data physically laid out in front of me. I considered this method of analysis, and also my response to the issue of memory, to be much more in keeping with my epistemological and ontological position. Firmly believing that there was not one *true* reality to represent I came to recognise the utmost need to illustrate this through a heterogeneity of reflections, narratives and analyses. And ultimately this was achieved not by minimising memory or seeking order, but by mitigating the urges of my own latent, rational research tendencies on my analysis of the data and making room for multiple stories to be told.

THE URBAN STUDIES CANON

To look now to the second site at which this work takes place, the urban studies canon. My recognition of the canon as a site at which to position points two and three of my research problem was in part dictated by my findings from the autoethnographic research described. As I came to argue at the end of Chapter Three, no facet of our being or the world in which we live is isolated from time, and the academy is included within that assessment. It sits at, is influenced by, and influences the exact same sites at which *clock time's* dominance is maintained and strengthened, and this reveals an urgent need to engage with those institutional factors which have the potential to uphold and strengthen time's dominant form. As Edward Said's (1978) and Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) critiques of Western modes of knowledge production reveal, the canon is a potent site at which knowledge and *truth* are traditionally held. When a text is canonised it gains status through its proximate association with other texts that are widely studied and respected. In this function the canon doesn't simply recognise a validity that is already given but inscribes validity on the works it contains. Thus, given the ability of the canon to exercise authority on those urban accounts and analyses that are not simply legitimate but possible to produce, it emerges as a

key site through which the absence of time within urban accounts can be imagined and explored.

The next part of this discussion might now be anticipated as a relatively straightforward affair: describe the canon; discuss the possible options for methodological engagement; describe the method adopted; detail its practice. This presentation of events is a frequent commentary to descriptions of method making and procedure, and invokes not simply the linear development of a research approach but suggests a strictly linear progression between research stages (Figure One).

FIGURE ONE: THE PRESUMED LINEARITY OF RESEARCH (adapted from Bryman, 2009)



In my experience, however, the discrete points detailed on the illustration at Figure One emerged in a decisively un-linear fashion. Each influenced the other, folded back upon itself, forced its own reorientation and that of the other parts. Trying to understand this complex and confusing presentation I undertook a mapping exercise in February, 2012, in an attempt to capture an alternative rendering that might explain the difficultly I was having in maintaining a neat order to my process. This took place at a number of different

sittings across a number of days, with each sitting represented by a different colour for the content produced and a different alphabetical identifier for the connections I'd made between that content. Reproduced in the pull-out overleaf (Figure Two), this map illustrates the influence not only between the different research stages but suggests the extent to which the development of my research approach was itself productive of the answers I sought.

As such this map proved an important counterpoint to what Elizabeth St. Pierre describes as the "ruthlessly linear nature of the narrative of knowledge production in research methodology" (1997: 179). In capturing the messy and complex evolution of my method it depicts an unfolding research process that is non-linear, and moreover illustrates that there exists multiple lines to the telling of its story. The non-linear interplay illustrated between each stage of my method development testifies to the formative nature of the method making process in itself. Specifically, in my case this proved crucial to my ongoing understanding of the concept and function of the canon, meaning that it wasn't simply the process of carrying out the research but the development of its method that proved insightful for points two and three of my research problem. Finally, as my understanding of the concept of the canon evolved I came to recognise the self as fully central to its form and function. This point was pivotal in the eventual iteration of my methodology which views its sites of research not as separate but intrinsically intertwined. Therefore, before I move to describe how my research of points two and three of my research problem eventually unfolded to pursue its concerns across the self and the urban studies canon in combination, it is important that I make visible some of those shifts that came to bear on the orientation of that eventual approach.

– *The canon: from corpus to assemblage, in concept and method*

The concept of the canon is perhaps at its easiest to grasp where it is presented as a dominant group of texts considered representative of their field. Across many disciplines, this notion of the canon as corpus, and its relative contents, can be readily brought to the minds of its scholars. Just as tangible is its more general form, manifest in those objects which adorn bookshelves, comprise library classifications, and which are spread out across a working desk. Between them, and together, the books which comprise the canon are considered to contain content central to their discipline, offering a site at which to view those ideas, knowledge systems and traditions that are prevalent. In recognising the canon in this way social scientists have developed a vast suite of textual methods, the majority of

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Figure Two: The non-linear realities of research

IN ITS PLACE

which are intent on bringing to light a sense of a text's meaning in order to demonstrate its effect. In discerning meaning, however, researchers are far from homogenous in their approach. At one end of the spectrum the structuralists begin by delimiting the boundaries of the system to be analysed; identifying a text or author that is ripe for scrutiny. Their analysis is then contained within the confines of that system, looking, for example, to the frequency and spread of its content, the binaries it invokes or the narrative it conveys (see Bryman, 2009). While such an approach tends toward a method that is relatively straightforward to adhere the consequential weight it affords the notion of a text as a discrete, closed-off entity is, however, cited as a profound weakness in coming to understand texts and their meaning (Chandler, 2002).

Contrary to this and infamously proclaiming *The Death of the Author*, the literary critic Roland Barthes instead suggested that "a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination" (1977: 148), reasoning:

> We know now that text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the message of the author god) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture [...] the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original.
>
> 1977: 146

Here, a text is conceived not as an unaffected, self-contained object but as something shaped by many other writings, expanding far beyond its own pages to exact the same influence upon other texts. This framing of text by other texts not only calls into question the practice of authorship as it is commonly perceived, but also holds implication for understanding the activity of the reader. As Fredric Jameson notes, "texts come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend them through the sedimented layers of previous interpretations" (1981: 9). Indeed, the well trodden history which accompanies the production of many texts – even those texts written against dominant accounts – foretells the presence of a text's common reading. Approaches toward the great novel, famous painting or legendary piece of music, for example, are in no small part bound to the context in which the object is reproduced – a frame which is unavoidable when a reader turns to interpret a text. Texts are therefore cultural in every regard – in their coming into

being and in the manner in which they're read. And as Michel Foucault suggests, it is the activities found in both events which serve to construct the sense, reference and meaning of the emergent text:

> The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network [...] The book is not simply the object that one holds in one's hands [...] its unity is variable and relative
>
> 1972: 23

Where an understanding of the text can no longer be adequately grasped via the book that "one holds within one's hands", the concept of the canon is also necessarily altered. It does not exist simply as a *corpus* of texts, but rather, its presence, form and importantly its influence, expands far beyond the written word to intersect across multiple sites. Also necessarily revised is the method suitable for its study. Connecting texts across two axes – from the author to their readers and from the text to other texts – proponents of intertextuality aim to expand analysis beyond the signs which function within texts (Kristeva, 1980). Their method is one that seeks to render culture itself as a narrative process in which texts and other cultural artefacts, consciously and unconsciously link to larger stories at play in society. In this sense intertextuality decisively blurs the boundaries not only between texts, but between texts and the conditions of daily life. Such accounts position texts as instrumental in the construction of other texts and the construction of experience, whilst recognising that the *text* is in no way limited to a written form.

While the method of intertextuality now casts a considerable shadow on the structuralist approach to textual analysis, much less appreciated is its potential comment upon the canon-forming activities of academic critique. In a much more general sense the postmodern turn in social research forces acknowledgement that the researcher is culturally attuned to specific discourses. What this reveals as far as the canon is concerned, however, is that the political resides not only in the text or in its standard interpretations, but that it similarly structures those methodological and analytical orthodoxies which frame academic engagement. Where the canonical is identified through no other means than a pre-existing knowledge of a discipline's core texts, for example, the dominance of those texts is already

implied. And for Catherine Belsey, failure to acknowledge the role of the researcher in this way has the potential to maintain the dominance of those texts at the expense of those which might challenge their dominant ideologies (2002). Furthermore, even if such criticism does succeed in undermining the canon, Belsey cautions that such activities can themselves serve to construct a new canon without fully engaging with the old canon or the influence of its dominant discourses (2002).

Where the very act of critical research can serve to maintain the *status quo* even where it seeks to undermine it, a further and necessary re-appreciation of the canon is once again required. Under this reading the canon is formed not simply from the texts it contains nor their standard interpretations, but indeed, where standard methods of interpretation have the potential to lead to its further stabilisation, the researcher is brought prominently into the fold. Authors, readers, researchers and other actors don't simply observe the canon independently but are internal to and complicit in its construction. Moreover, it is not just its contents but the canon itself that is textual in form. It too stretches out, reaching beyond its confines, to make connections with other texts and other canons, including, importantly, non-actors, Others and those *canons* of the non-canonical. Therefore, locating the researcher and their practice within this field requires that a method must be adopted that has the capacity to examine this much broader assemblage of things which make possible the positioning of canonical texts in the first place.

While intertextuality recognises the canon as an assemblage, its claim that the meaning of a text is signified through the interaction of authors, readers and their contexts does not offer an immediate means to bring the researcher into that assessment. Viewed through Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the rhizome, however, the text is neither signifier nor the signified (1987). That is, the meanings attributed to texts are not fixed, but are fluid and change over time. In this sense both the text and the canon are better appreciated as rhizomatic: they embody various connections, functioning as "a semiotic chain [...] a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive" (1987: 7). And accepting that as all subjects (authors, readers and researchers), all texts, and all contexts change, so do the meanings attributed to an individual text, the goal of drawing analyses to a unique interpretation no longer presents as an expedient one. What instead emerges as significant is how a text functions within and outside its confines; how it connects with other texts, including the non-linguistic; how it

reaches out to connect with other objects including readers, authors and researchers; and how it meets those literary and non-literary contexts in which it is held and, indeed, those in which it is not. In this regard the prominent query is no longer what a text *means*, but rather, how a text works – what it makes possible to think; how it serves to limit the spheres of knowledge, research and action (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). And accordingly, what is asked of a text is what thoughts go unthought? What assumptions lie within its accounts? And perhaps most importantly, how is it useful? As such, rather than advancing further down established lines the rhizomatic approach makes the choice to move outward from the canon and the text, in a conscious attempt to uncover some semblance of those missing aspects of thought and practice.

– *The canon as assemblage: drawing in the self*

At this point it should be understandable, at least in principle, how the self can no longer be maintained as a research site isolated from the canon. For me, however, it was only as I turned to face the canon *as* my researcher self that I became fully aware of the extent to which I was in effect constructing the canon as I worked to try and hold it steady. Up until that point I'd conceived of the self and the urban studies canon as two separate sites of research. With autoethnography exercising its limited function at point one of my research problem it would be the development of a rhizomatic form of textual analysis that would then take up the mantle as I engaged with points two and three. It would be an approach that could facilitate the finding of canonical texts as an entry point for examining the multiplicity of junctures at which time had become naturalised within urban studies, and would allow me to follow the ongoing trajectories of dominant ideas as they moved beyond the field. This is how I would play with the realities proposed through the urban studies canon as they circulated and became hegemonic (Figure Three).

FIGURE THREE: DISCRETE METHODS FOR DISCRETE SITES



In beginning to collect data, however, there was a point at which that view became irrevocably altered. As I started to look for the dominant texts of urban studies, I realised

that the process of discerning this data was in itself generative of it. I was no longer on the edges but fully inside the workings and function of the canon, within an immanent and ongoing production of unfolding connections. And seeing myself within the data collection process also brought me to the realisation that my membership of a culture that had lost sight of time's heterogeneity was not the only thing thing of value to this work, just as significant was my membership of the academic culture that sought to understand the urban. This also led me to recognise these facets not as discrete, but that as each collided they helped form an identity – my identity – that was neither one, nor the other, nor simply both, but which was multiple. Recognising this connection had a hugely transformative effect on the method as I'd initially conceived it. It was no longer the case that autoethnography spoke only to the self which experienced Western time but it could also reach the self which experienced processes of Western knowledge construction. And it was this which ultimately led me to expand autoethnography across my research problem as a whole.

Furthermore, in becoming more conscious of my multiple self, I came to appreciate the rhizome in other areas of my work. Deleuze and Guattari's insistence that "every image acts on others and reacts to others, on all their facets at once" (1987: 58) helped me realise that my understanding of the city came not from its actuality, the texts I read, nor the policy documents I came across. While these told me something, even as they combined they did not comprise the whole story, and I gradually recognised the Other city that came to me in literature, dreams and art; through smells, music and conversation, and so on. This city was similar but it was not the same. As such, the rhizome metaphor threw open further disjunctures within the dominant image of the city – the city conceptualised in urban theory, translated into policy, and which then shaped the city it sought to describe – and problematised the very acts of definition, research, analysis and reporting that sat at the heart of urban praxis. And it was this realisation that similarly led me to expand a rhizoanalytic outlook not simply across the urban studies canon, but across the project as a whole as I worked to reproduce my sense of the city within the pages of this thesis and beyond (Figure Four, overleaf).

Finally, the process of method making that I've outlined throughout this section, and the transformative revelations I've just described above, shaped my understanding of qualitative research in a much broader sense also. Arriving at a point where the self was

fully drawn into the research experience gave me the means to better understand the difficulty I faced when I first attempted to make sense of the methodology of this work (this chapter, pages 130–132). It helped me realise that it wasn't just *my* experience of it, but that the research process was non-linear. That is, *it* was complex, messy and diffuse; it was rhizomatic. Moreover, the collection of data in that process was not contained in discrete stages, nor could it be conceptualised in neatly described categories, but as St. Pierre describes, it was "transgressive". That is, it included data of the self: "emotional data, dream data, sensual data, and response data that [were] out-of-category and not usually accounted for in qualitative research" (1997: 175). Recognising this also led me to realise the expanded potential of this data. Where I no longer looked upon it for meaning or as evidence representative of *truth* (Scheurich, 1997; St. Pierre, 2002; Dufresne, 2002; Masny, 2011), it had the freedom to tell of the immanent connections produced through a rhizoanalysis which necessarily unfolded beside, within, through and in spite of myself.

FIGURE FOUR: METHODOLOGY TRANSFORMED



Autoethnographic Rhizoanalysis

Viewing the canon as an assemblage of conceptual, manifest and sensory relations between authors, readers, researchers, non-actors, Others, texts, contexts and all other entities

encountered, makes it a generous site at which to consider not simply the ideas in a given text but to trace the multiple movements of those ideas, knowledge systems and *truths*, throughout a discipline and far beyond it. Where research of the canon is also recognised as a canon-forming activity in its own right, the self is also very much drawn in to that encounter. As such, this section now moves to describe the method of autoethnographic rhizoanalysis across the self and the urban studies canon, as it was practiced in response to points two and three of my research problem, below:

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

3. Knowledge of *the urban* is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

Moreover, rather than continue to isolate the moments of this method under the ill-fitting terms of data collection, analysis and reporting, this section moves to conceive of these tasks as research events in which the collection, generation and analysis of data was, and is, ever ongoing. While I discuss the practice of these research events here and in Chapter Six in an order it should be noted that is only due to necessity and that they unfolded in no way linearly nor as separate from one another.

RESEARCH EVENT: ENTERING THE CANON

I first entered the canon somewhat unwittingly. Trying to discern its dominant texts as a means to plug-in to its function, I had no idea that the method I'd designed to do so would itself propel me deep into the inner workings of the urban studies canon. Rather than rely on my pre-existing knowledge of the field, my initial intention had been only to design a procedure for identifying a more *objective* sample of canonical texts from which I'd commence a rhizomatic analysis. To that end I'd selected three indictors that I felt would facilitate such a discovery:

INDICATOR ONE
COURSE READING LISTS

I considered that course reading lists from undergraduate urban studies degree programmes were a most basic way of working what texts got read at the beginning of an urban scholar's career, and in that sense were likely to be foundational. The *reading list* is often the first, and arguably dominant method used by undergraduate students when they turn to review the literature of their discipline.

INDICATOR TWO
EDITED COLLECTIONS

Articles selected for inclusion into urban studies readers and edited collections sit at the interface between student use and academic research activity insofar as students are encouraged to utilise these resources which are compiled and edited by experts in their field of study. Frequently occurring texts are likely to be those which are respected for their academic integrity and contribution to practice, and are likely to be among some of those most widely read by early scholars.

INDICATOR THREE
CITATION COUNTS

This method was an attempt to capture the political nature of the canon as it relates to academic research activity. It acknowledges that the canon isn't necessarily indicative of a quality of content but perhaps is better understood as a measure of transmissions that are received, and the power that is inherent in this process.

In my application of each of these indictors I documented my activity along the way[14], but to summarise: I worked to manufacture my access to the canon via these indicators by looking for *dominance* as I went. For *Indicator one: Course Reading Lists*, I started by looking at prestige groupings of top universities around the world, including the Ivy League, Russell Group and Universitas 21. I supplemented this data with league tables and rankings from the likes of Times Higher Education and, more specific to urban studies programmes, the website Planetizen and the Town and Country Planning unit from the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise. Collating this data led me to a number of universities with top urban studies undergraduate degree programmes, from which I requested copies of their reading lists in order to see what texts were most often included. In trying to get a sense of what authors and texts were dominant at *Indicator two: Edited Collections*, I used two library search engines, *Google Books* and *Worldcat*. Into these I entered a combination of urban-focused search terms, refined by the use of Boolean operators. Of those collections that were returned most often I counted the entires of their contents pages to discern the most frequently occurring inclusions. Finally, in gathering data pertaining to *Indicator three: Citation counts* I used two citation indexes, *Google Scholar* and *Web of Knowledge*. To maintain consistency with my approach for *Indicator two* I used the same urban-focused search strings. From the items returned at each search I collated those articles that had received the most citations.

From the data collected and collated across each of these three indicators I eventually arrived at a number of authors who appeared dominant and whose texts might be described as canonical. I further refined that list by looking qualitatively to other contextual

factors, including personal and academic web-pages, and testimonials written by other academics in the field. This led me to discern the following four items as canonical to urban studies, and therefore an appropriate sample from which to enter the function of the urban studies canon:

- *From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism* (Harvey, 1989)
- *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (Jacobs, 1961)
- *The Rise of The Network Society* (Castells, 2000)
- *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Sassen, 1991)

As I noted in my opening to this discussion, however, unbeknownst to me my entry had begun long before I'd arrived at these points. Though I'd worked hard to maintain a consistency across each of the processes summarised above, I now recognise the sterile directions which tell of that approach (briefed above and outlined in full in Appendix Three) as somewhat disingenuous. That is not to deny that an application of those instructions is likely approximate a very similar data set, but what goes un-captured are the half-steps, non-steps, dead-ends and about-turns, which actually led to the discovery of the steps detailed therein. I only have to think back to the long, arduous duration of those processes, and quite importantly, my *feelings* and affective responses at that time, to realise that those logical instructions are not indicative nor representative of my experience. And what I now recognise is that my attempt to capture this process as *objective* served only to elide the rhizomatic paths which thought followed in pursuit of its data. Therefore, as I write this here, fully cognisant of the canon not simply as a corpus of texts but as an assemblage that is textual at every turn, I similarly recognise that as I was working to find my entry to the canon, I was already reading it.

RESEARCH EVENT: READING THE CANON

My admission above – that an attempt to find entry to the canon resulted in my inadvertent reading of it – gives some indication that those texts eventually arrived at were not the only points at which I plugged in to the function of the urban studies canon. In addition to Harvey (1989), Jacobs (1961), Castells (2000) and Sassen (1991), the sources from which I ultimately recognised my *reading* of the canon taking place included journal descriptions; titles; abstracts; keywords; names; locations; dates; blurbs; course descriptions; webpages;

and many other textual and non-textual objects which accompanied or sat adjacent to the aforementioned. Heedless of my preemptive entry to the canon at these points, whilst simultaneously struggling to maintain an *objectivity* to my method for obtaining a more deliberate entry, I was also unwittingly developing my first strategies for *reading* its contents. Primarily as a means to understand and ameliorate the struggle I was having, I had begun once more to draw on the autoethnographic techniques I'd previously designed. What I came to realise, however, was that my reflections spoke not only to that struggle, but told of the multiple sense connections that were happening as I applied each of my indicators. Recognising the telling insight of my affective responses in this regard I moved to make autoethnography a more purposive aspect of that application, and paid attention to the following reading prompts as I wrote autoethnographic commentaries to accompany my more sterile directions:

- How does the canon function within and between the indicators I've identified?
- How does it reach out beyond these indicators to become sensible for me?

When it came to reading the canon, this time via the four texts identified as dominant, the use of autoethnographic techniques for honing in on my affective responses again proved helpful. However, I also took more deliberate direction from Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and other rhizomatically inspired scholars (see St. Pierre, 1997; Alvermann, 2000; Hagood, 2002; Dufresne, 2009; Leander and Rowe, 2006; Eakle, 2007; and Honan, 2007), regarding what might constitute a rhizomatic reading method. For Deleuze and Guattari, whether captured or not, readers come to embody interpretative connections as they move through texts; connections which expand far beyond the object that is read to form links with other texts pertinent to sense-making. To engage in a process of rhizomatic reading is, then, to facilitate a journey of continually unfolding sense connections. For Deleuze and Guattari, such a journey is about moving, always moving; about actively forgetting in order to bring forth other tendencies. They argue that much like the writing of a stream of consciousness, the text too must be read as such: over and over and over, again (1987). And summing this up in a later work, *Negotiations*, Deleuze returns to consider that practice:

> There are, you see, two ways of reading a book; you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you're even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next

> book like a box contained in the first or containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is 'Does it work, and how does it work?' How does it work for you? If it doesn't work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second way of reading's intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. [...] This second way of reading's quite different from the first, because it relates a book directly to what's Outside. A book is a little cog in much more complicated external machinery [...] This intensive way of reading, in contact with what's outside the book, as a flow meeting other flows, one machine among others, as a series of experiments for each reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books, as tearing the book into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, absolutely anything [...] is reading with love.
>
> 1995: 7-9

Where the text in question is a novel, a record, a poem, a play, a film or indeed any text read solely for the purposes of pleasure, any text read "with love", such an approach is recognisable. Where that text is guised as an object of analysis in its own right, however, Deleuze's first way of reading is arguably the more immediate. That is not to say that rhizomatic reading techniques are entirely absent in the academy. A. Jonathan Eakle's practice of *data walking*, for example, offers some insight into the practical application and difference where Deleuze's second way is adopted for textual analysis. Arguing that the use of pre-codified categories when reading is akin to experiencing a unfamiliar city by navigating it solely by map, Eakle instead suggests that reading should be thought of as walking or "strolling" through the strangeness of that city, following those things which catch attention; "an exploration of data as if you were an open and receptive traveler in a new and unknown territory" (2007: 483). Similarly, Donna E. Alevermann stresses the importance of what she terms an "implicated reading method", arguing:

> implicated readings engage us in intimate relations with texts and evoke a full range of readerly emotions – including enchantment, devotions, envy, frustration, disappointment, and so on – they are, like Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome, open and connectable
>
> 2000: 119

And explicitly connecting these "readerly emotions" back to how texts operate outside of themselves, Alvermann concludes their value for research:

> In sum, rhizoanalysis is a method of examining texts that allows us to see things in the middle. Looking for middles, rather than beginnings and endings, makes it possible to decenter key linkages and find new ones, not by combining old ones in new ways, but by remaining open to the proliferation of ruptures and discontinuities that in turn create other linkages.
>
> 2000: 118

Looking for new linkages as a way to *play* with the realities proposed through the urban studies canon, I was determined that my entry via four of its dominant texts took me beyond their beginnings and ends, towards that which was in the middle. To achieve this, I recognised the importance of an open, receptive and indeed adventurous attitude as I turned to face the texts. However, aware that this was not my *usual* method for academic textual engagement, I also anticipated that a loose framework through which my readings could unfold would be helpful.

To this end I developed a varied set of reading approaches, each of which allowed my reading to be a creative and generative activity in and of itself. I began my reading by attending to the texts in isolation, starting with Harvey (1989), then Jacobs (1961), Castells (2000) and finally Sassen (1991). Commencing with a first and second reading of each, I took no notes and did not refer to any other sources (online or hard copy) to aid my understanding. This allowed me to make sense of the text via my existing understanding of the field in which it was written and any other frames which just happened to colour its content. This also meant that I wasn't hung up on producing a commentary of my experience but could instead focus simply on the activity and experience of reading. Though these readings were formally unrecorded, their journeys were not lost. To paraphrase Brian Massumi's depiction of the hope of Deleuze and Guattari – elements of them stayed, weaving into the melody of my everyday life (1987: xiv).

I then read through each text a third time, again without any supplementary material, but this time highlighting and annotating them – and re-highlighting and re-annotating them – with those sense connections that were forthcoming. A fourth, fifth and sixth reading saw

me move through each text whilst following those connections, and new ones which were there emergent. In these readings I turned freely to other sources that entered my thoughts and focused on certain sections, themes, sentences and phrases that seemed particularly resonant, re-highlighting and re-annotating as I went. In my final two readings of each text I expanded to look across the other sources and commentaries I'd generated in previous readings. Across these assemblages I paid attention to a number of prompts in order that my increased familiarity did not lead me to close in on what the text *meant*. For example, paying attention to my affective responses as I read, I looked to those ideas that flowed freely and those which got stuck; I considered the stories it told of the city and those it neglected to tell; I paid attention to where, how and when time *popped* up and where I'd expected it to; I reflected on how it made itself sensible, spoke to me and affected me emotionally. Finally, where I'd already been familiar with a text prior to my rhizomatic analysis I looked back at notes made previously[15]. I read these not for their interpretations, but as textual materials which told once more of the function of the urban studies canon via the self.

Though my rhizoanalysis of the canon via these texts commenced with them as individual entry points, at no time did I conceive of these texts as discrete entities. Rather I recognised them as functioning within, between and beyond themselves, expanding to form a broader assemblage with other texts, including, importantly, the non-canonical. As such, following the sequential readings just described, my focus then conferred on the assemblage of the urban studies canon more generally. I prescribed no structure for my reading of this broader assemblage, but instead used the following prompts as a way to meet points two and three of my research problem:

- What is the (non)presence of time in this assemblage?
- What connections can I make between this assemblage and the absence/presence of temporal accounts of the city?
- What are the necessary conditions for temporal research?

Though I grew more accustomed with it throughout this research event, reading the canon rhizoanalytically was not an easy, straightforward, nor, dare I say, *natural* task for me. In particular, and in the beginning especially, I was often having to check myself for *how* I was reading. Initially it had been my unequivocal aim to steer well clear of those methods

espoused in more conventional forms of textual analysis – "Never interpret: experience, experiment" was the constant reminder I borrowed for myself (Deleuze, 1995: 87). I came to recognise, however, that more interpretative approaches were neither absent, nor wholly redundant within my readings; indeed I now realise that their presence was somewhat inevitable. This, after all, was how I first learnt my research craft – I was taught to look for lexical clues, discursive strategies and narrative devices in order to arrive at *meaning*. In contrast, I was never taught to follow rhizomes, to connect my affective self back up to the text, nor to aim only for the middles of the assemblage. Therefore, rather than devise elaborate strategies for excluding such tendencies from my reading, I ultimately came to believe that it was better to use my interpretations as means to pursue alternative lines: where they happened to emerge I used them to ask *what is this?* considering that the answers generated provided a somewhat stable jumping-off point for then asking *what is this not?* And in that sense, used cautiously, those more conventional forms of textual analysis actively helped establish the stage for new experiences and experiments to emerge, serving, in turn, to facilitate the emergence of alternative imaginings.

RESEARCH EVENT: CAPTURING THE CANON

"Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter", write Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 15). Rather thought – like the process of reading the canon I've just discussed – is rhizomatic. It "ceaselessly establishes connections" which unfold whether captured or not (7). As Honan explains, "there are always offshoots, tangents, ways of linking particular rhizomes with other rhizomes. There is a ceaseless flow of connections between, across, and through rhizomes" (2004: 270). And making clear that the "event of thought lies beyond the autonomy of choice", Claire Colebrook elaborates: "[t]hinking is not something 'we do'; thinking happens to us, from without. There is a *necessity* to thinking [...] Thinking happens" (2002: 38, original emphasis). When it came to capturing the routes by which thought wandered it was obvious to me that any presentation of a fixed, solid or static nature would not suffice. Yet faced with something that was always moving and changing, always happening, what emerged as an even greater concern was whether it was possible to capture anything at all. Describing the rhizomatic journey, Honan sums up this inherent tension in the quote below:

> The rhizomatic journey is not the urban trudging along a concrete pavement but, rather, a trail that may connect to other trails, diverge around blockages or disappear

> completely. The trail is never completely re-traceable, as, just like the footprints in the sand, it is erased almost at the same time it is created
>
> 2007: 535

Despite such complications I was aware from early on of two reasons why it was necessary to capture something of my reading of the urban studies canon in a manifest form. The first, and more process orientated reason, was driven by the requirements of my method. While I undertook a number of readings with no effort to document them, the majority required me to make some level of commentary in order that my subsequent readings could unfold beside, apart, on top of, or at cross purposes with those that had come previous. The second reason, and which I shall look to in more specific detail in the following chapter, was about making visible the productions of that process for others.

In response to both of these aims I turned once more to the pages of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and in particular the importance Deleuze and Guattari placed on *making maps*. Making maps, Deleuze and Guattari stress, is about following the rhizomatic paths which thought follows, whilst at the same time acknowledging that it is not possible to fully retrace one's steps. Speaking of the promise of mapping in this regard, they write:

> The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entry ways [...]. A map has multiple entryways as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back 'to the same'. The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged 'competence'.
>
> 1987: 12–13

Unlike tracings which aim to reproduce and mimetically represent *reality*, maps remain ever-open to experimentation: "[w]hat distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce [...] it constructs [...] fosters connections" (1987: 12). Moreover, in allowing for the theoretically imagined to exist alongside the seemingly concrete, the map is a supremely

capable medium for attending to goal of *playing with reality*. Making maps, therefore, does not stand apart from the process of following rhizomes, but is itself a key part of doing rhizoanalysis.

In contrast with what received notions may readily suggest, mapping does not necessarily entail the use of diagrams (Hagood, 2002; Eakle, 2007). And though certain aspects of my map making in this work did take on a diagrammatic form, my earliest strategies simply made use of columns on a spreadsheet. This technique emerged largely of its own accord. Already inside the canon as I struggled to discern the dominant texts by which I should enter it, I wrote myself notes on the difficulty of that process. Eventually recognising these not as benign reflections but as autoethnographic data generated both in response to the data that I was actively seeking and the data collection process itself, I began to embed autoethnography more fully within this task. No longer did I simply work to refine my method and arrive a sample of dominant texts. As I did, I simultaneously read the canon as I went, recording my immanent, affective responses in the adjoining cells of the vast tables of data I was generating. And returning purposefully to re-read those entries alongside my other data at frequent intervals, I supplemented them with the insertion of additional columns, comment bubbles and hyperlinks to other sources. In that sense the capturing of my reading never became routine nor linear, but was recursive and continually expanding in all directions.

As I then turned to capture the canon via my individual readings of Harvey (1989), Jacobs (1961), Castells (2000) and Sassen (1991), I continued to make use of this approach. In addition to using tables and spreadsheets, however, I also wrote lengthier pieces. Inspired by the rhizomatic reading approach I'd been learning I attempted to write in similar ways: quickly, without convention, without polish, more rhizomatically – much like the *stream of consciousness* writings I'd already practiced for my earlier autoethnographic research at point one of my research problem (discussed at page 127). Regardless of whether my writing was contained on the cells of spreadsheet or in the lines of my notebook, in the pages of typed document or as a *note* on my iPhone, this *capturing* always remained a part of the process; part of the analysis. As Laurel Richardson notes, "writing is not just a mopping-up activity at the end of a research project, writing is also a way of 'knowing' – a method of discovery and analysis" (2000: 923), and across all of my readings I witnessed this at play. Re-reading my commentaries – writing new ones as I read – I'd find those I'd lost confidence in; some

that had joined to advocate more strongly for a particular interpretation; others which stood to contradict, even argue against earlier considerations. But continually, I resisted the urge to synthesise and interpret these further, and instead worked to facilitate a way for the connections and contradictions between them to remain open.

In addition to these written methods of making maps I found the use of diagrams to be useful, and took my direction here from two interrelated cues. The first, from Deleuze and Guattari, was contained within the following short passage:

> The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out [...] on a single page, the same sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations
>
> 1987: 9

And it was my reading of this passage that led to the second. Forcing my imagination back to the process by which I attempted to make *sense* of my method I remembered the way in mapping helped to free my thoughts (see Figure Two, page 132). Accordingly, I turned once more to this technique, producing large and interconnecting diagrams at points where my readings did not easily resonate in strings of words, but spoke instead in diagrams, pictures and conceptual assemblages. I produced these diagrams by hand, making my marks with different coloured permanent markers on lining paper. The ten metre length of these rolls meant that I could expand my diagrams horizontally by unfurling more paper, whilst it was also possible to cut more length and attach it vertically. More often than not I produced this work by attaching long stretches of the paper to the the wall beside my desk, and keeping the diagrams ever-visible in this way frequently prompted me to amend my marks and adjust their positions as and when new connections emerged.

Dealing with rhizomes in the face of trees, making maps where there once were tracings, fixing free thinking whilst freeing fixed knowledge, was not an easy task. However, despite the difficulties I faced, the routes I considered and the eventual qualifications I made as I entered and read the canon, mapping as I went, there remained a persistent niggle that I'm not sure was adequately resolved in my method. Namely, whether my trust in a technique that felt overtly spatial reflected a glaring naïvety when I'd stressed the importance of paying attention to the temporal so emphatically. Admittedly, this concern emerges not

from the tenor of Deleuze and Guattari's work but arrives through my received notion of what mapping entails and those more common forms by which it speaks. Responding to this perceived threat nonetheless, as I mapped I made constant marks with time and date stamps, and used different colours and codes in my spreadsheets, notes and drawings in an attempt to illustrate my productions not as static, but ever-expanding. Moreover, I made use not of single maps, but multiple ones, over time, of things that changed, of moments which emerged in the present but which were of the past. I aimed that my process and productions should be multi-dimensional in their division of time and space as far as possible. Even within these efforts, however, I always felt that my maps retained an unsatisfying *flatness* to them, and I long craved the potential to build out from the page, screen and wall in pursuit of a more pleasing semblance to my thoughts. Looking to the rhizomatic techniques of other researchers I recognised similar concerns motivating their decisions to use software programmes (Bowles, 2001) and mind-map style diagrams (Masny and Waterhouse, 2011) to capture their journeys. But with no intention to dismiss the alternative insights and potential benefits of these approaches, even they lacked the dimensionality that excited me when I first read Deleuze and Guattari's ideal vision for a book, as quoted above.

As I reflect back on this, having reached an end of my entering, reading and capturing the urban studies canon, my niggle doesn't hold quite the same weight it once did, and my resolve is much more pragmatic as I recognise the *work-arounds* and limitations that occur in the application of any method. Instead, I now choose to hold on to what this approach has managed to facilitate in terms of process, and to produce as a result. Moreover, in recognising this important link between process and production, what perhaps emerges as even more important is the comment this makes for the development of a rhizoanalytic method more generally. Like the subjects it has the potential to reach after, rhizoanalysis must not be assessed for its complete coherence but rather the scope it allows for its own change and expansion as it seeks to produce the multiple realities which sit congruously to that which motivates it use. Indeed, where the goal is not to arrive at *truth* but to produce an alternative, it is against these such productions that the process of its method must be assessed. And with this in mind, now is an appropriate point to move to my final discussion of method in Chapter Six, which looks not simply to the efforts of this work to *play* with reality, producing it through the process; but outlines the ways in which those efforts have made it possible to (re)craft those realities in multiple and alternative ways.

notes

[13] To be clear, the *truth* I refer to here is the version outlined on page 112–113, which sees truth as a singular and verifiable explanation that emerges through the correct application of a research method. *That* version of truth is the one that motivates and organises the practice of traditional academic research, and which I am seeking to distance myself from in this work. As such, where I refer to this type of traditional truth without qualifying it as such, it will herein be italicised in this document. Where I am referring to truth beyond these notions, it will be left unitalicised.

[14] See Appendix Three for a fuller description of entering the canon via these indicators.

[15] I looked to notes made previously on Harvey (1989) and Jacobs (1961).

Chapter Six

(RE)CRAFTING REALITIES

Performing Performative Method

"The picture of method starts to shift. The argument is no longer that methods discover and depict realities. Instead, it is that they participate in the enactment of those realities", writes John Law (2004: 45). My conscious effort to detail not simply the practice of my method but also its development throughout Chapter Five, was inspired by Law's remarks in a couple of ways. First, this decision was motivated by my desire to make explicit the first part of Law's statement. That is by juxtaposing the development of my method alongside its practice, my belief was that it would be more difficult to cling to the idea of method-making and research as straightforward, linear and objective activities, thereby forcing the "shift" to which Law refers. This making visible a different process than that commonly assumed of method is an important point in itself. Second, and more significant, however, is what takes place where that alternative is confronted head-on. In bringing to light the non-linear development of research events, the new temporality that emerges in its place makes it much easier to appreciate the productive capacity of method in the way that the second half of Law's quote remarks upon. No longer is causality linear and forward bound; no longer does the researcher stand in isolation from their data; no longer does reality hold steady in its wait for observation. Rather, each part of the research process flows in every direction, shaping and being shaped by that with which it comes into contact. As Law summarises: [m]ethod is not [...] a more or less successful set of procedures for reporting on a given reality. Rather it is performative. It helps to produce realities" (2004: 143).

It is this point which draws my discussion to the final but crucial part of this work's methodological practice: its necessary and active engagement with the politics of ontology. Where the depiction of a *true* reality is no longer viewed as an expedient, sensible or indeed

possible research goal, and method no longer reacts to reality but forms reality through its practice, there is both danger and potential for research to be caught up in the making of ontologies. The danger – which is a danger for any method – is that the activity of conducting research further perpetuates the ontologies which it might rather argue against, and in doing so becomes complicit in the ongoing maintenance of those *problems* it seeks to address. I've already touched on this point briefly in Chapter Three, pages 96–97, when I spoke of how the mechanical rationality of social science bore a striking resemblance to the temporality of *clock time*, and was therefore an inappropriate means by which to orientate this work; and in Chapter Four, when I reported how the *cracks* of this work manifested in relation to social justice across an ontological register. My subsequent discussion in Chapter Five of the broad research approach I deemed necessary in light of such considerations then spoke, albeit implicitly, of the potential that the researcher is afforded where they become cognisant of the performative nature of their work. No longer forced to report on reality they might instead craft new ones through the research process. Indeed, considering this "promise of qualitative research as a form of radical democratic practice", Norman Denzin notes: "[t]oday we understand that we write culture, and that writing is not an innocent practice. We know the world only through our representations of it" (2001: 23). And certainly, it was in such a sense that I was able to take as central to my work the cry of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari that "[t]he multiple *must be made*" (1987: 6, original emphasis); allowing me to *play* with reality in pursuit of that goal whilst actively (re)crafting it through the very process.

Beyond this general approach, however, I've also maintained a careful attendance to my performance in more specific terms. At points where I've recognised my activities as enacting realities that were ill-fitting with my broader research and ethical positions, I've been quick to respond. Either by adapting my approach (in the case of my decision to stop coding my autoethnographic data so precisely) or by qualifying and making visible its limitations (such as accepting that the *flatness* of my maps did not necessarily render them overtly spatial). Similarly, I've also taken the opportunity to challenge arrangements I've recognised as perpetuating notions of time and ontology as singular and homogenous, and have made active attempts to (re)craft the multiple in their wake.

This has been particularly the case as I've performed this work through method and in writing. For example, Carolyn Ellis' view that "autoethnography, as method, attempts to

disrupt the binary of science and art" (2010: 11), revealed its scope to undo some of the artificial, disciplinary barriers erected between legitimate and illegitimate ways of *doing* academic work. Similarly, my decision to write my "multiple contradictory selves into the text, and to make visible the embodied experiences and their effects on the writer and the text" (Honan, 2007: 536) allowed me to challenge the practice of "silent authorship" which accompanies and upholds the idea of the *objective* researcher (Ellis, 2004). The heterogeneity of narratives that were then able to emerge allowed me not only to produce the multiple, but in the process helped dispel any notion that knowledge was equal only to truth of a singular or transcendent nature. Finally, both autoethnography and rhizoanalysis have allowed me to generate data through non-linear and non-mechanical means, and the processes involved in these efforts speak powerfully against the temporality presumed where the clock maintains its domination.

Arguably, however, my most definite attempt to (re)craft the realities in which this work has found itself has occurred not in method and writing, but in my reporting of the canon. The remainder of this section therefore looks to this as the final research event involved in the production of this thesis document.

RESEARCH EVENT: REPORTING THE CANON

In addition to the process requirements discussed at the end of Chapter Five, my efforts to capture the canon were motivated by my desire to make visible the productions of that process for others. Such a desire is central to the production of any thesis, with the reporting of *findings* often considered to be the fundamental goal of research. Lacking any ambition for producing *findings* representative of *truth*, however, two alternative ends have driven the practice of this seemingly pervasive research event. In addition to the first goal of finding a way to *play* with reality, the second and equally important aim has been to put it back together again so as to disturb those realities and their verities which so readily present. As May considers

> Ontology itself has strange adventures in store for us, if only we can think differently about how it might be conceived. If we stop searching for the true, stop asking for the world to allow us to recognize it, stop knowing what everyone knows, then we can set off on a new thought
>
> 2005: 81

Where the goals of research are motivated more by the production of *thinking* than knowledge, this task requires a conscious move on the part of the researcher from presenting *their* findings, towards encouraging a freedom of thought within the mind of the reader. That is, the task of reporting *findings* seeks a much more performative role. At this point, however, the tension of how to capture the inherently un-capturable character of the rhizomatic journey (discussed on page 146 in the previous chapter) rears its head once more. And moreover, is compounded by the need to reproduce the experience of that journey for the reader, whilst simultaneously heightened by the fact that the production of a thesis necessitates a certain amount of fixing.

In navigating this tension it is helpful once more to remember the function of the rhizome. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, there is no dualism between rhizomes and trees, and regardless of individual predilection neither concept negates the ontological status of the other – "[t]here are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots" (1987: 20), they write. As such, the pursuit of the rhizome – the goal of producing *thinking* – is not to negate the existence of arboreal thought, nor are its ends directed towards a state of *pure* rhizomatic thinking. Rather, the rhizome necessarily exists in relation to the tree and is invoked not to dialectically dissolve but to dialogically challenge:

> The important point is that the [...] tree and [...] rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel. [...] We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another.
>
> 1987: 20

This makes clear that the immanence of thinking always interjects to disrupt knowledge just as representational knowledge always intervenes to structure thinking. And what this allows for is reporting by representational means whilst at the same time being informed by a different aim.

In this work I have therefore chosen not to present *findings*, but to *report* my research of the urban studies canon by producing stories from and of my process. Though I recognise that my stories may take on a representational form, I remain firm to my insistence that they do

not seek to represent *truth*. Rather, I present them as snapshots of the rhizoanalytic process that unfolded throughout this research and continues to do so; as a way to display fragments of data that seem "to be engaged or interjected in such a way as to make new relations possible" (Leander and Rowe, 2006: 440). In working to realise this premise my intention has been to encourage my readers to move between a multiplicity of representations I've made, whilst also beyond them to make their own connections. As a result I've used data from three different origins in my telling of these stories: autoethnographic recordings, presentations to my supervisors, and new narratives crafted specifically for inclusion in this document. Each of these sources arose from a moment wherein sense emerged; an immanent event which suggested not what the correct interpretation of the data was, but rather, what potential it had to connect with other facets of data. And in that sense each is not the final but only the next iteration of the process of capture that took place.

Recognising that I could not tell each and every part of this work I crafted my stories on the basis of their affective powers – their potential to disrupt and to deterritorialize (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). As such, they emerged not from an effort to code the vast data I'd gathered as I entered and read the canon, but rather through my allowance for certain groupings, including those which contradicted one another, to come to the fore. (Re)writing my data in this way involved a certain amount of editing. For example, I altered the tense of many autoethnographic passages in order to ensure that my narratives flowed more smoothly. I corrected spelling and grammatical errors, and altered sentences for clarity where there was potential for confusion. In addition, moments of editing occurred as I transcribed my hand-written notes to the uniform text of this document, erasing, in the process, the more nuanced facets of their origin that I considered so important for my own analysis (see Chapter Five, page 128). And perhaps most significantly, editing occurred as I decided which data was most salient and warranted inclusion in my stories.

Prior to editing my data in these ways I considered alternatives that might lessen my interference. For example, I pondered using photographs and screen captures of my original data, allowing the reader to unpack my spelling mistakes (potentially finding in these my moments of haste, distraction or learned inaccuracies). While such strategies had their appeal I also recognised that a desire to report a raw and unedited version of my research might be taken to the extreme: I might simply leave the remainder of this

document blank, save for an instruction to the reader to rummage at will through the artefacts collected and constructed for this work. And even this, I considered, involved a certain amount of editing, for I could never hope to include the entire range of sensory and environmental conditions which gave rise to those artefacts, privileging, in many ways, the visual over the aural, haptic and olfactory, and, more concerning for this project, the present over memories of the past. Moreover, I realised that while I felt a pull to maintain the original form of my data, the more pressing aim was to keep a multiplicity of elements at play. As a result I considered that though editing my data for tense, spelling and clarity further drew things down, there overall remained a heterogeneity buoyant in the resulting stories, and this allowed me to strike a balance between something that was fixed but also moving, making the simple but important argument that "[t]here is always more to think" (May, 2005: 132).

The stories which I report in this thesis include key pieces of the rhizoanalysis; moments of sense that relate to my research problems. There are ten in total, presented across the next three chapters as follows:

CHAPTER SEVEN
TELLING STORIES

What is the City? (What is it Not?)
Power, Dominance and Sensibility
Material Encounters
Writing Solo, With Others
The Value of Knowledge
From Language to Presentation, Method and Pedagogy
Abridgement

CHAPTER EIGHT
STORIES OF THOSE STORIES

Entering the Canon
Reading the Canon
Reporting the Canon

This event of reporting is then concluded in Chapter Nine, where I tell one final story – *The Scope of the Debate* – in which I consider the connections between these stories, and the issues which sit at the heart of this thesis.

Beyond the Thesis

So far in this chapter I have written of the potential to perform method within and through the production of a thesis. The active crafting of ontology, however, is not exclusive to the production of the thesis document. Rather, the sites at which research takes place – as Law informs "in a combination of people, techniques, texts, architectural arrangements, and natural phenomena (which are themselves being enacted and re-enacted)" (2004: 56) – suggests that the performative capacity of method extends across all that it touches, no matter how loosely. This potential for enactment across a much broader realm means that the danger for types of knowledge to be reified, objects to be stabilised and representations to become verities, are of course heightened. Also considerable, however, is the potential to extend the practice of research beyond commonly designated research events, into those spheres which tacitly, though nonetheless powerfully work to uphold normative and/or problematic ontologies.

Such activities are not easily subsumed into the process outlined by a traditional research model (such as the one depicted at Figure One, Chapter Five), often sitting outside the anticipated limits of start and end dates, and research sites. In this work, however, I consider such efforts just as important as those research events detailed throughout Chapter Five, and Chapter Six thus far. There have been many points throughout this work where I have found myself enacting my thesis beyond these pages. For example, as I've attended conferences; designed and taught, lessons and workshops; facilitated discussions; spoke with colleagues; written for other sources, and so on. In addition to these activities which were previously unanticipated, however, I've actively tried to create spaces in which to (re)craft the realities this work found itself within and without, in ways that are more fitting. The remainder of this section now moves to discuss two such research events: an engagement with the university's ethics committee, and the production of an alternative form to sit alongside the thesis document.

RESEARCH EVENT: ENGAGING ETHICS WITH *ETHICS*

My engagement with the University of Glasgow's Ethics Committee was motivated by two separate but interrelated concerns. The first stemmed from my realisation that aspects of my work that were increasingly demanding my own ethical consideration appeared absent from the purview of the university's Ethics Committee. The second, from my growing belief that many of the procedures considered to promote good ethical practice by the

university's Ethics Committee might in many ways be consider unethical. To look at this first point. Early on I realised that my research might be exempt from formal review by the university's Ethics Committee[16], given that its subjects were textual objects and myself. Despite this, I recognised the potential for my work to have consequences which I felt should be considered for their ethical character. For example, my evolving understanding of texts were not as a passive objects, but as living, fluid entities which held strong relations with ways of seeing, and hence the world. Be it through the act of reading and re-reading; offering interpretations; or prompting others to question the ways in which texts related to their own work and practices, dialogue ensued, along with the potential for transformation. Moreover, while I was the only active human participant of the work I viewed myself as constituted through Others (see Ricœur, 1991; Derrida, 1998; Nancy, 2000), and hence felt a need to expand ethical considerations from a direct to a relational register. For example, there was potential for my work to impact upon other human subjects, either because they were in close physical and mental proximity to me and may witness my change; because they were closely related to my work and might experience a direct change in themselves; or because in choosing to write about myself I necessarily wrote about the Others who co-constituted me, potentially implicating and identifying them in the process.

Considering the range of ethical issues outlined whilst noting that there appeared no institutional requirement to engage with them, prompted me to question the institutional framing of ethics, and its relationship to ethics in a broader sense. And as I looked to the university's application form I grew to realise a number of other issues, leading to the second concern noted – my feeling that many of its procedures promoted not ethical but unethical behaviour within researchers. I had many concerns, such as the limits of informed consent, the notion of discrete research sites and times, and the nature of participation, for example[17]. But my gravest concern was that the relation of *ethics* to academic research was largely limited to the process of gaining institutional approval, and with its meaning reduced to the act of filling in a form, ethical research equaled research that had been ethically approved. Together these concerns portrayed a bleak reality, that the institutionalisation of ethics was in itself unethical due to both its production of normative values to assess research ethics, and in its promotion of research behaviour which served to maintain and extend those values in the guise of ethics. And where I grew to recognise the role of the Ethics Committee not just in stamping their approval upon *ethical* research but in deciding what research could and could not be conducted, I realised

that the knowledge, objects and representations of the Ethics Committee weren't limited to this arena but extended far throughout the practices of research in the contemporary academy, limiting the possibilities of knowledge, research and action.

In addressing these concerns my decision was to prompt a dialogue between myself and the Ethics Committee. This was done over a series of steps. First, after thinking through my issues with the form, I wrote to Ethics Committee to relay my concern that whilst my research did not seem to fall within their remit, I nonetheless considered it to be ethically concerning[18]. They took this very seriously, stressing where I understood there to be ethical concerns with my project I should make an application to the Ethics Committee, raising them to their attention. Upon this reply I completed and submitted a form, mitigating the lack of and ill-fitting categories by detailing my ethical concerns in lengthy appendices. Over the course of four months my correspondence with the committee continued back and forth as we worked to come up with a solution that was both ethical and met their institutionally framed notions of ethics. The eventual stumbling block related to the nature of Others in my project. My feeling was that it was important to recognise Others in my work for how they might be relationally affected by the project without subjecting them to the consent process. The Ethics Committee were clear in their stance: I must consider these Others as participants, and carry out the appropriate measures to assure their informed consent. By no means was my engagement and dialogue with the Ethics Committee complete, yet other facets of my project demanded that I concluded it and moved on.

Though I did not feel satisfied with their decision regarding my project, my engagement was an important one for a number of reasons. During our correspondence I reflected deeply on what ethics meant in relation to social research. This prompted many discussions with my supervisors, other colleagues and peers. It also led to my co-designing and teaching a workshop on ethics for postgraduate research students at the University of Glasgow[19]. Moreover, the correspondence appeared to lead to some fruitful discussion within the members of the Ethics Committee. Indeed, at no point did I find the committee dismissive of my application and our ongoing engagement. On the contrary, I felt they took my concerns seriously, suggesting that whilst they operated within the fixed parameters of the existing framework such things were always subject to ongoing review. Perhaps most significantly, however, it helped introduce the method of autoethnography to the committee – a method capable of imagining things differently. As Denzin notes, by

bringing into question many of the things which traditionally sit at the heart of research, such as verifiability, objectivity and *truth*, the practice of autoethnography can be conceived as an ethical practice in and of itself (2006). And in securing a certain amount of legitimacy for autoethnography by subjecting it to the scrutiny of the Ethics Committee, it was possible to enact a different politics of ethics both alongside and within the ill-fitting procedures stabilised and transmitted through the institutionalisation of ethics.

RESEARCH EVENT: QUILTING KNOWLEDGE

Within this thesis document there are points at which I've worked to (re)craft the problem realities addressed by this work not only through content but in presentation. Oftentimes the motivation for such efforts emerged where I was unable to express my thesis within the traditional limits of the written form. The collage of time in Chapter Two, for example, was presented not as a logically reasoned argument of time's multiplicity as fact, but in such a way that it invited the reader to focus on the experience of reading about different times in order that they might reach that realisation on their own terms; whilst the non-linear research map which unfolded from this document in Chapter Five was a means to allow that alternative reality of method-making to break free from what remained a necessarily linear discussion of methods. Despite such efforts, however, as my production of this work progressed in content, I also grew to recognise a need to challenge those limitations of the traditional thesis medium more explicitly.

When I looked more closely at the form of the traditional thesis document I was unsettled by what stared back. Black and white text; composed in rationally reasoned sentences, paragraphs, chapters; comprised of a start, middle and end; all sheets bound together at their spine. There was a strong linearity to the document, and bound from cover to cover it suggested that *knowledge lives here*; that within it, *truth* was fixed. Moreover, with its two dominant colours and uniform text, its somewhat masculine aesthetic conveyed a troubling rationality – black and white; on or off; *true* or false. Far from passive, as a medium it enacted strong statements of knowledge's proper modes and time's linearity, and moreover, suggested who might rightly make claims to speak of such subjects. In this I came to realise that I could be as plural with the content of my written thesis as I wanted, but there was also a need to challenge, not uphold, the dominant realities posed through my thesis as it was traditionally presented.

To this end I looked first to literature for inspiration, considering it closest to the medium in which I was working. I was initially quite taken by the achievements of Georges Perec in *A Void* (1994), B.S. Johnson in *The Unfortunates* (1990) and Jonathan Safran Foer in *Tree of Codes* (2010) – postmodern texts in which the authors challenged the limitations of their craft, crafting it anew in the process [20]. Despite their creativity, however, my feeling was that there was only so much I could alter within the limits of the traditional thesis medium whilst maintaining its ability to present as a social science thesis. Moreover, perhaps more concerning, the words of Deleuze and Guattari shouted loudly from within: "[n]o typographical, lexical, or even syntactical cleverness is enough to make it heard. The multiple *must be made*" (1987: 6). As a result my decision was to produce a second object in order to challenge the realities and verities proposed through the traditional thesis form – something that could sit alongside it, telling its stories, but through an entirely different medium and in an entirely different way.

What I eventually arrived at was a quilt. My recognition of this idea came not from other sources, but from an autoethnographic reflection I captured on writing:

> Writing.
>
> How do i actually write?
>
> Blank page – filling in or stripping away – or both?
>
> Writing starts for me in the shower, when I'm cooking, walking, crocheting.
>
> Mundane tasks that i am so familiar with.
>
> They free my mind and it starts writing.
>
> (Sitting staring at the computer screen makes this a more difficult process)
>
> I capture it often when i come out the shower – the watermarks on the pages of my notebooks testifying to the urgency with which I scribble down my thoughts.
>
> That for me is after writing.
>
> Writing was what came before.
>
> This thought, here, is a shower thought.
>
> It is a Sunday morning, I'm still dripping wet, one towel on my head and another wrapped around body. I type this one. And actually I'm finding that rather easier. I'm not looking at the screen. I'm not even looking at the keyboard. I'm just thinking.
>
> Although, I'm still aware of the translation from head to page – my 'error correcting' kicks in as I start to write. This thought isn't that which occurs in the shower, its combined with the thoughts that facilitate the task of writing. Much of these are non-verbal, in fact. I just feel myself stutter, stop in my tracks. I

> press backspace a number of times, correct, move on. Sometimes I can't help but search my head, the air around for words. I look up. Pursed lips, I glance to the side. This is a more verbal part of thinking, but I'm also amazed by the speed at which the thought changes from broad to focused.
>
> So this is how I write and will write. A combination of notebooks, voice memos and typed text will provide the outlet. But what i fill them with will always come from another place, another activity. A kind of 'process' activity that compels the attention of the focused part of my mind, keeping in its shadow the acts of writing. An activity that I am familiar enough with that it leaves my mind freedom to reign over its contents. So much of this thesis has been borne not from the activities that are so readily associated with it, but rather, from those which it is not.
>
> 24 APRIL, 2012

From this I came to recognise more fully the spaces in which I wrote, and hence, *how* I wrote. There was a physicality to writing – a tactility, urgency and energy in my efforts that were wiped out on the page; a vulnerable openness that all too often became tempered when it was translated and fixed in written text. I therefore wanted to find a way to bring that part of the knowledge production into focus; to bring to the fore the *embodied* practice of thesis creation. It was very quickly after this that I arrived at the idea of a quilt. I'd always been a keen seamstress and had amassed a lot of fabric over the years. Whenever I caught site of my pieces, bundles and bolts of pattern, texture and colour, it was fragments from my life which spoke back. Memories of where it came for, what it was meant for, what it had been previously, what it had become. And just like showering, walking or crocheting, I also remembered that cutting and stitching were tasks that I found busy enough to free my mind to write.

The composition I decided upon was a patchwork quilt, constructed from thirty-six individual squares, each of a different fabric, embroidered with a different quote. The quotes were to be from non-academic sources – snippets from outside the academy that nonetheless spoke to the same concerns of my written thesis. In joining the squares the edge would be left unbound; non-squares of absence would be interspersed at points between; and it would be quilted in two continuous lines – one tracing the order in which I embroidered each square, the other tracking the temporal origin of each quote. The rest of it was to be quilted in person, and in the mind, as I *performed* the quilt by telling its stories with Others who might look upon it. Indeed, there was to be no proper line through the quilt, only lines. Lines starting from the threads that made up the warp and woof, to the lines I marked on top. Only lines, and only stories[21].

As an alternative form to sit alongside the thesis document the quilt would act not to negate but to challenge the problematic realities that were enacted through the traditional medium. It was to be a counterpoint to the masculine, rationalised aesthetic of that electronically produced, sanitised form. It was to be produced from and to produce knowledge that was less fixed, more open, more *rhizomatic*. And perhaps most importantly, it was to permit time to flow in many directions; to be made in the present; and for what was past to be remade in the future. In spite of it fittingness, however, I felt compelled to justify my quilt to others – perhaps also to justify it to my earlier and less confident academic self – beyond the logic of my own rationale. It turned out that I didn't have to look too far to do so.

The fourteenth chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "1440: The Smooth and the Striated", opens with an image of a quilt. Here, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the conceptual pair of smoothness and striation as a way to rethink space. Striated space, they explain, is a partitioned field of movement which prohibits free motion. Smooth space, on the other hand, allows a subject to operate more freely and unhindered. They write:

> Smooth space is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties. It is *haptic* rather than optical perception.
>
> 1987: 479, original emphasis

Provoking a more sensual, tactical response, rather than navigated by a rationalised, perhaps planned trajectory, smooth space is more conducive to rhizomatic growth. And for Deleuze and Guattari the patchwork quilt, "[a]n amorphous collection of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways" (1987: 476), is a prime example of that concept. It wasn't simply the conceptual fittingness of the quilt I was to find in Deleuze and Guattari, however, but a more cultural and political rationale. Indeed, within that chapter they also make note of "the importance of the quilting bee in America, and its role from the standpoint of a women's collectivity" (1987: 476–477).

In this assessment I recognised even more fully the way in which the practice of making my quilt enacted a more fitting reality; how it produced a different space and a different time, in which knowledge could be made differently. And thinking through the different

knowledges that might be produced I remembered a passage I'd read previously in bell hooks' *Belonging: a culture of place* (1991). Describing the quilts Baba (hooks' Grandmother) used to make, she writes:

> Baba would show her quilts and tell their stories, giving the history [...] and the relation of chosen fabrics to individual lives. [...] To her mind these quilts were maps charting the course of our lives. They were history as life lived. To share the story of a given quilt was central to Baba's creative self-expression, as family historian, storyteller, exhibiting the work of her hands.
>
> 160

Indeed, reflecting on that same passage, Susana Vega-González makes clear the importance of quilting to the black community in particular, noting that "[q]uiltmaking gave black women the opportunity to tell their particular histories and stories, apart from the history imposed from outside by the white man." (2001: 242). And in this sense, and for me also, not only did the quilt have the potential to craft through its presence a different knowledge and different time, but in many ways it was, itself, the Other.

Beyond the Thesis, in Space and Time

Shortly I will move to the final two parts of this thesis in which I report on the returns and my experiences of conducting the research events described in Chapters Five and Six, and discuss the significance of these for my research problem, my aims, and for this project as a whole. However, even after I punctuate the final line of this thesis' concluding sentence, the work is far from over. This chapter in particular has aimed to make clear that the performative productions of method extend well beyond the limits assumed of the research process, and while I have largely focused on those events that exist beyond the manifest production of the thesis in space, the same is of course true for its extension in time. There are some *future* moments at which I am already anticipating my performance of this work must continue. In terms of the quilt, for example, the point at which I fold its lengths together, place it in my bottom drawer and stop talking about it, the claim by which it attempts to speak is denied. In this case, I therefore foresee an important need to continue to find and create ways of performing the quilt with Others, until such a point emerges where it no longer feels appropriate, or where it seems sensible to stop and try another tack.

Similarly, my development of autoethnographic rhizoanalysis in and for this work will undoubtably make its presence felt in any future projects I tackle or with which I am involved. What I anticipate here, however, is not that I retain a strict adherence to its form as it unfolded for this work, but that I allow for its ever ongoing change and expansion. In addition to these performances at which I anticipate my active engagement, there will be countless others that will reveal themselves in due course. The point, however, is made not by my knowledge of these at this moment, but rather, my knowledge that a careful attendance to the realities that are enacted through this work must remain, not simply for the way in which this thesis is spatially bound, but to how it may linger far beyond its ill-presumed temporal limits.

notes

[16] The University of Glasgow stipulates only that all research involving data or material relating to human subjects which is not lawfully in the public domain is subject to formal ethical review.

[17] See Appendix Four, pages 256–258 for a more thorough overview.

[18] See Appendix Four, pages 258–281 for the communication between myself and the Ethics Committee.

[19] This workshop, *Research Ethics in Practice*, was designed with Dr Gesa Helms, and was designed to explore the wider implications of research ethics and how they manifested in the practice of postgraduate research. It covers a number of areas, including the politics and ethical implication of social science research, moving from the administrative management of ethics towards the practice of research ethics, and ownership and power within the research cycle.

[20] *A Void* is written without using the letter 'e'. As Warren Motte suggests, "The absence of a sign is always the sign of an absence, and the absence of the E in *A Void* announces a broader, cannily coded discourse of loss, catastrophe and mourning" (2004). *The Unfortunates* is a book-in-a-box which consists of separate pamphlets of a first and last section, plus 25 other chapters that can be read in any order. As such it allows the readers' experience to echo that of the story's protagonist as he reminisces his way, non-linearly, through Johnson's narrative. *Tree of Codes* is literally a story cut from another story, with each page a die-cut of Foer's favourite book, *The Street of Crocodiles*.

[21] For obvious and also important reasons, the quilt is not contained in this text. Obvious, because it is made of fabric, and unlike this document, it remains as a single and original form. Important, because it exists to challenge this document, not to be subsumed within it. Though the quilt and this document are separate, however, they are interconnected at infinite points, and accordingly, Appendix Five provides a photographic sample of just some of the squares of the quilt in a possible juxtaposition.

III

REPORTING THE CANON

Chapter Seven

STORIES OF THE CANON

Telling Stories

Throughout this thesis I've been telling stories, stories bound by a common thread: changes to my imagination through time. It was in the Preface that I wrote of how my difficulties in finding a way to write *of* time *in* time led me to recognise this frame as a means by which I could capture and present my work in this thesis. It was this first story that granted its form to the other stories, whilst being a story of that type itself. It led me in Chapter One to explain how the question *what about time?* journeyed with me, prompting me to open my mind and pose that question to the urban field. Chapter Two started with a similar story of transformation. Collecting around my reading about time I discussed that not only did I learn to appreciate the social construction of time in theory, but through reading of other and Others' times I *felt* it. As I continued to explore the significance of that intimacy throughout Chapter Two, and in its companion, Chapter Three, the culmination of that story for this thesis was that an intimate politics of time moved me not to deal with urban temporality as a matter of first course, but to find means of better appreciating the presence and function of such gaps within dominant conceptualisations of the urban. And as I moved in Chapters Four, Five and Six to talk generally about method and more specifically about *my* approach, the stories that were central related to the development of my research imagination and the multi-directional linkages I grew to appreciate between each and every stage of research work, both internal and external to the endeavour. Indeed, it was this transformation that fuelled my desire not simply to *play* with the realities I'd found myself within but to *(re)craft* them through this work.

As I now turn to report my efforts of *playing* within the realities which sit beneath canonical presentations of the city, difference and time, the option of telling stories of the imaginative

shifts which have accompanied these efforts continues to hold promise for a couple of reasons. Reflecting upon those stories already told, I am reminded of the way in which this activity has allowed me to decipher various moments of this work without fixing them; has generated knowledge that is insightful in multiple though not necessarily concordant ways. What I find even more penetrating, however, is the productive capacity brought by a more fluid and changeable insight. Where perceptions are continually altered, so too are the realities of their perception. And in that sense, not only do these stories tell of the ways in which I've *played* with reality, they offer a means to *(re)craft* it in the process. It is for these reasons that my report of the urban studies canon in these next two chapters continues to appeal to my changing imagination as a means by which to loosely hold and present my accounts.

These stories not only share this in common, however, but are equally framed by my interests for entering this site in the first instance. What prompted my turn to the urban studies canon was a desire to explore the ways in which the discipline exercised authority on those accounts and analyses that were not simply legitimate but possible to produce. The prominent query was never what a text *meant* but how it worked – what it made possible to think; how it served to expand, maintain or limit the spheres of knowledge, research and action. What was significant to me in this regard was how a text functioned within and out with its confines: how it connected to other texts, including the non-linguistic; how it reached out to connect with readers, authors, researchers and non-actors alike; how it met those literary and non-literary contexts in which it was held, and those in which it was not. Accordingly, what I asked of the canon and the texts through which I read it was *what thoughts go unthought? What assumptions lie within their accounts?* And perhaps, most importantly, *how and in what ways are they useful?* Rather than advance down previously established lines this research approach was designed to be rhizomatic. It was intent on moving outward from the canon and the text in a conscious effort to uncover some semblance of those missing aspects of thought and practice, and their effects and consequences for the urban realm.

In order to report the productions of this research I have split my stories into two main groups. This chapter deals with *Stories of the Canon*, before I turn to consider some *Stories of Those Stories* in Chapter Eight. The former of these groups takes the urban studies canon as its object of rhizoanalysis, while the latter looks rhizoanalytically to the ways in which my

experience of researching the urban studies canon has itself informed the points of my inquiry described in the previous paragraph. There are of course many points of intersection between the stories gathered in each of these groups, and also between them; points of intersection that no doubt continue to transform the stories I tell. I address this to some degree by telling one final story in Chapter Nine of this work, as I prepare to move from reporting my research to *rhizodiscussing* it. This final story makes it possible to bring to the fore some of the connections between the stories. But as I've noted frequently, I cannot tell every story nor each version of it. And motivating my decision to tell the stories that I have included in this thesis – the next but not eventual iteration of this work – has been my long standing preoccupation: connections which tell of a naturalisation of time within urban theory, and their links to the naturalisation of time in everyday life. In this regard, as I've allowed myself to imagine how the canon connects to expand, maintain and limit the possibilities of research, thought, knowledge and action, my specific orientation toward such functions is in their relation to time.

In an effort to reflect the way in which both time and my imagination necessarily interjected such moments I use three different fonts in my telling of these stories. Their accompanying references pertain to the timeline of research events in Appendix Six. Not only does this presentation bring the temporality of these stories to the fore but it makes obvious the extent to which each of my stories are comprised of other stories, whilst themselves being smaller parts of larger tellings. The fonts I use are as follows:

- The first font speaks of those connections I made as I entered, read and captured the canon during the research events discussed in Chapter Five. These are lifted from my autoethnographic reflections, with added context given where necessary. My reference relates to the stimulus which prompted its collection, the research event during which it was collected, the medium of its recording, and the date on which it was recorded. To illustrate:

  > This font looks like this, is full justified, and positioned 3cm in from the main body of the text.
  >
  > [STIMULUS; RESEARCH EVENT; MEDIUM OF RECORDING; DATE]

- The second font I use represents my efforts to report aspects of this data to my supervisors. Just like the research events discussed in Chapter Five, my submissions to my supervisors were also iterative and recursive, with the development of my thinking spanning not just weeks but many months. I reference these entries to show the month of their submission to my supervisors. To illustrate:

> *This font looks like this, is full justified, and positioned 1.5cm in from the main body of the text.*
> [MONTH OF SUBMISSION TO SUPERVISORS]

- Finally, the third font – which is the font I've used throughout the body of the thesis so far – relates to my writing of these stories for this work. It makes no reference as it is the original source. To illustrate:

This font looks like this and is presented in line with the body.

Finally, just as I cannot tell every story it is equally impossible to enter the canon via all of its data, not least given the prominent role I myself played in generating that data as I made my efforts to discern it (see Chapter Five, pages 139–141). In this sense, my entry to canon was forged at many nodes beyond the texts identified as dominant, including via the strategies I developed to gain entry. Thus as I discuss the *Stories of the Canon* in this chapter and some *Stories of Those Stories* in Chapter Eight, it is therefore this much broader field which constitutes the object of research and of my reflections.

Stories of the Canon

WHAT IS THE CITY? (WHAT IS IT NOT?)

As I read Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen, their accounts of the urban realm resounded from the page and propagated within my mind. My imagination expanded into proximate realms of interest and significance; relevant sites at which the city unfolded. With intention or not, through explicit statements or more tacit characterisations, each spoke to me their answer(s) to that most central of urban questions: *what is the city?*

> *There is a section early in 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism' [herein 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism'] where Harvey explicitly engages with conceptual issues. Early in this section he moves to define the character of urbanisation, noting that it should be "regarded as a spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices" (5). Harvey talks about urbanisation in the first three pages of the paper also, but this is the first time he suggests a definition of what urbanisation is, how it occurs, how it manifests. With no ambiguity whatsoever he describes it as a spatial process, tacitly naming the city as spatial by virtue of that fact.*
> [JULY 2012]

Yet I was to quickly realise that the authors did not simply speak positively of their claims, but the non-proximate, non-interesting, non-significant and non-relevant were implicated within their accounts. That is, where the *nature of the city* was named so too implied was the *nature of what was not*.

> Reading and re-reading Harvey's account of the city, I appreciate so much more than that which he chooses to make expressly evident. From more purposeful readings, I certainly feel a spatial focus discernible [within the text], most evident from the frequent use of the word *space* and its associated terms. At no point does Harvey move to or even appear to move to positively deny, undermine or delegitimise the pertinence of time and temporality for analyses of the urban. Yet that is not to say that this does not happen anyway, indeed, I think it does. There are more subtle ways in which time loses its standing, and particular to this text is Harvey's distinct focus on the "spatial nature" of hegemonic capitalism. Where Harvey choses to stake a claim to his subject, in that claim can be read an additional point: he does not allow that it could be anything other than spatial practices which account for urbanisation. And where he elaborates ("in a class-bound society such as capitalism, these spatial practices acquire a definite class content" (5)), where he broadens his argument further (noting that gender and race, amongst others, can also act as lenses for certain spatial practices), space is made ever more connected, significant, pivotal, contingent and *vital*. And time? Well, that's nowhere to be seen nor counted.
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 24 MAY 2012]

> *At numerous points throughout the text 'space' is singled out. Describing major sociological changes that might elsewhere be understood out with processes of urbanisation, Harvey includes: "technology, space relations, social relations, consumer habits, lifestyles and the like" in his list of "successive revolutions" (3). This is clearly not intended as an exhaustive list nor a particularly comprehensive one. But nonetheless, while it alone cannot account for the wider absence of the temporal, it is certainly of note. Consider that it is not the absence of 'time relations' on the list, but the absence of time relations coupled with the presence of "space relations" that is significant. There are many such examples throughout this text, each serving to introduce and strengthen the presence of the spatial in our imagination.*
>
> [JULY 2012]

It was in such ways that I first recognised the presence of space working to fix time as irrelevant within my mind. I read of space but not time; I thought of space but not time; and so I continued to *see* space and its sensibility, while the lack of my temporal imagination had the potential to render any moments of its presence a *blip* on my mental landscape.

> Where space is made so explicit there appears to me no room for time. It grows, expands and pushes time and concerns of temporality from my mind. Indeed, despite my own claims for time's importance even I can feel it slipping as I gravitate back towards space. I see the word *space*, I think of space. I rarely see the word *time*. And not only is absent on the page, it remains absent in my mind whilst space's presence only grows.
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 2; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 9 MAY 2012]

But with readings of Jacobs and Castells unfolding in the interim, as I turned to Sassen my feeling was that there was even more to consider as to how the positive presence of space fixed time's absence as it went.

> *With reference to the relationship between time and space, I've certainly found it tempting to construe the spatial discourses of Sassen, Harvey and Castells, in binary opposition to time – to conclude that the presence of space was in itself a statement of the non-temporality of the thing in question. Indeed, that is how I experienced it in my mind: ideas of time and space certainly exist in relation to one another there, pitted against each another by virtue of the urban studies canon, and elsewhere. However, to say that 'if space not time. Space, so not time' is all that can be concluded from the relationship is perhaps overstating the extent to which this binary functions exhaustively in my mind. And more fundamentally, it does very little to flesh out the ways in which space and time function as interrelated concepts. Indeed, the extent to which space is foregrounded throughout these texts narrows the scope for temporal interpretations in many ways beyond its presence on the page and in the mind.*
>
> [JANUARY 2013]

Time, I came to realise, was absent not only on the page but ever-outward in the urban field. It was not only absented from *my* mind but more generally from a collective urban consciousness.

> I need to find a way to see the *presence (absence)* contained in statements of *what the city is (what it is not)* out with my own urban imagination and those texts which prompt it. And this, then, isn't really about me simply asking after the presence of space, but about considering how it's presented; how it functions; how is it analysed.
>
> [AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; READING THE CANON; JOURNAL 2; 13 MAY 2012]

> *This dominance of space relates to the (non)presence of time in two key ways. A positive statement of 'what something is' not only implicitly suggests 'what it is not', but further cements the 'truth' of what it is by (a) funnelling critical activity toward the explicit statement of what it*

is; and (b) making it difficult to pose questions of the implicit features, as these have only been implied. Taking space and time as an example, spatial conceptualisations lead to spatial critiques, spatial problematisations and ultimately to spatial solutions, all of which are performed and enacted within texts, and materially within the academy and the city. On the other hand, as time's absence is only implied, it has no activity in any of these three processes until the point where it is either named as relevant, or its absence is recognised and challenged. What is secured, however, is the performance and enactment of that absence, within the text, and materially within the academy and the city. And the most pressing question that now emerges is how the parameters for urban engagement are further narrowed through the performances and practices which are not these texts, but are nonetheless connected?

[FEBRUARY, 2013]

Space, it seemed, *functioned* via positive descriptions of the city; its presence was secured by the practices that gave rise to and maintained such descriptions. We questioned space but not time. We researched space but not time. We spoke of space but not time. The spatial construction of the city by and through the urban studies canon was happening not simply within the text, but in academic activities of the everyday. But it was not only beyond the text, but at many points beyond the relation of space to time that I came to appreciate how such collective practices of presence functioned to construct the city.

> Edited collections work to tell dominant stories and portray overarching narratives of the urban. Editors have considerable ability to control the story through their positive selection of items, the sequencing of those items, and the editing of the text. In many ways it seems like the actual *content* of those items that are included can be read as secondary to their positioning on the contents page, the way in which they proceed throughout the text and the categories used to group them into broader urban themes. Though much more implicit, these are the overriding positive statements within these texts, the ones that make clear the nature of the urban, and crucially the *order* of that nature.
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 14 FEBRUARY, 2012]

The procedures by which citations are counted remain unknown to me. The counting takes place inside a black box. I input my search terms; it outputs a list deemed canonical to my inquiries. But where the canonical is counted in darkness, the non-canonical also remains behind the veil. This is very much in contrast to reading lists and edited collections. It is possible to see what is missing from these grouping. In bibliographies and contents pages, these texts explicitly set out their stall and what's missing can, to an extent, be assumed as that which goes unexpressed. And though I'm not privy to the conversations, meetings and negotiations which led to the production of their contents, I can at least imagine the spaces and times in which they took place. But citations,

> *they do not tell me who they are, what they're about, let alone how they work. Like course lists and edited collection they count only that which is legitimate. Yet there is no framing, no sense of what 'legitimate' means in their case. And where I cannot see their function – how they function, how they understand their task of 'counting' – I find it impossible to read the non-canon within their process. Where the rationale by which they 'count' cannot even be glimpsed, that which goes un-counted disappears from view. Indeed, it is only when a list of frequently cited texts are generated, after these algorithms have functioned to produce the canon, that the absent stands a half-chance of coming to the fore.*
>
> [MAY, 2012]

Within this case, within this image of the urban studies canon, where I pose the question *what is the city (what is it not)?* I can assure a claim for the answer: *space (time)*. But where the canonical is counted via citations, represented in edited collections and presented in course reading lists, different answers emerge. It is *that which is counted (that which cannot be seen)*; *the table of contents (the white gaps in between its lines)*; *the reference list (those texts absent and/or dismissed from the course coordinator's mind)*. Each and any answer that might occur is, then, but a single line within a much more important story of how the canon constructs the city through presence. And rather than name the city *as* space and *not* time, the *presence (absence)* of *spatial (temporal)* urban conceptualisations are perhaps better recognised as symptoms of the function of the *canonical (non-canonical)* within the text, within the mind, within research, within debate and within the counting of legitimate accounts. Indeed, it is across each of these realms that the *presence (absence)* of the city is maintained, and across each that a way must be paved for imagining the city not only temporally but via other absent facets of urban life which have no course to argue for their relevance; facets which are neither now, nor perhaps even in the future, counted let alone countable.

POWER, DOMINANCE AND SENSIBILITY

I came across no shortage of powerful, dominant, *sensible*, voices as I read the urban studies canon. But I was also quick recognise that the canon was not simply as a grouping of those voices or the texts in which they were heard. Rather, it appeared that the very act of grouping certain authors together rendered them *canonical*; their *dominance* was manufactured; the *sensibility* of their accounts was produced. As I myself grouped David Harvey, Jane Jacobs, Manuel Castells and Saskia Sassen as entry nodes for this research, finding and then naming them as relevant, I felt myself inadvertently issue cause for my reader to recognise them as dominant, dare I say *vital* as far as urban matters were

concerned. But even before that point, I sensed a similar process take place within the ranking of top universities.

> The Time Higher Eduction (THE) don't just measure top universities, they construct them. Indeed, it is their lists of the top 100 universities which serve to construct and maintain the dominance of those institutions.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 13 DECEMBER 2011]

Public acts of recognition, it seemed, bestowed a dominance and sensibility upon those things named as dominant and sensible, gifting an heightened power to those things in the process. This certainly appeared the case as I read Ida Susser's introduction to her subject, Manuel Castells, in her editorial of the *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory* (2002).

> Susser writes that Castells has produced three "encyclopaedic volumes", comprising a comprehensive theoretical framework which outlines "the development of an informational mode of production, which follows the industrial mode of production" (my emphasis). In this statement it occurs to me that Castells' ability to adopt a position from which to be recognised, and then for that recognition to take place by the independent third party, Susser, in some ways facilitates the dominance and sensibility of his ideas. Just like Harvey before him, Castells emphasises space as it relates to the urban. But far from it solely being the content of his account which extends the sensibility of his argument, it is his ability to adopt a speech position and for that position to be maintained at other visible points within that context that makes its sensibility all the more pronounced. Indeed, the comprehensive nature of his framework doesn't just describe the city but arguably works to construct it where his authority to speak and the fact that he has already spoken *sensibly* (at least as far as Susser has it) is taken into account. So what does he speak about and what is its effect? He makes his position clear: "[w]hat urban sociologists of the twenty-first century really need are new tool boxes (including conceptual tools) to take on the hard work necessary to research and understand the new relationships between space and society [...] systematic theorization [...] to be specifically focused on the study of cities and spatial processes" (Castells in Susser: 404, my emphasis). This at no point denounces the importance of time, it cannot be charged for that outright. And yet it equally does nothing to provoke a temporal imagination, let alone give permission for a researcher to look upon the city out with a spatial gaze. And so where the tradition of urban sociology is explicitly stated as a spatial one can Castells' power and position can be linked back to the absence of time? And to what extent is it the fact that Castells is who he is – that his position and dominance allows him not only write such a statement but for that statement to be heard – that makes his statement, and all that is contained and implied within it, all the more compelling?
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; SPREADSHEET; 17 AUGUST 2012]

Initially my urge was to *chase* those lines; to grasp the threads of the dominant accounts of urban life in order to track down the seeds of space's sensibility and time's silence. Indeed, within my own self I'd witnessed the power of the author's voice as I felt compelled to *fall in line* and recognise the sensible.

> The very fact that Harvey does not speak of the social construction and social production of time, the very fact that he is David Harvey, makes me worried that time is of no importance to urban matters. For he is, after all, Harvey *the great urbanist*, and surely if it was important he would be speaking of its absence? He would be making it *present*.
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 2; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 10 MAY 2012]

And yet dominance continued to be manufactured, sensibility continued to be produced, at points indirectly linked with an author's own vocalisation of their ideas and accounts.

> *Those "independent third parties" who recognise the dominant and sensible aren't really independent at all. Rather, they are just as connected to the discursive lifeworlds of which they speak, and to the power, dominance and sensibility contained within them. As such, many more questions must now be posed of the ways in which dominance and sensibility manifest in the urban studies canon. For example, [with regards the relationship between Castells and Susser] which effect is more heightened? Is it simply that Susser confirms Castells' position? Or in electing to advocate for a figure who is already recognised as important, in using her voice to speak in sensibly apposite ways, in associating herself with those accounts already marked as canonical, might the effect be better recorded as Susser establishing her own authority to speak?*
>
> [AUGUST, 2012]

In other areas of the canon too, I came to see dominance manufactured by association to that which was already dominant, and strategically so.

> *Prestige markers both indicate and maintain dominance, but their application is not straightforward in this regard. The Ivy league, for example, is connected to sport and the traditions of its members. It views such things as important and was established in order to group such things and make them recognisably so. The Ivy League is dominant because it's prestigious. The Russell Group, on the other hand, openly trades on research excellence, income generation and its links to business and public sectors. And arguably, recognising the added value and power bestowed by 'badges' such as The Ivy League, their strategy is one that manufactures prestige in order to become dominant. Both [The Ivy League and The Russell Group] can be accused of elitism; both manage to weave their way back to the market. But whilst The Ivy League might be*

recognised first and foremost as a 'badge of excellence' bestowed upon something considered excellent, the function of 'The Russell Group' is perhaps better stated as a self-fulfilling promotional tool, designed to tap-in to a dominance that was elsewhere established.

[MAY 2012]

> As I'm looking at the home pages on the websites of top universities from around the world I'm struck to the extent to which they resemble a trophy cabinet. Each displays their affiliations, prestige memberships and academic awards proudly. But is this excellence? Or does it just contribute to circular notions which strengthen and maintain the idea of *excellence* and the limited form it should take?
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 16 JANUARY 2012]

> It appears that in 2009 The Times Higher Education (THE) altered the way they score and rank top universities. "Our world rankings are hugely influential but also come under criticism every year, so we have decided to improve them" (Mroz, 2009), they reason. But what are they improving? They don't cite any failure of their old system; they haven't retracted any of their past results or listings. And all I'm left to see is influence: they are motivated to *improve* their enormous influence in the academic sector.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 13 DECEMBER 2012]

Power, I came to realise, was not contained and exercised through the texts of the urban studies canon; it did not reside within dominant and sensible accounts of the city. It was not neatly contained, linearly traceable nor individually associated, and its effects did not start and end with an individual text, author or institution. Rather, its presence, influence and effects were diffuse throughout the canonical assemblage. And even beyond the more obvious moments of grouping, recognising, speaking, measuring and associating, power, dominance and sensibility appeared to circulate ever more pervasively to decisively shape both the outward appearance of the urban studies canon, and its inward effects upon academic practice.

> What is the effect of the mimicry? What effect does the manufacture of prestige have on the activities of those institutions who assume it for themselves? Perhaps I need look no further to the establishment of the 1994 Group as a direct response to The Russell Group, as in this alone I can appreciate the manifest reality of the project for other institutions. It shapes their research and teaching [practices], setting new limits on the knowledge and realities they deem valuable to produce.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 16 JANUARY 2012]

> What of items [in the canon] where there appears a distinct difference to the dominant found elsewhere; where dominance isn't so much maintained, but in someways appears challenged? Because I'm seeing some things that just don't fit. They're present within the canon but they don't match up to the dominant ideas which fuel canonical activity. Feminism, gender, black and race studies appear quite often on the reading lists and edited collections. I'd add bell hooks, maybe even Jane Jacobs(!) to this list too. And what is the nature of their inclusion into the canon? Do they represent an alternative canon, an expanded canon, and anti-canon? Is this seeds of challenge I am witnessing? Or maybe this presence of the seemingly non-canonical within the canon speaks more of an affirmative action by inclusion. Rather than re-imagining the canonical limits of the city they are included strategically for their ability to ameliorate tension and critique.
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 22 MARCH 2012]

In this regard, my eventual question was not how space maintained its power, dominance and sensibility, but how power, dominance and sensibility collided to confer *truth* on certain logics of the city, allowing those logics to hide the Other by virtue of the collision. And far from tracking and mapping the effects flowing outward from dominant texts and notions, as I considered power, dominance and sensibility I came to recognise a much more pressing task.

> It's not the authors but their connections that confer dominance and sensibility upon certain ideas – connections which enable power to flow not only forward, but back and forth, and all around. The need, then, is to connect their texts to those points at which sensibility and dominance are produced and maintained within the urban studies canon, as many as possible, and continuously so.
>
> [AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; READING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 22 AUGUST 2012]

MATERIAL ENCOUNTERS

> The canon as corpus is solid. I see it in the books that line the shelves beside my desk. I find something concrete, *comforting* even in that notion. The canon as assemblage, on the other hand. I get it. I know why it's important. But it seems somewhat otherworldly. It is more of an abstract, theoretical construct and leaves me nothing to hold, turn over in my hands – nothing to see, feel or smell. Is there anything solid I can take from it at all?
>
> [AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; ENTERING THE CANON; JOURNAL 1; 11 JANUARY 2012]

Despite early difficulties in finding a tangibility in the canon as *assemblage* I was to find plenty of concrete, and important links to make. It was a conceptual device, yes, but one that nonetheless told of very real, manifest relationships. There were networks of power

and privileged identities existing within past and present iterations of the urban studies canon. A colonial Britishness, for example, resounded in my lists of top universities.

> [As I'm working to find what *top* universities to approach for reading lists of their urban studies' degree programmes] I've come across something much more interesting. There is a Cambridge, London and (New)York, to name a few, on both sides of the pond. It seems that many high ranking universities can be traced back to British settler states. Anglo-American/post-colonial. There is a privileged gaze that constructs the modern academic field, and that gaze emerged from a very specific material context, from very specific points in history and geography. In this sense, these shared names suggest much more than just a shared language, but hint at shared practices, traditions, cultures, and so on. And in these much broader affects the 'privileged gaze' is arguably no longer simply a remnant of the past, but actively constructs present and future ways of academic working in very particular and material ways.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 DECEMBER 2011]

The dominance that circulated within the canon as *assemblage* was no longer confined to the abstract, but could be named and counted. I'd found cause to recognise the broad, historical sharing of culture in solid, geographical terms. And not only was this something that I might trace back through time, but noting its effects in the present, I also imagined it marching forth into the future. Beyond the historical linages of the modern university I also recognised the sharing of culture in more individual terms, in the relationships that authors held with one another.

> There are some relationships that go beyond author, reader and contemporary within these texts. Harvey, for example, references Erik Swyngedouw, who I seem to recall was himself a doctoral student of Harvey's. Swyngedouw's studentship does not dictate that his arguments be identical to Harvey's, nor even that they follow a similar form. Harvey and Swyngedouw of course retain their academic freedoms to perform different analyses of urban issues, to come up with different solutions to urban problems. But it nonetheless seems important to recognise that these things are happening within the same universe. And where Harvey and Swyngedouw navigate their work by way of a similar language, a similar code, and similar points (all mediated of course through a relationship imbued with hierarchical power) perhaps this freedom is not really freedom at all, but a limited sphere of consent in which permissible readings of the city unfold along paradigmatic lines.
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 3; SPREADSHEET; 16 MAY 2012]

Beyond the texts [of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen's], there are other ways in which their relationships with one another, and other dominant authors, maintain specific lines of enquiry. In

a very real sense they not only share ideas through text but in coming together in person. Castells, for example, informs his reader that Saskia Sassen reported some of her research findings to him "over a glass of Argentinean wine". Susser writes about an interdisciplinary session that was attended by Castells, Sassen, Mollenkopf, Soja, The Fainsteins...

[OCTOBER, 2012]

> How many of the top urban academics are married? Sassen and Sennett come prominently to mind – they've in many ways sewn up a large part of 'the city' in their seminal texts. To what extent does the trajectory and temporality of an academic career promote proximate working with one's spouse and other close companions? To what extent does proximate working engender closeness, allowing more personal relationships to flourish? And to what extent is it *this* which writes the city?
>
> [SASSEN (1991); READING 3; NOTEBOOK; 16 OCTOBER 2012]

... and in this sense the production of knowledge does not remain solely within the 'professional' relationships sanctioned for academic activities, but like business deals concluded on the golf course, practices of knowledge making are perhaps most prolific out with academic office hours and university buildings. They take place in social gatherings and closed events; around the dinner table, over weekends, and even perhaps late at night when drifting off to sleep. And where 'ways of seeing' are established not only within texts and 'working' practices, but within the mundane activities of the everyday, no longer does the idea that an ability to speak sensibly of the city is based on an objectively defined authority. Where knowledge of the city is performed and constructed by academics out with the institutional setting, where academic ideas become canonised in ways that are not immediately visible, the sites at which we engage with the dominance of some ideas whilst others are confined to silence, must accordingly be adjusted.

[OCTOBER, 2012]

In such relationships I could not help but come back to the cultures, histories and traditions transmitted through proximate things. York became *New* York, Cambridge was a city in Massachusetts. And where names were shared, so too, I considered, were cultures. But what was shared and to what extent?

> What does the close proximity (professionally and/or personally) with Others *like* ourselves imply? Do such relationships reinforce views; do they help reify certain things; do they prevent us seeing beyond the diversity of our most immediate Others?
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 20 AUGUST 2012]

> *It seems somewhat obvious to state, yet I will do so anyway, that these individuals [Harvey, Castells and Lefebvre] between them hold many of the components of the contemporary urban studies canon, fluid and changeable though it may be. But they are only three voices, theirs are only three accounts of the city. Much could be laboured about the non-representativeness of their identity, with assertions being cast as to their gender, education, class, race, ideological and political positions, etc. But so obvious is this that it seems more important to simply state that not only do they get to describe the city by their own accounts, they define and narrow the available parameters in which others can speak meaningfully of urban problems; others who fall into both similar and different categories of being, often moving also between.*
>
> [FEBRUARY, 2013]

With *ways of seeing* performed and enacted not only within the texts of the canon but far beyond their pages, I felt the canon as *assemblage* at its most tangible and understandable. Culture(s) played an unparalleled role in the accounts that were produced.

> *Accepting the group culture that could potentially develop within such proximate relationships, it may also be the case that a particular way of conceptualising the urban is shared amongst these authors. In Castells' case, there are a number of things that can be gleaned. It seems that his experiences in exile shaped his analysis of urban movements. 'The Urban Question', for example, emerged from his development of a methodological training program. His ethnographic tradition emerges because he feels the need of 'going beyond class': "in each case he is more concerned to document urban struggles in their full historical context than to find underlying class explanations as the roots of a diverse group of effective and social movements" (Susser, 2002: 8). Much of Castells' work on the city, be it a conceptual framework or methodological approach, derive from what he's seen and what he's looking to see. Similarly, this appears a decisive element of Jacobs' and Sassen's careers too. Jacobs' detailed account of the city derives from her day-to-day experience of 'her' city, the presentation of which is at odds with the prevailing logic. Sassen, who is fluent in five languages and travelled the world as a child, perhaps 'sees' the importance of being able to understand the processes and impacts of urbanisation at a global level.*
>
> [FEBRUARY, 2013]

And at its most relevant, this point led me not only to consider the conditions under which an author's take on the city continually evolved via *ways of life* and *ways of seeing*, but how such proclivities, forged through shared experiences with proximate and similar Others, tended towards a culture of time that made matters of urban temporality a more or less present concern.

> *There is a temporal logic that comes through strongly in each of these texts. Harvey, for example, positions himself linearly, in relation to the past. Jacobs lives in the here and now. Castells lives somewhat in the future. Not content with historical critique he feels an urge to imagine the ways in which such things prescribe the urban environs for decades to come. And in titling her text 'The Global City: London, New York and Tokyo', urban time for Sassen is something already overcome in our ability to maintain twenty-four hour trading practices across a spatial scale. Moreover, the language developed and coded between Harvey, Castells and Sassen in particular, is largely one in which time is conquered. Time is not up for grabs, nor does it need to be. These discourses, whilst never explicitly undermining time, nonetheless serve to stifle any recognition of its social construction. And what is perhaps more concerning is that it is within these temporal frames that each of these authors conceptualise their own practices, frames which in turn establish the parameters for sensibility and with it the limits of their own and their readers' urban imaginations.*
>
> [FEBRUARY, 2013]

As I recognised this contiguity between everyday experience and the categories made available for analysis, I turned away from the canon and looked to myself as an urban scholar. I asked: *what ideas does my embodied, day-to-day existence made possible to think? And to what extent do these experiences allow me to materialise alternative spaces and spatialities, alternative times and temporalities, within my work?* And in posing such questions of myself, I of course could not separate my thoughts from my relations with Others.

> There is a section [in 'The Network Society'] when Castells describes business men who commonly stay in the same beige hotel rooms, regardless of where they are in the world. This, he remarks, is part of the codified culture of business and is understood by business people as such. I wonder the extent to which academics share a similar code and a similar language; one that in turn suggests their sharing of a similar temporal logic? And so what *type* are the academics and how are they (and their temporalities) shaped by the work of producing knowledge in the contemporary academy? Where in-depth, highly nuanced and longitudinal modes of research, for example, are not seen as strategically viable in terms of career progression and notions of academic excellence (may not produce materially implementable solutions; would not speak to international agendas, could take too long to produce results), a broader turn away from methods that have the capacity to record temporal heterogeneity might also be taking place. And how does this further fuel the temporality of those who do the understanding, researching and writing of the city through institutions so closely aligned with the time of the clock? And perhaps more crucially, how do their temporalities compare with those who are the subjects of their accounts: the urban Others? I know from my own experience, and from my familiarity with those around me (at various scales of an academic career), time functions differently here [in the academy] than in

> other quarters of the city. I can call to mind many examples around working weekends; working to (oftentimes competing) project and teaching deadlines; difficulties in getting diaries to 'line-up'; stress levels which are weekly, monthly and seasonally variable; mixing of holiday time with working time at academic conferences; traveling across time zones for research and networking, and so on. And of course some of these experiences share aspects with other modes of urban living: the accountant, the lawyer, the business person, for example. But nonetheless, the academic appears a particular breed who, like any individual, inhabits a temporal logic, partly peculiar to their own lived experience of work. And in this sense, the canon must be conceived in terms of the relationships it crafts and holds between proximate Others. We must ask: what cultures of time are buoyant within such associations, and therefore maintained not only within texts, but as we circulate with Others who are not unlike ourselves? Indeed, if everyday material experience does have a role in shaping the ways in which we further experience, conceptualise and write about our subjects, then the temporal logics found in dominant spheres of academic activity are by no means secondary to questions over the (non)presence of time within these texts. Rather, these are, perhaps, the most essential.
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 20 AUGUST 2012]

WRITING SOLO, WITH OTHERS

> For quite some time I've had this feeling that my writing in this work is not my own, but is framed, and significantly so, by those around me. There are of course things which make *me* take pen to paper, things that *I* choose to speak of. But when it comes to tying those impulses together in writing I write not necessarily for myself but for my supervisors; I write not in monologue but in dialogue with those things I agree and disagree; I write not by myself but embed my words in the language and themes of debates elsewhere established. I wonder the extent to which the context in which I write holds just as much claim to the authorship of my work as I do.
>
> [AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; DESIGNING METHODS; JOURNAL 1; 10 OCTOBER 2011]

I've been aware of the Other in the production of my work from early on in this PhD project, one reason, perhaps, why it came as no surprise that the Other should similarly populate the texts of the urban studies canon. At points both visible and invisible, I came to discern the presence of Others in many texts and in many forms.

> *In her acknowledgements [in 'The Global City'] Sassen expresses gratitude for the assistance she received during the research and writing of the text, pointing to some individuals by name; others, by the many research roles necessary for the achievement her project. And there is further evidence of these individuals throughout the text, sometimes explicitly so when she writes 'we', for example, instead of 'I'. But beyond these obvious recognitions there are other voices to be found within this text. When she characterises Part Three of her inquiry as "admittedly provocative", there seems a*

hesitance in her articulation. Could this perhaps be in relation to the audience she anticipates? And though their voices may remain manifestly silent within the closed quarters of the text, I've no doubt that Sassen's anticipated audience is of much greater influence to the broader production of her work. In contrast, Castells writes not 'with' or 'for' others, but 'against' others he views of a particular tradition. And this is just as pivotal to his telling of the city. Indeed, it seems that his rejection of what has gone before – of Marxist concerns with class and Lefebvre's account of the production of space – leads strongly to his own re-imagined spatial analysis, 'The Space of Flows', in his treatise 'The Rise of the Network Society'.

[JANUARY, 2013]

Writing, therefore, appeared not as the self-contained process one might have imagined it to be, but occurred always in conversation to what came before, what was present, what might come after. And as such, I came to consider that the potential to produce the city through one conversational line and not another, revealed framing tendencies that were as canonical as those produced concretely upon the page. However, what I hadn't anticipated was the extent to which *Writing Solo, With Others*, crafted not only present and future accounts, but strongly reshaped the past.

While Harvey doesn't explicitly name Lefebvre in the text [From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism], the context by which Harvey comes to the city reveals Lefebvre a strong influence in his work. Indeed, Harvey cites Lefebvre in other seminal texts, such as 'The Right to the City' (2008) and 'Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference' (1996). And with the ideas contained within these easy to link back to this text, and this time, the connection between Harvey and Lefebvre is available for all to see. But as I look more closely to the sparks of influence between Harvey and Lefebvre, I not only appreciate the ways in which Lefebvre shapes Harvey's accounts of the city, and Harvey's accounts shape the work of future scholars as they posit their own accounts and critiques in response. But Harvey also performs a significant re-imagining upon that which came before; that which was already written. The story is of course more commonly presented as Harvey uncovering the 'lost' work of Lefebvre; re-positioning it to a rightful prominence in urban studies. However, the correspondence between the contemporary rediscovery of Lefebvre's thoughts to Lefebvre's original work is not quite as straightforward. As Luke Butcher implies, perhaps too many words have been placed in Lefebvre's mouth (2011). And what this brings more fully to the fore is not the influence of Lefebvre on Harvey's work, but Harvey's influence on Lefebvre's accounts in a way that linear understandings of temporality cannot and must not be left to account for.

[FEBRUARY, 2013]

Writing, I realised, not only occurred in a forward trajectory, forged within the conversations an author found themselves in the present, but it also involved a re-articulation and re-construction of past Others, whoever they may be. There was nothing linear to such processes. Indeed, the past is not contained there, but was made to emerge continuously as an order of the present. And in this, what I ultimately came to realise was that the urban studies canon I'd been able to name as the texts of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen, was better appreciated as the conversational streams that tied and re-tied those authors to the past, present and future. For it was these streams that made visible not only the ways in which an author's productions are informed by the context from which they write, but how their productions, in turn, hold just as much influence upon that context.

THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is valued in the modern academy. *Good* and therefore *valuable* knowledge is often recognised where the labels *truth*, *valid*, *justifiable*, and so on, can readily be applied. And when placed, such judgements might be considered paramount to deciding what texts, what *knowledge*, is allowed to freely circulate and populate the canon. Yet as I worked to discern the canonical texts of urban studies I came to see that a text's correspondence with *truth* was not the only value judgment which gave form to the canon. Rather more pivotal was an external, non-intellectual view of value that was elsewhere determined. I'd had a number of early clues to this, including a conversation with the *University of Glasgow's* subject librarian about difficulties I'd been having in obtaining reading lists from top urban studies degree programmes.

> I suppose I hadn't really thought about any potential difficulties in accessing course reading lists, I think because my own recollection of them was as temporary documents: necessary for the duration of a course, but to be filed away upon completion, perhaps for future use, perhaps in the bottom of a drawer. But the librarian has made me realise that the *reading list* has a greater value than I've attributed. Her suggestion that my difficulty in obtaining them [from the course coordinators of top urban studies degree programmes] might be down to the fact that they are perceived as intellectual property, is certainly telling. In fact, I've obviously had an implicit sense of this for sometime or I'd have never even have considered looking at reading lists in order to discern the canon.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 17 FEBRUARY 2012]

As I grew more familiar with the descriptions of edited collections citation indexes, I again recognised a language and sensibility that appeared to chime much more freely with property, business, markets and economics, than it did my anticipated notions of academic value.

> What does it suggest when [the publisher] Blackwell describes its *Companion to the City* collections as a "blue chip" item? Does this speak of the knowledge that is contained within it? Or is this about a *value* that doesn't align with knowledge at all, but something else? Am I in fact better to recognise this not as a description of the product but as a marketing strategy designed to stamp an alternative, more appealing notion of value on these texts?
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 FEBRUARY 2012]

> There is competition visible as far as the counting of citations go. SCOPUS and Web of Knowledge (WoK) each compete to prove they do it better. They trade on their self-proclaimed strengths, whilst hinting at their competitors' weaknesses. And the fact that they can even make these comparisons suggests that they *work* differently. This is, perhaps, the strongest indication that their job isn't just the *counting* of knowledge. And what their job might be I don't quite know, but there appears to be a lot more going on than simple counting.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 25 JANUARY 2012]

> [The citation indexes recognise that] things external to the content of *knowledge* shapes its value. Social media buzz, for example, appears to be a prominent measure. How far removed this seems from notions of *good* research and *true* knowledge. And yet, having now spent sometime sifting through these indexes, trying to get to grips with how they function to produce the canon, I really cannot say that I'm surprised that *influence* is credited as a gold standard as far as knowledge goes, because it's really not about knowledge at all, but rather, how far it has the capacity to travel.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 12 JANUARY 2012]

As I looked to the structures which formed and maintained the urban studies canon, any sense I held that *knowledge* for *knowledge's sake* might at least fuel the forward production of academic knowledge was also abruptly halted.

> Citation indexes may not measure absolute citation counts but they certainly correspond with something, something that is of great value in the modern academy. Bibliometric methods and citation analyses, for example, are to be rolled-out more widely in the REF. I read recently that some panels will make use of citation counts in place of peer-review in their assessment of excellence (REF, 2011). And yet the REF's idea of what citations measure appears just as

> vague as mine: "Where sub-panels make use of citation data, it will be made available to them as follows: (a) The REF team will procure a single source of citation data that provides a good level of coverage" (REF, 2011, my emphasis). What "single source"? What "good level of coverage"? Sources and coverage of what?! When it's gotten to this stage I more convinced than ever that citations don't simply indicate the dominant literature, they manufacture it.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 6 MARCH 2012]

> *Business logics not only determine what is canonical at a given moment but appear to fuel the production of knowledge within the modern academy. From those practices which surround the canonisation of certain ideas, texts and authors, however, it becomes easier to see the movement of knowledge within this sphere, and with this, to then ask some questions of its momentum. There is indeed a business to the production of knowledge, but what effect does this have? And where the value of knowledge is not held in its content but in adjacent factors, how are we to understand knowledge and our role in producing it? For one thing it seems that the 'knowledge-business' not only shapes the types of knowledge that are produced, but also that which is possible.*
>
> [MAY, 2012]

Knowledge, it seemed, was far from prime currency in the academy. Rather, both the canon and the activities of judging the canonical were shaped elsewhere, and by, I came to realise, a logic which bore a striking resemblance to that which fuelled another definitive marker of the contemporary urban experience: *clock time*. Recognising this, two questions were quick to form within my mind: where knowledge is valued in line with *clock time* (a) what types of knowledge are (im)possible to produce?; and (b) how does this connect to the absence of time's heterogeneity within the academy and in everyday life? And though it was not answers that followed, a fertile ground in which my questions bred ever more questions proved telling of the less visible roles that the canon played in establishing and reifying its dominant views.

> Both SCOPUS and WoK seem to deal more with journal articles than books. Why is it that social science knowledge is packaged and sold in this way in the academy? Does it link it to a necessary sphere of economic activity? Is it easier to regulate? Or perhaps it's a hold over from the science disciplines, where the journal article holds more sway. And what does this do to the accounts on offer? When I think about the book, its knowledge unfolds in a different manner than the article. The article stands as the more digestible account. Time is present in the familiar guise of *tell me quick*. The book, on the other hand, arguably encourages a deeper and more prolonged engagement. It remains more visible across our lifespan; left to sit upon the shelf as witness to our daily activities, as we continue to witness its presence. The article, on the other hand, has its

> presence in a more temporary form, more often than not via the computer screen, or perhaps printed, marked-up and then filed away. And within these differences I feel myself making a case for attributing the absence of time's plurality to the power that citation indexes have in valuing knowledge. Indeed, their tendencies for counting journal articles more prevalently than books is not benign at all, but arguably fuels a trend towards this mode of academic communication. And with different mediums of knowledge valued differently, and higher valued mediums becoming dominant, I recognise not simply *what* they count but the activity of counting citations as itself canonical. And what becomes of knowledge where it changes its material form of choice? What is at stake where WoK, SCOPUS and Google provide data of the canon to me, pre-analysed, leading me to read that data in a particular way? They control not only the transmission but the interpretation. Ideology does not simply populate the text but lurks ominously in the assemblage. And that's truly what's at stake in all of this: the limits and delimitations that are placed upon knowledge and thought by vehicles that do not even allow their functions to be glimpsed let alone challenged.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 14 MARCH 2012]

The REF values knowledge at its highest when it speaks internationally. And the cycle of the REF determines a finite window, during which that knowledge is at its most valuable. Each of these things detract from time. The international element arguably positions research at a macro-spatial level. There is not a great deal of scope for difference, let alone temporal difference to come through here. And where the research cycles of universities, and the academics within them, are dictated by the REF to quite a large extent, it is of course a 'clock time' that dominates. I cannot imagine that many allowances exist within this for an alternative temporality to emerge within academic life, let alone within the texts that are produced through the embedded, day-to-day temporality of the modern academic.

[FEBRUARY, 2013]

> [When I asked the subject librarian how I might get a hold of past editions of edited collections] she mentioned that standard practice was now to dispose of old, and middle editions of texts, and to only keep stock of first and newest editions. This was, she explained, in order to save valuable shelf *space* within the library. This is but a small example, and I'm not about to draw the conclusion of space's dominance to time's marginalisation from this alone. Nonetheless, that call to *save space* at the expense of maintaining the temporality of the text is based on something, and that something shapes the form of knowledge allowed as meaningful. And this suggests something about how institutional practice links to knowledge in the city; how the marginalisation of time may stem from a a seemingly unrelated need to *save space*; and how that may in turn serve to *hide* alternative theorisations. What would a world be like with only first and current editions, I wonder? What does that say about the interim? Where our witness to the temporal evolution of a text is annihilated by spatial privilege, does this implicitly yet powerfully suggest that only the start and end *products* are of

> importance; that *process* and the development of thought are no longer relevant objects for examination?
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 17 FEBRUARY 2012]

FROM LANGUAGE TO PRESENTATION, METHOD AND PEDAGOGY

Neither the canonical nor the making of it are contained solely within a text. Across multiple spheres of academic activity, the canonical is performed, practiced and strengthened. As I recognised the extent to which *language* maintained the canonical presentations of space and time, however, I initially found it difficult to refocus my attention away from the page, and onto other proximate streams of canon formation.

> I find Castells' chapter on *Timeless Time* a much easier read than *Space of Flows*, and I can't help thinking this is down to the fact that the language of time is not as technical as the language of space. And this makes sense I suppose – space, as an urban concept, has been explored in greater depth so there exists more words to talk about it with.
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 2; NOTEBOOK; 13 AUGUST 2012]

> Looking to the frequency with which words occur [in the contents, descriptions and blurbs of edited collections], many instances of *space*, *spatial*, *spatiality*, *spatialisation* are revealed. In contrast, there exist very few inclusions of *time*, let alone the corresponding variants, *temporal*, *temporality* and *temporalization*. Moreover, the language of space goes beyond its directly associated terms – it is a *place*, a *process*, a *description*, a *type*. A more nuanced language of time, however, doesn't appear to exist within collections of canonical texts. Time is *just time*, and I feel that this adds strongly to the sense that time is natural – you can't do anything with it. The contingency of space, on the other hand, is right there on the page, manifest in the range of language that is available for its engagement.
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 6 FEBRUARY 2012]

> *Something which illustrates the way in which time is limited is the narrowness of the language available for engagement. But again, this language doesn't just reflect the research and engagement that has taken place to date, but also conditions future engagement in a number of ways. For example, in Sassen's text ['The Global City'] space once again commands a privileged presence. And while it may be borrowed from elsewhere it certainly appears reaffirmed within her text. Moreover, the relative spread between the prominence of this spatial language and those very few points at which time is explicitly manifest suggests that the availability of a temporal urban discourse is lacking not only in this text, but arguably from those it drew its impetus and in those which it has itself impelled. Indeed, the heightened presence of a spatial discourse juxtaposed beside a more marginal temporal one further cements space as a concern in the imagination of the reader, whilst the range of its vocabulary makes it clear that it can take many forms, crafting it as*

> *contingent in the process. In contrast, the relative lack of language available to discuss time makes it all the more naturalised. In this sense, the development of the language of space is also the development of the mythology of it, and inevitably the mythology of time if we are to accept that there is a relationship between the two.*
>
> [FEBRUARY 2013]

Language, as anticipated, was highly significant. Gradually, however, I began to recognise ways in which space maintained its presence not just in vocabulary, but via the descriptive approaches adopted to *write the city*. Of particular note was a tacit presentation of space in accounts which *told* the city, compared to a tacit presence of time where an author instead *showed* the city through their work.

> *Harvey, Castells and Sassen 'tell' their readers of the urban. They privilege facts and conceptual schemas, to the extent that sometimes I require another book to read their accounts; I need a 'key' to code myself into their descriptions. But even when I have this, their urban environments do not propagate freely in my mind. Rather, laden with direction, even when my thoughts are given half a chance to gestate away from the narratives championed the fast and purposeful movement from one point to the next carries me along, attempting to fix their 'truths' for me. In contrast, Jacobs' descriptions populate the city with people, and the resulting effect could not be more different. Far from being cast within a conceptual realm, the city is revealed a living, breathing, fluid entity. It is a performance and at no place in 'Death and Life' is this more obvious than in the section most anthologised, 'Sidewalk Ballet'. This piece unfolds through the minutiae of everyday, city life, but displays an evocative sincerity that somehow transforms the mundane into something vital in the process. It doesn't leave me cold, perplexed or alienated. I am not reaching for another book in my collection to 'make sense' of the framework within which it speaks. I am not simply to accept it and move on. But rather, in reading 'Death and Life' I've no option but to experience Jacobs' city for myself, and my mind is left to freely wander as I fill-in and contrast her account with elements from my own urban experience. Across each of the authors, neither space nor time have a necessary presence in their descriptions. Nonetheless, they are infused into their descriptive endeavours. The macro-spatial theories, concepts, statistics and historical critiques which fill the texts of Harvey, Castells and Sassen, for example, describe fixed snapshots in time and by doing so they spatialise time in the city. Whilst in Jacobs, describing instead the organically unfolding pace of everyday life, a more heterogeneous time is made visible for all to see.*
>
> [FEBRUARY 2013]

Beyond this, I also came to realise that these contrasting acts of description did not simply relate to space and time, but to the traditions of wider academic practice.

> I don't think that the [descriptive] difference in Jacobs' work speaks only to her writing preference, but the fact that it stands out as remarkable probably says a lot more about our common ways of communicating in the academy. Be it the text, paper, conference panel or seminar, each of these mediums asks us to argue for something; to pick a position and erect it in a finite space and time. There isn't a lot of room left for *just showing* and letting the audience interpret in such encounters. And even when there is, a meta-narrative frequently runs alongside to explain which parts are significant and why that is the case.
>
> [JACOBS (1961); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 28 JUNE 2012]

And as I considered these contrasts further, leaving the texts more fully to consider what other practices I might link back to the canonisation of *the urban*, I began to see not only a preference for one style over another, but methods of research that appeared to lead authors inevitably toward specific descriptive tendencies.

> The specialisation of a spatial vocabulary can be also be seen in the advancement of ways to measure and produce the city spatially. In the articles which dominate the lists I've generated from edited collections and citations counts, I find frequent reference to *new* and *advanced* methodological techniques – GIS [Geographic Information System] methods, for example, and other mapping techniques. And the descriptions of space which accompany these *advancements* are similarly advanced, more commonly defined as *scale*, *segregation* and *locality*. Spatial engagement with the city is now so complete that it is specialised to the point where it is no longer necessary to describe an approach as a *spatial* one. How very far we have advanced down the arboreal line.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 8 FEBRUARY 2012]

> *Perhaps the most crucial question here is how description links back and forth to method. How and in what ways do the large scale methodological practices of Harvey, Castells and Sassen connect to their macro-spatial descriptions which emerge alongside an argumentative use of statistics and historical critique? But such links between description and method don't simply pit spatial research against temporal research, for time can of course be measured. Hours worked and wages earned in one part of the city can be contrasted with another part; the time it takes to do the school run can be compared to the average commuting time to work. These measurements, and specifically the very fact that time is 'measured', are already indicative of a very particular type of time: one that is fixed and spatialised. Look again to the time that 'is' present in Castells and Harvey: it's measurable time. And so what is of concern here is whether their projects would have been able to capture any other types of time through their method; whether it was even possible for them to 'see' within their data a time and temporality contingent and more nuanced in nature.*
>
> [FEBRUARY 2013]

> *Jacobs' fight is for a way of life. It is her culture that is at stake, not her academic reputation. She writes differently because she is coming from a different place, and accordingly, her choice of method also differs [from Harvey, Castells and Sassen's]. Her autoethnographic methodological approach (though it is not named as such) is laid out in the introduction: "So in this book we shall start, if only in a small way, adventuring in the real world ourselves. The way to get at what goes on in the seemingly mysterious and pervasive behaviour of cities is, I think, to look closely, and with as little previous expectation as is possible, at the most ordinary scenes and events, and attempt to see what they mean and whether any thread of principles do emerge among them" (23). And this autoethnographic approach is also carried forth in her descriptions. She makes the city sensible to her reader by writing of the ways in which she makes sense of the city for herself. Revealing that it is the act of "Mr. Goldstein arranging the coils of wire which proclaim the hardware store is open" speaks strongest not of the hardware store nor Mr. Goldstein, but of the subjective, experiential manner by which her accounts unfold. Likewise, it is not the fact that she puts her bin out and exchanges glances with her neighbours, but the fact that she is conscious of this fact, notices it, and then considers it important enough to make manifest within her text, that is significant. It is not the language of the text which populates Jacobs' city with people instead of concepts; it is not its language that favours a heterogenous time over one that is fixed and spatialised. Rather, in her text's descriptive form and in the methods she chooses to record it, such things echo prominently to resonate through its pages and populate the mind of her reader.*
> [AUGUST 2012]

Language, description and method: tendencies for each of these things were secured by the canon, maintaining it through their ongoing practice. Their form and influence, however, were not immediately apparent to me, but emerged only when I was able to contrast the more typical approaches of Harvey, Castells and Sassen to Jacobs' alternative way of writing, describing and recording the city. And in *Death and Life*, I was also to find one final entry point into processes by which the canonical was performed and strengthened: through pedagogic practice.

> [In introducing *Death and Life*] Jacobs' describes the common use of Boston's "North End" as a case study exercise: "The North End is thus a recurring assignment for Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard planning and architectural students, who now and again pursue, under the guidance of their teachers, the paper exercise of converting it into super-blocks and park promenades, wiping away its non-conforming uses, transforming it to an ideal order and gentility so simple it could be engraved on the end of the pin" (10). Such exercises I certainly remember from my Masters degrees – thought experiments with existing sites, the purpose being to make them better (under an assumption that they are broken to begin with). As students we are taught to play, but in a way that leads to being *educated*. We are socialised, institutionalised

> and indoctrinated into good practice with nary the credit given for what intuition, creativity and alternative ways of seeing might bring to the process. Indeed, how the city *can* be seen is largely inconsequential given that such courses [as Jacobs describes] teach students how to *see*. It is here, then, that both the relative absence of time within teaching materials and the methods by which students are taught to train their inquiries, serve to sever the temporal further. And by methods, I am not simply thinking about the tools of interviews, surveys, mapping exercises (though these are of course important), rather, what I'm trying to get at is the broader methodological approach to the urban that is taught; the philosophical traditions and degrees of reflexivity encouraged. Where the canon is presented largely as fact, and it is accompanied by a methodological tradition that seeks to train rather that provoke intrigue, then it is left all the more dominant for it. Indeed, the manner in which the classroom has the potential to accompany a student into practice is also captured by Jacobs when she recalls a conversation shared with a friend: "Here was a curious thing. My friend's instincts told him the North End was a good place, and his social statistics confirmed it. But everything he had learned as a physical planner about what is good for people and good for city neighbourhoods, everything that made him an expert, told him the North End had to be a bad place" (20). And from this I can only conclude that processes of learning and teaching, informing others and re-informing ourselves, matter greatly in the search for time. These behavioural activities that sit at the heart of imagining the city are also the making of cities as they are carried forth. And in this sense, the *expert* is a site to examine not simply for their external power to *make* the city, but in the internal powers which shape their tendencies as they do so. Indeed, often the expert is paid not for their capacity to re-imagine but for an application of knowledge, already learnt. It must be asked, then, the extent to which this role causes the expert to revert to their training and official learning practices as they share their knowledge? Do acts of knowledge delivery lead to cautious behaviours on the part of experts, censoring out what other eyes may see? Is there too much personally at stake for them (reputation, getting paid, getting repeat jobs, etc.) to question their apparently tried and tested analyses? And indeed, perhaps there is no real incentive for them to imagine things differently – nowhere up from expert, only down if you show yourself to be fallible. As Jacobs herself notes: "they are all in the same stage of elaborately learned superstition [...] just so in the pseudo science of city rebuilding and planning, years of learning and a plethora of subtle and complicated dogma have arisen on a foundation of nonsense. The tools of technique have steadily been perfected. Naturally, in time, forceful and able men, admired administrators, having swallowed the initial fallacies and having been provisioned with tools and with public confidence, go on logically to the greatest destructive excesses, which prudence or mercy might previously have forbade" (21).
>
> [JACOBS (1961); READING 4; SPREADSHEET; 22 JUNE 2012]

It is not only the explicit, but in that which is implied and tacit it is necessary to ask after the processes of canonisation. In relation to language, description, method and pedagogy: what do they allow us to see?; who is present?; who is active?; who has the potential to be active?; what questions are possible to pose? With regards to language, there is more available to describe and

debate space in, making space all the more contingent and flexible, leaving time to appear comparatively fixed and naturalised. Language moreover allows us to bring that which is static on the page to life in the minds of the reader. This again may convey an open, fluid, rhythmic and temporally contingent encounter of urban life, or it may construct the city with reference to fixed, spatial point that renders the city as a process, a concept or as something connected to the global economy. And each evokes a response of not only how one 'should' engage, but limits the sense of how they 'can' engage. Indeed, in language and description, the methods used to arrive at the presentations of the city are also visible, and in this sense, the evolution of a particular paradigm not only makes space visible to the researcher, but it spatialises that which is not space, making invisible that which cannot be held within its conceptual framework in the process. And when attention returns to the classroom and the dissemination of knowledge to future urban scholars, it is not simply content but the instructions and exercises by a student learns their craft that shape the possibility for thought. Such activities can lead us not only to truth but to ways of seeing and recognising both truth and apparent falsehood. In each of these academic activities the canonical is made, constructing the non-canonical as it goes. And in this case, in urban studies, as dominant linguistic, descriptive, methodological and pedagogical practices are disseminated into the field, the (non)canonical presentations of space and time are perpetuated ever further.

[FEBRUARY, 2013]

ABRIDGEMENT

Throughout my reading of the canon something curious appeared to linger: the presence of the non-canonical.

> Jacobs' method [in *Death and Life*] allows her to see time. This method seems very similar to that which I've termed autoethnography in my own work. And this text is, for all intents and purposes, dominant and canonical. She suggests that people draw on their own realities when reflecting on their city, that they "listen, linger and think" about what they see. In her introduction, she actively instructs people to use their own illustrations. At no point does she demand of her reader that their city should be as hers is. And while she makes no explicit statement of the salience of time's contingency to matters of the urban, a heterogeneous temporal rhythm fills her work nonetheless, oozing forth from her descriptions of everyday urban life. Hers is a reality of the urban that is notably lacking in many of the disciplines less dominant texts, so how is it that Jacobs' accounts have come to inhabit a canonical stage when so many of its central traits remain silent?
>
> [JACOBS (1961); READING 2; NOTEBOOK; 11 JUNE 2012]

> It is important for me to state as clearly as possible that time is not absent in Harvey's account of the city. It appears both conceptually and categorically relevant throughout many of his texts. For example, his discussions of time in

> *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (1990) and *Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination* (1990) recognise the productive capacity of time to construct normative modes of culture. And in the latter of those, Harvey actually points to a shift in acceptable modes of temporality in the academy. Reminiscing that in the past the publication of two books would have been considered something of a great achievement he notes that today's academic career demands a more numerous textual output for success. Surely this hints at the way in which a shifting conception of temporality leads to a shift in institutional practice, and vice versa, and doesn't this get at least somewhere close to the relevance of time for matters of urban culture?
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 9 MAY 2012]

Time has had a varying level of presence in Harvey and Jacobs, but the manner in which it has manifested has been very different to space. I never had to go looking for space, it grabbed my attention. But time, for the most part, was something I had to excavate via the connections these texts held with other texts and contexts. In this sense, given the extent to which I actively sought moments of time's presence, my finding of it is not surprising. And yet my reading of Castells has been rather different. [In 'The Rise of the Network Society'] time largely 'found me'. 'Time' was so central to this text that it demanded for itself a dedicated chapter ['Timeless Time'], whilst it also flitted in and out of Castells' spatial account of the city in [the chapter] 'Space of Flows'.

[FEBRUARY 2013]

How was it that the non-canonical was present within the canon yet never elevated to the canonical? What might account for time and temporality to be lost within processes of canonisation? As I turned once more to attend to the presence of time in Castells' account of the city, I developed a greater sense of why such things might be the case.

> [In *The Rise of the Network Society*] Castells' chapter *Space of Flows* unsurprisingly reinforces the spatial dimensions of urban life. Through my broader familiarity with his work, however, I know that he is not arguing that modern society only holds relations with space. Nonetheless, even though *I* realise that *Timeless Time* is required to fully appreciate the strength of his argument I wonder if the fact that *Space of Flows* is the widest read chapter privileges *space and society* over *time and society*? And I've certainly some cause to suspect this. When I think back to my lists of edited collections, *Space of Flows* made a frequent appearance – physically removed and abridged for inclusion. And in Susser's *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory* (2001), she directs her reader toward Castells' seminal message "the Space of Flows" at every turn: "Castells (1996) outlines the structures of global networks and characterises the new communication processes as the 'Space of Flows'" (10). Moreover, in her more general introduction to Castells' work, she condenses his three volume urban treatise *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* [of which *The Rise of the Network Society*

> is volume one] into less than 300 words. Perhaps Castells intended time to be central to his argument, but where a reader is strongly directed to the *Space of Flows* at every turn, *that* becomes the marker with which his work is associated.
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 24 AUGUST 2012]

The level of canonisation across an author's work is not homogenous. The texts which surround a text work direct readers to their canonical parts. And this is significant for a number of reasons. Knowledge is often made in the academy by 'following the breadcrumbs' rather than reading each and every text in depth. And where does one go when faced with lengthy texts: do they start dutifully at page one or seek instruction on where to begin? Castells' text ['The Rise of Network Society'] provides a good example here. This is a text with over 22,000 citations (Google Scholar, 2013), that is 597 pages long, and is only the first volume in a three volume series. And yet a single concept endures which both the text and its author have become somewhat synonymous with: the space of flows. Therefore, in this particular separation of concept from text a strong message for understanding the city spatially rather than temporally is borne. It does not matter that Castells writes so much about time if it is largely overlooked in favour of his more dominant work. It does not matter that time is present if it is to become absent in the more narrow portion of the work that is circulated and transmitted. An author may in fact write about about time, but if it's not in the dominant, canonical aspects of their work, it can easily go unacknowledged. And the question that really gets to the heart of this is whether it really matters if you've written about time if no one is going to read it?

[OCTOBER, 2012]

> I'm realising that you never get a full picture of an author's work. The dominant aspects are lifted from everything else, and it is only these dominant features which become canonical. I've even come to recognise this from the marks upon the page. We customarily indicate the removal of sections of a text with an ellipsis. *No harm done*, I originally thought, *they were only circular references that would be redundant in an abridged version*. But I'm now seeing some other features that have been altered, including the removal of references and footnotes, and I'm really starting to wonder about the impact of these common practices of abridgement. Indeed, even if the references are only circular, they are nonetheless descriptive and instructive. For example "described in chapter 5" directs a reader towards other information, indicating that a full account is not provided but the blocks necessary to build the argument are also to be found elsewhere.
>
> [CASTELLS (2000); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 25 AUGUST 2012]

Abridgement, it seemed, was not simply condensing an author's work for a particular audience or creating it as a more digestible form. But the means of reproduction it pursued appeared to involve a reframing, and therefore the reconstruction and rewriting of an

account through the process. And as I looked to the direction upon which such processes might draw I came to see that time never left the texts, but rather, it left the agenda.

> *Time has become marginalised as the agenda has shifted more and more to a spatial one – the spatial turn. Throughout Harvey's, Jacobs' and Castells' work there is an attentiveness to time. Perhaps this does not always appear in the most useful of ways (with the exception of Jacobs, it is often fixed and spatialised) but it is present nonetheless. What seems crucial then are the 'soundbites'. The slogans that sum up a concept, a paradigm, an academic discipline. It is these which become removed from the context in which they are held, reinterpreted as they go. And it is also these which frame any future (and previous) works who seek entry to the canon.*
>
> [FEBRUARY, 2013]

In terms of space, it was not its presence within a text but its removal and circulation as an element in its own right that ensured its heightened role in the framing of other works. Moreover, I also came to recognise the considerable power of such processes. While each author's accounts were of course much broader than a single issue, they themselves appeared consensual with such arrangements as they continually (re)produced their work within the canon.

> *Despite his conceptualisation of 'Timeless Time' Castells' own characterisation of his urban inquiry often appears to return back to the spatial. In the conclusion he authors for Susser's edited collection ['The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory' (2001)], for example, Castells defines his work in spatial terms. In this sense, despite his broader account which prompts a necessary engagement beyond space, a focus on space is retained when he is asked to define his endeavour and does so spatially. And in doing so he arguably implies time's non-relevance once again. In this example it seems that it is not simply the canon that works to unearth the canonical from the text, but that an author, aware of the wider salience of some of their ideas, can themselves act to further reify the canonical aspects of their work as they continue their practice of knowledge production amidst the workings of the contemporary academy.*
>
> [AUGUST, 2012]

The mechanisms by which part of an author's work became substituted as the whole emerged evermore relevant as I read the urban studies canon. But far beyond space, I also came to recognise that such processes had a significant role to play in the canonisation of much broader ideas.

It does not simply relate to space and time but part of this 'abridgement' means that other key aspects of an author's work are reified in their removal. When an idea emerges above the context of its construction; when it is removed from its context and becomes ripe for extrapolation; when it is backed not only by an author but by the canon: what becomes its power to construct the city? Take Sassen's concept 'the global city' as an example. It is widely acknowledged as being coined within her text ['The Global City'] yet it of course does not rest within its pages. In the twenty-plus years since its inception it has become a mechanism for debate within many quarters of urban studies and, out with the academy, it frequently appears as an aspirational blueprint for urban life via its prominence within urban marketing strategies and competitiveness agendas. Not only, then, does 'the global city' shape how research is done and how we think about our city, but it helps construct the ways in which cities and its institutions attract investors. It is important to also note the 'the global city' has become part of a popular urban lexicon in ways that Harvey's 'entrepreneurial city', Jacobs' 'sidewalk ballet, and Castells' 'space of flows' cannot even begin to match. And while these popular understandings and uses of the term may not be akin to what Sassen had in mind, connected back to points of its original inception the question is: does the widespread salience of the term work to reinforce 'spatial' understandings, problematisations and solutions in urban studies and beyond? And moreover, in its popular usage has 'the global city' become naturalised as a 'thing' and thereby extracted from the sphere in which critical engagement was once at least possible? Indeed, who'd dare to question the relevance of 'the global city' in today's academic and everyday spheres of urban activity?

[JANUARY, 2013]

And similarly, beyond the loss of time, I came to see that processes of abridgement had a significant role to play in absences which were much more profound and devastating to the production of urban knowledge.

Abridgement not only 'makes' the dominant, but does so by silencing those aspects which don't align with the canon. Such acts remove not only the content that the canon deems non-pertinent, but also our ability to see that content and reproduce it in other work. Indeed, from Jacobs' work it appears that not only has time been lost, but a method that allows us to see time. In her introduction; her argument; her style of writing; her method of research – explicitly and tacitly Jacobs' makes her point: it is not the results but the method of inquiry that must change. But this, it appears, is not enough in itself. Across many measures this work is recorded as the number one planning text, but again, that's apparently not enough to maintain its critical methodological message. Had it have been we might have seen a field of inquiry more inventive with its presentation. To come back to autoethnography, we might recognise this as a more prevalent medium in coming to the city. Yet this method, this mode of writing, while present it certainly does not dominate the field of urban studies. Much more prevalent are GIS mapping techniques, and

quantitive, indicator driven accounts. It is not the case that a contingent time and a method by which to see are absent in Jacobs' work, but that they are made to appear absent despite their presence. And what 'Death and Life' serves to illustrate is the functional power of the canon to 'extract' sense from texts, and to sever from accepted practice the methods which could enable us to see something different. Indeed, it is the fact that Jacobs' book is both dominant whilst its more radical readings remain silent that is telling of the broader processes at play in the canonisation of urban ideas. And in this, perhaps the message that comes through strongest is a need not simply to take for granted that the dominance of an author's work will ensure the wide dispersal of their texts' contents, methods and stylistic tendencies. Rather it is the canon that speaks, and it does so via its texts.

[FEBRUARY, 2013]

Chapter Eight

STORIES OF THOSE STORIES

Stories of Those Stories

2008, the year in which I commenced my postgraduate study of urban studies at the *University of Glasgow*, was also the year in which my urban imagination was newly fired by academic accounts of the urban realm. Ever since, my understanding of the city has been forged not simply within experiences of city-life, be they of my own or Others' making, but through the contents, relationships and functions of the urban studies canon. So too are my productions. When I write, my accounts are accompanied by the ghosts of all that they don't contain. As I work to craft *sense* for my reader I position myself and my writings alongside the dominant. I circulate amongst Others who are not unlike myself. Like Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen, I write for, within and against the canon. My efforts are in part decided by a value that is elsewhere established. I perform my theses far beyond the confines of my texts. And these very pages will potentially be sliced and diced to paragraphs, sentences and strings of words, moulded for other contexts and other arguments.

All along the canon has been present as I've read, thought, discussed, performed and written the city, and my experience of conducting research upon it has been no exception. It too has proved insightful into the functions of the urban studies canon, revealing itself something of an autoethnographic case study into how the canon works to expand, maintain and limit the possibilities of knowledge, research and action. As such, following from Chapter Seven which focused on the canon as the object of rhizoanalysis, this chapter looks to the research events of *entering*, *reading* and *reporting* the canon (as described in Chapters Five and Six). And in doing so offers a more nuanced and personally informed

account of the ways in which the canon constructs its objects and itself via those who look and remark upon it.

ENTERING THE CANON

I had no intention of entering the canon in this first research event, only to tap gently to have it reveal to me its canonical texts. Yet as I sifted through edited collections, making decisions as to those which sat within my remit; designed search strings that might generate canonical texts; narrowed down universities from which to request reading lists, enter it I did. In blurbs, contents pages, reviews and course descriptions – texts which spoke of the texts I sought – I found the canon. My appreciation of this was gradual, initially roused only by the familiarity of the results that were appearing.

> Top institutions – the ones I expected to see, I've seen. Harvard, Yale, Oxford, Cambridge – every one of them there. The institutions at the centre of my personal experience – Glasgow, Edinburgh, St. Andrews – they don't rank at the very top, but still appear. Other institutions that hold for me an embodied connection to Urban Studies in Glasgow – Amsterdam through Dvora Yanow; Richard Sennett through NYU – good schools, top academics, expected.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 2 FEBRUARY 2012]

But with each bit of data, each fragment that I read, my familiarity grew.

> Castells. Again. There's a surprise! It's funny, if I base my understanding of him on the courses I've taken throughout my Masters' years in Urban Studies, I wouldn't think him that important. I came across the name but never really engaged with any of his writing beyond that. And I guess that's now seeming like a bit of an oversight on my part: he's everywhere! In all the edited collections, and now making a frequent appearance on the reading lists of other institutions.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 5 MARCH 2012]

> *The neat idea I'd had that I would collect my data and then analyse it has been rudely halted. Working this month to uncover something that can be said to present itself as the urban studies canon has made me realise of analysis in the research process: 'it's happening all the time'. My urgent pleas for the analysis to stop have given ground as I've come to accept that as I engage with the data, it proliferates within me. And so my rhizomatic analysis of the canon won't only happen in relation to the chosen data at the end of the data-collection process, but also within the process of data-collection itself.*
>
> [JANUARY 2012]

In this I began to realise that the canon was not to be revealed in a sterile list – the *Top 10 of Urban Studies* so to speak – but in a much more intimately formed knowledge of dominant categories, themes, and institutions, that evolved as I searched for those very texts. Far from being contained within a corpus of texts, the canon appeared to me as a complex network of relations between authors, spaces, texts and ideas.

I found that this knowledge was also forged at points of dissonance, points where the canon manifested in ways that were strange, messy and unexpected. This was particularly the case with the citations search. When conducting this I was frequently met with connections that I didn't understand; experiences that did not match existing or newly developed expectations.

> Citation index search engines have a "keyword optimizer", suggesting what words should be used in the retrieval of data. Another layer of complexity. Both categories and content are co-produced between me and the search engine, but I have no idea how they work out their part. So much is shaped by the search engine that in the end it's difficult to know the nature of the data produced, but it is certainly more than just a count of top cited articles. At no point throughout this process have I become accustomed to how the algorithms work. I get different results from different search engines so what are the variables used in the searches?
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 24 JANUARY 2012]

I am quite a neat a methodological worker and I was very aware of how 'messy' my computer desktop was becoming when using the citation search engines...

[FEBRUARY 2012]

> I have 11 web windows now open. 11! And I have no idea what they are, where they came from, other than they also bare the Thomson Reuter's logo. Out of all my searches for dominant urban studies texts, this one is by far the most challenging. I know what I'm looking for, and it's not even that I cannot find it. It's that I can't even find a *way* to find it. I lack any clear way to translate what I'm looking for into information that will populate their search boxes, and where I cannot provide this, I'm pushed out by the search engines.
>
> [CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 24 JANUARY 2012]

...I resorted to leaving myself breadcrumb trails that I could follow – webpages, connecting to webpages, connecting to other webpages – believing that with enough data, sense would appear amongst the tangles, showing me the ways in which the search engines counted their objects.

> *Instead, I found myself going deeper and deeper into websites, losing myself and my data in the twists and turns.*
>
> [FEBRUARY 2012]

With no other means to make sense of what I was coming across I found myself turning to fictional accounts in order to *place* the different search engines and relations between them.

> SCOPUS by SciVerse is meaningful only to me through sci-fi and dystopian fiction. I have no real understanding of this company; what they are or what they do. Left to rely solely on other sources I find myself turning to fiction, and I cannot dispel the immediate connections I make to the Ministry of Information, Replicants, The Umbrella Corporation, and so on. Digging deeper I find that SciVerse is owned by Elsevier who describes itself as a publishing company. But they do more than *publishing*, surely? Like Thomson Reuters, there is something that just doesn't seem right; something that just doesn't *feel* right. Thomson Reuters describes itself as a *business data provider*. I don't know what that means! These companies come across as so strange that even when I dig deeper, all I have to draw on to make sense of them are fictional accounts.
>
> [CITATIONS, ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 25 JANUARY 2012]

This need to look elsewhere made me realise just how much I was relying on existing knowledge to make sense of the citations search. Indeed, as I thought back to my previous searches, I recognised similar strategies at moments of confusion.

> The way in which edited collection are described reveals the discourses they sit within. For example, Blackwell describes its *Companion to the City* collections as "blue chip" items. This isn't the language of the social sciences, is it? I certainly can't makes sense of it within that context. Only when my thoughts turn to stock markets and reports of share prices does such language resonate.
>
> [EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 FEBRUARY 2012]

At every turn I was reading the texts *through* text in order to make them sensible. Whether familiar or strange, there was always something there in the background, enticing *sense* to come to the fore – a sense that in this case fabricated my knowledge of the canon. But as this knowledge continued to develop I realised that the canon was not simply a network of relations that *I looked upon*. Rather, it was much more tacit. A *feel* for the canon was growing within me; I no longer felt "pushed out" by the citation search engines, for example.

> Any interface is about more than just *ease of use* as a universal attribute. I have become accustomed to Google – it makes sense to me now. After moving from Windows to Mac OSX, I can't use Windows. It just doesn't *feel* right. These tools become an extension of us, and for them to work well we need not to notice them. But what we also don't notice is their subtle changes to our working practice and patterns. And I'm thinking this is where I'm now at with WoK and SCOPUS. It wasn't so long ago that they didn't make any sense to me whatsoever. I couldn't actually use them to search for what I was looking for. They were maps without a key. But now I turn to them and... they just work... I've *learned* to use them. I don't even think about it.
>
> [CITATIONS, ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 23 FEBRUARY 2012]

I realised that the *something there in the background*, the thing that *enticed sense to come to the fore*, the text through which I read the canon, was now the canon itself. The canon had become the barometer against which I measured the sensibility of the data that was emerging. My growing familiarity had ultimately returned a canonical sensibility within me. I had become a node in its network. And the considerable scope that this arrangement afforded the canon to maintain its dominance through my reading of it, could no longer be ignored.

> In using the results from my previously collated groups of Reading Lists and Edited Collections, I realise that I've been drawing upon my growing familiarity with the *look* of the canon to check the accuracy of my methods. That is, I've been using my expectations, no doubt trading on their accuracy thus far, to *check* my methods. If a list looked wrong, the filter combination must be wrong: *MIT doesn't appear in this one, must be something wrong here*, for example. And across each of these things, I realise that never have I been on the periphery of the canon, but in seeking the canon I've been drawing on my existing, my evolving understanding of the canon to check my results.
>
> [READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 8 JANUARY 2012]

This work of examining the canon can serve, in part, to uphold the canon. The majority of places I've come across seem right. I am at ease as they emerge from the data. It is the unfamiliar that causes concern. The unfamiliar has led me to question the efficacy of the methods I've chosen to get at the most dominant texts, and the results are far from inconsequential. When sorting through the various rankings of top universities, for example, my initial response was to delete non-Western, non-English speaking institutions, considering them pointless to retain as 'they don't exist within the canon'. Little did I appreciate that the very fact they were appearing showed them to be on the radar. Anticipation and assumptions can be dangerous things! In this case, it was 'me' that made the canon Western by removing non-Western items from the analysis. I done that. And in doing so my efforts led to my reproduction of the canon in its canonical form. As such, even in my deconstruction of it, I am working to uphold a similar canon by virtue of my own assumptions.

> *Even in the most gentle of encounters it proliferates fervently. It draws in all that it comes into contact, and maintains its dominance in the process.*
>
> [JANUARY 2012]

READING THE CANON

There was a certain amount of relief I felt when the time finally came for me to *read* the texts of this research. I turned first to Harvey, and did so with an eager anticipation of knowing *what to expect*. Having performed textual analysis on policy documents and news articles in the past, I was confident that with the texts now selected I could finally search for time, space, and all else that I was *meant* to be doing. Initially this appeared to be the case. I read Harvey's text as I've read many texts before it: looking for clues, attending to the language, trying to work out what it was trying to tell me, and searching each of these things for *what it meant* in order to get at *how it worked*. Time, it appeared, was absent. When I turned to read Harvey for the fifth and the sixth time, however, it, like everything else in this work, failed to hold steady. These encounters called my previous interpretations firmly into question.

> So sure was I that time was absent in this text. But then chasing the lines, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest; allowing my reading to reign freely beyond these particular pages, I find time in Harvey's work, and so must assume that if it's a feature of his writing elsewhere, it somehow informs this analysis too...
>
> [HARVEY (1989); READING 5; NOTEBOOK; 9 MAY 2012]

But then these readings of Harvey's text weren't in fact my first readings at all. I'd been familiar with this text prior to the research.

> *My first encounter with both David Harvey, and this particular text, came simultaneously. It was one of the first items I'd read after choosing to study for a MSc in Public Policy, in 2008. I've still got my original, annotated copy from that first reading. Looking to my notes, they read more as a conversation with myself about how I access the text. I pose questions about the article, yet make no assessment nor interpretation of its contents. I ask only tentatively, is this what he means? Is this what he's talking about? The battle lay with me and my ability to read the text, not with being able to get to Harvey, let alone engage critically with him. It made no sense for me against the contextual background which prompted me to undertake the MSc in the first place. I think this in itself tells me something about a texts' and my own temporality when reading a given text – time changes both meaning and significance – readers from a different temporal context to that when the text was written (and without a developed knowledge of that context) may struggle to*

> *engage with the text on its terms. And when they then engage with the text on their terms, the text is changed because of it. Reading 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism' for the first time in over two years, and with quite a different motivation for doing so, the first thing that struck me was the familiarity of its content in terms of the concepts it drew on and of the contemporaries Harvey identifies. Things that wouldn't have meant much to me in October 2008 now held a connection for me; connections to Harvey and to each other that I could now make sense of.*
> [JULY 2012]

What had changed?...

...I had.

And the same was of course true as I started to engage with the texts of Castells and Sassen. But it was when I turned to engage with Jacobs that I recognised the extent to which there was a great deal of *me* not only in such changes over time, but also in my present readings of the texts. This was particularly visible when two very distinct versions of *Death and Life* emerged. In the initial readings I found *Death and Life* to be a heartening, affirming read. But when read with and in the shadow of other sources, more negative connotations were to follow.

> *It is very easy to get swept up in the imagery of Death and Life, and certainly, for my first readings, that's just what happened. But in my more recent readings I have witnessed myself have a more negative response. She writes, for example, that "[d]eep and complicated social-ills must lie behind delinquency and crime, in suburbs and towns as well as in great cities. This book will not go into speculation on the deeper reasons. It is sufficient, at this point, to say that if we are to maintain a city society that can diagnose and keep abreast of of deeper social problems, the starting point must be, in any case, to strengthen whatever workable forces for maintaining safety and civilisation do exist" (31). And I find myself wonder whether Jacobs rejection of theory in favour of reality is possible, let alone sensible. Moving more cautiously through the text in subsequent readings I feel myself taking further issue with this separation of theory from experience. I read now about her famous solution, 'eyes on the street', but this time wondering whether an informal, self-surveilling, neighbourhood watch scheme would be satisfactory. For example, would it really attend to 'deep and complicated social ills' or might it just drive them further away from the eyes? And where would this be to? In this I can't help but question whether Jacobs' concerns over safety are in fact serving to mask a civilising discourse. Indeed, within this text lie many assumptions of what cities are and what they are for, and it also willingly seems to set people apart from criminals and delinquents, when in reality, this isn't perhaps so easy to do.*

'Eyes on the street' suggests a certain type of attitude towards Others. There have been a number of comments of late about Jacobs' being read as fore-bearer to the Tea Party movement in the US and of advocating a very early form of gentrification, and I wonder if this in fact is what I'm seeing. A glorified NIMBYism?

[NOVEMBER 2012]

> Writing my analyses of Jacobs', drawing in my interpretations sixty years on from this text, with hindsight my companion, I realise the extent to which these texts are read and imagined with context. And with my readings emerging quite distinct from one another, I realise that there is a subjectivity to that context. I am there within the interpretation.
>
> [JACOBS (1961); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 22 JUNE 2012]

Following my readings of Jacobs' text, I attempted to be more attentive to my framing and in doing so witnessed the ways in which my affective anticipations and reactions had the potential to either *pull* me in, or *push* me out.

> Far too often now when I think of the *urban* I think of ideas relating to infrastructure, planning, mobility, flexible accumulation, knowledge exchange, competitiveness, and so on. Much less frequently does the idea of people living there come to the fore. In all honesty, however, I'm not engaged by this language, and I've maybe not realised the extent to which it repels me until I realise just how drawn I am to Jacobs' text. I live in a city, in a neighbourhood not too dissimilar from that which that Jacobs describes. When I read *Sidewalk Ballet* I populate it with fragments of my daily life. The characters in Jacobs' text are brought to life with faces of my own daily experience.
>
> [JACOBS (1961); READING 2; SPREADSHEET; 17 JUNE 2012]

And within this I could start to see why such things might be the case. I, like anyone, had preferences, for certain styles, certain topics, even, dare I say, the motivations which compelled certain authors.

Reading through Castells' chapter on Timeless Time, I must say I find it much more engaging – it piques my interest a lot more. But I also have to be aware that it was written by the same author. This helps me realise that my preferences for a certain language, a certain type of argument, help frame the text.

[SEPTEMBER 2012]

My imagination was another factor which had the potential to help me read between the lines, so to speak. It might either bring a text to life, in the case of *Death and Life*, or fill the cold analyses of Harvey's Baltimore with a *Baltimore* from another encounter.

> *Harvey discusses Baltimore more and more as the text progresses, culminating in a description of the city borrowed from the findings of a local enquiry which suggests there is much "rot beneath the glitter". So much of this speaks to me not through Harvey's account, but through the television show The Wire. This has come to be recognised by academics and non-academics alike as an important portrait of North American, urban life. And it is indeed a very powerful one. But when I think as to why The Wire conjures more of an image for me than this text, it is perhaps the manner in which different aspects of the city are juxtaposed side-by-side throughout the series. At times almost fly-on-the-wall documentary, it shows rather than tells.*
>
> [JULY 2012]

And as my readings progressed beyond individual authors, I realised that I couldn't escape my previous encounters – these too now helped construct my preferences and imagination. I read Jacobs with Harvey; I read Castells with them both. And as far as my enquiries went the *meanings* of the texts were cumulatively made. After my analyses of Castells, for example, I imagined a map of the processes at play, and drew them accordingly (Figure Five). But upon that act I also realised that those processes were also occurring within Harvey and Jacobs, its just that it took the process of reading all three to get me to that point.

It was when I eventually turned to engage with Sassen, however, that I realised that my *framing* of these texts was not only something that made my readings in a personal way, but it also made the texts. My interpretations constructed the texts. I recognised this at points where I could no longer reach out for alternative analyses.

> *Looking back to my first engagement with ['The Global City'], and its associated concepts, I didn't see time. Rather, the text functioned by leading me to familiar debates on space, gentrification and agglomeration in order to anticipate its meaning. While this is what I was largely expecting, such expectations were also leaving me concerned that my reading of 'Sassen' was being too heavily influenced by the analyses already conducted on Harvey, Jacobs and Castells. As such, I returned to 'The Global City' a number of times, trying to 'see' something different. Forcing myself to move beyond my own framing I began to interpret the text temporally. The casualisation of working practices, for example, seemed particularly relevant, whereby the*

[REMOVE THIS PAGE AND INSERT

Figure Five: Castells and the Canon

IN ITS PLACE]

> *different 'types' of work are named not for their spatial location, their economic potential, nor their political influence, but for their temporal appearance: part-time, seasonal, daily labour and temporary. Beyond the stated interpretation of the text, this data stands for itself. From recognising this temporal facet I can also engage differently with other aspects of the text. For example, when Sassen tells of the "pressure to reduce labour costs" I can read this as a need for business operators to get more time, and more flexible time for the same money. Appreciated temporally, aspects of this text are freshly rendered with a utility applicable to my own concerns, and derived from Sassen's own examples, and therefore based on the same data, a focus on the temporality inherent in these apparently spatial patterns in the global city reveals that time, too, serves as a powerful lens through which to consider the relationship between the world economy and the life of cities. This is not to say that my original reading of the text was wrong, nor that this one is better. Nor is it to say that Sassen was in fact telling a temporal story all along. The point here is that different readings have within them a different productive capacity. Part of space's dominance is the spatial imagination with which we read, revealing that readers too hold clues as to a stated (non)presence of time within this text. Such considerations remind and reinforce that any meaning of a text is is connected not only to its writer, but also its reader. But more importantly, it is in recognising this we can begin to appreciate that part of the problem isn't just the absence of temporal accounts of the city; it is also the absence of the city reader's temporal imagination. Reading, therefore, is an active sphere of activity in which the scope of the debate is narrowed powerfully in the reader's mind.*
>
> [OCTOBER 2012]

It was not an understanding of the content of the canon that was fleshed out in my reading of Sassen, but rather, an understanding of how the canon functions in relation to its reader. Expectations, imagination and judgement; each of these were crucial. I expected certain things to appear and read the text with such an imagination, making judgments based on that framing. But realising the extent to which my readings were a product of other readings, this time I again recognised the role of the canon in all of this. It had an enormous hold over what got read; what order they got read in. It directed me towards certain texts, sections, even sentences. And even beyond its structural direction, I recognised the role the canon played in getting me to read *right*. I noticed points, for example, where I censored my readings, in favour of what I felt to be more or less appropriate interpretations. And with increased reading, increased time with the canon, the greater ability it had to *fix* each of these things for me. Indeed, even my very search for the absence of time within these texts spoke not of an actual absence, but rather, its absence within the canon. And subsequently, that is how I read these texts; believing time to be absent, and without a temporal imagination as a result. And crucially, what I recognised in

this was that the imagination with which I read texts, the imagination that might expand beyond what was deemed possible, was not entirely my imagination at all, but once again (co)constructed between myself and the canon.

REPORTING THE CANON

> *As I've reported the canon to date I've been careful not to overwork my writing. This is partly to keep my 'working', so to speak, visible on the page. But primarily it's in order to ensure that the potential lines of analysis remain open as long as possible. As I've captured my data, I've allowed myself to write quickly, more rhizomatically, and without many of the conventions which merit the polished academic text. And as I read through my notes of the canon, to check only for basic clarity, I've lost confidence in some of the thoughts, while some have joined with others to advocate more strongly for a particular interpretation. In addition, there are those which stand to contradict, even argue against earlier considerations. You [my supervisors] will see that there are fragments of my data scattered throughout. Orphan lines. Font, colour and justification changes. In many ways the 'activity' that is visible on these pages is akin to the experience of doing the research. There was a lot of energy inside that process too – a lot of thoughts that were jumping around. As my aim in this research has not been to 'interpret' the texts but rather to analyse them in such a way that my own assumptions and those of the text are allowed to surface, I've opted to retain all aspects of the analysis as they've emerged. But currently standing at over 55,000 words, when it comes to drafting this work into my findings I'll need to find as way to manage the tough decisions over how and where to edit it.*
>
> [JULY 2012]

Where to cut, how to edit, what to lose?

> There's still quite a bit of cutting to do with this section but I just can't find the right places. I'm tempted to lose some of the stuff around Castells and Susser, given that Susser's text isn't in the corpus. But then it speaks so powerfully about *how* the canon functions... I'm struggling.
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 2 SEPTEMBER 2011]

> *As anticipated, I've spent the time available this month re-reading and attempting to re-craft my analyses thus far. The chapter(s) remain lengthy, somewhere around 40,000 words. Editing has proven to be an uneasy task. So many decisions. I've tried to keep track of my thinking by working with tracked changes, but that's just created an even bigger mess. My commentaries of my commentaries of the texts are now joined with a commentary of reporting them!*
>
> [FEBRUARY 2013]

> Maybe I just need to use what data I've got, and not worry too much about *re*writing. Just allow myself to be comfortable with what came out. Keep the mistakes I made. All the grammatical and spelling errors that occurred along the way. Oh dear, I don't even want to think about what that would look like, let alone read like. I still want this to be readable. I want the narratives [of my stories] to flow. But then is that really the reason that I'm so uncomfortable with the idea of submitting my thesis as a jumble of mess and mistakes?
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 9 DECEMBER 2012]

How to order, how to introduce, what context to give?

> I am unsure as to which of these spheres to discuss first when ordering the findings chapter(s) – the texts of the canon, the look of the canon, or the processes underpinning the canon.
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 15 APRIL 2012]

With regard to the texts of the canon, I am wondering whether to present these in order of publication, or order them as I've conducted the analysis. Currently they are in the order of analysis. Ordering them autobiographically like this seems more apt, given that neither readers nor authors come to texts in the order of their publication. As such, what would I be demonstrating by presenting them in this way? All that comes to my mind is a linear temporality; a narrative that is neither mine nor the texts, but a construct of rationalised time. On the contrary, presenting them in the order of my coming to them tells a story which does indeed find truth in my experience.

[JUNE 2012]

> How much contextual information do I provide as I introduce each author? Specifically, do I present their *official* biography or focus more on how it is that I came across their work? Similarly, do I bring the statistical information which suggests their dominance into these sections? Or maybe such discussions would be better held in the methodology chapter(s)... Maybe I should merge all three of these things. I just don't know where to put all this – *where does it all go?*
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 10 JUNE 2012]

For so long my writing of the canon has been contained with each author. It has reached the point, however, where I'm realising that these authors don't stand alone, nor does my analysis of them. In fact, the perhaps the most important thing I've came across is the extent to which the canon is (co)produced. So, from this month I've been writing my findings more as themes around how the canon functions in that way, rather than about the individual texts. And in many ways that deals with my questions about how to order the authors – I don't. They'll appear as and when the data reveals their sections as apposite.

[SEPTEMBER 2012]

How to present, how to signpost, what commentary to provide?

> I think part of the problem I've been having is that describing this work as *findings* seems so positive, so definite – like one day I just arrived at an answer. And I haven't. But I do have something to say of my encounters with the canon. This is, after all, what I've been working towards. But where it comes in this thesis, what it's called, how it's written – I'm just not sure of that at all.
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 23 SEPTEMBER 2013]

> *For the past while I've been working with two themes: contents and function, but this bundling of analyses doesn't seem very rhizomatic. It's far too neat and I wonder if I need to reconsider the use of text boxes, columns, more diagrams, or something else to make the page less simplistic? I just feel that I'm not yet capturing this in a way that is as rhizomatic as I'm arguing. I need to better capture the function of the canon rhizomatically in the text itself, or to find a way to defend why my write-up of the rhizoanalysis is itself not very rhizomatic. One way or another this must be a conscious decision on my part. It's far too important to leave to chance.*
>
> [OCTOBER 2012]

> Given my growing feeling of the extent to which the canon is produced not just by the texts of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen, but by the framing of the debate, by the agendas of urban studies, and so on, I need to find a way to make the (co)production of the canon *visible*. Maybe I should be writing some of the material literally alongside other segments, making sure that it's not just straightforwardly *down the page*. Would that better reveal the non linearity of the connections I've been making? Or maybe that would just be irritating!
>
> [REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 4 MARCH 2013]

Each of these questions finds resolution within this text. But as I've (re)produced my version of the canon within these pages, that resolve has been met through acts of erasure fashioned with the canon in view. As I found, read and wrote of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen, I wrote *with* Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen; all that they contained; and all that contained them. And as I report upon those encounters – abridging the work of Others, abridging myself from myself – the canon has been freshly fixed within my mind, within this thesis, and placed within the mind of anyone who may glance upon it...

...along with the impossible denial of all else that it might have been.

Chapter Nine

ONE FINAL STORY

The Scope of the Debate

The stories told in Chapters Seven and Eight report upon the process and productions of this research as I have explored the ways in which the urban studies canon connects to a naturalisation of time within the academy, and more generally within everyday life. Viewed individually, each story reports on how the canon works to expand, maintain and limit the possibilities of knowledge, research and action. Viewed together, they gravitate toward a common theme: *the scope of the debate*. And viewed in combination, cumulatively, *exponentially*, the powerful function of the canon to *limit* that debate can be glimpsed in the connections these stories make with one another. As I reach the end of reporting the canon, my urge is to comment on such connections; to tie up some of the ends that have unraveled as I've moved beyond the fixity of the reports I've offered and provide some answers. Yet simultaneously I recognise that I too exist within those connections; I too am caught up in the making of that *scope* and that *debate*. And I acknowledge that if there is any thought I truly wish to make present here it is that the *scope of the debate* is not broadened through the offer of alternative answers alone, diverse though they may be, but by making visible the conditions and questions which gave rise to them.

As such this *One Final Story* unfolds differently to those already told in a couple of distinct ways. First, it is written not as a narrative, but much like the collage of time in Chapter Two it offers itself as fragments drawn from Chapters Seven and Eight. These are provided separate from one another, in the envelope overleaf, the intention being that they may be freely juxtaposed and repositioned as connections are seen, and new ones emerge. Second, the questions which have in part prompted the answers I find myself urged to tell are also contained within the envelope. Where these are made visible there is potential for different

answers to those questions to come forth or for the questions themselves to be challenged and/or replaced by others more pressing. Therefore, before moving toward the final discussions of this work in Chapters Ten and Eleven, I conclude my stories of the canon in such a way that they may be made anew.

IV

RHIZODISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION TO THE WORK

Chapter Ten

THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE/
THE POLITICS OF TIME

Introduction

As I now approach the final pages of this thesis the point has arrived at which to reflect and remark upon the ways in which this work has met its foci. My stated motivation throughout this work has been a desire **to expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study**. Significant to this has been this work's more specific aims to:

- bring to life time's social construction, and with it, highlight sites of its normative function in the contemporary city;
- open up dialogue on the meaning of time and temporality in the city;
- consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions which have contributed to time's naturalisation;
- help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; and
- stress the need to consider contemporary urban problems from a temporal perspective.

The course of this project has been realised, however, not in strict relation to stated objectives but rhizomatically, across processes and productions that were intended and aimed for, and experiences that have developed quite serendipitously nearby the undertaking of this PhD. Indeed, long before my interests in the difference, the city and time were stabilised in the aims above, my inquires began with a simple question: *what about time?* As I posed that question towards everyday life, the literature of urban studies, and the workings of the contemporary academy, many more questions surged forth. They took me

from considering the social construction of time and time's construction of the social; to thinking through the possible ways in which to *craft* this thesis through method; to seeking the sites and mechanisms by which time was naturalised within urban studies. In each encounter I witnessed limits placed upon time, knowledge and the city. Limits not only in terms of what was possible, but what was imaginable. And it was as I sought to examine the forms, functions and impacts of such limits that I recognised the importance of chasing the lines that thought followed and felt the need to re-imagine the impossible as I went. Indeed, it was in *these* things that I was pulled into this project and this work was made.

Far beyond the fixed points of interest that are implied by the aims on page 218, then, this work's focus has been to privilege a freedom of thought. In recognition of this considerably expanded remit these next two chapters take their cue from an earlier and much broader frame: the problem realities this work was founded within. Until this point these *problems* have been more readily articulated as follows:

1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
   a. time is socially constructed, *and*
   b. dominant modes of temporality have a normative function.

2. The presence of time and temporality as categories for analysis seem to have fallen off the agenda in urban studies.

3. Knowledge of the urban is constructed in such a way that it encourages the naturalisation of time and the marginalisation of temporal accounts.

In these points the *cracks* from which they emerged can once again be seen. But before they were *cracks*, *long* before they were problems, they were simply facets of the realities that impressed themselves upon me; verities which demanded the right of recognition. It was an underlying sense that time was natural and hence removed from the social and cultural construction of urban life and urban ills, that was to eventually *crack* and emerge as strand one. For strand two, it was my unquestioned assumption that the productions of urban studies were objective, complete and determinable. And in many ways the third strand was preceded by the seemingly simple fact that the production of academic knowledge was about the discovery of *truth*.

Taking such things into account this rhizodiscussion does not speak directly to the aims of this work[22], but rather, its effort is to follow just some of the lines that my thoughts have

followed as I re-confront those verities that all too recently sat comfortably within my perception. It is not written as the final say on these points of interest, nor on this work. It is simply a space in which I make visible a temporary gathering of connections and passages of thought that occur as I reflect, first, on how the performances and productions of this work has served to unsettle the ideas that time is natural, urban studies is objective, and knowledge is *truth*. And second, as I imagine what is produced when we dare to choose to make such realities anew. That is, when those verities are challenged, what becomes possible on the back of that. In an attempt to capture the rhizomatic character of that process my writing is faster, more fluid, and more questioning than previous passages in this document. The text is more scattered on the page as I attempt to convey the movement of these thoughts. Despite these efforts, however, the limitations of this document form are not fully escapable, and I am all too aware that only finite points of connection are possible as I pass between each, refer back to some, all the while keeping the clarity of the discussion in my sights. Certainly, the quilt that accompanies this text is far more *rhizomatic* in this regard and it offers a means to tell those connections which go unrecorded and unimagined. Nonetheless, the connections that are made in this chapter have the means to make visible some of the ways in which this work has (re)imagined the (im)possible limits of time, knowledge and the city. And the performance of that begins now, where in starting with the last of the verities in order to arrive back at the first I argue for a close and important connection between the ideas that time is natural, and knowledge is *truth*.

From Verities which Present...

KNOWLEDGE IS *TRUTH*

I began this thesis by telling stories and so it has continued. Stories of my own and my stories of Others' stories. The stories have been told from a common location: the comfortable armchair of the academy. A place where the production of knowledge is conceived by some as the quest for a *truth* that is transcendent, singular and universal. Where it is conceived by many as a *truth* that is unearthed by the studious application of an appropriate research method; a *truth* that has the right to make the world a better place through its *truthfullness*; a *truth* that reasonable people will agree upon.

Or so the story goes.

For this has not been the case in this work. Far from neutral, knowledge, in this thesis, has been revealed as political and personal in every process and in every production. In stories told of policy making in Chapter One, philosophising about time in Chapter Two; and *cracks* in Chapter Four, disincentive, intuition and motivation have been positioned as potent in the knowledge-making activities of the academy. When Jacobs' grounded her urban knowledge in her life-world; when Castells' turned against his experiences of class to write the city; and when Burniers' autoethnographies proudly carried their *feminine* traits, experience, culture and gender were brought to the fore. Far from neutral, the production of knowledge has been rendered a far more complex mingling than the simple quest for *truth* might suggest.

But these stories only *tell* of the political and personal in the production of knowledge. The *showing* of that comes elsewhere: in the practice of telling stories.

In the stories that I've told of my practice, the political and the personal have been made visible. Embedded equally in moments of comfort and difficulty, in spaces of clarity and points of dissonance, my stories has questioned my motivations, my character and my abilities for seeking and claiming knowledge. They have revealed the ways in which the decisions I've made have been bound up with one another, over time, derived from both my academic and non-academic lifeworlds. In looking for the means to undertake the research of my thesis, my stories reveal that far from method uncovering *truth*, it already supposes its existence. The personal is already entangled in those processes that lay claim to *truth's* discovery. In telling my stories multiple motivations for telling, speaking and writing knowledge have been written into this work; multiple motivations for looking and looking in the ways that we do. In each of these things there is much at play, and much that is implicated. And again, the production of knowledge finds itself caught up in far more processes of fabrication than the simple quest for *truth* implies.

But again, this story only *tells* of the political and personal in the production of knowledge. I repeat, the *showing* of that comes elsewhere: in the *practice* of telling stories.

It is the way in which the production of knowledge has been performed in this thesis that uncouples knowledge from *truth*. The *practice* of telling stories doesn't just provide content for a thesis, but is the process by which a thesis is made. And making this visible *is* a way of

making knowledge. Choosing to characterise the activities of this work as *telling stories* is a choice not to search for *truth* but to reveal the personal and the political, so that they are present on the page. A choice not to search for *the truth* but to bring the immanent, multiple and contingent into focus. A choice to argue that method, and our choice of it, are productive of the apparent *truths* that we seek. A choice to question the very notion of *truth,* rights, and better worlds that legitimate the production of academic knowledge. A choice not to contribute to the stability of reasonableness, but to question the nature of that reason. In such choices, in such practices, the quest for knowledge isn't the quest for the academy's *truth* but a quest for something entirely different. Social justice, ethics, making better relations? Perhaps. But regardless, in performing a practice of knowledge production that is unlike that which might be expected, the easy equivalence between knowledge and *truth* is throughly unsettled.

Or so the story goes.

Because it cannot be denied that *truth* still circulates beside knowledge in the academy. It cannot be denied that *telling stories* is better recognised as the crafting of fiction – a worthwhile pursuit but not the purview of the academic. So what is it that maintains the pursuit of *truth* as legitimate and casts other forms of knowledge production aside? What are the means by which some stories lose their status as fiction and are elevated to the level of *truth*? What mechanisms hide the story telling nature of knowledge making? What configures some methods, motivations and interests appropriate to the quest for *truth* but not others?...

...To what extent is it significant that the academy acts to legitimate its own brand of truth?

My engagement with the ethics committee. It revealed the academy's ability not only to facilitate the pursuit of *truth* within its pre-designated categories, but in deciding which acts of knowledge production could and could not advance, the *ethical* arm of the academy also decided which stories might be rendered *truth*, and which stories were to remain as fictions. And then there is the *viva voce* and publication by peer-review, what statuses might these staples of entering and continuing in academic life confer on thought? How does the political and personal circulate in these processes? How will my knowledge speak to *truth* and how does that *truth* speak to Other knowledge? And where social realities are formed

within the academy, whilst the academy itself acts to make its own brand of *truth* legitimate, dare I even wonder whether all along the more pressing question has been not about the equivalence of knowledge to *truth*, but of *truth* to truth?...

...another story, for another day.

URBAN STUDIES IS OBJECTIVE

Urban studies. A discipline that seeks to understand the urban. A discipline whose knowledge is applied by urban practitioners to undo the ills of urban life. The discipline in which this work was conceived. But that at the end of this work urban studies should have less meaning as the container of this thesis, than as a case-study which attests to thoughts just shared on knowledge and *truth*, is telling. Much that was written in that section holds here also. As I entered, read, captured and reported the urban studies canon, I saw methods selected, stories told, knowledge made and realities silenced. I saw that urban studies participates not in objectively recording the *truth* of the city, but recording a knowledge of the city that is necessarily partial.

All too easy I recognise a parallel between Said's analysis of *the Orient*, discussed in Chapter Four, and my understanding of *the urban*. And all too easy I find myself replacing Said's *-ism* of interest with that of an urban bent, and with characters from my encounters...

> ...What Harvey, Castells and Sassen did was to place urbanism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an urbanist. Their inauguration of urbansism was a considerable feat. It made possible a scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of the urbanist as a central authority for the urban; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent urbanist work; it put into circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the urban would henceforth be spoken for; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige.

It is uncomfortable to read this back. This hybrid account *feels* wrong to produce. Where I recognise the characters from my encounter within Said's analysis, it reads not as a story, not even as fiction, but a lie.

But simultaneously, I cannot deny that *the urban* is not the city; it's not even the urban. It is an apparatus crafted from vocabularies, ideas, terminologies, clarities, authorities, coherences, currencies, lineages, traditions and ambitions. Something which functions powerfully to produce the methods, activities and limits of urban studies. And far from objective, this apparatus is the product of micro-decisions, reasoned from the subjective faculties of its scholars, imbued with their preferences, motivations and politics. And I cannot deny that Harvey, Castells, Sassen *and* Jacobs, whether they are cast as the inaugurators or not, remain a part of that.

Indeed, Said's analysis also speaks of the eventual evolution and hold of these intellectual apparatuses once established, where the activity of making knowledge becomes performed not just by the "inaugurators" but "future generations of scholars". This too was visible in my reporting of the canon. The language of urban studies was revealed a conduit through which authors, future authors, and so on, found the means to speak meaningfully with one another. Everyone entered the field in the shadow of this language. But it was those who performed it best that were deemed sensible enough to speak for the field. The same was true of method. Scholars reproduced their knowledge of the city through method in such ways that it would resonate as meaningful to the field. In language and in method, urban studies defined its trajectory of knowledge not through the objectivity of its content but through the establishment of a coded framework that allowed qualified individuals to speak meaningfully of the city as *the urban*.

And indeed, it did so in such a way that it staked claim to all that the city was, all that it could be, banishing anything that could not be held in its conceptual faculties. Ultimately, I see that *the urban* exists not as the city, but as a concept of it.

And so perhaps the search for time within *the urban* is no longer a mystery...

a story rushes forth

...Spatial accounts of the city breed other spatial accounts of it, not only through the development of a language in which to speak of it, but a methodological tradition which makes certain discourses impossible.

In turn, this wider discursive field helps to reify such spatial accounts through the continual development of its lexis and descriptive preferences, and the adoption of an associated methodological paradigm that helps it *see* its subject.

Add to this the self-censorship of authors in their anticipation of their audience, and as they *work* to produce *value*.

Add to this that inquiries of *the urban* take place in officially sanctioned environments.

And here, we see not the city, but a powerful construction of the city – a powerful means to construct the city, by a discipline that is not objective, but cultural, political, personal, and ideological in every which way.

Here we see that not all facets of the city can be spoken about in *the urban*.

And even if time has always been there in city, its silence is all too easily performed where the city shrinks and *the urban* grows.

TIME IS NATURAL

Parallels between urban studies and the production of knowledge now draw to another, this time between the academy and between everyday life. It is at the intersection of these sites that any notion of time as natural is thoroughly unsettled.

But first, back in time, there are many other points where that idea was challenged.

Everyday life. Placing *our* time within the Other and using the Other to illuminate *our* time. Revealed the ways in which time was made through time, via history and tradition; the ways in which language made certain times more possible than others;

the ways that technology upheld, strengthened and extended existing dimensions of time into new arenas.

> A similar case was found in politics. Not only did it legislate for time but did so to actively maintain the dominance of temporal modes that were beneficial to those who had the power to act. Its very practice, like the academy, and like urban studies before it, was imbued with a distinct temporality – one that relied on the linearity, rationality, objectivity, spatialisation, uni-directional causality, and so on, of *clock time*
>
> > The institutions of the family and of education. The self-same ideals of *clock time* were taken on board at a personal level: learned as a way of being in time that was passed on through generations and worked to uphold the temporality suited to the preservation of the nation state.
> >
> > > Can't forget philosophy. Here was revealed the capacity it had for bestowing its ontology of time, its ontologies, upon everyday life practices.
> > >
> > > > And finally in method, where I recognised its role in enacting reality, and saw this not as problem but potential. Autoethnographic rhizoanalysis presupposed that time was not natural, but that it was multiple. It set out to capture this time, and time's multiplicity was subsequently brought to the fore through the practice of that method and through the presentation of it in stories. In both performances a very different knowledge of time was produced.

And so we arrive at the last verity: knowledge is *truth*. And so we see the role of it in making time. The ability of philosophical accounts to construct time at an ontological level; the relationship between social science, and science and metaphysics. The ability of the academy to stabilise *its* time through it activities of knowledge production, and to do so in a way that secures it as *truth*. It performs and produces its temporality as it makes knowledge;

and the easy equivalence between knowledge and *truth* extends back to pull in the conditions of its production. The academy's time is *truth*.

But perhaps it is through the academy's ability to order difference that time's reification is all the more secured, for it is here, where time's heterogeneity is hidden, that surely its homogeneity is secured? So many points at which this might occur, too many to mention, but I can at least look back within this chapter and see single *truths* in place of multiple stories. The translation of the city to *the urban*; the translation of time to *clock time*. In each of these the multiple is configured as singular, and *made* singular in the process. The city as *the urban* is the city. Time as *clock time* is time. And in many ways, isn't this the traditional way of making knowledge in the academy where notions of validity and *truth* hold court?

> Validity is the determination of whether the Other has been acceptably converted into the Same, according to a particular epistemology. The world is the raw, untamed Other, as in raw data and as in rejected, invalid research. It must be cooked into a valid research-based theory so as to be visible and knowable; the coarse, untheorized, polyvocal Other is considered to be insufficient unto itself. It must be given meaning and appropriate form
>
> Scheurich, 1997: 85

The academy's ability to order difference, however, is perhaps most visible where there is an active attempt to produce it within its walls. We can see its reach in the rationalisations we make; the things we tell ourselves to keep us ticking along. We can see its reach in the struggles we have as we fall in line with the traditional ways of doing academic work, submitting to the *truth* of the academy. Indeed, within the visceral, within the self, within the personal, these are the locations whereby difference is dealt with and ordered.

...to Imagining the Impossible

WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS NOT *TRUTH*

When knowledge is not *truth* the potential in *not* knowing might more fully be recognised. Crises of aporia; hiatuses of intellectual confidence. Such experiences have been difficult in this work. They have been uncomfortable. But when viewed not as failure, inadequacy, or inability to get to the *truth*, the (non)knowledge in such moments can instead be chased. In autoethnography I glimpsed just some of the generative potential of this:

> Working with the data, I was realising that I was always with it. It was in my dreams; with me when I awoke again. It was there, proliferating. Making connections that I cannot follow. And it's moving, from being data in the empirical sense, to something a lot more abstract. I have no hope of keeping up.
>
> 11 JANUARY, 2012

> Aporia. Not knowing. Making my not-knowing public. I've been experiencing it for sometime. What is this feeling? What can I do with this? Does it tell me that I'm doing something right? Where does it lead to?
>
> 24 SEPTEMBER, 2011

Not knowing led to a space in which I could actualise another reality. It led me to experience contingency in the face of the absolute. And in realising this, not only did I witness it unfolding beside my research practice, I began to seek it out. I'd ask myself, am I comfortable? *Then challenge that comfort*. For it became all too obvious what happened when *not* knowing was dismissed as ignorance – the questions asked and answered (and those that sat silently beside). Such is the substance that works to maintain the silence of the silent; that uses absence only to enable presence. But when knowledge takes seriously (non) knowledge it finds productive sparks that would elsewhere be hidden. It makes a new knowledge unhindered by *truth*, and produces that difference in the process.

When knowledge is something other than *truth*, it is able to present as multiple. Just like *not* knowing, however, making the multiple through story-telling, juxtaposing and collaging can feel difficult. Too many tangents; not enough focus; failure to *reason* contribution. It can feel uncomfortable. More than once I wondered: was I falling into that trap? But bringing to the fore heterogenous accounts of points of interest, finding ways to hold them together whilst apart, knowledge was accumulating.

So what of this difference in knowledge and different ways of making it? What about chasing the uncomfortable? For so much of this work, so much of my defence of my approach, has been was written in response to the traditions of social science; in response to the comfortable armchair of the academy. And might it have simply been enough to state this work was different and then for it to be different? Perhaps.

But so much of this work's evolution occurred within a context which though malleable, was nonetheless telling me how I ought to work. So many of its *cracks* emerged in direct

relation to verities I perceived within that context. And in this there is another point. Having written so much of this thesis in response to social science, as a defence of what it does and why it does it, not only does it perform another way of producing knowledge, but in doing so, it calls into question those traditional practices. What becomes possible when knowledge is not *truth*? It becomes possible to question the means and rationales by which knowledge is made as *truth*. Where traditional ideas have not space for aporia, or *not* knowing, or story telling, we can move beyond it, and in doing so actively challenge those taken for granted assumptions of knowledge.

Still, what is to occur where this transpires amidst the expectation for knowledge in the form that it is known? If research reporting is about sharing what has been learned, if the defining feature of a doctoral dissertation is that it makes an original contribution to knowledge, what does it mean if that knowledge speaks more to thought? Because this thesis has not simply been about expanding the existing network. It has not aimed to add another node that will join existing readings of *the urban* and construct a more complete urban environment on the basis of a more complete understanding of it. Rather, it is about ensuring that I recognised the network and its functions; that I was not content with interpreting the city as *the urban*.

How might this be assessed?

> the truth effects of telling stories, the empathy they generate, the exchange of experience they enable, and the social bonds they mediate.
>
> Jackson, 1998: 180

> I seek an existential, interpretive social science that offers a blueprint for cultural criticism. This criticism is grounded in the specific worlds made visible in the writing process. [...] The work should articulate a politics of hope. It should criticize how things are and imagine how they could be different.
>
> Denzin, 2003: 261–262

> If truth by itself is not a gold standard, then perhaps there may be additional *political* reasons for preferring and enacting one kind of reality rather than another. Such, at any rate, is a possibility.
>
> Law, 2004: 13

Options, at least.

WHEN TIME IS NOT NATURAL

Where knowledge is not *truth*, the way is cleared not only for it to become multiple, but for time to become multiple too. And where time is multiple, where it is no longer natural, the politics of time are made visible...

...and things that were previously impossible become possible, including the potential to see and pose questions of the difference, the city and time.

Indeed, in the methods I've employed – in the politics of knowledge I've enacted through them – time has been multiple within. And so where time is no longer natural, not only might we begin to imagine the methods by which we might see another time but we might begin to *make* another time through our methods.

A way of making time through knowledge...

...a new way of making knowledge in time?

I come back to this excerpt from the collage of time:

> When the stop arrests the intellectualising tendencies of the mind, the concept of time is also affected. Time is ordinarily understood through succession (one event follows another), direction (movement from past to future), insufficiency (never enough time), and extraneousness (Being outside of and containing events.) When time comes to a stop, one experiences not timelessness, but time unqualified by intellect. [...] A reversal of ordinary assumptions takes place. Events are linked by nonlinear relations rather than by succession. Time ceases to be past, present and future, and instead either moves or is frozen. Time becomes ample enough to allow an event to occur without crimping it. Time ceases to exist apart from what takes place; instead it becomes a quality specific to the event.
>
> Appelbaum, 1995: 85

For it is within this that we see the politics of time connect to the politics of knowledge production, and the politics of knowledge production connect back to the politics of time. That it becomes recognisable: should we experience time differently, we might make different knowledge; and if we make different knowledge, we might make a different time.

Where time *was* natural, existing methods were not able to see time as multiple, nor could they avoid upholding time as natural through the performance of their practice. In this it was seen that:

> Complexity could not be held within classic dualisms.
>
> > How time was conceptualised made a difference, it had implication for what could and could not be seen.
> >
> > > *Clock time* was unsuitable for the multiple times of its subject matter. It had no hope of reaching, capturing the time of Others, let alone invisible pasts, future extensions, and aspects of everyday lives lived at odds with its logic.

And so methods, they need to:

> Draw on multiplicity in order to see it, and ensure that *our* time is placed within it.
>
> > Find ways to capture hard to grasp times – of the body, of the mind, of moments of the past emerging in the present, of hope and fear configuring the potential of the day. These cannot be excluded from social science.
> >
> > > Be wary of a research understanding that enforces a separation of past, present and future; relies on a linear causality; stems from a positivistic methodology; and seeks to make generalisations across time.

What might this look like in urban studies? There is much of that which may not sit easy in the canon. And much, that in its entry to the canon, might be altered. But as it is practiced in person, perhaps there is some scope. Talking about time in urban studies, with colleagues, with peers, has made time matter. Do the necessary conditions for temporal research begin by simply talking about time again; by bringing to the fore temporal

connections that are already known and making connections that emerge for the first time in conversational exchange?

And in reading too, is this another way?

> Time was already present in the texts. When I read and looked for it, it was there. When I read with a temporal imagination, I found time. Time never left the texts, but rather, it left the agenda. And in this sense, can reading be reclaimed as an strategic and critical activity in and of itself?
>
> 28 NOVEMBER 2012

It cannot just be about injecting time and temporal concerns back into the canon, because depending on *how* we look, both are already there. Moreover, viewing the canon only as a material entity, formed from the texts which fill it, grossly undermines and underestimates the nature of the efforts necessary to maintain it. It cannot be just about placing within it new texts – affirmative action from those with the power to act.

But it can be about encouraging a temporal imagination to gestate.

> Developing a methodological suite with the ability to capture time and a language nuanced enough to speak meaningfully of the findings.
>
> Increasing instances of temporal research...
>
> ...and that marks only the beginning. For the academy is itself embroiled in this politics of time, and if efforts are to be truly successful they must reach beyond their category to touch those devices which serve to limit the horizons for thought and knowledge.

And so, might we practice a different production of knowledge, in a different time, and ask after the time that would be required to make life differently? Can we consider what scope there is for the possibility of Other times? Will we attempt to reach out and feel for those times that are irrational, non-dominant – that are not *clock time*? Do we dare to think about how time could help us transform?

Perhaps *the urban* cannot hold such multiplicity within its framework.

Yet.

But at least now there should be no doubt that the city can and does; and it is from here, and from now, that we must take our cue as we work to imagine the possibilities of time, knowledge, and the city itself.

notes

[22] Though they are not addressed directly, each of these aims are nonetheless attended to within the content of these chapters.

Chapter Eleven

(IN)CONCLUSION

The aims of this thesis have not been to answer a set of questions. Rather, in response to those verities I've identified as problematic, in response to those realities in which they sit, I have worked to produce the possibility of the alternative. This work originated from *cracks* within my own imagination and practice, ending up as research problems which have guided this work. As I now reach the physical end of the thesis, and hence that part of my journey with them, there are no threads to tie together. Rather, what I hope I've achieved is a diversification, an expansion, dare I say a tangled mess that prompts further questions of those problematic realities, and also the ones I've (re)crafted in their wake. Therefore this conclusion isn't actually about concluding anything at all. It closes simply, remarking upon a potential for openings that this work has made.

Postscript

A PREGNANT PAUSE

"Look at it well. You will never see it again", says the book-seller to Jean Louis Borges' self-styled narrator in the *Book of Sand*, "neither sand nor this book has a beginning or an end [...] No page is the first page; no page is the last". Feeling "threat in the [seller's] words", as Borge's narrator grasps the book within his hands, at the point where he might say something of one page and turn to another, it is gone: the *Book of Sand* has changed. *Time*, in this thesis, throughout this PhD journey, has borne the selfsame quality. Personally, institutionally and within this work, the only thing that has remained constant is that it has never been the same. On a personal level, time, *my* time, has not been static, simple nor solely of the clock, but fluid, multiple, of myself and of Others. From the first to the last of this work, my days, their routines, have been punctuated by deadlines, pauses, progressions, aporias and back-steps – each bringing their unique and multiple temporalities along with. I could write here of so many encounters which attest to this, but perhaps none have been more arresting than my journey into motherhood. In pregnancy, I did not locate and judge myself in time solely with reference to my PhD schedule, but in counting down, with dutiful attention paid, a finite, scientifically rationalised measure of 40 weeks. I did not feel time's continual march only in the passage of night into day but in the tightening of my clothes, the stretching of my skin, the increased movement I felt within, and the growing attentions I garnered from strangers. As I approached 36 weeks one such stranger shouted to me from across the supermarket aisle, "either that's twins in there or you're about to pop". As I moved past 41 weeks I was preparing myself for the ensuing fight not to have my labour medically induced. When labour eventually arrived at 42 weeks, time emptied. Numbers were stripped away all together. There were no cycles, no passages, no counting, only a constant rhythm oscillating between surges and not surges – always present, never past and never future. Yet all the while a *clock time* remained prominent for nearby others:

heart-rates were measured, hours were counted between stages, all culminating in the announcement of a *baby girl born at 12 noon* before I'd even glanced upon her face. And in motherhood my time(s) has been cut through with that of a smaller being's. On-demand feeding, changing, playing and sleeping mark out the quality of days; the perceptible changes of cheeks getting fuller, a body getting longer, a mind becoming more aware are the furnishings for the weeks and months. Our time(s) combined, time *as* multiple, together encountering multiple times of progress, respectability and nature elsewhere determined.

At an institutional level too, *time* has also undergone something of a transformation. Whilst I find it difficult to judge whether time is now less absent to academic concerns, I've certainly recognised it entering and exiting in different ways. The current promise of *big data*, for example, brings with it the potential to make time multiple. Past records and future projections of the city might be pulled into the present, commenting upon the multi-directional influences upon urban policy and planning. Space and time might be pursued side by side, creating powerful pictures that show competing temporalities alongside areas of spatial deprivation – not only spatialising time but temporalising space. Far reaching and long ranging political and institutional barriers to temporal social justice might now be studied more comprehensively, raising awareness of points at which they are most compounded. Possibilities, yes, but all too readily I am reminded that time and knowledge go hand in hand. And where academic departments up and down the country recently scurried and hurried towards the end of the REF 2014 cycle, where time was practiced in pressed, constricted and finite conditions, perhaps the trajectory of time studies through *big data* may be more readily realised in projections of the future based upon the past. That is, time may simply have its complexity tamed by the power of *big data*, and its linearity, causality and measurable nature once again reinscribed through the process.

The making of time through academic research, however, is not something that occurs solely at an institutional level and smaller, more personal interventions, *interruptions*, can and must be made. As I reach the final sentences of this thesis, for example, I am all too aware that time as an object of and for analysis in this work has of course taken on a new, changed, developed sensibility. All too obvious feel those absent accounts of time that might have appeared, in this case the work of Deleuze. My journey with time commenced largely ignorant to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. They came later to the party, after the point at which I'd explored the sociological, anthropological and philosophical

literatures on time; after the point at which I felt my research problem set. Had I have known then what I know now, Deleuze's work on time would have undoubtably helped shape the calling and method of this work. I can imagine myself getting swept away in his language of time. Of past-past-futures, repetition, temporal multiplicities and becomings. I can imagine myself crafting this work anew under his tutelage. Pursuing not only knowledge but time in a rhizomatic manner, from the very outset. Into such reflections can certainly be read the admission of this work's shortcomings; of what it doesn't do. And yet this work was always of time, in time. I allowed myself no privileged or better position from which to write it. *Look at it well. You'll never see it again* – yes, that may be. But there is no threat in those words as long as the possibility to see time differently, to reimagine it anew, is not simply punctuated by this work, but remains facilitated by it.

APPENDICES

Appendix One

QUESTIONS ABOUT TIME

The questions below arrived as a result of a mapping exercise I undertook in March, 2010. My aim then was to try to discern those themes which were both central to my own concerns (which were continually evolving as I read about time) and, crucially, were *researchable*. While this thesis in no way addresses the range of these questions, the questions nonetheless had a constructive effect on its eventual direction. And in that sense I've continued to think of them as threads of this work, which though not yet fully tugged upon remain significant elements of the tapestry.

TIME IN THE CITY

- What is the reality of time in the contemporary city?
- Are dominant modes of temporality in the contemporary city normative or naturalised?

THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME AND TEMPORALITIES

- How and what does time mean in the contemporary city?
- How does the process of temporal construction occur?
- What are it's instruments and procedures?
- What are it's enabling technologies?
- In what way does the construction of a particular temporality build upon, modify, expand and limit culturally available shapes of time?
- What is the relationship between intuitive understandings and ideological constructions of time?
- What is the relationship between the perception of time and the experience of reality?
- To what extent does technology govern the human experience of time and construct reality in the contemporary city?

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCE OF PARTICULAR TEMPORALITIES

- How do particular temporalities contribute to the formation of social, cultural and individual identities?
- How do particular temporalities organise behaviour?
- In what way do particular temporalities constrict or expand the field of experience?
- What is the relationship between the process of temporal construction and empowerment?
- Are particular temporalities involved in processes of domination?
- Does clock time exclude those who are unwilling or unable to conform?
- Who does clock time serve?

THE FORM OF NORMATIVE AND OTHER TIME

- What is the form of normative time in the contemporary city?
- How are dominant temporalities related to 'whole-life' temporalities?
- What is time for those individuals who operate outside dominant modes of temporality?

THE INFLUENCE OF THE RESEARCHER'S MODE OF TEMPORALITY

- What is the impact of 'knowing' a particular temporality while conducting this work?
- What idealisations and reflections (conscious or otherwise) take place in the analysis of particular temporalities?
- How does the researcher's own position in time impinge on the process of analysis and description?
- To what extent is the apparent dominance of certain temporalities due to proximity with a particular group of individuals, and the patterns they inhabit?

Appendix Two

AUTOETHNOGRAPHY WRITE-UP

This write-up of *Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks* was prepared in April, 2011, as part of my First Year Review.

Everyday life without clocks

My pursuits to date have served to suggest that time is socially constructed, with the constructs of clock-time and mechanical time pieces playing a particularly prominent role in organising and making sensible the experience of everyday life in a Western context. However, while such constructs appear particularly manifest in the urban context, the extent to which an individual's perception of time is governed by these externalities remains unclear. Also uncertain is *what* and *how* clock-time means in the contemporary city.

In order to engage with these concerns an experiment was conducted which explored the experience of everyday life without the use of conventional methods of time-reckoning. The aim was to examine how and to what extent the subjective and intersubjective experience of time remains sensible without access to clocks, and to consider what this in turn reveals about the materiality of time in the contemporary city. This report presents the reflections and preliminary analyses which emerged as a result of this work.

OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND DESIGN

The experiment was conducted over a period of twelve days from *Saturday the 5th* to *Wednesday the 16th of February, 2011*, and was split into three distinct stages. Stages one and three lasted for three and seven days respectively, during which every effort was made to minimise the presence of clocks and other such conventional time pieces. In between these stages was a two day break in which I reverted back to my usual method of time-keeping. While some individuals were aware of my intention to conduct the experiment, no one was informed of the exact timing of the experimental period or of the individual stages.

While all stages broadly adhered to an autoethnographic approach, the precise manner in which this was conducted varied slightly between the three. Stage one ran from *Saturday the 5th* to *Monday the 7th of February*, during which all clocks that I knowingly came into regular contact with were either hidden or covered. These included the digital displays on my computer, laptop, mobile phone, television and in my car, and the clocks in my kitchen and by my bedside. Reflections were documented by using the *Notes* application on my mobile phone and were officially recorded by writing entries and posting these to an online blog.

For the most part these entries comprised the culmination of the day's thoughts, however, where I had access to a computer throughout the day, shorter reflections were embedded directly into the blog. This electronic method had the benefit of attributing a fixed timestamp for each entry, potentially allowing for the future analysis of the extent to which my perception of time aligned with clock-time over the course of the experiment.

Stage two ran from *Tuesday the 8th* to *Wednesday the 9th of February*. During these two days my everyday life resumed with my usual methods of time-reckoning reinstated. Journal entries were minimal during this period as the purpose was not to compare an everyday life with clocks to one without, but rather it was intended to stimulate reflection on how the experience to date could shape the form of the third and final stage of the experiment. Allowing for this break not only provided insight into the operational techniques which did and didn't work, but it also refocused both the objectives of the experiment and my personal approach to it.

The third and final stage lasted a total of seven days and ran from *Thursday the 10th* to *Wednesday the 16th of February*. Like stage one, this too minimised the presence of clocks whilst documenting the experience, however, drawing on stages one and two, changes were implemented to improve the manner by which this was achieved. Despite the precautionary efforts taken to cover and hide time pieces in stage one, as the initial three days progressed I grew familiar with the location of *other* clocks. The main intrusion came from timestamps on text-messages and emails received and accessed on my mobile phone. I did consider that I could refrain from retrieving these communications via my phone for the duration of stage three, however, acknowledging the extent to which this activity forms an integral aspect of my everyday life I decided that this would likely conflict with the overall aim to isolate and experience the absence of conventional methods of time-reckoning. I therefore continued to use my mobile phone in the manner which I was accustomed, but randomly altered the clock-time at various intervals throughout the day in order that the time displayed was both inaccurate and meaningless.

As stated previously, stages one and two recorded reflections solely on an online blog. This decision was the result of many hours of considering how best to keep order and systematise the experiment. However, during stage two I realised that the rigidity of this method was not only hindering the fluidity of my perception but it was also heavily reliant on my memory. To address this, stage three adopted multiple methods for documenting reflections, including taking photographs, making voice recordings and writing on post-it notes, whilst also using the blog as and when it seemed appropriate. The variety of methods available to me at any given time made for more spontaneous reflections which were more in keeping with the nature of the experiment. While the loss of systematic order nullified the prospect of analysing the timestamps for each post, given that I was mostly updating the blog with lengthy posts based on memory, it is likely that the time stamps would have revealed very little about the immediacy of my perception in any regard.

The final aspect that altered during stage three was my personal approach to the experiment. As indicated previously I was conscious that I had not successfully minimised the presence of clocks, nor had I designed the best way to document my reflections. Together these culminated in preoccupying thoughts of *how* to undertake the experiment; raising questions of *where* I should go to best utilise my chosen methods. The break of stage two highlighted the extent to which these considerations were at odds with the overall aim of the experiment, and as such served to refocus my approach. Adopting a more fluid approach to both my encounter with clocks and the manner by which this was recorded, and not questioning *where* I should go, helped shift my focus away from the technicalities of the experiment back to reflecting on the experience of everyday life without clocks.

THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Over the twelve day period of the experiment I experienced a variety of thoughts and emotions. Central to stage one, however, was an ever present anxiety stemming from my need to organise and control. Indeed, even prior to the start of the experiment my thoughts were occupied with questions of *how* to do it: when should I start; how should I keep track; how should I deal with the plans that I've already made. I acknowledged this in the first journal entry, writing;

> *I could easily get caught up in the practicalities of it all and get bogged down in establishing the correct way to do it.*
>
> 5 FEBRUARY 2011, 10:38 AM: BLOG ENTRY

Similar anxieties were also manifest in a dream I had that evening. Reflecting on it the following morning, I wrote;

> *I had some rather unexpected dreams last night...for the most part transient and fluid, but where my thoughts did coalesce there emerged an office scene which saw me attempting to negotiate a way to navigate without time. And it wasn't just me, Jennifer Aniston and Lisa Kudrow were there too. Together we sorted, filled, scheduled, met and discussed, in order to find a way to restore balance. The overriding feeling of the situation was akin to what I imagine the immediate aftermath of a disaster; complete with acknowledgment of a reduced capacity to operate and compliance with protocol which dictates an emergency meeting be called to take control of the situation.*
>
> 6 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:47 AM: BLOG ENTRY

My preoccupation with *how* to keep control of time in spite of having to abandon clocks continued throughout stage one of the experiment and it wasn't until I entered stage two that I realised the extent to which it had been the experience of the experiment itself which formed the experience of my everyday life without clocks thus far;

> *So my three days are up, and this morning I awoke to my alarm once more. I got up, had my breakfast, showered, and dressed; all the time thinking that it didn't really feel any different to any other day; that I didn't really feel any different. And then it struck me – today feels like a Monday. This of course could be largely due to the fact that I worked from home yesterday, however, when I consider why I worked from home it is*

> *clear to me that my feelings are just as linked to this experiment (just as connected to my perception of time) as any others I've had over the last three days.*
>
> *Yesterday, other than my mid-sleep post (which I now know was around 6:00am), I did not reflect on my experiences; I did not update this journal. I was intending to, but something kept getting in my way. At the time, I put this down to a combination of busyness/having nothing new to say. But in retrospect, yesterday, I was just a bit flat. I could have got up in the morning, had my breakfast, showered and dressed, and got on with the day. Instead I stayed in my pyjamas until it was dark; feeling like I was waiting for something but that I couldn't quite remember what that something was. I think that perhaps I was waiting for the time to return...I think I was bored already...*
>
> *Looking back over the last three days, there was something very unreal about the experience of living without clocks. And it wasn't the absence of time, but rather that my time was filled only with the reflections of time's potential absence. I wasn't reading for the PhD, I wasn't stressed about completing work, there were no deadlines crowding my thoughts. There was simply existence and waiting.*
>
> *The hardest thing about living without clocks was trying to live without clocks; keeping the intrusions to a minimum. Now this of course reveals something very significant about how far it is possible for an individual to be removed from the mechanics of time in the contemporary city. But other than the acknowledgement that my perception of this experiment has shaped my perception of living without clocks as non-threatening and non-disruptive, I feel I've yet to uncover anything as interesting about my own perception of time.*
>
> *So in a few days I'll begin again, this time armed with the knowledge that this experiment must force me to adopt as close to my normal routine as possible. I will spend today and tomorrow considering how best to do that, before on Thursday I start living without clocks once more. May it be threatening; may it be disruptive.*
>
> 8 FEBRUARY 2011, 8:26 AM: BLOG ENTRY

Following the reflective break of stage two, stage three began with me feeling reinvigorated and refocused on the task at hand (10 February 2011, time not recorded: notebook). Some anxiety remained, yet its object was not the organisational concerns of stage one, rather, it appeared borne from my realisation that I no longer had access to my ability to control time;

> *I'm beginning to feel a little bit nervous about this. And it's not about things going wrong or not being able to effectively hide the clocks in my life. I think it's the feeling that I now can't look at the time. Even though I don't want to right now and shouldn't need to over the next seven days, I feel nervous that I can't. In fact maybe it's better characterised as vulnerability? Or maybe it's 'feeling exposed'. Regardless, I think I'm slowly being stripped of my ability to control that which perhaps, was never meant to be tamed.*
>
> 9 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK

With the *reality* of an everyday life without clocks slowly dawning, my anxiety manifested in irritability and uneasiness the following day (10 February, time not recorded: Notebook). However, as the day continued and I grew less conscious of my lack of access to clock-time, these feelings gradually dissipated and were replaced with a sense of ease and contentment that for the most part continued to the end of stage three. I reflected that this was grounded in my experience of a new everyday reality in which there was no such thing as *being late*, and which saw me eat when hungry, go to bed when tired and get up when I woke

(14 February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note). I also noted how this reality shaped a different emotional response to familiar events;

> *Unlike most Sundays, there's been no 'I can't believe tomorrow's Monday' weighing heavy on my head. In it's place is a calm acceptance that when I'm tired, I go to bed, and yes the weekend is over, but tomorrow's just another day.*
>
> 13 FEBRUARY 2011, 9.23 PM: BLOG ENTRY

This is not to say that other thoughts and feelings didn't enter during stage three, indeed, there were panics over being late (10 February 2011, time not recorded: notebook; 11 February 2011, time not recorded: voice memo), rogue desires to *check* the time (10 February 2011, 9:49 AM: blog entry; 11 February 2011, 2:12 PM: Notes application; 16 February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note) and at times a heightened awareness of the unreality of the experimental state in which I'd placed myself (13 February 2011, 1.24 PM: voice memo), however, in comparison to the pleasure derived from not having to *keep* time, these other sensations were minimal.

THE SEMIOTICS OF CLOCK-TIME

In addition to the immediate and subjective experience outlined above, the experiment also led me to reflect on my own and indeed other individual's relationship to clocks; in particular *what* and *how* clock-time means. My feelings of ease and contentment which arose for the duration of stage three highlighted my own tendency to *clock-watch*;

> *On a personal level, any feelings of anxiety over my lack of access to clock-time remain absent. I do at times go to look at the clock or ask the time, but always manage to catch myself before I actually do. I'm beginning to realise that this 'checking in' with the clock is purely habit. I don't really need, or even want, to know what the time is.*
>
> 14 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK

Even more revealing was the qualitative value that I would normally assign to what I find. Waking during sleep one night, I noted;

> *It's still very dark outside. Normally this would present a prime opportunity for me to clock-watch. Depending on what I'd find, I'd either feel better about my predicament or worse; either comforted by knowing that there was still time to get a good 'x' hours sleep or distressed that it was already 'x:xx' AM and it was almost time to get up; either thinking that tomorrow could still be salvaged or it would be an awful day...no such access to joy or misery-making tonight.*
>
> 13 FEBRUARY 2011, 6:02 AM: NOTES APPLICATION

As stage three of the experiment progressed my desire to *clock-watch* certainly declined and I even recorded an instance in which I accidentally saw the time but didn't immediately recognise, or bestow upon it, any meaning;

> *I've just accidentally glanced towards the clock and it took me a moment to register what 18:48 meant.*
>
> 14 FEBRUARY 2011, 6:48 PM: POST-IT NOTE

Whilst contemplating my tendency to frequently *check* the time throughout the day, I also reflected on the extent to which I utilise the clock as a tool for procrastination;

> *I've noticed that procrastination has been a lot less of an issue during the active stages of the experiment and it makes me realise the extent to which the clock is the chief enabler of this rather obstructive activity: "Just five more minutes"; "I'll move in ten"; "It's 4:32pm, I'll move at quarter to". I say this, I do this, I lose more time than I save.*
>
> 14 FEBRUARY 2011, 11:21 AM: BLOG ENTRY:

As I began to write up the findings in the very final days of the experiment I did notice that my desire to *clock-watch* returned to an extent. I documented this, reflecting that while it seemed in opposition to my newly established freedom from temporal constraints, the organisational ability of clocks still held sway in my mind;

> *I'm back to the writing; preparing the next paper for my PhD supervision. I am also still undergoing the final stages of the experiment. The combination of the two result in my desire to check the time to gauge how many working seconds/minutes/hours remain in this increasingly darkened day...and yet this is also tempered by my desire to negate this primary desire.*
>
> 16 FEBRUARY 2011, 4:27 PM: BLOG ENTRY

These subjective traits were also echoed in my reflections relating to other individual's ineffectual relationship to clock-time. I noted the extent which notions of good and bad time could impact an individual's mood and go on to shape their behaviour and use of clock-time;

> *I've noticed that indicators of time play a huge role in the organisation of the everyday...even in the scheduling of that which does not need scheduled. Take JK for example, out of the people that I know, he probably has the life that is least dictated by temporal constraints; no need to be at the office for 9am, doesn't need to go home at lunch to feed the dog, doesn't need to pick up the kids from school at 3.30pm. Yet he too makes use of temporal markers to assess his progress throughout the day, saying that "It's only 1 o'clock, that's good" or "I can't believe it's already four, and I've not even started what I wanted to do today". Comments like these come often, and on schedule.*
>
> 15 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK

Also witnessed was how notions of good and bad time are checked and established between individuals. During stage three I had a friend come to visit me. Her first words when I opened the door came were; 'I've been told I've to apologies for being late and holding you back' (14 February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note). Indeed, while this individual didn't feel the immediate pressure of time etiquette, she nonetheless willingly attributed negativity to her lateness based on her partner's understanding of *what* time means. I also located this interpersonal construction of time's meaning in my own understanding of time, most visibly in instances when I was concerned about being late;

> *Yesterday; before, during and even after the tutorials; I felt anxious, sweaty and ill at ease with the prospect of being late. And today, I've experienced the reality of it. I was planning to attend a seminar this afternoon which started at 4:00 PM. At what I*

> *thought was roughly the right time I headed to the venue, only to unintentionally glance the time from the clock on the university tower. It was already 4.25 PM. I didn't go in and instead headed back to the office. I do wonder if maybe I should have went in regardless, to experience the feeling of being 'that person who came in late'. Yet I'll nonetheless feel the shame of being 'that person who didn't show', so perhaps it's not a total loss for locating the threatening and disruptive consequences of living clocklessly.*
>
> 11 FEBRUARY 2011, 5:26 PM: BLOG ENTRY

THE NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC EMBEDDEDNESS OF CLOCK-TIME

During the course of the experiment there were very few occurrences where I actually *lost* clock-time. While I found this highly problematic during stage one of the experiment, I came to realise that it was in fact highly significant. In particular it suggested the extent to which clock-time *is* time in the contemporary city. This sentiment was echoed when I reflected on the extent to which the conventions of clock-time are embedded in everyday life.

Especially noteworthy was the presence and profusion of temporal lexis in everyday language. Despite the fact that I'd isolated many of the physical indicators of clock-time, throughout the course of the experiment I remained largely aware of the time due to the frequency at which individuals made reference to it. Averaging at around five occurrences a day, I documented over sixty instances where different individuals stated the time, quite often unprompted. I also repeatedly came across the need for individuals to translate vague plans into time. During stages one and three I was actively resisting the use of clock-time to organise my day which accordingly resulted in my making approximate or casual plans. Yet this was often met with a desire for formality from other individuals. For example, one day during stage three I sent a text to a friend to tell her I would meet her in about half an hour. She replied;

> *Ok, yip, in about half an hour, so about 10.40 then if that's ok?*
>
> 12 FEBRUARY 2011, 10:07 AM: TEXT MESSAGE

Moreover, there were a couple of instances where some people became irritated when I displayed reluctance to agree to a specific time. For example, one family member got quite impatient when I failed to engage in discussions relating to what time lunch time would be the following day, despite my insistence that I would be at home all day (6 February 2011, 5:21 PM: voice memo).

In addition to this naturalised presence of clock-time, also apparent was the extent to which it was integral to the function of technology. In particular I noticed its pervasive presence on my mobile phone;

> *It is becoming increasingly apparent how difficult it is to block temporal indicators from my mobile phone. Whether a call comes in, I receive a text, or get an email, it is all too easy to see the time. I have of course covered the clock on the home screen, but every action taken by my phone is logged and communicated back to me in real time*
>
> 5 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:54 PM: BLOG ENTRY

The time according to clock-time was also highly visible from the television;

> *Sitting down to have my tea and toast as per my normal routine shows the television to be a prominent keeper of time. I've covered the position of the screen clock on BBC News, but even though there are no clocks on the other channels, they all mark the procession of time at regular intervals. Whether it's to run through the headlines; break for some adverts; transition to the next show; or to report on the weather, the television tells its story in neat little packages, seemingly scheduled for optimum efficiency. I am in two minds whether to avoid it completely or to embrace it as I would normally. But it's really got to be the latter. If I am able to tell the time by the content and running order of the programming, then this is significant. Not least considering the extent to which the TV has replaced the fireplace as the focal point in the modern family home.*
>
> 7 FEBRUARY 2011, 8:46 AM: BLOG ENTRY

Finally, clock-time was also recorded in the rhythm of the city. In stage three of the experiment I spent one day in the city centre, walking and experiencing different spaces and different times in the city. It was clear the extent to which the apparent fluidity of the city aligned to the rigidity of the clock;

> *From the early morning rush, to the lunchtime break, to the evening sprint towards home, clock-time is very much alive in the city centre. While people come and go all day long, the human flow increases, purposes alter, external avatars change and internal characters shift. And all the time the clock ticks onwards.*
>
> 15 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK

CONVENTIONAL TIME RECKONING BY PROXY

The extent to which I experienced clock-time as embedded is further highlighted by considering that not only did I never really lose track of time during the experiment, but that I was able to more or less function in accordance with clock-time without using a clock. This came not only through my familiarity with the rhythms of the city, but also from my familiarity with the routine of those people around me.

From early on in the experiment I was aware that I could take a cue for 'bedtime' from my partner (5 February 2011, 10:19 PM, blog entry) but it was only as the experiment progressed that I begun to grasp the interpersonal nature of my time-reckoning;

> *The temporal infiltrations have been at a minimum today, yet I don't feel I have lost my sense of time at all. I have however noticed the extent to which this feeds off of others around me. While they may of course opt to validate their urges with reference to watches and mobile phones, nonetheless, for me at least, making sense of time has today seemed a very interpersonal activity.*
>
> 7 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:29 PM: BLOG ENTRY

As I grew more aware of this, I realised that I was able use this understanding to allow me to navigate my everyday life more or less *on time*;

> *Thursdays are teaching days for me and while I considered this should dictate that the experiment should start after my commitments, I instead relied on my familiarity with my colleagues' schedules and awoke unaware of the time. I was repeatedly tempted to*

> *check the 'time' before I left the house; feeling increasingly conscious of my desire not to be late to class. But I held true to my decision and when I got into the office and saw that SR and KD had yet to leave for their appointments I realised I wasn't going to be late.*
>
> 10 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK

I also reflected that my newly established method of time-reckoning must still be recognised as making use of conventional clock-time;

> *Of course this method of keeping time of is not without issue and again raises my previous concern over time-reckoning by proxy: while I myself may not be relying on clocks to tell the time, I am depending on my familiarity with the schedules of those around me who are relying on clocks. It also again draws attention to the difficulty of keeping time in the city by modes external to conventional logics. Such findings will no doubt continue to surface over this next week, but I have come to accept that in some way my life without clocks will remain governed by a temporal rhythm which is underpinned by a rationalised system of conceptualising and keeping time.*
>
> 13 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTES APPLICATION

ESCAPE FROM THE CITY?

Over the course of the experiment I did try to develop other methods of time-reckoning and to uncover experiences free from clock-time. Prior to the experiment I held the somewhat naïve notion that where clocks would depart from my everyday life I would grow accustomed to the changes in light. Certain of this I set out to document this over the first five days of stages one and two by taking a photograph each morning so that I could later compare the view from the window to the clock-time. Comparing these now reveals that there was very little difference (see Figure A).

FIGURE A: PHOTOGRAPHS OF MORNING

DAY 1: 8:42 AM | DAY 2: 9:05 AM | DAY 3: 9:15 AM | DAY 4: 10:01 AM | DAY 5: 9.16 AM

Despite my inability to convene with a more *natural* indicator of time, there was one standout example in which clock-time was largely absent in the city. During the weekend of stage three, a friend and I went shopping to a purpose built centre on the edge of the city. Writing about this after the experience I reflected on the extent to which conventional methods of time-reckoning were more difficult to detect in this artificial location;

> *Not immediately, but as our trip progressed, it struck me that there was a distinct lack of access to conventional methods of time-reckoning. Firstly, there were no clocks. Admittedly I was initially trying to avoid exchanging glances with any sort of timepiece, but becoming increasingly aware of their absence I began to seek them out. The result: there are no public clocks in this shopping centre; at least none that revealed themselves to me. Secondly, the enclosed and indoor nature of the space made it difficult*

to sense the day's progression by natural light. The sky was particularly overcast, but when we finally emerged from the car park it was dark outside. An interesting counterpoint to the artificial light inside the centre which remained static throughout the day.

Where these modes were lacking, some others took their place. We went for a lunch not dictated by lunchtime, but by when we were hungry. I was careful not to alert AF to my experiment; it sufficed to agree that we were both ready to eat. When we arrived at our chosen eating location I was surprised by the lack of patrons. No need to queue; no need to watch for a seat. It certainly wasn't lunchtime, but it was time for lunch. The various restaurants and cafes in the centre also provided further cues; as the day got older their busyness increased. This was particularly noticeable by the increase in sound; the pervasive hum of conversation and the clinking of crockery and cutlery. The temporal nature of these activities was further evident from the content of plates; soups, sandwiches and salads for lunch; and afternoon tea for, well, afternoon tea. Yet despite this, and unlike any other space I've experienced while conducting this experiment, it was incredibly easy to lose time here. Indeed, AF arrived home late for her evening plans.

12 FEBRUARY 2011, 7:36 PM: BLOG ENTRY

Appendix Three

ENTERING THE CANON: APPLICATION OF METHOD

READING LISTS

To ascertain which reading lists would be suitable for examination it was considered appropriate to look to the universities which presented as dominant. Markers of *top* academic institutions, such as the *Times Higher Education Annual University Rankings* (*THE*), and prestigious groupings, such as *The Ivy League*, seemed like the obvious place to locate this search. Starting with these two sources, data was gathered of universities included in such lists. Looking first at *The Ivy League*, a list was created of the universities who had membership of this grouping. In searching to confirm the members of *The Ivy League*, a number of other prestige groupings emerged as potentially pertinent, namely, *Ivy League Plus*, *The Russell Group*, *Universitas 21*, *Group of Eight* and *U15*. Universities who were affiliated with one or more of these groupings were compiled in a table under the headings UNIVERSITY NAME, LOCATION, and MEMBERSHIP OF. In total fifty-seven institutions were recorded in this search.

The search then moved to examine institutions who frequented the *THE* rankings. Data was included from 2004 (when the results were first recorded) to 2011/12 (the most recent results). In compiling this data the top 100 entires from 2004-2011/12 were copied from *THE* website and pasted into table retaining the *THE* headings of WORLD RANK, INSTITUTION, LOCATION and OVERALL SCORE. This produced a total of 800 entries. The table was checked through manually to ensure that each institution was identified by its correct given name and that locations were of the same format. The table was then sorted alphabetically by institution name, and only those with four or more appearances on the table between 2004-2011/12 were kept. The table was again sorted alphabetically by institution and rankings for each institution over the eight year period were combined to give an average. For institutions that did not rank in the top 100 consecutively over eight years, absent years were marked as 'not ranked' under WORLD RANK and a score of '101' was entered at OVERALL SCORE. A further column was added (AVERAGE SCORE), and a formula entered to calculate the average score for each institution, rounded to the nearest whole number.

Its existence being detected whilst conducting the above, attention then moved to consider the ranking of the *Top 50 Social Science Universities 2011/12*, also published by *THE*. A new table was created, combining headings from the previous two and adding a column titled SOCIAL SCIENCE SCORE. Into this the 2011/12 rankings were entered. A further three columns were added, titled NO OF PRESTIGE INDICATORS, PRESTIGE INDICATORS and WEBSITE. Entered into these fields was the number of prestige groupings each university

held affiliation to, the name of these groupings, and a direct hyperlink for each university's home webpage. To help identify not only the top institutions but those who ranked highly in relation to urban studies, a further three measures of excellence in urban research and theory were considered: *The 10 Best Graduate Programmes in Urban and Regional Planning* from *The Best Colleges*; *Planetizen's 2012 Top 10 Planning Programmes*; and *Town and Country Planning Unit* from the *2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)*. Where present, data was entered for each university under the appropriate headings of BEST COLLEGES, PLANETIZEN and RAE.

The universities selected for potential examination were based on a geographic spread dictated by the relative percentage of locations in *THE* World University Rankings 2011/12. This resulted in twenty institutions spread across six areas: USA(9), UK(4), EU (2), Canada(2), Australia(2) and Other(1). Based on this spread, universities were selected from each area that ranked strongly across each of measures. A strong result in the WORLD RANK column and at least one entry at PRESTIGE INDICATORS was necessary, after which each institution was considered on its relative merits. The group of twenty was then reduced to ten by identifying those which had the strongest urban studies programmes. This was achieved by individually entering each university's name followed by "urban studies" into Google. Course descriptions were read, and those with a broader theoretical focus, rather than a planning or practice focus, were given preference.

The process then moved to identify relevant courses and request reading lists from ten institutions: University of Melbourne; Cornell University; University College London; University of Pennsylvania; University of California; Los Angeles, University of Toronto; University of Amsterdam; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; University of Manchester; University of Glasgow. This process was conducted from the home page on each university's own website. For each institution, "Urban Studies" was entered into the search box on the home page and the most pertinent departments were examined in order to identify available urban studies degree programmes (undergraduate and postgraduate) and courses within them. A new table was created with relevant information entered under the headings of UNIVERSITY NAME, LOCATION, WEBSITE, and SUMMARY OF RANKINGS ACROSS INDICATORS. Columns titled DEPARTMENT, DEGREE DESCRIPTION, CORE COURSES, and NOTES were also added, into which details pertinent to the above search were recorded. From the data gathered the most foundational course from each degree programme was selected and the ten universities were contacted via email (with letter attached) requesting access to their reading lists for their respective courses.

EDITED COLLECTIONS

Two search engines were used to find key edited collections in the field of urban studies: *Google Books* and *Worldcat*. Starting with *Google Books*, keywords stemming from the research problem defined throughout the thesis were identified and applied in various combinations, further refined through the use of boolean operators. Searches were conducted via the home page with all variants of "Urban (Boolean OR) City (Boolean AND) studies; theory; culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems" entered, yielding a total of

sixteen search strings. For each search string returned, details of the first twenty entries were copied and pasted into a table under the headings TITLE, EDITORS and RELEVANCE. The table was manually formatted and sorted alphabetically by TITLE in order to delete any duplicates. Each item was then individually examined to consider its relevance to the intended search parameters and those deemed non-related were deleted.

Following completion of the *Google Books* search, attention moved to *Worldcat*. Searches were conducted from the 'advanced search' window. Using the same keywords and Boolean operators, the following options were additionally selected from drop-down menus: "Audience = non-juvenile; Content = non-fiction; Format = Book; Language = English". The results from each search string were sorted by "relevance" and the first fifty entries were saved to a private *Worldcat* list named after the variable search term (i.e studies; theory; culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems). Following the completion of the searches, the eight lists were downloaded as comma-separated Value file (.csv) and the content of each pasted into a single table under the following headings OLCL NUMBER, TITLE, EDITOR(S) PUBLICATION INFORMATION and NOTES. The data was sorted by arranging OLCL NUMBER in ascending order, and duplicates were combined to create one entry for each title, recording the number of searches the item had been returned in an additional column VARIABLE(S). The data was then sorted alphabetically by TITLE and duplicates were again combined. Working from the data in the table and each items' information page on *Worldcat*, each item was considered for relevance and its applicability to the intended search parameters. Out of 245 items, only thirty-four were retained as specific to the search.

At this point both the *Google Books* and *Worldcat* tables were combined in a single document, with duplicates combined. For each entry, further columns were added, indicating the NO OF EDITIONS, and the YEARS PUBLISHED and PUBLICATION INFORMATION for each edition. The number of editions recorded for each item did not include the number of print runs or different formats, but was strictly limited to the number of edited revisions. To ascertain this information, details held by *Worldcat* and *Google Books* was considered, alongside other sources such as Amazon and the University of Glasgow online library catalogue where necessary. This produced a total of thirty-eight items. Of these items, only those items published after 1990 were retained, reducing the list of titles to twenty-one.

To compile more specific information about each title two new tables were created. The first table, **TITLES**, had eight headings: PUBLICATION TITLE, EDITOR(S), EDITION, PUBLICATION DETAILS, NO OF EDITIONS, WEB LINK, SECTIONS, and PRODUCT DESCRIPTION. The second table, **CONTENTS**, duplicated the first seven of these headings, replacing PRODUCT DESCRIPTION with CHAPTER TITLE and AUTHOR. To populate these tables, information from the *Worldcat* entry for each title (and each edition) was examined, and where the PRODUCT DESCRIPTION and contents were available online, they were copied and pasted into the relevant fields, and formatted to maintain consistency. Where the information wasn't available electronically, hard copies of the titles were

obtained from The University of Glasgow library (in some cases via interlibrary lending), and the data was inputed manually. In all cases, the data entered was checked against a hard-copy for any errors or inaccuracies.

CITATIONS

So as not to get bogged down in analytic debates, it was decided that citation counts alone would suffice to establish the those urban studies articles which were the most cited and arguably therefore, the most dominant. To access this information two indexes were selected from a wide range of paid for and free services: *Social Science Citation Index accessed* via *Web of Knowledge (WoK)* and *Google Scholar*.

The search proceeded first by way of *Google Scholar*. Using the same keywords used in the edited collection search, all variations of "Urban (Boolean OR) City (Boolean AND) studies; theory; culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems" were entered, yielding a total of sixteen search strings. For each search string returned, the first twenty entries were copied and pasted into a table, and manually formatted to retain information of AUTHOR, ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS. The table was sorted alphabetically by ARTICLE TITLE in order to find and delete any duplicates, and then ranked in descending order of NO OF CITATIONS. Attention then moved to consider the relevance of each entry in closer detail, seeing the further addition of two columns headed RELEVANCE and NOTES. Fields were completed to indicate whether the texts returned were applicable to the intended search parameters, and if not, why not.

At this stage the search moved to *WoK*. This method necessarily relied heavily on the level of specification that could be altered in the engine itself. At the home page "urban" was entered into the first search box and "topic" selected from the drop-down menu beside it. The search was limited initially by expanding the menu under "citation databases" and selecting only "Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) - 1898-present" . For the 83,506 entires that were returned, the parameters were further refined by eliminating non-relevant subject areas from the results. Of 100 subject areas offered under "Web of Science Categories", only nine were retained: Urban Studies; Geography; Planning Development; Sociology; Social Issues; Political Science; Social Sciences Interdisciplinary; Anthropology. The results were sorted by "Times Cited -- highest to lowest" and the first one hundred records were exported as a rich text format (.rtf) document. After manually formatting each entry, the contents were copied and pasted into a table under the headings AUTHOR, ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS, RELEVANCE and NOTES. As with the *Google Scholar* search, each entry was examined independently to assess its applicability to the intended search parameters.

Following the completion of these two searches, the results from each were combined into a single table under the headings AUTHOR, ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS (WOK), NO OF CITATIONS (WOK), COMBINED SCORES (AVERAGE), RELEVANCE and NOTES. Entries were manually checked to ensure that they were formatted to the same standard, and results

were sorted alphabetically by ARTICLE TITLE. Entries that were returned under both searches were then combined as a single entry and the average of the two citation scores was calculated and entered into COMBINED SCORES (AVERAGE) and ranked in descending order. A further two columns were added to the table headed KEYWORDS and ABSTRACT. The abstracts and keyword for the top thirty highest ranking entires were entered into the table where applicable and, where available, a copy of the text was obtained.

DOMINANT TEXTS

In order to ascertain the texts, categories and authors most dominant, a content analysis was performed on various items of text which were gathered throughout the stages described above. From Reading lists, this data included: COURSE DESCRIPTION, PUBLICATION TITLE and AUTHOR From Edited Collections, this included data entered at PUBLICATION TITLE, PRODUCT DESCRIPTION, SECTIONS, CHAPTER TITLE and AUTHOR. From Citations: ARTICLE TITLE, ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS, and AUTHOR. From each table the pertinent column was selected, formatted to remove any punctuation and to ensure a uniformity of data, then pasted into Textmechanic, an online word frequency counter. To avoid an over saturation of non-relevant terms, the programme was instructed to ignore 136 common words in the search[23]. It was also selected that it should highlight the terms "time, times, temporal, temporality, temporalities, temporalization, space, spaces, spatial, spatiality, spatialities and spatialization" in the results. In addition to these quantitive outputs, word clouds which visually illustrated the relative dominance of these texts were made by entering the same text into Worditout, an online word cloud generator. The option was again taken to remove 136 of the most common words.

Reader, *urban* and *city* unsurprisingly ranked highest in word count for titles amongst the edited collections, but out with these broad descriptions, terms diverged into more focused areas. There were a number of titles that specialised in *sociological*, *geographical* and *cultural* perspectives of the city. There were also single instances of urban readers framed from *communication*, *globalisation*, *political* and *cybercities* issues. In the product descriptions, *culture*, *social* and *geography* were again prominent, but were accompanied closely by *politics*, *theory*, *planning* and *history*. Across these descriptions there was also sufficient reference made to the inclusion of specific prominent authors, including: Manuel Castells, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford and Saskia Sassen. Within the descriptions, there were ten references to spatial modes of analysis in comparison to three references to *time*. On closer inspection two of these instances were idiomatic, with the third suggesting a need to understand democracy and citizenship in spite of the fact that "urban politics may change over time" (Strom and Mollenkopf, 2006).

Like the product descriptions, the section headings of these texts revealed a more detailed account of historical and contemporary conceptualisations of the city. After *culture*, *politics* and *planning* ranked amongst the most regularly occurring frames of inquiry across the readers. Also common were sections focusing specifically on *space*, *design*, *gender* and *economy*.

Within these section headings there were eleven spatial references, and only one reference to *time* in a section in *The Cultural Studies Reader* entitled "Space and Time" (During, 1993).

The chapter headings in the vast majority of instances (over 97%) remained as the title of the original text. Unlike the section headings, which were editorially titled, arguably these would be expected to appeal to a more diverse range of common terms; less dominated by synthesised issues. However, after *city* and *urban*, *space*, *planning* and *global* remained highly dominant. Within the chapter headings, spatial terms appeared in seventy-eight separate titles, compared to two references to *time*. A number of authors were frequently included across the readers. In addition to Manuel Castells, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford and Saskia Sassen, who were already highlighted as prominent in the product descriptions, David Harvey, Susan Fainstein, Sharon Zukin and Edward Soja appeared most prominently.

In the citations search, the titles of journal articles appeared much more varied than those included in edited collections. While *urban* again dominated, there was a reduced inclusion of alternative terms such as *city* and *cities*. Out with the urban, terms including *poverty*, *social*, *black*, *crime*, *neighborhood* and *space* ranked as the most common. There were eight articles that included spatial terms in comparison to one that mentioned *time*, and it should be noted that this was in reference to a longitudinal study. The abstracts portrayed a much more diverse range of topics and conceptualisations, with *scale*, *economic*, *geographical*, *neoliberalism* and *industrial* each appearing in approximately 10% of the articles. *Political*, *space*, *disorder* and *growth* were similarly common. There were ten references to spatial conceptualisations in comparison to only one reference to "change over time" (Morenoff and Sampson, 1997: 31). *From Managerialism To Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation In Urban Governance In Late Capitalism* (Harvey, 1989) was the article most cited, followed by *Neoliberalizing Space* (Peck and Tickell, 2002) and *Systematic Social Observation Of Public Spaces: A New Look At Disorder In Urban Neighborhoods* (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). However, amongst the top one hundred, Robert J. Sampson, Jamie Peck and James McCarthy were the most cited authors overall, each with 3 texts (co-authored and single authored) in the list.

notes

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[23] Words and terms ignored in the search: a; also; am; an; and; are; aren't; as; at; be; been; but; by; can; can't; cannot; could; couldn't; did; didn't; do; does; doesn't; don't; down; e.g.; for; from; get; gets; got; had; hadn't; has; hasn't; have; haven't; he; he'd; he'll; he's; her; him; his; how; however; I; i.e.; I'd; I'll; I'm; I've; if; in; into; is; isn't; it; it's; its; may; me; might; mine; must; mustn't; must've; my; no; not; of; off; on; or; our; ours; out; shall; she; she'd; she'll; she's; should; shouldn't; so; such; than; that; that's; the; their; theirs; them; then; there; there's; these; they; they'd; they'll; they're; they've; this; those; thus; to; too; up; us; very; was; wasn't; we; we'd; we'll; we're; we've; were; what; when; where; which; who; why; will; with; won't; would; wouldn't; you; you'd; you'll; you're; you've; your; yours.

Appendix Four

ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ETHICS COMMITTEE

Detailed in this appendix is my engagement with the University of Glasgow's Ethics Committee. The first section outlines the issues I had with the standard application form. The activity of compiling these concerns was what prompted my engagement with the committee over how I should apply. The numerical headings used in this section refer to those used on the form (which can be viewed at pages 264–271 of this appendix). The second section of this appendix reproduces my initial correspondence with the committee. The remaining sections provide copies of my applications to the committee and their responses.

CONCERNS WITH FORM

I believed that the following items required problematisation:

- Title of the form
  "College Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects: EAP1 - Application for Ethical Approval". The fact that it is applicable to research which involves human subjects means that it should be applicable to my work.

- 2.3A Research Methodology and Data Collection
  Data isn't gathered solely through pre-specified methods, even if one claims this to be the case. Also, "Other (please provide details - maximum 50 words)" - this isn't sufficient space in which to describe the methods of this project.

- 2.3B Research Methods
  The ethical considerations of this project aren't discussable via the form. Key areas, in my project, which should be given ethical consideration are: self; Others; truth; culture.

- 2.4 Confidentiality and Data Handling
  I again cannot discuss my concerns via the form. The data 'exists' largely in my head. Furthermore, I cannot anonymise the data to the point that it becomes meaningless. It also seems too simplistic to assume, and dangerous to suggest to students and staff, that it is possible to assure "confidentiality of data" for any participant. In making research findings meaningful the researcher contextualises and connects their account, thereby making visible some of the relationships which their subject(s) inhabit. Making visible these relationships also has the potential to reveal the identity of those who inhabit them. Raising the issue of confidentiality in such an absolute way could give a false sense of security to researchers, making them remiss of the range of ways that they may inadvertently reveal the identities of their participants.

- 2.6A Dissemination of Results
  Cannot foresee the lifecycle of our work. Again, too simplistic and encourages researchers to view research as a series of discrete projects.

- 2.7 Participants
  The participant is me, but there is no space to record this on the form. Furthermore, the self is constituted through Others, therefore, even though I am the sole participant, there are ethical considerations applicable to the Others which are implicated in my work.

- 2.7E Dependant Relationship
  It is likely to be those Others with whom I share my closest relationships with that are the key characters in my work, arising from their relational proximity to me. I'm not sure what steps could be taken to ensure that their participation is purely voluntary. Seems like any subject's participation would be always be influenced by the research relationship in one way or another. And of course it is ethical to try and address the inherent power imbalance in this relationship, but to suggest that it can be eradicated again seems overly simplistic, and ultimately runs the risk of making researchers blind to the presence of power (and their power) within research practices.

- 2.7F Location of Research
  Research is not an on/off process and as such it cannot be linked to a finite series of locations.

- 2.9 Informed Consent
  How can I be considered to be in a position to fully inform my research subjects when I myself am not fully aware (in some sense, informed) of the full reach of my work?

- 2.9A Plain Language Statement
  Doesn't recognise the potential ethical issues arising from changing the 'language' of something. This is a reductive process, and so how can this be presented as unproblematic and necessary part of gaining 'informed consent'?

- 2.5C Retention and Disposal of Personal Data; 4 Health and Safety; 5 UK and Scottish Government Legislation.
  Topics such as these above demonstrate the conflation of ethical considerations with those which would be better described as health and safety, and legal concerns. These things shouldn't be presented on the from, which is titled as the "Application From for Ethical Approval". Doing so suggests that ethical concerns are similar, if not the same as, ensuring compliance with best practice and applicable legislation of the day.

- 6 Declarations by Researcher(s) and Supervisor(s)
  This following suggests that research is a neat, contained process:

  "I understand that **no** research work involving human participants or data collection can commence until **full** ethical approval has been given by the either the School Ethics Forum (UG & PGT students only) or the College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee (for PGR students and Staff)"

  Furthermore:

  "I have read the University's current human ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures set out in the attached application in accordance with the guidelines, the University's Code of Conduct for Research and any other condition laid down by the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee and the College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee […] I and my co-researcher(s) or supporting staff have the appropriate qualifications, experience and facilities to conduct the research set out in the attached application and to deal effectively with any emergencies and contingencies related to the research that may arise".

These seem to be about entering into a contract with the researcher in which they are liable for their own ethical conduct. This is, in a sense, fully appropriate. However, when the only ethical guidance is delivered via a form that is unethical, the reality of the process of applying for ethical research becomes clearer: this is not a process designed to ensure the ethical conduct of researchers, it is a way for the university to safeguard themselves against potential legal ramifications.

Overall I had a number of concerns beyond the individual items on the form. I understood that the form may be suitable for some projects. If, for example, a researcher was doing a survey in a fixed location and were to analyse those results at another fixed location, they would likely be able to discuss their work in the manner dictated by the form. However, three problems lingered:

- It is the most simple types of work that this form is geared towards, likely to be those projects that perhaps pose little ethical concern when viewed within the narrow parameters of the project.
- The language and categories of the form leads the researcher to only view their work in this narrow sense, and doesn't encourage a broader ethical engagement with their topic and research project.
- The naturalisation of forms like these within the academy and within individual's research careers means that when a research project is being conducted that may have very pressing, broader ethical concerns, the researcher isn't aware of these, nor would they be in a position to deal with them.

INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ETHICS COMMITTEE

- 18 November 2011
  Dear Dr Valentina Bold,

  I am contacting you in relation to your role as the College Ethics Officer and it is from that position that I hope you can assist. My name is Lisa Bradley and I am an Urban Studies PhD student in the School of Social and Political Science, under the supervision of Ms Annette Hastings and Dr Libby Porter. It is my intention to commence the research stages of my PhD in the coming months and accordingly I have been preparing a submission for ethical review. As per the Committee's guidance, I have attempted to engage with the five stages for making an application. Whilst I have successfully completed step one, I am having difficulty proceeding past step two as I am unable to discuss pertinent ethical concerns relevant to my study using the proforma provided.

  To give some background, the topic of my PhD relates to processes of cultural construction in the contemporary city and their relation to the framing and concrete manifestation of social malaises prevalent throughout this context. My approach to this issue is meta-theoretical: I am seeking to comment on the dominant ways in which urban theorists and researchers understand, analyse and approach urban problems. Specifically, I posit that time and temporality are crucial yet contingent factors in the formation of urban culture, but consider that these features have been largely naturalised in the contemporary era. My aim is to uncover some of the ways in which the socially constructed nature of time has become invisible in academic discourse and in everyday life, in order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the organisation of urban society which warrant detailed future study.

In pursuit of this thesis I intend to use three methods: autoethnography, textual analysis and a spatio/temporal comparative case study. While there are ethical considerations relevant to each of these methods, it is with the first method - autoethnography - that I am experiencing particular difficulty. Autoethnography is a method aimed at opening up and exploring the peculiarity of one's own culture, therefore I am the primary human subject and sole "participant" of this research. However, recognising that I am constituted through other people with whom I come into contact (both regularly and uniquely), non-participating individuals are also necessarily implicated in my work. For example, while I write about my perception of time, my perception is not mine alone but is constituted intersubjectively; when I write about my day, the activity of those around me not only shapes my reflections, but these individuals are key characters in my experience of culture and are recorded as such. This means that ethical considerations should extend to these other, non-participating subjects, however, I am unable to address such points via the suggested method for review. This is just one area of difficulty - there are quite a few others for which the criteria on the proforma are similarly insufficient for the nature of my research.

To enable me to proceed in an appropriate and ethical manner, I wonder if I could seek clarification and guidance on a couple of points:

1) Am I correct in thinking that as my work involves human subjects (participating and non-participating) and data that is not publicly available, that my research falls within the remit of the College Ethics Committee and that my submission for review should seek to engage with the full range of ethical concerns relevant?

2a) If so, could you outline a way in which I can submit my project for ethical review and fully engage with the ethical concerns, that will also satisfy the College Ethics Committee's Terms of Reference?

2b) If not, would you be able to point me to the appropriate mechanisms to ensure that my research is given adequate ethical consideration by me, the researcher, and also the institution from which I conduct my research?

As outlined above, I have discussed these concerns in full with my supervisors and we are in agreement that I should seek guidance from the College Ethics Committee before proceeding. Should you require any further information, please don't hesitate to get in touch.

Yours sincerely,

Lisa Bradley

- 18 Nov 20111
  Dear Lisa Bradley,

  Thank you for your e-mail and for outlining the issues therein: it is an interesting set of questions. I see the dilemma of drawing on personal experience, but on the formative impact of other people. The main question to ask is: will you be quoting/describing from observation the speech/action of others? If so, then I think you should submit an ethical application; you mention 'recording' the experiences of others—does this imply covert observation, or will you be asking consent to do so? I would certainly advise the latter and that, again, means an ethical approval is necessary.

I think the safest way is to submit a formal application, in consultation with your supervisors which, at the least, will assist you in clarifying your own ethical understanding of your methodology and, at the best, will protect the interests of the individuals whose opinions you are drawing on.

I am copying in Terri Hume so that the correspondence will be noted and, if you need further information, please give me a call: my direct line is 01387 702021, although next week I am away from the office a great deal, as we have a conference on site—I will still, however, be checking e-mail regularly.

With all best wishes, and good luck with what sounds like a very fruitful approach,

Valentina Bold

- 18 November 2011
  Dear Dr Bold,

  Many thanks for the promptness of your reply. I very much agree that the appropriate step is for me to submit an application for ethical review, as do my supervisors. The main issue I'm having is that the standard method of submission - the application form made available at http://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/info/students/ethics/forms/ - does not allow me to discuss the range of ethical considerations relevant to my PhD, nor to outline my intended approach to mitigate these issues. There is indeed the potential for me to quote/describe from observation, the behaviour of Others. However, the exploratory nature and non-limited range of an autoethnographic approach means that these Others are unknown to me until they present, thus they would not be classified as "participants" under the criteria set out on the proforma. I have given my response to the ethical dilemma just outlined (and others relevant to my PhD) considerable attention over the past few weeks, however, there is no way for me to communicate my intended approach through the current application form. Might you be able to suggest an alternative method which will allow me to submit a formal application that fully articulates the ethical dimensions of my project, and that will also satisfy the requirements of the Ethics Committee?

  All best and many thanks,

  Lisa

- 19 Nov 2011
  Dear Lisa why don't you complete the form as best you can and add a coda in the form of an explanatory note similar to your explanation here? You do not need to name participants if you cannot but an indication of number and types would be useful. Best wishes Valentina

CONTINUED OVER /

INITIAL APPLICATION TO ETHICS COMMITTEE

Application No. (Office use only) _____

University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

COLLEGE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR NON-CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
EAP1: APPLICATION FORM FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL

This application form should be typed, and submitted electronically. All questions must be answered. "not applicable" is a satisfactory answer where appropriate. (NB: In Word format, click on shaded area within box to enter text, the boxes will expand accordingly). Applications should be submitted at least one month in advance of the intended start date for the data collection to allow time for review and any amendments that may be required.

1. Applicant Details

1.1 Project Title:

The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban malaise in the contemporary city.

1.2 Name of Applicant:

Lisa Bradley

1.3 Matriculation or Staff Number:

0108279

1.4 School/Subject/Cluster/RKT Group:

School of Social and Political Science/Urban Studies

1.5 This Project Is:

Staff Research Project		Postgraduate Research	x	Programme Conveners Only: Project within a PGT or UG programme	
Postgraduate Taught		Undergraduate			

1.6 Programme Title:

PhD Urban Studies

1.7 Comments from Supervisors:

Comment on the research ethics risks involved in the project:

Lisa's research poses very little 'risk' to herself as the primary research participant , and very little other kind of risk to the various 'non-participating Others' she outlines here. Her application represents an extremely thoughtful and deeply ethically informed approach to research. Her approach stretches, and indeed challenges, the assumptions built into procedural approaches to ethics, and this is intended as a genuine attempt to work through the issues arising from and thorugh her research as she sees them. This is why we as supervisors fully support her unusual approach in this application, as a means of more insightfully engaging with the ethical dilemmas she sees present in her work.

Supervisor's Name: Dr Libby Porter Date: 20 December 2011

1.8 Researcher(s) (and Supervisor(s) where appropriate):

Researcher(s)

TITLE & SURNAME	FIRST NAME	PHONE	EMAIL (This MUST be a University of Glasgow e-mail address)
Miss Bradley	Lisa	0141 422 1246 07791 757891	L.Bradley.1@research.gla.ac.uk

Supervisor(s) (where applicable)

TITLE & SURNAME	FIRST NAME	PHONE	EMAIL
Dr Porter	Libby	0141 330 3664	Libby.Porter@glasgow.ac.uk
Ms Hastings	Annette	0141 330 6275	Annette.Hastings@glasgow.ac.uk
Dr Franks	Benjamin	01387 702055	Benjamin.Franks@glasgow.ac.uk

1.9 External funding details:

Note. If this project is externally funded, please provide the name of the sponsor or funding body.

Urban Studies Journal

2. Project/Participant Details

2.1 Start date for your data collection and end date of your research project:

	(dd/mm/yy)		(dd/mm/yy)
From:	31/ January/2012	To:	31/June/2014

2.2 Justification for the Research (use no more than 100 words):

Why is this research significant to the wider community? Outline the reasons which lead you to be satisfied that the possible benefits to be gained from the project justify any risks or discomfort involved.

The prominence afforded to spatial analyses of urban issues can be seen to overlook and marginalise the extent to which time too is a significant medium in constructing the city culture. With spatial analyses thus unable to capture the complexity of urban life, policy which emerges from such accounts could be ill-informed, perhaps ineffective, and almost certainly incomplete. A need therefore exists within urban studies, and arguably in the broader academy, to move beyond an overwhelmingly spatial understanding of urban issues and to explore the processes of social and cultural construction via a temporal lens.

2.3 Research Methodology and Data Collection

2.3A Method of data collection (Tick as many as apply):

Questionnaire (attach a copy)	
Online Questionnaire (provide the address: http://_____)	
Interviews (attach a copy of discussion guide/proposed questions)	
Participant observation (attach an observation proforma)	
Audio or video-taping interviewees or events (with consent)	
Focus Group (attach proposed questions and recording format)	
Other (please provide details - maximum 50 words): Documents that are not publicly available: Course reading lists will be requested from prominent academic institutions in order to examine the texts which present as the urban studies canon. Autoethnography: Audio recording; Video recording; Journaling; Blogging; Note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; mobile phone applications; post-it notes); Morning pages (stream-of-consciousness writing upon waking); Photographs; Voice memos; Personal communications (such as emails and text messages); Drawing/sketching. Please refer to appendix A for further detail on how these methods differ from the categories offered above.	x

2

2.3B Research Methods:

Please explain the reason for the particular chosen method, the estimated time commitment required of participants and how the data will be analysed (use no more than 250 words).

AUTOETHNOGRAPHY: Autoethnography will be used throughout the study in three main ways. First, to achieve integrity of methods and approach, and to more fully inform the findings and analysis of the other research methods, I will use a reflexive approach. This will document the position from which I approach this PhD and reflect on the reasons I arrived at the topic in the first place. It will be autobiographical in part, but will also recognise the manner in which I am shaped by Others. Embracing personal thoughts, feelings, stories and observations will lead to a more nuanced understanding of the social context in which I and the topic are situated, and it will shed light on my interactions with the research, making them visible for the reader. Second, in order to chart my own transformation, I will conduct a narrative autoethnography. The everyday experience of thinking, reading, writing about time has been and will continue to be reflected on throughout the PhD, with a particular focus on how I have changed with regards to how I interpret reality and everyday life in respect of my understanding of what time is. Finally, in order to see how I can 'play' with conventions of time and still make sense of everyday life, experimental autoethnography will be used. This will be similar to the narrative method, but conducted under experimental conditions in which the experience of specific temporalities are investigated, for example, time after meditation; while on holiday; urban and rural time; and the same space at different times.

RHIZOMATIC TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: To trace and establish the presence and subordination of time within this canon, textual analysis will be conducted on dominant texts. To examine those texts which present as dominant, course reading lists (which may not be publicly available) will be requested from prominent academic institutions. Under the metaphor of the rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), texts are not isolated units of meaning, but rather, are assemblages that function within a context or contexts; connecting with other texts, institutions, contexts, and audiences, and constantly changing through these connections. This approach will develop an understanding of where, when and how time has been naturalised in the academy, and beyond and is complementary to the autoethnographic method which views the researcher and the research as rhizomatic (with multiple and contradictory reasons for approaching a particular topic and multiple and contradictory interpretations arising from the data).

DATA ANALYSIS: Data will be analysed discretely as described above and also rhizomatically across the three methods in order to consider the impact of time's naturalisation on understandings and approaches to contemporary urban problems and to comment on the necessary conditions for future temporal research.

TIME COMMITMENT: This work is largely theoretical and whilst there is an empirical aspect to the autoethnography, I am the sole participant in this method. I am a full-time PhD student and I am fully committed to this project in that capacity. Other than my supervisors, there will be no time-commitment required from any other individuals.

2.4 Confidentiality & Data Handling

2.4A Will the research involve (Tick all that apply):

Participants consent to being named?	x	Please note, as outlined above this research employs only one participant: me. However, whilst I am the sole participant, other non-participating individuals will be implicated by this work. For details of how I intend to make reference to these Others in an ethical way, please see appendix A.
De-identified samples or data (i.e. a reversible process whereby identifiers are replaced by a code, to which the researcher retains the key, in a secure location)?		
Participants being referred to by pseudonym in any publication arising from the research?		
Anonymised samples or data (i.e. an irreversible process whereby identifiers are removed from data and replaced by a code, with no record retained of how the code relates to the identifiers. It is then impossible to identify the individual to whom the sample of information relates)?		
Complete anonymity of participants (i.e. researchers will not meet, or know the identity of participants, as participants are part of a random sample and are required to return responses with no form of personal identification)?		
Any other method of protecting the privacy of participants? (eg. use of direct quotes with specific, written permission only; use of real name with specific, written permission only)		
If "any other method of protecting the privacy of participants", please provide more details:		

2.4B Which of the following methods of assuring confidentiality of data will be implemented? (Tick all that apply):

Data to be kept in locked filing cabinets	x
Data and identifiers to be kept in separate, locked filing cabinets	
Access to computer files to be available by password only	x
Storage at University of Glasgow	x
Stored at another site (please provide details, including address):	Private residence: 2/1 6 Leven Street, Pollokshields, Glasgow, G41 2JQ. Also, please see appendix A.

2.5 Access to Data/Dissemination

2.5A Access by named researcher(s) and, where applicable, supervisor(s) and examiner(s):

Yes

2.5B Access by people other than named researcher(s)/supervisor(s)/examiner(s):

Please explain by whom and for what purpose

N/A

2.5C Retention and Disposal of Personal Data:

The 5th Principle of the Data Protection Act (1998) states that personal data must not be kept for longer than is necessary based on the purpose for which it was initially collected. Please state when and how you intend to destroy the data you have collected.

Non-publicly available documents:
The course reading lists that are requested from other prominent academic institutions will be destroyed within a year of completing the PhD research. Paper documents will be destroyed by a mechanical shredder and digital files will be deleted and irreversibly corrupted using digital document shredding software.

Autoethnographic data:
This data will not be destroyed. The fifth principle states that “If personal data have been recorded because of a relationship between the data controller and the data subject, the need to keep the information should be considered when the relationship ceases to exist”. As I am both the data controller and the data subject there will be no point at when the relationship no longer exists. Furthermore, as I believe that I may make use of this autoethnographic data in future research, in compliance with the conditions set at Section 33: “personal data may be kept indefinitely despite the Fifth Data Protection Principle”.

2.6 Dissemination of Results. (NB: Take account of age appropriateness of participants)

2.6A Results will be made available to participants as:

Written summary of results to all		Copy of final manuscript presented if requested	
Verbal presentation to all (information session, debriefing etc.)		Presentation to representative participants (eg. CEO, school principal)	
Dissertation		Other or None of the Above Please explain: N/A, but please see appendix A	x

2.6B Results will be made available to peers and/or colleagues as (tick all that apply):

Dissertation	x	Journal article(s)	x
Thesis (e.g. PhD)	x	Book	x
Submission	x	Conference papers	x

Other or None of the Above. Please explain: It would not be consistent with the philosophical positioning of this work to produce a single objective textual document. I believe that there is an ethical imperative for this thesis to move beyond a conventional form in order to better capture the confusion, contradiction, and inconsistencies inherent in its production, and to also challenge the norms implied and stabilised through a conventional linear narrative, a textual means of representation, and the truth status that is awarded and transmitted via this form. To accompany the written thesis, I intend to present this work in at least one other form. The exact parameters are unknown at present and will be allowed to emerge during the research process, however, this alternative representation will make use of the same data and methods used in the production of the written thesis and therefore should not pose any additional ethical concerns.

2.7 Participants

2.7A Target Participant Group:

Please indicate the targeted participant group by ticking all boxes that apply.

Students or staff of this University	x	Adults (over 18 years old and competent to give consent)	x
Children/legal minors (under 18 years old)		Adults (over 18 years old who may not be competent to give consent)	
Young people aged 16 – 17 years			

2.7B Will the research specifically target participants with mental health difficulties or a disability?:

YES		NO	x

If YES, please explain the necessity of involving these individuals as research participants (no more than 50 words:

N/A

2.7C Number of Participants:

if relevant give details of different age groups/activities involved

One participant: age 29, PhD Student and sole researcher of this work. Also, please see appendix A.

2.7D Please explain in detail how you intend to recruit participants:

If payment or any other incentive (such as a gift or free services) will be made to any research participant please specify and state the level of payment to be made and/or the source of funds/gift/free service to be used. Please explain the justification for offering payment or other incentive.

N/A

2.7E Dependent Relationship:

Are any of the participants in a dependent relationship with any of the investigators, particularly those involved in recruiting for or conducting the project? For example, a school pupil is in a dependent relationship with their teacher. Other examples of a dependent relationship include student/lecturer; patient/doctor; employee/ employer.

YES		NO	x However, please see appendix A

If YES, please explain the relationship and the steps to be taken by the investigators to ensure that the participant's participation is purely voluntary and not influenced by the relationship in any way.

Please see appendix A

2.7F Location of Research:

University of Glasgow	x
Outside Location	x

Please provide details of outside locations, including as much information where possible.

The rhizomatic textual analysis and spatio/temporal comparative case study elements of this research will be desk based and will be conducted from two main locations: on campus in my office and from my home. The autoethnographic elements cannot be linked to a finite series of locations. The nature of this method means that all locations I inhabit during the research of the PhD are also active sites of research. This extends to non-material spaces, such as the internet, fictional and non-fictional spaces portrayed in books, television and film; and those I enter during dreams. In order to suitably consider the potential ethical concerns that may arise in non-familiar material sites, an evolving location map will be kept that will anticipate the likely new locations. This will be discussed at regular intervals during monthly supervision meetings and more frequently as and when the need arises. Please see appendix B for an example of this.

2.8 Permission to Access Participants

2.8A Will participants be identified from information held by another party?:

(eg. a Local Authority, or a Head Teacher, or a doctor or hospital, or Glasgow University class lists)

YES		NO	x

If YES please describe the arrangements you intend to make to gain access to this information including, where appropriate, any other ethics committee that will be applied to. (No more than 150 words)

N/A

2.8B Written Permission:

Please note that written permission is usually required to gain access to research participants within an organisation (e.g. school, Local Authority, University of Glasgow class).

Are copies provided with this application?

YES		NO	x

OR are they to follow?

YES		NO	x

OR if not required, give details explaining why.

N/A

2.8C Is this application being submitted to another Ethics Committee, or has it been previously submitted to another Ethics Committee?:

YES		NO	x

If YES, please provide name and location of the ethics committee and the result of the application.

N/A

2.9 Informed Consent

If you require information on the age of legal capacity please refer to the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/50/contents

2.9A Have you attached your Plain Language Statement(s) (PLS) for participants?:

A Plain Language Statement is written information in plain language that you will provide to participants to explain the project and invite their participation. Contact details for Supervisor and College Ethics Officer MUST be included. Please note that a copy of this information must be given to the participant to keep.

YES		NO	x

(If NO, please explain.)

N/A

2.9B How will informed consent be recorded by individual participants or representatives?:

6

Signed consent form (A copy of the proposed consent form, written in simple non-technical language, MUST ACCOMPANY THIS APPLICATION. The final consent form MUST contain the University of Glasgow logo.)	
Implied by return of survey	
Recorded verbal consent	
Other (Please specify): N/A, but please see appendix A	x

3 Monitoring

Please describe how the project will be monitored to ensure that the research is being carried out as approved (e.g. give details of regular meetings/email contact) (Maximum 50 words).

The project will be monitored as part of monthly supervision meetings. These meetings are integral events for ensuring that the 'staged' approach outlined for dealing with the locational concerns (see 2.7F) and the ethical treatment of non-participating Others (see appendix A) proceeds in the manner detailed herein this application.

4 Health and Safety

Does the project have any health & safety implications?

YES	x	NO	

If YES, please outline the arrangements which are in place to minimise these risks. Please give details

I believe that this research poses an extremely low risk to my health and safety but it would be remiss not to highlight the extent to which the theoretical nature of this work may impact upon my mental faculties. By exposing myself to a different way of seeing and understanding time it is likely that cognitive, and therefore manifest, change will occur on some level. This of course does not entail a negative impact upon my mental or physical health, however, the position of this work in relation to a number of existential orthodoxies make it sensible to maintain awareness of such activities throughout. This will be monitored during monthly supervision meetings or more frequently as and when required.

5 UK and Scottish Government Legislation

Have you made yourself familiar with the requirements of the Data Protection Act (1998) and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002? (See Application Guidance Notes for further information. In addition visit http://www.gla.ac.uk/services/dpfoioffice/ for guidance and advice on the Act). Please ensure you have read the eight basic Principles underlying the Data Protection Act 1998 ["DPA"] that protect the rights and freedoms of individuals with respect to the processing of their personal data. The Freedom of Information Act 2002 ["FOI"] provides a general right of access to most of the recorded information that is held by the University. The Act sets out a number of exemptions/exceptions to this right of access.

YES	x	NO	

If NO, please explain

N/A

6 Declarations by Researcher(s) and Supervisor(s)

- The information contained herein is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, accurate.
- I have read the University's current human ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures set out in the attached application in accordance with the guidelines, the University's Code of Conduct for Research and any other condition laid down by the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee and the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Full details of the University's ethics guidelines are available at: http://www.gla.ac.uk/research/aimsassessmentandpolicies/ourpolicies/ethicshomepage/
- I and my co-researcher(s) or supporting staff have the appropriate qualifications, experience and facilities to conduct the research set out in the attached application and to deal effectively with any emergencies and contingencies related to the research that may arise.
- I understand that no research work involving human participants or data collection can commence until full ethical approval has been given by the either the School Ethics Forum (UG & PGT students only) or the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (for PGR students and Staff).

In the case of student applications, the Ethics Committee will give no final decision UNLESS the electronic submission has been authorised by the supervisor. If there is no digital signature then please type the names in to the boxes below.

	Signature	Date
Researcher	Lisa Bradley	20 December 2011
Principal Supervisor	Libby Porter	20 December 2011

For student applications, there are two options for submitting Supervisor approval:

(a) The student e-mails the application to their supervisor, who checks it and submits it to their local SEF contact (UG and PGT only) or to the College Research Ethics Secretary, Terri Hume (for PGR only).

(b) The student e-mails the application to the SEF contact (UG and PGT only) or the College Research Ethics Secretary (PGR only) and the supervisor sends a separate e-mail to the appropriate UG/PGT/PGR admin point of contact giving the details of the application and confirming approval for the submission.

Where to send your application

Applications should be submitted electronically as follows:

- Undergraduate and Postgraduate Taught Student applications should be sent to their School Ethics Forum. Please see contact details on the respective School's website.
- Postgraduate Research (PGR) and Staff applications should be submitted to: Terri Hume in the College Office Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk, Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow, G12 8QF

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Appendix A: Additional ethical concerns

Autoethnography is a method aimed at opening up and exploring the peculiarity of one's own culture, meaning that I am the primary human subject and sole "participant" of this research. However, recognising that I and my culture are constituted through other people with whom I come into contact (both regularly and uniquely), non-participating individuals are also necessarily implicated in my work. For example, while I write about my perception of time, my perception is not mine alone but is constituted intersubjectively; when I write about my day, the activity of those around me not only shapes my reflections, but these individuals are key characters in my experience of culture and are recorded as such. This dictates that ethical considerations should extend to these other, non-participating individuals. As I am unable to address such concerns within this pro-forma this appendix serves to outline the range of ethical considerations relevant to this research, and to detail my intended approach to mitigate issues that may arise. The inclusion of this addendum was suggested and discussed via email with the College Ethics Officer, Dr Valentina Bold.

In many ways the autoethnographic narrative that will emerge from this research presents as a low ethical concern to both me and Others; for example, the topic does not address an area that is socially sensitive, such as the lived experience of eating disorders, homelessness, incestuous relations. However, even the most benign of topics can still pose difficulties. Specific to this research, my attempt to reveal the constructed nature of something so everyday, so taken-for-granted as time, has the potential to be unsettling not only to me, but to Others also. There is also a danger I present Others in a negative manner, perhaps by detailing their temporal logics in a way that would be considered a 'bad' use of time, or by documenting their unsettled responses to my work. There is an ethical imperative to engage with these concerns and to minimise the negative impact this research has on Others. However, it would not suffice to simply render them unrecognisable in this work. On the contrary, I believe it would be ethically unjust to position myself centrally in this research without explicitly acknowledging the extent to which my position is constituted by Others. While the autoethnographic data that will emerge during this research will not be written in collaboration with these Others, their rights in relation to the narrative must be given adequate consideration.

The headings below relate to the sections of this form that I feel should be extended beyond participants to non-participating Others that may be implicated in the research process.

2.3A: Method of Data Collection:

Autoethnography employs similar data collection techniques as ethnography, and this study will include: Audio recording; Video recording; Journaling; Blogging; Note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; mobile phone applications; post-it notes); Morning pages (stream-of-consciousness writing upon waking); Photographs; Voice memos; Personal communications (such as emails and text messages); Drawing/sketching. The range of Others which may appear in this data cannot be finitely stated, however, their position will be neither that of subject nor object. Rather, where and when they appear, they will stand as markers to give meaning to the manner in which time functions in the context from which I study and the manner in which I experience and perceive time. For this stage of data collection I don't believe it necessary, possible or even ethical to obtain written consent from every individual. However, to ensure that research is not misconstrued as covert, those individuals who appear in the data will be verbally informed of the ongoing autoethnographic process (see 2.9 below) and updated where ethically appropriate.

2.4B: Data Handling:

Autoethnography is a very immediate method with data potentially being recorded and gathered at any time and any where. To maintain adequate privacy of this data, all sources will be collated weekly intervals using the techniques previously indicated on this pro forma. However, as the data I gather will not simply allude to my behaviour, but also Others around, when making notes about others who are known to me I will use only their initials and those who are unknown will be described in a manner that is meaningful to the context from which the data being collected rather than a general identifier.

2.4A: Confidentiality:

I will be named as author and participant of this work. To ensure a wider degree of confidentiality to the Others that are implicated, if they consent they will be referred to only by their initials. Should they wish to retain a higher degree of privacy they will have the option to be known by assumed initials. No steps will be taken to de-identify Others who can be identified by their relation to me, as it is these relations which I hold and am held in which are essential categories for the analysis in this work that must be maintained in order that it remains meaningful. Should individual Others find this level of anonymity unsatisfactory their wishes will be respected. If the pertinent section is crucial to the thesis it will be reworked into a fictional vignette, if not, it will be discarded from the final documents.

2.6A: Dissemination of Results:

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While the Others implicated in this work are not the topic of this PhD, fragments of them nonetheless help constitute the culture that is. As such, this work may be of interest to them and they will be given access to the written thesis and the alternative output.

2.7C: Number of Participants:

Similar to my response at question 2.7F “Location of Research”, this research cannot be linked to a finite and known group of Others. It is impossible to know with certainty those who may be implicated, directly and indirectly, until the autoethnography is in process. A mapping technique will again be used to maintain appropriate ethical consideration of Others in this research. This map of non-participating Others will be reviewed and updated on a monthly basis, and will be amended in respect of data already gathered or in anticipation of Others who may feature more prominently due to my expected increase in proximity to them (see appendix C for an example of this).

2.7E: Dependent Relationship:

The topic of this research and my desire to explore the way in which time is intersubjectively constructed means that the prominent Others in this work are likely to be those whom I am in an intimate or dependent relationship with. The fact that this is not intended as a therapeutic process or a narrative that I feel compelled to write reduces the likelihood of emotional coercion. However, while my emotional investment is relatively uncomplex, I do have a professional investment in the project which these others will be aware of. The manner in which these individuals will be informed is crucial to ensure that their potential inclusion is voluntary and with their informed consent (see 2.9 below).

2.9: Informed Consent:

Taking these considerations outlined above into account, the process of gaining informed consent from Others will be a staged process.

STAGE ONE: With reference to the map of non-participating Others, individuals whom I reference in my autoethnographic data by name or by relational identifier will be verbally informed of the topic of my PhD and the manner in which I am researching it. These individuals will be updated where appropriate throughout the data-gathering stage.

STAGE TWO: On completion of data gathering, individuals who were verbally informed in stage 1 will be recontacted and asked whether they would anticipate an objection to the inclusion of their words or a written observation of their behaviour, for example, being used in the thesis documents.

STAGE THREE: On completion of the written thesis draft, appropriate Others will be given a document comprised of copies of the sections in which they are present (contributions that are not mine or theirs will be redacted from these documents). They will be asked to review and to indicate whether they consent to being identified by the applicable option (as set out at 2.4A). Their consent will be implied and recorded by the signed return of the document.

Gaining consent using a staged approach will ensure a greater level of informedness; I am currently blind to the eventual trajectory this research and it would be unethical to suggest to non-participating Others that I am conscious of the extent to which their presence will in fact constitute my object of study. It will also minimise the provocation posed by intimate and dependant relationships that would be undoubtably heightened if consent was sought retrospectively accompanied with the material realisation of three years work.

Appendix B: Location Map



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Appendix C: Non-participating Others Map



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COMMITTEE'S RESPONSE TO INITIAL APPLICATION

CSS20110105

University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects

NOTIFICATION OF ETHICS APPLICATION OUTCOME PGR Applications

Application Type:
(select as appropriate)

Application Number: CSS/2011/0105

Applicant's Name: Lisa Bradley

Project Title: The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban malaise in the contemporary city.

Date Application Reviewed: 25/01/12

APPLICATION OUTCOME: *(see sections A, B, C below as applicable)*

(A)

(select from drop down as appropriate)

Start Date of Approval: *End Date of Approval:*

If the applicant has been given approval subject to amendments this means they can proceed with their data collection with effect from the date of approval, however they should note the following applies to their application:

Approved Subject to Amendments without the need to submit amendments to the Supervisor

Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the applicant's Supervisor

Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the College Ethics & Research Committee (CREC)

See APPLICATION COMMENTS on page 2

The College Research Ethics Committee expects the applicant to act responsibly in addressing the recommended amendments.

A covering note (letter or email) must be provided highlighting how the major and minor recommendations have been addressed. Some amendments only need to be submitted to an applicant's supervisor. This will apply to essential items that an applicant must address prior to ethical approval being granted, however as the associated research ethics risks are considered to be low, consequently the applicant's response need only be reviewed and cleared by the applicant's supervisor before the research can properly begin. **If any application is processed under this outcome the Supervisor will need to inform the College Ethics Secretary that the application has been re-submitted (and include the final outcome).**

(B) Application is Not Approved at this Time

See Application Comments and provide further information where requested.

If you have been asked to resubmit your application then please send this to the College Ethics Secretary. You should include a covering letter to explain the changes you have made to the application.

This section only applies to applicants whose original application was approved but required amendments.

(C)

(select from drop down as appropriate)

University of Glasgow
College of Social Sciences

Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street. Glasgow G12 8QF
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401

Tel: 0141-330-3007
E-mail: Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk

CSS20110105

APPLICATION COMMENTS

Major Recommendations:

This has been a very difficult application to respond to. The concept and methodology outlined by the applicant are new to the reviewers and raise, in our minds, significant issues to be resolved before research can begin. We believe that, with further information, we may have a clearer idea of what the researcher hopes to achieve.

Although the applicant indicates that she is the only participant, she describes the research as involving non-participating "Others" as is described in Appendix A and B. The committee is not persuaded that the boundaries for the involvement of Others is clearly enough described and would like further detail of what behaviours might be part of the research - for example, are there areas which will be excluded such as bereavement or intimate relations with a partner or others. Are there any limits to the research where Others are involved?
The very act (as described at 2.9) of informing Others of the work could be said to make them participants, particularly with a partner or another with whom a significant amount of time was spent. To understand this better, the committee would like to see examples of the verbal explanation which the applicant will provide to those notified at Stage One. And will the content and emphasis of the verbal explanation vary from one person to another depending upon their knowledge of research or their age or ability to understand? Given the complexity of the research idea, the words used to describe what is involved will be crucial to informed consent and must be in plain language.

The opportunity to opt out of the research is described in the Appendix but is unclear to the committee. At Stage One, there does not appear to be the opportunity to opt out. Could family members or work colleagues feel obliged to be involved in order to support a relative undertaking research important to her career? How long is data collection likely to last and could a lengthy period of research place a strain on those with whom the applicant interacts? And at Stage 3, when non-participating Others sign their section of the thesis to confirm consent to use their words or described behaviours, what will be the outcome if they decline? Will the data, even if crucial to the thesis, be withdrawn?

Among methods of data collection described are video recording and photographs. Will the act of using photographic equipment create discomfort among the non-participating Others described in Appendix B and how can this be addressed? Will they have the option to to view film containing their images and request that they not be used?

The urban malaise referenced in the title is not mentioned again in the application. Can the applicant clarify how this will form part of the research?

The applicant notes that the work will be presented in another form which will emerge during the research process. It will be necessary to update the committee when that form is defined in order to ensure that no further ethical issues arise.

Minor Recommendations:

There are no recommendations in this section.

If amendments have been recommended, please ensure that copies of amended documents are provided to the College Office for completion of your ethics file.

Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact Terri Hume, Ethics Secretary, in Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow G12 8QF.

End of notification.

University of Glasgow
College of Social
Sciences

Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street. Glasgow G12 8QF
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401

Tel: 0141-330-3007
E-mail: Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk

AMENDED APPLICATION TO ETHICS COMMITTEE

Tuesday 14 February 2012

Dear Ethics Committee,

Re: Application number CSS/2011/0105

Thank you for your response. I have considered your recommendations and discussed them in depth with my supervisors. Your view that ***"The very act (as described at 2.9) of informing Others of the work could be said to make them participants, particularly with a partner or another with whom a significant amount of time was spent"*** is a concern I share. The definition of research participation and how it relates to the Others who populate and who are implicated in my PhD research has long been a preoccupation of my ethical deliberations. I find that a dilemma lies in managing to find a way to recognise the central presence of Others in this work without requiring them to be subject to the guidance offered under procedural notions of research participation. My decision to describe these Others as 'non-participating Others' (where 'Others' is the dominant adjective) was an attempt to account for their role without elevating their presence to such a point where their participation, and the ethical response dictated by standard procedures to ensure their ethical treatment, becomes far more intrusive than the research process itself and misinforms these Others as to the nature of their involvement.

Following your response, I now consider that while the term 'non-participating Others' captures these Others as distinct from standard research participants, it doesn't fully acknowledge their participative presence within the work. Still, the problem remains that the characterisation of these Others as participants doesn't leave space for participation beyond the types discussed and made available through the standard ethics proforma. I have continued to seek a better description and have found guidance published by the University of Sheffield to be particularly helpful. Their Research Ethics Policy conceives of participation in a manner that moves beyond ESRC guidelines, outlining a broad spectrum of participation ranging from "actual research subjects", to Others who facilitate and/or are proximate to research activities. They characterise this latter group as indirect participants, of whom they note to be "particularly an issue in auto-ethnographic research, in which the researcher uses her/his own life experience as a primary source of data" (available: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ris/other/gov-ethics/ethicspolicy/policy-notes/participants-data-tissue). Sheffield's policy contends that in any research the safety and well-being of participants in this broadest sense should be taken into account. And while they identify that research which involves only indirect participants is exempt from formal ethics review, they nonetheless stipulate that "informed consent should always be sought from anyone who may be recognisable in an auto-ethnographic account" (available: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ris/other/gov-ethics/ethicspolicy/policy-notes/consent/autoethnographic-research).

There seems, then, some precedence to characterise the Others in my research as 'indirect participants', however, I don't suggest that this suffices to render my work exempt from the University of Glasgow's ethics review process. Indeed, my own difficulties precipitated by the lack of formal guidance, and the fact that the concept and methodology appear new to the reviewers, suggest that it is important to engage with these issues and their ethical implications within the broader research community at Glasgow. As such, I herein provide a full response to this committee for consideration.

Under the advisement of your recommendations I have made the following changes to my application:

- *The term 'non-participating Others' has been replaced with 'indirect participants' in the main form and the accompanying appendices.*
- *A further appendix has been added (Appendix D). This takes as its headings the main issues raised as the Major Recommendations of the committee and seeks to clarify: the aims of this research project; the role of indirect participants within it; and the method by which full and informed consent will be gained should any indirect participant be rendered recognisable in the resulting autoethnography.*

A copy of Appendix D is also attached to this letter.

Yours sincerely,

Lisa Bradley

Appendix D: Further clarification on the role and ethical treatment of Others

1. The committee is not persuaded that the boundaries for the involvement of Others is clearly enough described and would like further detail of what behaviours might be part of the research - for example, are there areas which will be excluded such as bereavement or intimate relations with a partner or others. Are there any limits to the research where Others are involved?

The nature of participation in this research means that indirect participants are not *mined* for data or placed in deliberate research conditions; rather, the indirect participants in this work are regarded in their own conditions with reference only to the manner in which their everyday lives reveal something about the meaning of time and temporality in the contemporary urban context. Furthermore, it is not the words or behaviours of indirect participants that will be captured directly, but rather, it is the manner in which their various activities make me consider myself and the research topic, time and temporality. As such, there is a level of analysis that happens *before* the autoethnographic reflection is even captured meaning that the data will not explicitly pertain to the indirect participant directly.

There will be no areas which will be limited or excluded in this research. To comment on the committee's example of bereavement: I see no ethical issues that arise from my reflecting on such events and features of everyday life in and of themselves. On the contrary, I think it would be unethical to exclude such areas from this research and to limit its scope to the seemingly benign facets of our lived experiences. My very engagement with the topic emerges from what I consider to be an ethical need to better understand how it is that urban scholars theorise and subsequently shape our cities. Imposing limitations or exclusions would lead only to a partial engagement with the research topic, potentially resulting in an incomplete analysis which may in turn further silence the different temporal realities which exist in the city. The ethical response to circumstances of heightened sensitivity should not be one that limits or excludes certain autoethnographic reflections, but rather, it should ensure that the process of capturing these reflections is done so in an ethically sensitive manner. For example, if I was attending a funeral and a pertinent thought occurred during the service, I would consider it unacceptable to capture this reflection at that point. However, that is not to say that I may recall and note this reflection at a less sensitive and a less public future point, or that I might later return to reflect on the manner in which time and temporality functioned in this environment.

2. The opportunity to opt out of the research is described in the Appendix but is unclear to the committee. At Stage One, there does not appear to be the opportunity to opt out.

I am not asking for consent to reflect on the social meaning of time in the presence of the indirect participants, I am asking their permission to add their presence to the thesis in a way that may render them recognisable. This is to what the 'consent' is in relation to. As such, there is no opportunity for indirect participants to opt-out prior to stage three as there is nothing for them to opt-in or out of. To be clear, the rationale for employing a staged approach for gaining the informed consent of indirect participants is not to obtain consent from each individual at each stage, but it is to ensure that when an indirect participant is approached to give their consent, they have been informed as fully as possible in order that they can make their decision with sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to be recognisable in this work, and to minimise the possibility of coercion or undue influence that may be introduced should permissions be sought retrospectively.

3. [T]he committee would like to see examples of the verbal explanation which the applicant will provide to those notified at Stage One. And will the content and emphasis of the verbal explanation vary from one person to another depending upon their knowledge of research or their age or ability to understand? Given the complexity of the research idea, the words used to describe what is involved will be crucial to informed consent and must be in plain language.

This research will involve no procedures for which written consent is normally required out with a research context and the intended methods do not unnecessarily expose the indirect participants to risk. I do not foresee the potential for it to adversely affect the rights and welfare of the indirect participants in any way. As outlined in the point above, the staged approach is to ensure that if an indirect participant is approached at Stage Three to give their consent for their recognisable inclusion in this work, that have

been informed as fully as possible in order that they can make their decision with sufficient opportunity to consider the implications of the request, free from undue influence or coercion.

The explanation of this research will not occur as a verbal statement but will be established through a conversational exchange between myself and each indirect participant. The nature of the research means that the Others who may feature in this work are likely to be individuals with whom rapport has already been established, making such an approach possible. I also consider this to be a more ethical approach to 'informing' the indirect participants who populate and are implicated in this research. While I fully accept the need to minimise a technical or academic vernacular, I do not necessarily agree that the simplification of complex ideas into plain language leads to better informed participants. Indeed, I think that such a practice runs the risk of being reductive to the point that it misinforms the indirect participants as to the framing and positioning of this work. This research idea *is* complex and ensuring that the participants are informed as to their presence in this research and their rights in relation to their indirect participation requires a more nuanced approach and a space for dialogue to emerge. As such, each exchange will begin with an introduction of the fundamental aspects of this work in as straightforward a way as possible in order that the more esoteric ideas are received with some foundational understanding of their contextual significance to this research.

The conversational style of this approach does of course entail that the process and therefore the emphasis may vary from one person to another, however, in order to maintain clarity in the necessary content, certain key elements will be included in each discussion in order to ensure that the indirect participants will have sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to consent to their recognisable inclusion if and when requested.

The key elements that will be covered in each conversation are:

- *An outline of the research topic covering the following key points:*
    - *Urban policy is not confined to a piece of paper but it shapes the form of the city and its citizens, impacting on everyday life as it is experienced in the urban environment. While the ideas that shape urban policy may be borne from political ideology, election pledges, manifestos, public pressure, perceived necessity etc; theory is also significant.*
    - *A great deal of 'urban' theory is the product of empirical and theoretical research activities that occur within universities. In writing urban policy, policy makers draw upon understandings of how cities work; how they can be improved; and how their problems can be minimised. As such, the way in which the city is causally understood shapes the policy which comes to fruition.*
    - *Therefore, academics and university researchers don't just describe what they see, but, acknowledging that policy is based to some extent on the evidence produced through various research activities, the manner in which they understand the city also has a direct consequence on the form of the city and its citizens, and everyday life as it is experienced in the urban environment.*
    - *The complexity of the city necessitates that the theories which describe it are necessarily incomplete, however, it is my view that there is an entire category of city life that has notably fallen off the urban studies agenda: the socially constructed nature of time and temporality.*
    - *Evidence of the socially constructed nature of time is all around, in the watches, clocks and calendars we use to make sense of our daily routines. At the same time, these objects help serve to naturalise our experience of time and can be linked to ideas which attest to the proper and normal use of time such as the impoliteness of 'being late' or the respect afforded to those who manage to get tasks completed quickly.*
    - *The city is a diverse place and individuals who come from different social, economic and cultural backgrounds may perceive and experience time differently. Nonetheless, urban policy seems largely constructed on the basis that we all share a similar understanding of time.*
    - *The university also has a role to play in this. Time and temporality are not considered as key categories within contemporary urban theory and a great deal of urban problems are considered from a spatial perspective. As such, policy that draws on dominant urban theory will be insufficient to address the temporal lived realities of individuals in the city and may require individuals to conform to a proper use of time in order to make the best use of available public*

services. Moreover, those who don't conform, either through choice are circumstance, may be stigmatised within society. This suggests that urban theory also has some bearing on the way of life that is considered normal and proper in the city.

- *My engagement with this topic sits at the university level. I'm interested in examining how, where, and when has time been naturalised within urban theory and to consider how this links to the naturalisation of time in everyday life. One of the ways that I aim to consider the naturalisation of time is by reflecting upon my own experience and perception of time in order to examine how time means and functions within the city. I also aim to consider how to reorientate the field of urban studies in order capture a more holistic understanding of the city and its problems, in turn facilitating the production of a temporally aware and more complete urban policy.*

- *A full overview of the autoethnographic data collection techniques used in this work that indirect participants' presence my be recorded within, including: audio recording; video recording; journaling; blogging; note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; mobile phone applications; post-it notes); morning pages (stream-of-consciousness writing upon waking); photographs; voice memos; personal communications (such as emails and text messages); drawing/sketching.*
- *Assurance that if I do record indirect participants within my autoethnographic reflections, to minimise the risk of them being recognised from the raw data I will refer to them only by their initials and/or their relation to me.*
- *A clarification of what it is that I may seek consent for from indirect participants at a future point: their recognisable inclusion in the thesis. It will also be made clear to indirect participants that their consent will be entirely voluntary and that they will have full access to view the pertinent sections prior to giving their consent.*
- *Assurance that my autoethnographic reflections will be viewed only by me and my supervisors up until the point that the thesis is completed and they sign-off their section if relevant.*
- *I will also provide each indirect participant with a card containing my contact details, and the names and email addresses of my supervisors and the ethics committee, and make it clear that should they have any further questions about the research and/or problems relating to it they are free to get in touch.*

4. And at Stage 3, when [indirect participants] sign their section of the thesis to confirm consent to use their words or described behaviours, what will be the outcome if they decline? Will the data, even if crucial to the thesis, be withdrawn?

As previously outlined in Appendix A of my application, should the indirect participants prohibit their recognisable inclusion within the thesis, their wishes will be fully respected. If the section in question is crucial to the thesis, the data will be withdrawn and the argument reworked into a fictional vignette.

5. Among methods of data collection described are video recording and photographs. Will the act of using photographic equipment create discomfort among the [indirect participants] described in Appendix B and how can this be addressed? Will they have the option to view film containing their images and request that they not be used?

Data that is produced in an audio, video or photographic medium will result either from my attempt to capture *something* that reveals *something* about time and temporality, or to document my attempt at doing so. My feeling is that I would be unlikely to find such data in a portrait of an individual, and I imagine that cityscapes, crowd scenes and non-personal spaces are more likely to comprise the foci of such material. In order that my presence impacts minimally on the existing flows of everyday life in these settings and the indirect participants who occupy them, my use of this equipment will be discrete. As such, I do not expect that it will create discomfort amongst the indirect participants. However, in order that my activities are not misconstrued as covert, indirect participants will be altered to the full range of autoethnographic data collection techniques that my research may employ during the verbal conversation outlined above at point 3 above. If I do happen to record data that I later wish to use in a way that could

render an indirect participant recognisable in the thesis, that individual will be asked to give their permission for the inclusion of the item. If they decline, the data will be withdrawn from the thesis.

6. Could family members or work colleagues feel obliged to be involved in order to support a relative undertaking research important to her career?

Yes, however, I think that this 'obligation' is akin to that which is already imposed upon Others by any lengthy period of research and is not unique to, or heightened by, my chosen methodology. The decision to undertake a period of research such as a PhD has the potential to be all-consuming and requires if not support, at least an understanding on the part of those who surround the researcher. Looking at the acknowledgements which preface many academic dissertations and monographs, it is clear that the experience does not occur for the researcher in isolation but that it has had some bearing on those Others who are proximate to the process. 'Obligated' could be one way to characterise the behaviour of those Others who endure the difficulties of this process not through any direct reward for their own selves, but for those with whom they are intimately related. Viewed through the methodology of this research, this intimate relation undergoes no additional measures of obligation, the difference is that this autoethnography recognises these voices as central to the research and as such it ethically and explicitly names them as indirect participants.

7. How long is data collection likely to last and could a lengthy period of research place a strain on those with whom the applicant interacts?

The autoethnographic method does not conceive of data-collection as a discrete act within the research process but recognises that data-collection and data-analysis have the potential to be constant throughout the research. There is the chance that these activities place a strain on those Others who live and work in close proximity to me, but again, this is not heightened by the specific manner in which autoethnographic research functions but is a feature of academic inquiry in general. I think, therefore, that the ethical question of this strain is not of consequence for the matters dealt with in this application but relates to the decision to undertake a period of intensive research in the first instance. My decision to commence the PhD was made with the support and awareness of those closest to me, and as the reality of that decision continues to reveal itself, its impact for me and for my significant Others is negotiated within the confines of those existing relationships.

8. The urban malaise referenced in the title is not mentioned again in the application. Can the applicant clarify how this will form part of the research?

This phrase relates to the theoretical orientation of this work only and has no direct influence on the collection or analysis of data. To clarify, I am not looking for 'urban malaise' in the data but seeking to comment on the extent to which dominant urban theories have the capacity to recognise time and temporality in the contemporary urban problems (considered collectively as the 'urban malaise') which occupy academic inquiry in this field, and to consider the extent to which the production and dissemination these dominant theories can be linked to the marginalisation of time and temporality as analytical categories within the academy, and the silencing of their contingency in everyday life.

9. The applicant notes that the work will be presented in another form which will emerge during the research process. It will be necessary to update the committee when that form is defined in order to ensure that no further ethical issues arise.

Yes, I will ensure to update the committee as and when this is defined in order to engage with their considerations and requirements.

FINAL DECISION OF ETHICS COMMITTEE

CSS/20110105-2

University of Glasgow | College of Social Sciences

Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects

NOTIFICATION OF ETHICS APPLICATION OUTCOME PGR Applications

Application Type:
(select as appropriate)

Application Number: CSS/2011 0105-2

Applicant's Name: Lisa Bradley

Project Title: The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban malaise in the contemporary city.

Date Application Reviewed: 8/3/12

APPLICATION OUTCOME: *(see sections A, B, C below as applicable)*

(A)

(select from drop down as appropriate)

Start Date of Approval: 19 March 2012 ***End Date of Approval: 30 June 2014***

If the applicant has been given approval subject to amendments this means they can proceed with their data collection with effect from the date of approval, however they should note the following applies to their application:

Approved Subject to Amendments without the need to submit amendments to the Supervisor

Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the applicant's Supervisor

Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the College Ethics & Research Committee (CREC)

See APPLICATION COMMENTS on page 2

The College Research Ethics Committee expects the applicant to act responsibly in addressing the recommended amendments.

A covering note (letter or email) must be provided highlighting how the major and minor recommendations have been addressed. Some amendments only need to be submitted to an applicant's supervisor. This will apply to essential items that an applicant must address prior to ethical approval being granted, however as the associated research ethics risks are considered to be low, consequently the applicant's response need only be reviewed and cleared by the applicant's supervisor before the research can properly begin. **If any application is processed under this outcome the Supervisor will need to inform the College Ethics Secretary that the application has been re-submitted (and include the final outcome).**

(B) Application is Not Approved at this Time

See Application Comments and provide further information where requested.

If you have been asked to resubmit your application then please send this to the College Ethics Secretary. You should include a covering letter to explain the changes you have made to the application.

This section only applies to applicants whose original application was approved but required amendments.

(C)

(select from drop down as appropriate)

University of Glasgow
College of Social Sciences

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The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401

Tel: 0141-330-3007
E-mail: Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk

CSS/20110105-2

APPLICATION COMMENTS

Major Recommendations:

Thank you for the care taken in setting out responses to issues previously raised. However we still have difficulties with the proposal / application and require amendments to enable the research to begin. We have carefully reviewed your arguments in favour of no PLS or consent form but cannot agree that these are not required.

The application is approved but the committee requests that you respond to their concerns as noted below before commencing your research.

We recommend that you recognise that the other people involved/implicated in this research will be participants and that they should not be made participants without their prior adequately informed consent. Normally such consent should be evidenced in writing and supported by a full plain language statement, and it is not clear that there is good reason to make an exception in this case. We recommend that such consent and plain language statement procedures be planned for. You might like to consider whether there is a two-part process to informed consent, given the stages in your design.

We note that at Appendix D point 1, it is confirmed that "there will be no areas which will be limited or excluded in this research". Even with informed consent, such wide ranging freedom to make the lives and activities of others an object of research seems potentially intrusive in ways that participants might not fully foresee at the time when an initial consent was given. Careful consideration needs to be given to the question of consent, and the particular difficulties associated with such open consent as is proposed.

The recommendations above are predicated on our view that the others involved are participants: On the basis of the information given we do not see good reason for thinking otherwise. You may have other explanations to give on this point. If so please note that in our view the fact that the others involved in the research really are participants seems to be clearly indicated by the explanations already supplied. For example, the claim at Appendix D point 1, that "the indirect participants in this work are regarded in their own conditions with reference only to the manner in which their everyday lives reveal something about the meaning of time and temporality in the contemporary urban context", seems to indicate that the lives of the others involved will be subject of research.

The argument that the others involved are not participants, because their participation is mediated through your reflection on how "their various activities" (Appendix D point 1) make you think about yourself, is not convincing. The fact that you will use the activities of other people as material for your reflection seems quite clearly to make them subjects of / participants in the proposed research. We therefore reject the claim, at Appendix D point 2, that the consent to participation is not required from other people implicated in the research because "there is nothing for them to opt-in or out of" .

Minor Recommendations:

There are no recommendations in this section.

If amendments have been recommended, **please ensure that copies of amended documents are provided to the College Office** for completion of your ethics file.

Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact Terri Hume, Ethics Secretary, in Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow G12 8QF.

End of notification.

University of Glasgow
College of Social
Sciences

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Appendix Five

QUILT













Appendix Six

TIMELINE OF RESEARCH EVENTS



- General Autoethnography (A/E) — October, 2010 – Present
- Engaging with various literatures — October, 2010 – Present
- A/E Fortnightly Journal — December 2010 – October, 2013
- A/E Experiment One (clocks) — February, 2011
- A/E Experiment Two (space/time) — August – September, 2011
- A/E Stream of Consciousness Journal — September, 2011 – May, 2012
- A/E Experiment Three (Holiday) — October, 2011
- Engaging Ethics with "Ethics" — October, 2011 – present
- Entering the Canon (EC): Reading lists — December, 2011 – April, 2012
- EC: Edited collections — December, 2011 – March, 2012
- EC: Citations — December, 2011 – March, 2012
- Reading the Canon (RC): Harvey — May, 2012
- Reporting the Canon — May, 2012 – February, 2013
- Capturing the Canon (CC): Harvey — June, 2012
- RC: Jacobs — June, 2012
- Quilting Knowledge — June, 2012 – Present
- CC: Jacobs — July, 2012
- RC: Castells — August, 2012
- CC: Castells — August, 2012
- RC: Sassen — September, 2012
- CC: Sassen — October, 2012

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